Iran understands ‘brute force,' says US treasury secretary

The United States and Iran appear willing to compromise to reach a nuclear deal, the Turkish foreign minister told the Financial Times and warned that expanding the talks to include Tehran’s ballistic missile program would risk “nothing but another war.”

“It is positive that the Americans appear willing to tolerate Iranian enrichment within clearly set boundaries,” Hakan Fidan said, adding that Tehran now recognizes it needs an agreement and Washington understands Iran has “certain limits.”

“It’s pointless to try to force them,” he added.

Fidan also dismissed the prospect of regime change in Iran even in a conflict, saying government institutions and other targets could be badly damaged, but “the regime as a political entity would be a functioning entity.”

High-resolution satellite imagery shows Iran is reinforcing tunnel entrances at a major underground facility at Kolang-Gaz La Mountain, also known as “Pickaxe Mountain,” the Institute for Science and International Security reported.

The imagery, dated February 10, indicates ongoing efforts to harden two main tunnel portals, with heavy equipment — including dump trucks, cement mixers, backhoes and cranes — operating across the site.

Concrete was seen being poured atop an extension of the western entrance, while rock and soil were pushed back and leveled above an eastern portal, the report said.

A concrete-reinforced headworks structure has also been added in recent weeks to allow additional layers of rock, soil or concrete for protection.

The group said the fortification work appears aimed at strengthening the tunnel complex against potential airstrikes.

UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told Iran International that the message, sent on Iran’s national day, followed a decades-long protocol applied uniformly to all UN member states.

According to the spokesperson’s office, each country receives an identically worded letter on its national day. The messages are prepared in advance and do not signal any shift in the United Nations’ position toward a particular government.

“The letter should not be interpreted by anyone who receives it as an endorsement of whatever policies that government may be putting in place,” Dujarric said during the UN’s daily noon briefing.

The clarification came as Iran faces renewed scrutiny over crackdowns, arrests and reports of repression.

In recent weeks, families across the country have mourned losses, while human rights groups have documented detentions and what they describe as heavy-handed security measures.

News of the letter triggered backlash from activists and members of the Iranian diaspora, who argued that even if the message followed established administrative practice, its timing appeared insensitive given the political tension and public grief inside Iran.

They said the congratulatory tone risked being seen as disconnected from the reality faced by many Iranians demanding accountability and political change.

State-affiliated media in Iran widely amplified the letter, portraying it as a sign of international legitimacy. The coverage further fueled criticism from those who say such messaging can be instrumentalized for domestic political purposes.

The United Nations has repeatedly raised concerns about Iran’s human rights record, including through reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and discussions at the Human Rights Council and General Assembly.

UN officials maintain that diplomatic protocol operates separately from the organization’s human rights monitoring mechanisms.

Still, the episode underscores the tension between institutional diplomatic practice and the sensitivities surrounding governments facing sustained domestic unrest and international criticism.

This keeps it firmly in straight news territory, sharpens the opening, clarifies the backlash, and tightens the language without shifting tone.

Iran’s foreign minister dismissed an Israel Hayom report alleging Tehran secretly executed thousands, accusing the outlet of pushing politically motivated claims.

"No executions have taken place, no court process has been concluded, and more than 2,000 prisoners have been pardoned," Abbas Araghchi said in a post on X.

On Wedesday, Israel Hayom reported that Western intelligence agencies believe Iran secretly carried out thousands of executions despite assurances to the United States, alleging detainees were killed in custody and their deaths concealed.

The report said that instead of hanging protesters detained in city squares, authorities shot or strangled them in custody and told their families they had died during the protests, despite evidence they had been arrested alive.

Earlier on Sunday Iran’s judiciary chief said detained protesters would be excluded from annual pardons issued to mark the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution, when authorities traditionally grant sentence reductions or releases to selected prisoners.

Netanyahu’s sudden trip to Washington on Tuesday is not routine diplomacy. It reflects his deep concern that renewed US–Iran talks in Oman could drift toward a narrow nuclear agreement that would stabilize Tehran rather than confront it.

Recent statements by President Trump have focused almost exclusively on the nuclear file. After the meeting on Wednesday, he said he told Netanyahu that he prefers a negotiated settlement with Iran and hopes Tehran is more reasonable than it was in 2025.

For Netanyahu, this signals a familtiar danger: pressure within the United States to settle for a deal that curbs uranium enrichment while leaving Iran’s missile arsenal, regional network of proxies, and broader strategic posture intact.

Netanyahu appears to believe this moment is unique—that Iran is weaker than it has been in years: economically strained, internally divided, and strategically exposed after recent regional confrontations. In his assessment, a limited agreement would squander a rare opportunity to alter the regime’s trajectory, particularly at a time of unprecedented US military presence in the region.

As in past confrontations with US administrations, Netanyahu is expected to arrive armed with intelligence briefings and a historical argument tailored to Trump himself. The message is likely to be direct: presidents are remembered for moments when they reshape history, not defer it. This, he will argue, is such a moment.

Netanyahu will also push for broadening negotiations to include Iran’s ballistic missile program—a threat not only to Israel but to US forces and regional allies.

Tehran is unlikely to accept such terms. Iranian officials have asserted this many times. Yet from Netanyahu’s perspective, that refusal would strengthen the case for a tougher American response. If Tehran accepts expanded terms, its capacity to project power would be significantly reduced.

There is also a domestic dimension.

Netanyahu seeks to reinforce his image as the leader most capable of confronting Iran while maintaining close ties with the US. That positioning carries particular weight after earlier claims that Israel had neutralized key Iranian threats—claims now tempered by recognition that deterrence alone may not suffice.

Underlying this approach is a broader strategic conclusion: Israel can manage Iran’s proxies, but it cannot indefinitely manage the regime itself. Only a fundamental shift in Tehran, whether through internal collapse or decisive US-led military pressure, would transform Israel’s long-term security equation.

Netanyahu’s decision to engage Trump directly also reflects skepticism toward the president’s diplomatic circle, particularly advisers who favor a pragmatic nuclear arrangement that stabilizes tensions in the short term while leaving the core challenge unresolved.

From Netanyahu’s standpoint, the risk of a narrow agreement is clear. Economic relief for Tehran could dilute international urgency and complicate future coalition-building against Iran while constraining Israel’s freedom of action.

Yet this strategy carries risks of its own.

Netanyahu may underestimate the resistance his approach could encounter within the United States, especially among segments of the MAGA movement increasingly skeptical of foreign entanglements. While Trump himself has shown openness to assertive uses of power, much of his political base is wary of being drawn into another Middle Eastern confrontation.

Historical memory also shapes the landscape. Netanyahu’s 2002 congressional testimony supporting military action in Iraq—and the subsequent costs of that war—still resonates in Washington. Advocacy framed as preventive or regime-targeting military action inevitably triggers those comparisons.

Israel could face heightened scrutiny and erosion of political goodwill should US–Iran tensions escalate in ways perceived domestically as externally driven or strategically avoidable.

In seeking to shape US policy at a pivotal moment, Netanyahu is pursuing what he sees as strategic necessity. But in doing so, he risks complicating Israel’s long-term standing within an increasingly divided American political landscape.