Institute for National Security Studies
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes only direct engagement with US President Donald Trump can prevent a limited nuclear deal with Iran—and turn this moment into a decisive blow against the Islamic Republic.
Netanyahu’s sudden trip to Washington on Tuesday is not routine diplomacy. It reflects his deep concern that renewed US–Iran talks in Oman could drift toward a narrow nuclear agreement that would stabilize Tehran rather than confront it.
Recent statements by President Trump have focused almost exclusively on the nuclear file. After the meeting on Wednesday, he said he told Netanyahu that he prefers a negotiated settlement with Iran and hopes Tehran is more reasonable than it was in 2025.
For Netanyahu, this signals a familtiar danger: pressure within the United States to settle for a deal that curbs uranium enrichment while leaving Iran’s missile arsenal, regional network of proxies, and broader strategic posture intact.
Netanyahu appears to believe this moment is unique—that Iran is weaker than it has been in years: economically strained, internally divided, and strategically exposed after recent regional confrontations. In his assessment, a limited agreement would squander a rare opportunity to alter the regime’s trajectory, particularly at a time of unprecedented US military presence in the region.
As in past confrontations with US administrations, Netanyahu is expected to arrive armed with intelligence briefings and a historical argument tailored to Trump himself. The message is likely to be direct: presidents are remembered for moments when they reshape history, not defer it. This, he will argue, is such a moment.
Netanyahu will also push for broadening negotiations to include Iran’s ballistic missile program—a threat not only to Israel but to US forces and regional allies.
Tehran is unlikely to accept such terms. Iranian officials have asserted this many times. Yet from Netanyahu’s perspective, that refusal would strengthen the case for a tougher American response. If Tehran accepts expanded terms, its capacity to project power would be significantly reduced.
There is also a domestic dimension.
Netanyahu seeks to reinforce his image as the leader most capable of confronting Iran while maintaining close ties with the US. That positioning carries particular weight after earlier claims that Israel had neutralized key Iranian threats—claims now tempered by recognition that deterrence alone may not suffice.
Underlying this approach is a broader strategic conclusion: Israel can manage Iran’s proxies, but it cannot indefinitely manage the regime itself. Only a fundamental shift in Tehran, whether through internal collapse or decisive US-led military pressure, would transform Israel’s long-term security equation.
Netanyahu’s decision to engage Trump directly also reflects skepticism toward the president’s diplomatic circle, particularly advisers who favor a pragmatic nuclear arrangement that stabilizes tensions in the short term while leaving the core challenge unresolved.
From Netanyahu’s standpoint, the risk of a narrow agreement is clear. Economic relief for Tehran could dilute international urgency and complicate future coalition-building against Iran while constraining Israel’s freedom of action.
Yet this strategy carries risks of its own.
Netanyahu may underestimate the resistance his approach could encounter within the United States, especially among segments of the MAGA movement increasingly skeptical of foreign entanglements. While Trump himself has shown openness to assertive uses of power, much of his political base is wary of being drawn into another Middle Eastern confrontation.
Historical memory also shapes the landscape. Netanyahu’s 2002 congressional testimony supporting military action in Iraq—and the subsequent costs of that war—still resonates in Washington. Advocacy framed as preventive or regime-targeting military action inevitably triggers those comparisons.
Israel could face heightened scrutiny and erosion of political goodwill should US–Iran tensions escalate in ways perceived domestically as externally driven or strategically avoidable.
In seeking to shape US policy at a pivotal moment, Netanyahu is pursuing what he sees as strategic necessity. But in doing so, he risks complicating Israel’s long-term standing within an increasingly divided American political landscape.
The annual commemoration of the 1979 Islamic Revolution has long served as a showcase of mass loyalty. This year, however, it unfolded under the shadow of what critics describe as a deepening crisis of legitimacy following the January bloodshed.
In Tehran, security forces and Basij units maintained a visible presence as supporters gathered in Azadi Square. State media broadcast images of families and children waving flags, and highlighted what it portrayed as festive participation across the country.
Among the more striking displays were symbolic coffins bearing the names and photos of senior US military officials, including US Army Chief of Staff Randy George and CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper. Cooper was part of the US delegation that recently held talks with Iranian officials in Oman.
American and Israeli flags were also burned during the rally.
The imagery of defiance came as Iranian officials engage in renewed diplomatic contacts with the United States. The juxtaposition reflected a dual message: confrontation abroad and consolidation at home.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, addressing the rally, repeated the government’s narrative about the recent unrest, accusing protesters of sabotage and violence and saying “no Iranian takes up arms to kill another Iranian.”
He acknowledged widespread dissatisfaction but said the government was prepared to “hear the voice of the people,” while emphasizing loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and adherence to his “red lines” in diplomacy, a tacit reference to Iran’s uranium enrichment, missile program and support for regional militia groups.
State television placed particular emphasis on images of children and families at the rallies, a move that analysts say may reflect efforts to soften the government’s image after weeks of reports about civilian casualties.
Rights advocates have long criticized the use of minors in political events, arguing that it instrumentalizes children for propaganda purposes.
The commemorations took place roughly a month after a violent suppression of protests that erupted in late December.
The editorial board of Iran International said earlier this month that more than 36,500 people had been killed in a targeted crackdown ordered by Khamenei.
Even as the government staged its anniversary spectacle, dissent surfaced in other forms. On the eve of 22 Bahman, residents in multiple neighborhoods of Tehran – including Narmak, Ekbatan, Majidieh and Naziabad – shouted slogans such as “Death to Khamenei” and “Death to the dictator” from rooftops and balconies. Similar chants were reported in cities including Mashhad, Arak, Qazvin, Kermanshah and Shahriar.
Videos circulating online showed nighttime fireworks lighting the sky as anti-government slogans rang out.
In one clip from Arak, residents could be heard chanting against Khamenei in response to mosque loudspeakers broadcasting the traditional “Allahu Akbar.”
In Tehran, one resident said the fireworks were so loud “we thought America had attacked.”
In isolated incidents, pro-government speakers appeared to inadvertently repeat anti-Khamenei slogans during live broadcasts, prompting abrupt cuts in coverage.
One state reporter in Sistan and Baluchestan was heard listing “Death to Khamenei” among rally chants before the feed was interrupted.
Political analyst Iman Aghayari told Iran International that the anniversary had become “an arena of confrontation between the government and the people,” adding that unlike in previous years, authorities seemed less concerned with demonstrating broad public backing and more focused on asserting control.
“This time,” he said, “the regime is not trying to prove people are with it. It is simply declaring that it rules.”
As Iran navigates renewed diplomacy abroad and mounting pressure at home, the 22 Bahman (February 11) anniversary appeared to reflect a widening gap between official displays of unity and the anger that continues to surface beyond the state’s stage-managed events.
The transfers involved at least six Iranian diplomats who carried suitcases filled with US dollars on commercial flights to Lebanon, according to the information.
The cash deliveries formed part of efforts to help Hezbollah rebuild its finances and operational capacity after sustaining significant blows to its leadership, weapons stockpiles and funding networks.
Those involved include Mohammad Ebrahim Taherianfard, a former ambassador to Turkey and senior Foreign Ministry official; Mohammad Reza Shirkhodaei, a veteran diplomat and former consul general in Pakistan; his brother Hamidreza Shirkhodaei; Reza Nedaei; Abbas Asgari; and Amir-Hamzeh Shiranirad, a former Iranian embassy employee in Canada.
Taherianfard traveled to Beirut in January alongside Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. He carried a suitcase filled with dollars, relying on diplomatic immunity to avoid airport inspection.
Similar methods were used on other trips, with diplomats transporting cash directly through Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.
Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also traveled to Beirut in October and carried hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, according to the information.
After Israeli strikes disrupted weapons and cash-smuggling routes used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Syria, Beirut airport emerged as a primary channel for direct cash deliveries.
Hezbollah’s longstanding influence over security structures at the airport has in the past facilitated such transfers, though Lebanese authorities have recently increased control.
The cash shipments come as Hezbollah faces acute financial strain. The group has struggled to pay fighters and to finance reconstruction in parts of southern Lebanon heavily damaged in fighting. Rebuilding costs have been estimated in the billions of dollars.
In January 2025, The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had accused Iran of funneling tens of millions of dollars in cash to Hezbollah through Beirut airport, with Iranian diplomats and other couriers allegedly carrying suitcases stuffed with US dollars to help the group recover after major losses.
Israel filed complaints with the US-led cease-fire oversight committee, while Iran, Turkey and Hezbollah denied wrongdoing. The report said tighter scrutiny at Beirut airport and the disruption of routes through Syria had made such cash shipments a more prominent channel for funding.
On Tuesday, the US Treasury announced new sanctions targeting what it described as key mechanisms Hezbollah uses to sustain its finances, including coordination with Iran and exploitation of Lebanon’s informal cash economy.
The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Lebanese gold exchange company Jood SARL, which operates under the supervision of US-designated Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a Hezbollah-linked financial institution. Treasury said Jood converts Hezbollah’s gold reserves into usable funds and helps the group mitigate liquidity pressures.
OFAC also sanctioned an international procurement and commodities shipping network involving Hezbollah financiers operating from multiple jurisdictions, including Iran.
“Hezbollah is a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement, adding that the United States would continue working to cut the group off from the global financial system.
Iran has long considered Hezbollah a central pillar of its regional alliance network and has provided the group with financial, military and logistical support for decades.
