Iran denies report of secret executions of protesters

Iran’s foreign minister dismissed an Israel Hayom report alleging Tehran secretly executed thousands, accusing the outlet of pushing politically motivated claims.

"No executions have taken place, no court process has been concluded, and more than 2,000 prisoners have been pardoned," Abbas Araghchi said in a post on X.

On Wedesday, Israel Hayom reported that Western intelligence agencies believe Iran secretly carried out thousands of executions despite assurances to the United States, alleging detainees were killed in custody and their deaths concealed.

The report said that instead of hanging protesters detained in city squares, authorities shot or strangled them in custody and told their families they had died during the protests, despite evidence they had been arrested alive.

Earlier on Sunday Iran’s judiciary chief said detained protesters would be excluded from annual pardons issued to mark the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution, when authorities traditionally grant sentence reductions or releases to selected prisoners.

Why Netanyahu raced to Washington over Iran

Feb 11, 2026, 20:12 GMT

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Danny Citrinowicz

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes only direct engagement with US President Donald Trump can prevent a limited nuclear deal with Iran—and turn this moment into a decisive blow against the Islamic Republic.

Netanyahu’s sudden trip to Washington on Tuesday is not routine diplomacy. It reflects his deep concern that renewed US–Iran talks in Oman could drift toward a narrow nuclear agreement that would stabilize Tehran rather than confront it.

Recent statements by President Trump have focused almost exclusively on the nuclear file. After the meeting on Wednesday, he said he told Netanyahu that he prefers a negotiated settlement with Iran and hopes Tehran is more reasonable than it was in 2025.

For Netanyahu, this signals a familtiar danger: pressure within the United States to settle for a deal that curbs uranium enrichment while leaving Iran’s missile arsenal, regional network of proxies, and broader strategic posture intact.

Netanyahu appears to believe this moment is unique—that Iran is weaker than it has been in years: economically strained, internally divided, and strategically exposed after recent regional confrontations. In his assessment, a limited agreement would squander a rare opportunity to alter the regime’s trajectory, particularly at a time of unprecedented US military presence in the region.

As in past confrontations with US administrations, Netanyahu is expected to arrive armed with intelligence briefings and a historical argument tailored to Trump himself. The message is likely to be direct: presidents are remembered for moments when they reshape history, not defer it. This, he will argue, is such a moment.

Netanyahu will also push for broadening negotiations to include Iran’s ballistic missile program—a threat not only to Israel but to US forces and regional allies.

Tehran is unlikely to accept such terms. Iranian officials have asserted this many times. Yet from Netanyahu’s perspective, that refusal would strengthen the case for a tougher American response. If Tehran accepts expanded terms, its capacity to project power would be significantly reduced.

There is also a domestic dimension.

Netanyahu seeks to reinforce his image as the leader most capable of confronting Iran while maintaining close ties with the US. That positioning carries particular weight after earlier claims that Israel had neutralized key Iranian threats—claims now tempered by recognition that deterrence alone may not suffice.

Underlying this approach is a broader strategic conclusion: Israel can manage Iran’s proxies, but it cannot indefinitely manage the regime itself. Only a fundamental shift in Tehran, whether through internal collapse or decisive US-led military pressure, would transform Israel’s long-term security equation.

Netanyahu’s decision to engage Trump directly also reflects skepticism toward the president’s diplomatic circle, particularly advisers who favor a pragmatic nuclear arrangement that stabilizes tensions in the short term while leaving the core challenge unresolved.

From Netanyahu’s standpoint, the risk of a narrow agreement is clear. Economic relief for Tehran could dilute international urgency and complicate future coalition-building against Iran while constraining Israel’s freedom of action.

Yet this strategy carries risks of its own.

Netanyahu may underestimate the resistance his approach could encounter within the United States, especially among segments of the MAGA movement increasingly skeptical of foreign entanglements. While Trump himself has shown openness to assertive uses of power, much of his political base is wary of being drawn into another Middle Eastern confrontation.

Historical memory also shapes the landscape. Netanyahu’s 2002 congressional testimony supporting military action in Iraq—and the subsequent costs of that war—still resonates in Washington. Advocacy framed as preventive or regime-targeting military action inevitably triggers those comparisons.

Israel could face heightened scrutiny and erosion of political goodwill should US–Iran tensions escalate in ways perceived domestically as externally driven or strategically avoidable.

In seeking to shape US policy at a pivotal moment, Netanyahu is pursuing what he sees as strategic necessity. But in doing so, he risks complicating Israel’s long-term standing within an increasingly divided American political landscape.