Iran re-arrests digital security expert once accused of spying for US

Iran, in this view, is a buffer—a state whose continued cohesion has helped secure Turkey’s eastern borders for decades, whatever its internal circumstances.

The prospect of that buffer weakening alarms Ankara far more than the nature of the demands driving Iran’s unrest.

That approach was underscored on Thursday, when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian in a phone call that Turkey opposed any foreign intervention in Iran and valued peace and stability in the country.

The message echoed a broader pattern in Ankara’s response: caution, restraint, and a clear preference for preserving the status quo over endorsing political change.

Since the protests began, Turkish officials have framed developments in Iran as the erosion of central authority driven by outside forces.

Senior figures, including Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, have described the unrest as a “scripted scenario” and warned against what they portray as foreign efforts to push the region toward chaos.

At the core of this stance lies a long-standing fear that instability in Iran could open space for militant groups along Turkey’s eastern and southern frontiers, even as a peace process with Kurdish militants has made historic progress after decades of combat.

The Syrian precedent

This security-first reading of events reflects a fear expressed from corners of Turkey’s media and academic establishment that if the Islamic Republic were to collapse, Turkey could be next.

As a result, Iran’s protests are often explained away through the language of conspiracy—foreign plots rather than expressions of domestic discontent—making meaningful democratic solidarity between the two societies more difficult at a moment of profound crisis.

Years of economic strain at home and unresolved entanglements in Syria have further heightened Ankara’s sensitivity to instability beyond its borders.

Few Turkish policymakers are eager to risk a scenario that could trigger new refugee flows after the epic out-migration of Syrians fleeing that country's civil war strained Turkey's domestic cohesion and stoked bitter arguments with Europe.

Support for armed insurgents in that war did not render the hosting of millions of Syrian people on Turkish soil any easier, and Turkey has shown no such fondness for any anti-state elements in Iran.

Ankara’s caution has also been shaped by its regional calculations since the war in Gaza. Turkish officials are acutely wary of being seen as aligned with Israel, particularly as Israeli leaders have spoken openly in favor of regime change in Iran.

In Ankara’s reading, Western rhetoric about democracy masks a broader realignment that would ultimately strengthen Israel’s regional position at Turkey’s expense. Weakening Iran, they fear, could expand Israeli influence in ways that leave Turkey strategically exposed.

Some Turkish analysts have warned in recent days that the government should be less concerned about Iran losing a conventional conflict than about what might follow. A weakened Iranian state, they argue, could rely on proxy forces and non-state actors to drag the region into a prolonged, asymmetric struggle.

Fear of what may come next

From this perspective, preventing war in Iran is a strategic necessity. A collapse of authority inside Iran could empower Kurdish groups such as the PKK or its Iranian affiliate, PJAK, and test Turkey’s security more severely than the Syrian civil war ever did.

The fragmentation of Syria remains a vivid reference point: a power vacuum, the emergence of armed enclaves, and a long-term security burden that Ankara is still struggling to manage.

These fears help explain why the refrain “if Iran falls, Turkey is next” has gained traction in Turkish media.

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, has largely aligned with the government’s cautious approach. Even media outlets critical of Erdoğan have, at times, reinforced narratives that external actors are driving the violence in Iran.

The relative absence of support from Turkey’s secular movements for protesters in Iran also reflects the limited reach of Iranian opposition groups in neighboring countries.

Turkish officials often say they would prefer an Iran that is more developed and better integrated into the international system. But the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s political trajectory—and the perceived costs of a turbulent transition—continue to outweigh that aspiration.

For now, Ankara’s overriding objective remains stability: not because it approves of Iran’s system, but because it fears what might come after it.

The cell carried out reconnaissance around the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey and used commercial activity as cover, the paper said.

Investigators said the network was directed by Iranian intelligence officers Najaf Rostami, known as “Haji,” and Mahdi Yekeh Dehghan, referred to as “Doctor,” according to Daily Sabah.

The investigation found that one of the suspects, Iranian national Ashkan Jalali, based in Ankara, planned the transfer of armed unmanned aerial vehicles from Turkey to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot administration through companies he owned, Bulaq Robotics and Arete Industries, it said.

Jalali and another suspect, Alican Koç, attended specialized drone training sessions in Iran in August and September 2025, according to the report.

Police detained defense industry company owners Erhan Ergelen and Taner Özcan, textile businessperson Cemal Beyaz, Remzi Beyaz, Koç and Jalali in Istanbul-centered raids. An Istanbul court later arrested all six on charges of “obtaining confidential state information for political or military espionage,” Daily Sabah said.

The paper said Ergelen and Özcan traveled to Iran in October 2025 and played roles in drone shipment plans to Greek Cyprus. In testimony, Remzi Beyaz said he was offered money to take part in assassination plots targeting Iranian dissidents.

The network used encrypted messaging under the code name “Güvercin” and financed its activities by disguising operations as commercial drone trade, the paper added.

The expression gained traction during the 12-day war with Israel in June, when Khamenei largely disappeared from public view amid reports that he had moved into a fortified underground shelter.

While Iranian officials did not confirm his location at the time, state media limited his presence to a pair of prerecorded video statements, which appeared to be filmed from a bunker rather than his office.

Since then, new reports have reinforced the perception of prolonged seclusion.

According to sources who spoke to Iran International on condition of anonymity, Khamenei has again taken refuge in an underground facility in Tehran amid heightened concerns about a potential US strike amid the recent wave of nationwide protests.

The site is described as a fortified complex with interconnected tunnels, with his son, Masoud Khamenei, overseeing day-to-day operations and serving as the main conduit between the leader’s office and the government.

In Persian, “moush” (rat) is a common metaphor for timidity or avoidance, particularly when someone is perceived as retreating from danger rather than confronting it. By pairing the word with Khamenei’s name, critics draw a sharp contrast between the image he has long cultivated – of a steadfast leader and commander-in-chief – and his physical absence during moments of acute national crisis.

The nickname has also taken on a visual dimension. Protest imagery circulating online depicts rats in clerical robes or emerging from underground tunnels, reinforcing the association between concealment and political weakness.

One chant that includes the term – “Cry out, Moush-Ali, Pahlavi is coming” (Zajjeh Bezan Moush-Ali, Dareh Miad Pahlavi) – links the insult to broader political demands and signals a rejection not only of Khamenei personally, but of the authority structure he represents.

For analysts, the spread of the phrase points to something deeper than mockery. Khamenei’s extended absence during the war, followed by reports that senior officials struggled to reach him directly, has raised questions about leadership visibility and continuity.

While political slogans in Iran have evolved before, the rapid adoption of “Moush-Ali” shows how language becomes a vehicle for social judgment – compressing complex grievances about power, accountability, and legitimacy into a single, resonant word.

In that sense, the term is less about insult than about perception: a reflection of how authority is being re-imagined, contested, and, increasingly, stripped of its aura.

“Foreign terrorist organizers are NOT welcome in our country,” ICE wrote, announcing that Ehsan Khaledi, Mohammad Mehrani and Morteza Nasirikakolaki were returned to Iran over the weekend.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identified the three men as former IRGC members and said they were among 14 Iranian nationals on a deportation flight to Tehran, the first such flight since widespread anti-government protests in Iran were met with a deadly crackdown.

According to DHS, Mehrani and Khaledi entered the United States illegally in Southern California in 2024, while Nasirikakolaki entered illegally in November 2024 and was apprehended by Border Patrol near San Luis, Arizona. The White House said all individuals deported had final removal orders issued by a federal judge.

The IRGC is Iran’s elite military force, separate from the regular army and reporting directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The United States designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization in 2019, citing its role in supporting militant groups and carrying out operations targeting US interests and allies.

The deportations come amid sharply rising tensions between Washington and Tehran, as the Trump administration has signaled it is prepared to use military force if Iran continues executions and violent repression linked to nationwide protests. The United States has also stepped up its military presence in the region in recent weeks.

The judiciary identified him as Hamidreza Sabet Esmailipour and said he was arrested on April 29, 2025. It said he was convicted of “espionage and intelligence cooperation,” alleging he communicated with an intelligence officer and handed over documents and classified information.

In a detailed account published by Mizan, the judiciary’s official media outlet, authorities said Sabet Esmailipour had carried out logistical and support tasks for what they described as Israeli intelligence operations, including moving vehicles between provinces and transferring funds. The report alleged some of the vehicles contained explosives intended for sabotage operations, claims that could not be independently verified.

Mizan said the man acknowledged cooperating with Mossad during interrogations and court proceedings, and that his death sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court before being carried out by hanging.

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  Iran hangs man accused of spying for Mossad

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  Iran publicly executes man on alleged murder charges

Iran has executed more than a dozen people in recent months on charges of spying for Israel, cases that human rights groups say often involve opaque legal proceedings.

Iranian authorities have said more than 700 people were detained on suspicion of espionage or collaboration with Israel following the conflict in June.

US-based rights group HRANA said in a report earlier this month that at least 313 prisoners were executed by hanging during a period of nationwide protests between late December and late January, adding that executions surged alongside mass arrests and a security crackdown as unrest spread and internet access was widely restricted.