Israeli security experts have cast doubt on Tehran’s recent claims of obtaining sensitive Israeli intelligence as exaggerated or psychological warfare while Iran’s intelligence minister says the documents will soon be made public.
Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB reported on Saturday that Iranian intelligence services had obtained a large volume of sensitive material from Israel, including documents related to the Jewish state's nuclear and strategic facilities.
Asher Ben-Artzi, a former head of Israel’s Interpol, told Iran International, “I know that the relevant information is well-guarded in Israel and it does not seem to me that hackers can access it."
He warned that the intelligence may not be as significant as claimed. “Iran wants to tell the world that their intelligence personnel are professionals, but they probably think that their use of disinformation will increase their achievements,” he said.
Intelligence analyst Ronen Solomon also said, “We don’t know if it’s something scientific or operational, and it could possibly be something like details of the supply chain. Nobody in Israel has confirmed this officially so it could also be a psychological operation.”
"Iran is attempting to replicate what Israel did to Tehran’s nuclear archives in 2018," he said, referring to the Israeli intelligence operation that allegedly seized Iranian nuclear files from a warehouse in Tehran.
In 2018, Israel said it had stolen Iran's nuclear documents including 55,000 pages and 55,000 digital files from a warehouse in Tehran's Shourabad area through an intelligence operation.
Iran has since been accusing the UN nuclear watchdog of using those documents in its reports about the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities.
Iran says it will release documents soon
Iran’s Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib said on Sunday that Tehran had obtained “a vast collection of strategic and sensitive documents, including plans and data on the nuclear facilities of the Zionist regime,” referring to Israel. He added that the documents would be published soon.
According to Iran’s state news agency ISNA, Khatib said the material would enhance Iran’s “offensive power” and added that the documents also contained data about the United States, European countries, and others.
“Complete nuclear documents have been obtained and transferred,” he said.
He described the operation as broad, multi-dimensional, and complex, involving infiltration, recruitment, and increased access to Israeli sources.
“The transfer method is just as important as the documents themselves. We ensured the documents reached us securely, and we are protecting the methods as well,” Khatib said, adding that the transfer process itself would remain classified for now.
Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB had earlier reported that the documents were already outside Israeli territory and under review, but provided no evidence.
The reports come as Israeli authorities investigate the arrest of Roy Mizrahi and Almog Atias, two Israelis accused of conducting surveillance for Iran, allegedly in the town of Kfar Ahim, home to Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz.
Iran’s media linked their arrest to the intelligence haul, saying it happened after the data had been exfiltrated.
Israeli officials have accused the two of cooperating knowingly with Iranian handlers, and that they carried out tasks including the transfer of a suspected explosive device.
A report by Microsoft last year that Israel had surpassed the United States as the primary target of Iranian state-backed cyberattacks following the war in Gaza.
Their accounts document a sprawling overseas network operating under direct orders from the Supreme Leader’s office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence arm well out of step with common diplomatic practice.
“Every embassy has a list. People to watch. People to engage. People to silence,” an Iranian former diplomatic employee told Iran International.
“It’s not foreign policy—it’s field execution,” another told Iran International. “The people sent abroad are on assignment, not appointment.”
Their account outlines a foreign service shaped not by diplomacy but by ideology, surveillance and illicit finance.
According to these individuals—whose names are withheld for their safety—Iran’s diplomatic missions double as intelligence gathering hubs tasked with tracking dissidents, surveilling student communities and delivering cash and equipment under the protection of diplomatic immunity.
UK authorities detained eight men in May, including three charged under the National Security Act for surveilling Iran International journalists on behalf of Tehran between August 2024 and February 2025.
It was not clear whether the charges related in any way to the Iranian embassy in London.
Iran’s foreign ministry denounced the charges as politically motivated, but former officials say such actions are core to the Islamic Republic’s overseas agenda.
Iran’s embassies maintain the outward structure of any diplomatic mission—ambassadors, attachés and advisers—but according to the sources, the roles often serve as cover.
“A person listed as a translator might actually coordinate funds for proxy groups,” said one of the former diplomats. “Titles are just for appearances.”
In one high-profile case, Iranian diplomat Asadollah Asadi used his status to transport explosives intended for an opposition rally in Paris. His 2021 conviction in Belgium exposed how far such dual roles can go.
Another ex-staffer recalled colleagues arriving in Istanbul and Baku with briefcases of undeclared dollars. “They know no one will search their bags,” he said.
Cultural attachés, especially those linked to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization, are said to organize religious events abroad that double as screening grounds for potential recruits.
Germany shuttered the Islamic Center of Hamburg in July over its ties to Tehran and what the Interior Ministry called promotion of extremism and antisemitism.
The diplomatic corps itself, sources say, is dominated by the sons of clerics and system insiders.
“Your father is a Friday prayer leader? Your uncle is close to the Supreme Leader? You’re in,” said one.
Posts rarely align with professional background; language skills and experience are often secondary to loyalty.
Though often expelled or exposed, the structure endures. Loyal staff are rotated across continents with little interruption.
“Each post is a mission. If you complete it to the system’s satisfaction, you’re held in reserve for the next,” one former diplomat said.
The network’s reach is enhanced by front organizations. The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation has been linked to Hezbollah financing. The Iranian Red Crescent has faced accusations of being used by Quds Force operatives for weapons transport. IRGC members have admitted posing as aid workers during the Bosnian war.
IRIB outlets—Press TV, Al-Alam, Hispan TV—have functioned as propaganda arms and intelligence fronts. France expelled one of their journalists in 2011 for spreading state messaging.
The Iranian Red Crescent and the IRGC officially denied these remarks, saying that any such actions were unauthorized and not representative of their organizations.
Despite the rhetoric of resistance, many live in luxury. One former ambassador’s Paris residence cost over €40,000 per month.
“They send their kids to secular schools while preaching Islamic values,” said another. Leaked records show senior envoys receiving up to $12,000 monthly, with generous stipends and ceremonial budgets.
“It’s both reward and insulation,” an ex-diplomatic employee said. “The system buys loyalty with luxury—and distances them from the reality of ordinary Iranians.”
What emerges is not a diplomatic corps, but a global extension of Iran’s security state—trained, titled, and deployed to safeguard the Islamic Republic, not represent it.
Key to that mission, Congressman Cory Mills said, was enabling de facto president Ahmed al-Sharaa to scotch what remains of Iran's influence in Syria.
"What do we truly have to lose in this? You know, we know what we have to lose if they ... allow Iran to create a proxy state and what that means for the region and what that means for our allies," Mills said.
Syria’s new leadership is working to stamp out any Iranian activity on its soil, just months after a rebel advance led by al-Sharaa uprooted the Assad dynasty, Tehran's oldest Arab ally.
Damascus has been expelling proxy fighters, cutting off arms transfers to Hezbollah and pursuing new diplomatic partnerships across the region, including potential ties with Israel, Mills told Eye for Iran.
“He’s not allowing these proxy militias to continue to operate there as they did under the Assad regime,” Mills said.
Syria for Syrians
Mills argues this shift presents an opportunity for Washington to engage—both diplomatically and economically—before Russia, China or Iran move to fill the vacuum.
“If we actually open up the platform to allow for contract bidding, to rebuild infrastructure, that is a great first start,” he said, pointing to areas like water, electricity, and telecoms. “This is one of the most strategic geolocations in the entire region.”
Such engagement, he added, would not only counter authoritarian influence—it would create opportunities for American companies, reinforce regional stability, and help prevent Syria from sliding back into sectarian violence.
“The Iranian people could take a lot away from what has happened in Syria,” he said. “This could be them too. But it has to be an Iranian strategy, not an American strategy.”
Sanctions and Syria's new leadership
Until recently, Ahmed al-Sharaa was himself under US sanctions due to his leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Al-Qaeda affiliated group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department.
On May 13, 2025, President Donald Trump while visiting Saudi Arabia last month made a shock announcement that he was lifting US sanctions on Syria.
Mills stressed that engagement with al-Sharaa must come with clear-eyed realism. “Trust but verify,” he said during the interview. “I think he knows what he has to do. He’s already taken actions that are not just words.”
Diplomatic overtures and regional stability
Mills revealed that al-Sharaa expressed interest in normalizing relations with Israel—albeit cautiously. While no formal talks have begun, the signal alone marks a dramatic shift from the Assad era, which was defined by hostility toward Israel and alignment with Iran and Hezbollah.
“He actually said that we would look at a good relationship and partner with Israel—not the 'Zionist state' ... but he knows the risk that he's taking,” Mills said.
The potential for Syrian-Israeli normalization would echo the Abraham Accords, a US-brokered framework that reshaped parts of the Middle East by bringing Israel into diplomatic relations with several Arab states.
Mills said any future agreements must respect Syria’s sovereignty. “What I don’t support is a balkanization of other sovereign territories,” he said. “I think that good fences make good neighbors.”
The trip to Damascus, however, was not without danger. Mills told Eye for Iran that Islamic State had allegedly plotted to assassinate him while he was in Syria. “They had already put together where they were going to utilize a car bomb,” he said. “They had already put together the location.”
Despite the risks, Mills argued that Syria’s political realignment offers the United States a rare chance to help shape a post-war roadmap—one that sidelines Iran, opens new diplomatic channels and bolsters long-term regional stability.
You can watch the full episode of Eye for Iran with Congressman Cory Mills on YouTube or listen on any major podcast platform like Spotify, Apple, Amazon Music or Castbox.
