US to Pressure Malaysia to Stop Iran Accessing Funds

An open letter, signed by over 460 individuals, criticized the Iranian government's lack of accountability and its tendency to suppress dissent through intimidation and terror, highlighting the "shameful death sentence for a young protesting artist."

The signatories also made a plea to the government to halt its oppressive treatment of Iranian women forced to comply with mandatory hijab and to refrain from further threatening and intimidating the nation's youth.

Salehi, a vocal figure in the 2022 protests ignited by the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody, has been a supporter of protesters, detainees, and political activists. Arrested shortly after the protests began, Salehi faced an initial sentence of over six years in prison. However, in a move by a judge in Isfahan, his sentence was escalated to the death penalty, bypassing the usual legal procedures expected to reduce his term upon appeal.

Salehi's death sentence has triggered a global outcry, continuing to draw international attention and protest.

In a recent development, scores of French and Iranian artists, writers, athletes, and activists have reached out to French President Emmanuel Macron, soliciting his influence to help overturn the execution order. The collective voice of the diverse groups underscores a significant global concern over human rights practices in Iran, particularly regarding freedom of expression and the treatment of political dissidents.

Thursday’s military operation was in response to an assessed "imminent threat to US, coalition forces, and merchant vessels in the region," CENTCOM stated, adding that “these actions are taken to protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S., coalition, and merchant vessels.”

This week, Israel targeted a site close to the Syrian capital resulting in several Syrian soldiers sustaining injuries, while there were no casualties reported among the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) – unlike Israel’s strike last month on a purported Iranian consulate in Damascus.

Experts have noted that amid regional tensions, Houthi rebels have broadened their operational reach, extending their influence from the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden eastwards towards the Indian Ocean – with a reported aim is to block maritime traffic heading to Israel through strategic waterways.

In response to the Houthis' escalated activities and threats, the US, in collaboration with the UK, has intensified its military operations within Yemen.

While Israel's Iron Dome defense system has been protecting it from incoming rocket attacks for years, it is now trying to beef up its cyber security by building a system to ward off increasing threats from hackers.

"It is a silent war, one which is not visible," Aviram Atzaba, the Israeli National Cyber Directorate's head of international cooperation told AFP.

Since Israel launched its war on Hamas in Gaza, following the militant group’s attack on October 7 last year, the country has experienced a notable surge in cyberattacks from Iran and its allies, Atzaba said.

Since the war began, around 800 major cyber-attacks have reportedly been foiled.

Among the targets were government organizations, military infrastructure, and civil infrastructure; some, including hospitals in the cities of Haifa and Safedsome, could not be stopped.

Without going into details, Atzaba told AFP that for the past two years, the directorate has been attempting to develop a centralized, real-time system that proactively protects all Israeli cyberspace – emphasizing the project's collaboration with Israel's allies.

"It takes a network to fight a network," he said.

According to experts speaking to AFP, Iran's investment in cyberwarfare was spurred by two pivotal incidents. Firstly, the use of the internet by anti-government protesters to garner support for a post-election uprising in 2009. These protests erupted following the announcement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in the presidential election, amid widespread allegations of irregularities.

Iran's investment in cyberwarfare was also prompted by a cyberattack in 2010 that inflicted physical damage on Iran's nuclear program. Tehran attributed this attack to Israel and the US.

But, Israel is not the sole target of Iranian cyber attacks, with Iranian hackers belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ (IRGC) hacking US governmental and private organizations.

In April the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on individuals and companies accused of conducting cyber-attacks for the benefit of the IRGC’s Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC).

“Iranian malicious cyber actors continue to target US companies and government entities in a coordinated, multi-pronged campaign intended to destabilize our critical infrastructure and cause harm to our citizens,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson in April.

The US Justice Department and FBI also unveiled an indictment in April against Iranian individuals, accusing them of taking part in a coordinated hacking initiative from 2016 through April 2021.

Intelligence agencies in both the US and Canada also warned in February that Iranian state-sponsored hackers might interfere with their respective country’s elections.

Out of the 36 athletes from 11 countries selected, 14—or almost 40%—are Iranian.

The considerable presence of Iranian refugees on the team follows a surge in the emigration of athletes, artists, and skilled workers from Iran, driven by ongoing anti-regime protests and increasing economic and political pressures over the past few years.

The 14 Iranian athletes, comprising 10 men and 4 women, have found new bases across Europe, including notable names such as Omid Ahmadisafa (Germany) in boxing, Matin Balsini (Britain) in swimming, and Mahboubeh Barbari Zharfi (Germany) in judo.

The mass defections come in the wake of at least 30 Iranian athletes seeking asylum in recent years, escaping not only the political repression in Iran, but also specific challenges within the sports sector.

Issues cited by athletes include corruption within sports federations, the enforced policy of not competing against Israeli athletes, and for women, the mandatory wearing of the hijab during competition.

The Islamic Republic’s policy of prohibiting its Olympic athletes from competing against Israelis stems from its longstanding enmity towards the country, after 1979.

Athletes are often pressured by the government-controlled sports federation officials to intentionally lose matches, forfeit, or cite injuries to avoid competitions against Israeli opponents.

Tehran’s citizens swiftly demanded the municipality stop the building of the mosque with a petition that circulated on social networks, garnering over 147,000 signatures within just a few days.

But, this all transcends the mere building of a mosque in Qaytariyeh Park in the north of Tehran.

Since 1979, the Islamist regime has escalated the count of mosques in Iran from approximately 25,000 to roughly 75,000 presently. Yet, as stated by a senior cleric within the regime, around 50,000 of these mosques remain shuttered, devoid of congregants for prayer.

Various polls converge on a singular explanation: the remarkable and rapid transformation of the Iranian populace towards irreligiosity and apathy towards religious rituals over the past four decades.

Last year, in a government study titled the National Attitude Survey of Iranians, respondents were asked about the change in the level of religiosity among the people compared to five years prior. 85% of respondents stated that, based on their observations, the level of religiosity among Iranians had decreased, while only 7% reported an increase.

So, why does the Islamist regime insist on building mosques that are likely to remain empty?

First: New mosques are constructed in areas where Basij bases and repression centers are absent or few, and the government uses the mosques as cover to expand its social and political control.

The Basij, which plays a significant role in quelling dissent, is a paramilitary volunteer militia force that operates under the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).

In the past, the country's mosques have indeed been used to mobilize forces during street protests, and protesters have even been shot by Basiji snipers from rooftops. The government also seeks to establish a surveillance and information-gathering infrastructure within neighborhoods, without paying the price associated with public intimidation.

Second: The mosques are a base for gathering and recruiting for the regime's repression organizations. Today, the Islamist regime is desperately seeking to expand the network of Basiji forces and its plainclothes forces. In the past, these forces were the ones who assassinated the opposition figures. There were mosques with Imams such as Mojtaba Tehrani and Azizullah Khushvaght who were accused of issuing fatwas for killing dissidents and writers.

The attendees of their mosques were mostly working for the Iranian security agencies. The assassin who shot Saeed Hajjarian, an advisor to former President Mohammad Khatami, in the head, was affiliated with one of the politicized mosques.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has filled his security, military, and paramilitary apparatus with worshipers of the same type of mosques.

Third: The state-controlled mosques have become centers of brainwashing and political propaganda. These mosques host kindergartens and indoctrination classes that propagate anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism, and political Islam.

All of the aforementioned objectives are centered around security and political agendas.

The objective of attaining complete state control over mosques in matters of religion and religiosity entails direct intervention by governmental institutions in the organization and execution of religious ceremonies. This is achieved through: the appropriation of public spaces by advocating Sharia as a way of life, and by substituting religious teachings with governmental directives.

Prior to the establishment of the Islamist regime in 1979, Iranian mosques served as civil institutions for worship and congregation, with ownership being shared. The Imam of the congregation was selected by the local community, and management was overseen by a board of trustees elected by the locals, with minimal political involvement. Every class and group of Muslims could claim the local mosque as their own.

However, the Islamist regime usurped the mosques by establishing Basij bases, appointing Imams, and constructing new and additional mosques. Following the usurpation, it treated the public domain as its conquered property.

Over the past 45 years, any Imam who has made a critical statement against the government has been dismissed from their position. Sunnis are unable to have even a single mosque in major cities like Tehran, Mashhad, Kerman, and Shiraz.

The country's mosques underwent governmentalization through three specific processes.

The first involved the formation of the Headquarters of Imams and Congregations to appoint and control mosque imams. This institution was established in every province and operates under the supervision of the Leader’s office.

The second process entailed the establishment of Basij bases in mosques as the initial government institution installed there.

The third process involved setting up "cultural centers" within mosques, managed by the Supreme Headquarters of the Cultural and Artistic Centers of the country's mosques, aimed at countering the "cultural invasion of the enemy" as mandated by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution in 1992.

This way, the Islamist regime turned mosques that the Iranian people voluntarily built with their own hands and funds, into government institutions.

The regime transferred religious institutions such as seminaries, mosques, endowments, and mausoleums from civil institutions into completely state-owned entities.