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INSIGHT

Iran says the US must ‘surrender’ to seven conditions. What are they?

Nov 12, 2026, 14:05 GMT+0

Iran’s leaders say no talks can begin until Washington accepts seven conditions. But Tehran has never published them, its own officials list them differently, and several are demands no US president could meet, while the one issue Washington cares most about is ruled out.

The conditions are back at the center of the war’s diplomacy this week. On Thursday, Hossein Taeb, a cleric who ran the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence organization until 2022 and now heads the Basij paramilitary force, gave the most detailed account yet of how messages are moving between the two sides.

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Iran says the US must ‘surrender’ to seven conditions. What are they?

Nov 12, 2026, 14:03 GMT+0
•
Arash Sohrabi
100%
People walk past an anti-US billboard in Tehran, August 3, 2026. Officials have presented Iran’s seven conditions at home as the terms of an American defeat.

Iran’s leaders say no talks can begin until Washington accepts seven conditions. But Tehran has never published them, its own officials list them differently, and several are demands no US president could meet, while the one issue Washington cares most about is ruled out.

The conditions are back at the center of the war’s diplomacy this week. On Thursday Hossein Taeb, a cleric who ran the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence organization until 2022 and now heads the Basij paramilitary force, gave the most detailed account yet of how messages are moving between the two sides.

  • Iran threatens US bases in Europe if attacks resume

    Iran threatens US bases in Europe if attacks resume

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    Trump vows ‘total victory’ as Iran rejects concessions and threatens wider war

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    Iran state TV panelists urge tougher action against US blockade

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    US targets Iran's land trade routes, but Tehran may hold firm

Days before the US midterm elections, he said, a Trump representative went to Vladimir Putin, and a Russian envoy then flew to Tehran with a written message for Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. The envoy waited for a reply. Khamenei, Taeb said, calmly ordered that it be sent “at a suitable time.”

Then came a phone call between Putin and Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Rezaei’s trip to Moscow, where he handed Putin a letter from Khamenei on November 5.

“Our position is that Iran’s seven conditions must first be met and accepted by the other side,” Taeb said. Only then would Iran decide how, and about what, to negotiate.

His account sits awkwardly beside his colleagues’. Rezaei told Al Mayadeen this week that there are no negotiations of any kind and that reports of talks are “lies.” On X he told Washington to stop “manufacturing FAKE NEWS about imaginary talks” and wrote that it was “time to SURRENDER to the seven conditions.”

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who formally leads Iran’s negotiating team, told Al Jazeera on Wednesday that Tehran had given Washington “a clear and transparent response” and was waiting for an official reply.

The US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Putin in the Kremlin on Thursday, mainly to discuss Ukraine after talks in Abu Dhabi. Neither side has said whether Iran came up.

A list that was never published

Rezaei announced the seven conditions on September 23, after a meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and said they had been put in writing and handed to Pakistan and Qatar. Iran later offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if they were met, then within two.

Iran has never officially released the text. Officials say the conditions grew out of the Islamabad understanding of June, which Hassan Ghashghavi, spokesman of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, says the presidents of both countries signed. Trump has disowned it.

No official list exists. Pieced together from what officials have said, it usually runs: an end to the war on all fronts, especially in Lebanon, the lifting of sanctions, the release of frozen assets, an end to the US naval blockade, compensation for war damage, guarantees against future attacks, and Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz.

But the list moves. Vahid Ahmadi, a member of the same committee, includes “the management of the Strait of Hormuz” by Iran under a new route agreed with Oman. Ghalibaf, listing them on Wednesday, added guaranteed waivers for Iranian oil sales. The armed forces chief, Ali Abdollahi, has set out five conditions of his own, including recognition of Iranian authority over Hormuz and a new regional security framework. Some reports include a reduction of US forces in the region. “Sometimes we may mention some conditions,” Rezaei said in September, “but Iran has seven.”

On October 11 Rezaei said Washington had “agreed to some” of them. This week he said there was no response at all.

Why they don’t hold up

An end to war “on all fronts.” This asks Washington to stop wars that Iran’s allies are fighting. Ahmadi says the condition now covers not only Lebanon but “the other resistance fronts,” meaning Hezbollah, the Houthis and militias in Iraq. Lebanon already has its own track. A US-brokered framework between the United States, Israel and Lebanon in June led to direct talks between Israel and Lebanon. Tehran is tying its own deal to a war fought by a group it arms and funds.

Lifting sanctions. No US president can do this alone. Many US sanctions on Iran are written into law by Congress. United Nations sanctions returned in late September 2025 under the nuclear deal’s snapback mechanism. The European Union and Britain impose their own. Lifting sanctions under the 2015 nuclear deal took two years of negotiation. Iran is asking for it as a condition for starting to talk.

Frozen assets. Iran’s own figures do not agree with anyone else’s. Tasnim and the central bank put the total at about $24 billion; other estimates run past $100 billion. Some of the money is tied up in US court judgments won by victims of attacks blamed on Iran, and the $6 billion moved to Qatar in 2023 was frozen again after the Hamas attack on Israel that October.

Ending the blockade. The US blockade of Iranian ports began on April 13, after Iran choked traffic through Hormuz. The condition asks Washington to lift its response while Iran keeps the closure that caused it. Iran’s only offer in return is to reopen a waterway it closed.

Reparations. The government spokeswoman has put Iran’s losses at $270 billion without a breakdown. Trump has rejected paying anything. Tehran is demanding compensation while its own missiles and drones struck its neighbors. The UAE alone absorbed close to 3,000 attacks in the first months of the war, the Financial Times has reported.

Guarantees against attack. No US president can bind his successor, which is the lesson Iranian officials themselves draw from Trump’s exit from the 2015 deal. The same officials who say Washington cannot be trusted are demanding a promise from it.

Iranian control of Hormuz. The strait is an international waterway. A condition that Iran “manage” it, approve routes or collect tolls is not a term for ending a war. It is a claim to a power Iran did not have before the war began.

What is not on the list

The issue Washington says the war was about is missing. Rezaei said this week that the nuclear file “is not under discussion,” and that “not even a particle” of Iran’s enriched uranium would leave the country.

The result is a list that asks Washington to give up every lever it holds, sanctions, the blockade, its forces and the money, before talks begin, while Iran keeps the two things the other side wants most: the closure of Hormuz until the end, and its nuclear material for good.

Who the list is for

Officials have sold the conditions at home as the terms of a victory. Rezaei told Washington it was “time to SURRENDER to the seven conditions Iran has repeatedly set out.” Taeb told his audience that the 40-day war decided the elections in Israel and the United States, and that Trump would have to withdraw his forces or face “a wider social movement” at home.

Ghalibaf said on Wednesday that Tehran wants to end the state of “neither war nor peace,” but that this might come through “sustainable deterrence” rather than talks.

The cost of the stalemate falls on Iranians. Ghalibaf himself complained that the blockade has cut access to food and medicine. Taeb said gasoline output fell to about 102 million liters a day during the war against consumption of about 135 million, and that Iran still imports some seven million liters a day. Inflation reached about 77 percent in October.

Trump wants to keep Iran blockade. Can the Persian Gulf sustain the standoff?

Nov 11, 2026, 02:11 GMT+0
•
Negar Mojtahedi
100%
People walk beneath regional flags at a market.

US President Donald Trump says the Iran war is effectively over militarily, but his plan to maintain a naval blockade raises questions about how long the standoff can last and whether it serves the interests of the Arab neighbors he says support it.

“Most importantly, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and others would prefer the status quo, that we remain as is,” Trump told reporters at the White House on Monday after meeting Qatar’s prime minister.

He described that approach as continuing the US naval blockade, while keeping American forces ready for renewed military action.

Speaking to reporters in Paris after meetings with G7 counterparts on Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said US sanctions and the naval blockade were inflicting growing economic damage on Iran, reducing the need for further major combat operations.

Regional analysts disagree over whether that policy offers Arab states across the Persian Gulf their safest option or prolongs a confrontation that threatens their security and economies.

Pressure without stability

Ghaith al-Omari, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and former executive director of the American Task Force on Palestine, offered the opposite assessment to Trump’s. Regional governments want a weaker Islamic Republic, he said, but that does not mean they favor an indefinite blockade.

“They would like to see the regime weakened, but they don't believe that the blockade serves their interests,” he told Iran International.

Even where oil continues to flow, insurance costs and the risk of further attacks weigh on regional economies. Prolonged uncertainty also threatens the stability underpinning investment, tourism, finance and logistics, he said.

“No war, no peace equals uncertainty, equals instability,” al-Omari said.

He argued that Arab governments across the Persian Gulf doubt Washington’s willingness to sustain the policy.Trump’s midterm setback has intensified concerns that domestic pressure could prompt an abrupt change, leaving neighboring countries to manage the consequences.

Without an agreement reopening the Strait of Hormuz and ending the conflict, some governments could seek separate arrangements with Tehran to reduce their exposure, he said.

Between a rock and a hard place

Dalia Ziada of the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) described the Arab states of the Persian Gulf as caught “between a rock and a hard place”: fearful of a resurgent Islamic Republic, yet harmed by the instability of a prolonged standoff.

“They don't want the Iranian regime to get strong again,” she told Iran International.

But continued insecurity carries its own economic consequences, threatening the region’s appeal to investors and confidence in its future.

“The biggest loss for the wealthy Gulf states is the lack of stability,” Ziada said.

She argued that differences among regional governments, combined with doubts about the reliability of American protection, complicate their choices. Their concerns cannot be reduced to a simple preference for war or continued restraint, she said.

One incident could break the standoff

Mohamed Fahmy, a journalist and Middle East political analyst, also sees significant differences among Iran’s Arab neighbors.

“There is no unified Gulf position on how long the blockade should continue,” he told Iran International.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE see value in maintaining American pressure until Tehran makes meaningful concessions, Fahmy said, while Qatar and Oman place greater emphasis on mediation.

Their shared interest in reducing the Iranian military threat does not eliminate the costs of prolonged confrontation.

“The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have invested heavily in presenting themselves as stable international hubs for business, tourism, finance and logistics. Prolonged confrontation threatens those ambitions,” he said.

Those concerns reflect damage already sustained. An October 15 Reuters investigation documented at least 135 missile and drone attacks by Iran and allied groups against at least 84 infrastructure sites across seven Arab countries since US-Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28. The tally covered infrastructure attacks, rather than every launch or attempted strike.

Fahmy said the standoff could continue for some time because Washington and Tehran both appear to believe waiting will improve their negotiating positions. But an attack killing American personnel or seriously damaging Persian Gulf energy infrastructure could trigger renewed military action.

“It takes only one serious incident involving American forces, a commercial tanker or a Gulf energy installation to undermine the current restraint,” he said.

Growing pressure in Washington over financial costs, military commitments and the absence of a clear exit strategy could instead encourage a negotiated settlement, he argued.

The case for staying the course

Saad bin Tefla Al-Ajmi, Kuwait’s former information minister, argues that maintaining the status quo remains the least harmful choice.

“The solution is to keep the status quo as is. That’s the best solution,” he told Iran International, referring to an article he supplied outlining his position.

Renewed war could bring further Iranian attacks on neighboring countries, he argues, while American withdrawal could leave them exposed.

“The third option is the safest and best for us, for the region and for the beleaguered peoples of Iran,” he wrote in the article.

Al-Ajmi advocates sustained naval and economic pressure alongside efforts to constrain Tehran’s regional armed allies. He predicts that pressure could eventually bring down the regime, although that outcome remains uncertain.

He acknowledges the costs to neighboring states.

“The Gulf states are indeed paying a price under this scenario. Their trade is disrupted, tensions persist in their airspace and their projects are delayed,” he wrote.

His support for maintaining that pressure rests on the judgment that the alternatives would be worse. The question is whether Washington and its regional partners can sustain it without an escalation that forces them back into war.

Oil prices or US prestige? Tehran analysts weigh Trump's next move

Nov 9, 2026, 23:20 GMT+0
•
Maryam Sinaiee
100%
FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump speaks during a rally at Guardian Centers in Perry, Georgia, US, October 24, 2026.

Two Iranian analysts have offered contrasting assessments of what could prompt Donald Trump to launch another attack on Iran before the new US Congress convenes in January.

Speaking on the popular Tehran-based online talk show Azad, conservative commentator Mehdi Kharratiyan argued that the prospect of surging oil prices and damage to US financial markets could restrain Trump, despite his continued authority to order military action following the Republican defeat in the midterm elections.

International relations analyst Rahman Ghahremanpour disagreed, saying Trump might be willing to accept substantial economic costs if he believed America's international standing or his presidential legacy was at stake.

Kharratiyan warned that another major conflict could further disrupt energy supplies and push Brent crude prices as high as $130 a barrel, exposing the US and global economies to the risk of recession.

He argued that Iran would retaliate against regional infrastructure in the event of a major US attack, potentially worsening the economic consequences for Washington. Following the Republicans' heavy midterm losses, he said, Trump would struggle to justify another war that could further damage his party's prospects in the 2028 elections.

Ghahremanpour, however, argued that preserving American credibility could take precedence over financial considerations.

He drew a comparison with Britain's experience during the 1956 Suez Crisis, when London was forced to abandon its military intervention under international pressure, suggesting Trump would be determined to avoid a similar humiliation for the United States.

The discussion aired on Azad, known for hosting debates among commentators with opposing views. Its YouTube channel has more than 160,000 subscribers, and the episode had attracted nearly 190,000 views.

The platform was shut down by Tehran prosecutors in August over allegations of spreading false information and operating without a licence, but was allowed to resume broadcasting in late October.

Despite their disagreement over Trump's calculations, both analysts warned that the period before the new Congress convenes could be particularly dangerous for Iran.

“As long as Mr. Trump is in the White House and Netanyahu is in the prime minister's office in Israel, even if they are in a weakened position, the possibility of unpredictable actions, even foolish ones, or actions driven by desperation, remains,” Kharratiyan said.

“If we are not alert, we could suddenly be caught off guard, as we have been in the past.”

Kharratiyan said Iranian officials appeared determined not to allow another surprise attack. If Tehran concluded that Washington had decided to strike, he argued, Iranian forces could launch a pre-emptive attack.

He said a major US-Israeli operation would depend on Washington and Israel identifying an intelligence opportunity, finding potential assistance within Iran and believing they could disable Iran's ability to retaliate in the opening minutes.

Ghahremanpour also warned that Trump's midterm defeat could push him in opposite directions, making him either more cautious or more willing to take risks.

“The election results could make Trump more cautious in his foreign policy, but they could also make him act more boldly and recklessly,” he said in recent remarks to the Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA).

“Which of these happens will naturally depend on Trump's own assessment and that of his team.”

Ghahremanpour, who favours a negotiated settlement, said the absence of substantial concessions from either Tehran or Washington suggested that any agreement reached in the coming days would likely be fragile, temporary and limited.

He argued that an understanding between Trump and congressional Democrats could reduce the risk of renewed war. But if the president anticipated aggressive moves against him once the new Congress convened, he might instead seek a military confrontation to reinforce America's standing and secure his political legacy.

Debate continues in Tehran over prospects for US deal after midterms

Nov 9, 2026, 22:03 GMT+0
•
Behrouz Turani
100%
An Iranian flag flies above Tehran's sprawling skyline, shrouded in haze, November 9, 2026

Four Iranian reformist intellectuals have urged Tehran to seize an opportunity for diplomacy following Donald Trump's midterm election defeat, while warning that the US president could respond to his political setback by escalating rather than ending the war.

Writing in three articles published in the reformist newspaper Etemad on Sunday, November 8, Mohammad-Javad Haghshenas, sociologist Mahmoud Sadri, international relations analyst Alireza Ghandriz and political analyst Alireza Rajaei offered differing assessments of what Democratic control of Congress could mean for negotiations.

Their shared premise is that the elections have raised the domestic cost of the war for Trump without removing his authority to wage it. Trump himself acknowledged that “part of it was Iran,” while defending his decision to attack.

Haghshenas, a former leader of the National Trust Party, offered the most optimistic assessment, arguing that Tehran should move quickly rather than wait for uncertain political developments in Washington.

Citing reports of a purported letter from Vice President JD Vance proposing direct talks, Haghshenas argued that Vance, a potential contender for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, had a political interest in ending a war that has damaged his party.

Echoing Qatar's prime minister, he urged both sides to accept a workable agreement rather than hold out for an ideal one.

Making a deal politically possible

Sadri and Ghandriz, writing jointly, argued that any agreement must be politically defensible in both Tehran and Washington.

They warned that Democratic opposition to Trump's handling of the war should not be mistaken for opposition to pressure on Iran.

President George W. Bush, they wrote, responded to the Republican defeat in the 2006 midterm elections by ordering a military surge in Iraq rather than withdrawing.

Citing the gradual normalisation of US-Vietnam relations in 1995 as a model, they proposed starting with limited humanitarian and maritime cooperation before expanding civil, academic and business ties.

Above all, they warned that presenting an agreement in Iran as an American surrender would undermine the very figures in Washington whose support would be needed to sustain it.

The danger of a wounded Trump

Rajaei offered the most guarded assessment, comparing Trump to a political gambler who might raise the stakes rather than accept a visible defeat. He stressed that he was describing political behaviour, not making a psychological judgment.

He outlined three possible scenarios: a limited agreement, continued pressure through sanctions and military threats, or renewed escalation triggered by failed negotiations, Israeli pressure or miscalculation.

Rather than trying to predict Trump's next move, Rajaei urged Tehran to strengthen crisis management, civilian resilience and transparent public communication.

His warning comes as Washington continues to combine diplomatic signals with military and economic pressure.

On the eve of the midterms, Trump said a deal with Iran “could happen,” and Tehran has since conveyed proposals through Qatari mediators. Meanwhile, the US naval blockade and sanctions remain in place.

Reports of preparations for a larger US offensive and the expected arrival of an aircraft carrier group in the region have added to uncertainty.

The conflicting signals make it difficult for Tehran to distinguish genuine negotiating opportunities from attempts to extract concessions under pressure.

Trump's record of abrupt changes in negotiating positions, including his public rejection of Iran's account of the Islamabad memorandum in June, adds to the risks of relying on a sweeping agreement rather than limited, reciprocal steps.

Each reversal could also strengthen Iranian hardliners who argue that Washington cannot be trusted, echoing Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's November 4 warning against expecting changes in US policy simply because political control shifts between parties.

The three articles offer a snapshot of reformist thinking at a moment when Tehran faces competing pressures to negotiate and maintain its confrontational posture.

Haghshenas sees an opportunity that should be seized quickly. Sadri and Ghandriz argue that any agreement must withstand political opposition on both sides. Rajaei warns that Trump's electoral defeat could encourage escalation rather than compromise.

What unites them is a warning that Trump's electoral defeat is neither an Iranian victory nor a guarantee of American restraint.

Tehran hails economic pain in US as Iranians struggle to make ends meet

Nov 7, 2026, 08:42 GMT+0
•
Behrouz Turani
100%
A worker packs dates in Ghasr-e Shirin, western Iran, November 5, 2026

While Tehran celebrates Donald Trump's midterm defeat and the economic pain the Iran war has inflicted on Americans, soaring prices and stagnant wages are pushing ordinary Iranians deeper into a cost-of-living crisis at home.

Senior Iranian officials have come close to claiming credit for the Democrats' sweeping election victory, frequently pointing to US officials' acknowledgment that the war contributed to Republican losses.

Many Iranian newspapers have followed suit, dwelling on America's economic and political troubles while portraying Iran as a country growing stronger despite the war.

"Ever-Stronger Iran on the Road to Progress," one economic daily declared on its front page on Thursday. Another proclaimed "American Humiliation Continues," alongside a photograph of a seemingly dejected Trump.

The hardline daily Kayhan highlighted what it described as €127 billion in European losses resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, presenting the economic damage as a measure of Tehran's success.

Largely absent from those triumphant headlines was the economic crisis that matters most to ordinary Iranians: the soaring cost of living.

The labour-focused news agency ILNA offered a starkly different picture, reporting that the estimated cost of basic household necessities had nearly doubled in seven months to 85 million tomans a month, almost six times the monthly earnings of an ordinary worker.

Labour expert Hamid Haji-Esmaeili told ILNA that inflation had become "normalised" in the thinking of Iranian officials, criticising the government's inadequate response and calling for wages to be revised midway through the year.

Pay levels set at the beginning of the Iranian calendar year no longer reflected economic realities, he argued, warning that the crisis was no longer confined to low-income workers but also affected civil servants and large sections of the middle class.

Economist Ali Ghanbari, also quoted by ILNA, described Iran as facing a "livelihood crisis", warning of a severe decline in the purchasing power of lower-income households.

Another ILNA report highlighted delayed wage payments for contract workers in Iran's southern oil-producing regions, adding to the uncertainty facing employees already struggling with inflation.

Growing calls to expand food-support programmes suggest that wages alone are no longer sufficient to protect many households from the rising cost of essential goods.

Years of inflation, currency depreciation, sanctions and inadequate investment had already eroded living standards. Two rounds of war in 2025 and 2026, and the subsequent US blockade of Iran's maritime trade, have compounded those pressures.

The government's response has come under increasing criticism, particularly over its failure to adjust wages and pensions to reflect the rapidly rising cost of living.

Pensioners have been among the most vocal groups demanding action. ILNA reported calls for authorities to restore their purchasing power immediately, as housing, healthcare and other essential expenses consumed an increasing share of their incomes.

In another report, a representative of military pensioners' organisations criticised repeated discussions about wage increases that had produced no concrete results.

He warned against creating "false hope" among pensioners frustrated by promises of financial relief that have yet to translate into higher payments.

Pensioners are among Iran's more organised social groups and have staged repeated demonstrations in recent years over inadequate incomes and rising prices.

Yet the emphasis in hardline political rhetoric remains on the costs Iran has imposed on its adversaries.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its impact on international energy markets have been presented as evidence of Tehran's leverage over Western economies.

Such claims of success sit uneasily alongside accounts of hardship emerging from Iran's own media, where journalists operate under restrictions on reporting deemed damaging to the Islamic Republic's image.

For workers awaiting overdue wages and pensioners demanding relief, the economic pain inflicted on Iran's adversaries offers little consolation. Their immediate concern is whether they can pay next month's rent and put food on the table.