Visiting lecturer, Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA)
A supermarket refrigerator might seem an unlikely instrument of geopolitical confrontation. Yet France’s attribution of cyberattacks targeting refrigeration systems to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards brings a distant war into Europeans’ everyday lives.
With supermarkets in several other European countries also affected, this is more than a bilateral dispute between Paris and Tehran.
It raises a question Europe can no longer postpone: how should it respond to attempts to make European societies bear the costs of confrontation in the Middle East?
On November 10, France summoned Iran’s ambassador after publicly assigning responsibility for the attacks to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Tehran denied the allegations.
French prosecutors have requested international arrest warrants against several individuals linked to the Shahid Kaveh cyber unit. France’s decision to name the institution it holds responsible marks a political threshold.
Disrupting refrigeration can destroy stock, interrupt distribution and impose costs on businesses. It can also undermine public confidence in the authorities’ ability to protect ordinary routines.
This does not establish that the attackers could generate nationwide food shortages. But the implications extend beyond the immediate damage: civilian infrastructure can become vulnerable to a conflict that many Europeans consider geographically remote.
One dimension of France’s confrontation with Tehran is the deterioration of bilateral relations. French engagement with Iran has combined diplomatic dialogue and economic interests with disagreements over nuclear proliferation, regional security and human rights.
Iranian security institutions, however, appear to regard France’s diplomatic and cultural presence with suspicion.
The closure of the French Language Centre in Tehran, condemned by Paris in September, and reported attacks against embassy personnel illustrate the deterioration. Cultural institutions that maintain connections between societies have become pressure points in disputes between states.
Information operations exploiting social tensions in France can serve a similar purpose, increasing the domestic costs of confronting Tehran.
Tehran has long been suspicious of foreign engagement with Iranian civil society, often interpreting cultural contact and public criticism as potential subversion. Such an approach further narrows the space for normal diplomacy.
Another dimension concerns France’s military alliance with the United States, which exposes it to Iranian pressure despite its diplomatic opposition to the war.
France also maintains close security relationships with Washington’s partners in the Persian Gulf, including Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, countries that have faced Iranian retaliation in a war they did not seek.
These relationships help explain why Tehran may regard European states as part of the strategic infrastructure sustaining American power in the Middle East. Several European countries host US military bases, making them potential targets in a confrontation that extends beyond the region.
Iran’s top security official, Mohsen Rezaei, reinforced those concerns on Wednesday, warning that Tehran could strike US military bases in Europe and on distant islands if Washington attacked Iran again.
Such threats illustrate the possibility of horizontal escalation: widening a confrontation geographically and expanding the range of potential targets. Pressure on European territory could be intended to influence Washington indirectly while encouraging European governments to constrain American military action.
Cyber operations are particularly suited to this form of pressure because they can disrupt civilian activity while allowing those responsible to conceal or deny their involvement. Responsibility can remain contested even when governments believe their intelligence establishes a convincing chain of attribution.
Beyond cyber operations, Iran’s announcement that it has lifted its self-imposed 2,000-kilometer missile-range limit adds another dimension to this signaling.
The announcement does not, by itself, establish the deployment of reliable longer-range capabilities. It nevertheless suggests that previously asserted geographical restraints should no longer be taken for granted.
Europe should assess these developments together without treating them as identical threats. Cyber sabotage, hostage diplomacy, intimidation of diplomats, information operations and missile signaling involve different methods and require different responses.
Their possible convergence matters because each can contribute to an effort to deter European involvement through the threat of retaliation.
A credible European response must combine collective political action with practical protection. European governments should share evidence, coordinate investigations and strengthen the security of vulnerable commercial systems. Where responsibility is established, sanctions should target the institutions and individuals involved.
Existing measures also need effective enforcement; otherwise, successive announcements risk becoming largely symbolic. Businesses, meanwhile, need clear security guidance. Diplomatic statements alone cannot protect vulnerable equipment.
Maintaining dialogue with Tehran presents a further difficulty. Official denials by Iran’s Foreign Ministry do not necessarily reflect the activities of its security apparatus, often described as the country’s “deep state.”
Iranian intelligence networks have been accused of exploiting diplomatic access and cover for operations abroad. This creates a challenge for European governments seeking to preserve diplomatic engagement while guarding against the misuse of diplomatic privileges.
Diplomatic channels remain necessary to reduce the risk of miscalculation, but they require scrutiny and safeguards. Europe should make clear both the consequences of further attacks and the possibilities for de-escalation.
France’s attribution could become a European wake-up call if it leads to a common policy that protects civilian infrastructure, supports regional partners and preserves diplomatic engagement while guarding against its exploitation by Tehran’s security apparatus.
The Group of Seven (G7) foreign ministers warned on Wednesday that they would continue coordinating economic and political pressure on Iran if diplomatic efforts failed to produce an agreement addressing Tehran's nuclear program and regional security concerns.
In a joint statement following their November 9–10 meeting in Paris, the ministers expressed support for regional mediators seeking a lasting diplomatic settlement while reiterating that Iran must never be allowed to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon.
"Absent a diplomatic solution, we committed to continuing our coordination to economically and politically constrain the Iranian regime's ability to sow instability in the region and around the world," the ministers said.
The foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and the United States, alongside the European Union's foreign policy chief, called on Tehran to resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to restore transparency over its nuclear activities.
They also reaffirmed their commitment to enforcing UN sanctions reinstated against Iran in September 2025 through the snapback mechanism and urged other UN member states to implement the measures.
G7 raises alarm over alleged Iranian plots abroad
The ministers expressed grave concern over Iran's alleged involvement in violent plots targeting citizens and territories of G7 countries, specifically citing a September incident at a British military air base used by US forces.
"We also expressed grave concern over Iranian involvement in violent plots against many of our citizens and territories," the statement said.
The ministers acknowledged Britain's attribution of Iranian involvement in a September 27 incident at RAF Fairford, an air base in Gloucestershire that has hosted US bombers.
"Iran should be in no doubt that we are united and remain committed to safeguarding our sovereignty," they said.
British counterterrorism police arrested several suspects following a security alert at RAF Fairford after reports of suspicious vehicles approaching the base.
Two British nationals were subsequently charged under Britain's National Security Act, including one accused of assisting a foreign intelligence service believed to be Iranian.
On November 10, the US Justice Department separately announced charges against three men over an alleged network linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and implicated in attacks and attempted attacks in Europe and the United States, including the suspected RAF Fairford plot.
Iran has denied involvement, and the allegations have not been established in court.
Separately, US military aircraft were relocated from RAF Mildenhall, another British air base, amid security concerns.
The Associated Press reported Tuesday that 13 American aircraft, including aerial refueling tankers, had departed the base in eastern England for other military facilities in Europe.
A US official told AP the move was a precaution in response to a threat but did not identify its source. The Wall Street Journal reported that the threat was linked to Iran, citing people familiar with the matter.
There has been no public confirmation that the incidents involving the two bases were connected.
G7 rejects Iranian restrictions on Strait of Hormuz
The ministers strongly condemned Iranian attacks on neighboring countries and civilian vessels, as well as disruptions to international trade and energy supplies caused by restrictions on maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
They called on Tehran to cease attacks against commercial shipping and respect its obligations under international humanitarian law.
The G7 reaffirmed its opposition to "any tolls, fees, illegal costs, discriminations or any limitation imposed on maritime transit through the Strait."
The ministers also emphasized the importance of US Central Command's operations to clear naval mines and escort civilian vessels through the waterway.
They recognized a separate French-British initiative aimed at facilitating the resumption of commercial shipping, including by helping verify the removal of mines.
The statement underscored the importance of restoring safe and unrestricted passage through the strategic waterway, a major route for global energy exports that has faced severe disruption during the conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel.
G7 demands end to Iranian support for armed groups and Russia
The ministers urged Tehran to stop supporting nonstate armed groups across the Middle East, specifically calling for an end to Iranian weapons supplies and other assistance to Yemen's Houthis.
They condemned continued Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia, including attacks affecting civilians and infrastructure, and called for an immediate halt to military operations.
On Lebanon, the G7 reiterated that the disarmament of Hezbollah and other nonstate armed groups was essential to bringing all weapons under the authority of the Lebanese state.
The ministers also condemned Iran's military assistance to Russia in its war against Ukraine, alongside North Korean military support and Chinese supplies of weapons-related materials and equipment.
They said G7 members intended to continue taking action against countries enabling Russia's military campaign.
US President Donald Trump says the Iran war is effectively over militarily, but his plan to maintain a naval blockade raises questions about how long the standoff can last and whether it serves the interests of the Arab neighbors he says support it.
“Most importantly, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and others would prefer the status quo, that we remain as is,” Trump told reporters at the White House on Monday after meeting Qatar’s prime minister.
He described that approach as continuing the US naval blockade, while keeping American forces ready for renewed military action.
Speaking to reporters in Paris after meetings with G7 counterparts on Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said US sanctions and the naval blockade were inflicting growing economic damage on Iran, reducing the need for further major combat operations.
Regional analysts disagree over whether that policy offers Arab states across the Persian Gulf their safest option or prolongs a confrontation that threatens their security and economies.
Pressure without stability
Ghaith al-Omari, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and former executive director of the American Task Force on Palestine, offered the opposite assessment to Trump’s. Regional governments want a weaker Islamic Republic, he said, but that does not mean they favor an indefinite blockade.
“They would like to see the regime weakened, but they don't believe that the blockade serves their interests,” he told Iran International.
Even where oil continues to flow, insurance costs and the risk of further attacks weigh on regional economies. Prolonged uncertainty also threatens the stability underpinning investment, tourism, finance and logistics, he said.
“No war, no peace equals uncertainty, equals instability,” al-Omari said.
He argued that Arab governments across the Persian Gulf doubt Washington’s willingness to sustain the policy.Trump’s midterm setback has intensified concerns that domestic pressure could prompt an abrupt change, leaving neighboring countries to manage the consequences.
Without an agreement reopening the Strait of Hormuz and ending the conflict, some governments could seek separate arrangements with Tehran to reduce their exposure, he said.
Between a rock and a hard place
Dalia Ziada of the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) described the Arab states of the Persian Gulf as caught “between a rock and a hard place”: fearful of a resurgent Islamic Republic, yet harmed by the instability of a prolonged standoff.
“They don't want the Iranian regime to get strong again,” she told Iran International.
But continued insecurity carries its own economic consequences, threatening the region’s appeal to investors and confidence in its future.
“The biggest loss for the wealthy Gulf states is the lack of stability,” Ziada said.
She argued that differences among regional governments, combined with doubts about the reliability of American protection, complicate their choices. Their concerns cannot be reduced to a simple preference for war or continued restraint, she said.
One incident could break the standoff
Mohamed Fahmy, a journalist and Middle East political analyst, also sees significant differences among Iran’s Arab neighbors.
“There is no unified Gulf position on how long the blockade should continue,” he told Iran International.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE see value in maintaining American pressure until Tehran makes meaningful concessions, Fahmy said, while Qatar and Oman place greater emphasis on mediation.
Their shared interest in reducing the Iranian military threat does not eliminate the costs of prolonged confrontation.
“The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have invested heavily in presenting themselves as stable international hubs for business, tourism, finance and logistics. Prolonged confrontation threatens those ambitions,” he said.
Those concerns reflect damage already sustained. An October 15 Reuters investigation documented at least 135 missile and drone attacks by Iran and allied groups against at least 84 infrastructure sites across seven Arab countries since US-Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28. The tally covered infrastructure attacks, rather than every launch or attempted strike.
Fahmy said the standoff could continue for some time because Washington and Tehran both appear to believe waiting will improve their negotiating positions. But an attack killing American personnel or seriously damaging Persian Gulf energy infrastructure could trigger renewed military action.
“It takes only one serious incident involving American forces, a commercial tanker or a Gulf energy installation to undermine the current restraint,” he said.
Growing pressure in Washington over financial costs, military commitments and the absence of a clear exit strategy could instead encourage a negotiated settlement, he argued.
The case for staying the course
Saad bin Tefla Al-Ajmi, Kuwait’s former information minister, argues that maintaining the status quo remains the least harmful choice.
“The solution is to keep the status quo as is. That’s the best solution,” he told Iran International, referring to an article he supplied outlining his position.
Renewed war could bring further Iranian attacks on neighboring countries, he argues, while American withdrawal could leave them exposed.
“The third option is the safest and best for us, for the region and for the beleaguered peoples of Iran,” he wrote in the article.
Al-Ajmi advocates sustained naval and economic pressure alongside efforts to constrain Tehran’s regional armed allies. He predicts that pressure could eventually bring down the regime, although that outcome remains uncertain.
He acknowledges the costs to neighboring states.
“The Gulf states are indeed paying a price under this scenario. Their trade is disrupted, tensions persist in their airspace and their projects are delayed,” he wrote.
His support for maintaining that pressure rests on the judgment that the alternatives would be worse. The question is whether Washington and its regional partners can sustain it without an escalation that forces them back into war.
President Donald Trump’s talks with Qatar’s prime minister come amid a renewed diplomatic push to end the Iran war, but securing terms both Washington and Tehran can present as a victory remains a central obstacle, analysts told Iran International.
Trump and Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani met behind closed doors in the Oval Office on Monday, and Axios reported that their discussions focused on Iran. The Qatari prime minister also met Vice President JD Vance earlier in the day.
An Iranian official told Al-Monitor on Friday that the country’s nuclear program was “under discussion” with mediators. Tehran has said negotiations depend on Washington meeting its demands, including sanctions relief and the release of billions of dollars in frozen assets.
Trump needs a nuclear achievement to justify the war, not just the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, said Aaron David Miller, a former US Middle East negotiator now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“It’s the nuclear issue. He needs a win to justify this war,” Miller told Iran International.
“And I don’t know whether the Iranians are prepared to make that concession or what Trump would consider to be a win that they could accept. So I think that’s a huge problem.”
Who moves first?
The new round of diplomacy has not settled the basic dispute: whether economic and military concessions should come before progress on Iran’s nuclear program, or after.
Danny Citrinowicz, a former head of the Iran branch of Israeli military intelligence and now a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, said an interest in ending the war should not be mistaken for an agreement in sight.
“I believe both sides genuinely want to find a way to end this war, but that does not mean they are close to an agreement,” he told Iran International.
Iran wants Washington to meet its conditions on Hormuz, the naval blockade, oil exports and other economic restrictions before nuclear talks begin. Washington wants movement on the nuclear issue much earlier, he said. “The problem is not simply what each side wants, but who moves first.”
A breakthrough was possible, Citrinowicz said, if Washington accepted a different sequence of reciprocal steps. “Without meaningful American flexibility, however, I see little reason to expect Iran to abandon its red lines.”
Miller criticized the interim memorandum of understanding reached in June, which was meant to open the way to nuclear talks but collapsed soon afterward. It committed Washington to a sequence that favored Iran, he said, calling it “one of the worst negotiated documents in the history of US diplomacy.”
Two definitions of victory
Even if negotiators settle the order of steps, both governments would have to defend the concessions at home as achievements.
Trump could claim victory by reopening Hormuz, lowering energy prices, ending the fighting and securing an Iranian commitment not to build nuclear weapons, Citrinowicz said. Tehran would need an outcome it could present as a success too.
“After surviving months of attacks, the Iranian leadership is not going to accept an agreement that looks like surrender,” he said.
Iran could reopen Hormuz, stop attacks on shipping and regional infrastructure, return to nuclear talks and possibly accept tighter international monitoring, he said. In return it would expect real steps on sanctions, oil exports, frozen assets and guarantees against further attacks.
Miller doubted Trump’s wish to end the war would outweigh his fear of looking beaten. “I think he’d want to be done with this, but I don’t know if he’s prepared to spend the next three years being called a loser,” he said.
Eric Mandel, founder of the Middle East Political Information Network, said a deal could let Trump declare victory while leaving the nuclear dispute open.
“The president would like to have a diplomatic solution. The president is looking for victories. He may claim victories where there aren’t,” Mandel told Iran International.
Tehran was drawing out the talks to wait Trump out, Mandel said, and economic relief in exchange for promises of future nuclear concessions could throw the Islamic Republic a lifeline without securing lasting limits.
A meeting is not a breakthrough
Conflicting reports over a possible meeting between Vance and Iran’s security chief show how uncertain direct contact remains.
Turkey’s intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, said Qatar would host Vance and Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, next week, the Turkish newspaper Türkiye reported. The Tasnim news agency, which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, then quoted a senior Iranian security official as denying any meeting was planned and saying Washington must first act on Iran’s seven conditions.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Tuesday there were no plans for Rezaei to meet Vance. The war, he said, would end neither through military action nor through more sanctions. “The only way to end it is diplomacy and acceptance of the Islamic Republic’s conditions.”
Citrinowicz said Rezaei should not be expected to break with the Islamic Republic’s established positions. “He is deeply rooted in the Iranian political and security establishment,” he said. “He is not someone who can simply be persuaded to abandon the regime’s fundamental positions in exchange for an American offer.”
Rezaei is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice over his alleged role in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people. He and Tehran deny involvement. As commander of the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq war, he led the failed Karbala-4 offensive of December 1986, in which Iran suffered heavy losses.
The decisive question, Citrinowicz said, is whether Vance has Trump’s authority to offer something substantially different.
“A failed meeting could be more dangerous than no meeting at all,” he said. Trump might conclude that diplomacy had run its course and order more strikes to force concessions.
Continued economic pressure, indirect talks and a limited interim deal would remain options, he said, but failure to close the gaps could raise the risk of a return to war.
Four Iranian reformist intellectuals have urged Tehran to seize an opportunity for diplomacy following Donald Trump's midterm election defeat, while warning that the US president could respond to his political setback by escalating rather than ending the war.
Writing in three articles published in the reformist newspaper Etemad on Sunday, November 8, Mohammad-Javad Haghshenas, sociologist Mahmoud Sadri, international relations analyst Alireza Ghandriz and political analyst Alireza Rajaei offered differing assessments of what Democratic control of Congress could mean for negotiations.
Their shared premise is that the elections have raised the domestic cost of the war for Trump without removing his authority to wage it. Trump himself acknowledged that “part of it was Iran,” while defending his decision to attack.
Haghshenas, a former leader of the National Trust Party, offered the most optimistic assessment, arguing that Tehran should move quickly rather than wait for uncertain political developments in Washington.
Citing reports of a purported letter from Vice President JD Vance proposing direct talks, Haghshenas argued that Vance, a potential contender for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, had a political interest in ending a war that has damaged his party.
Echoing Qatar's prime minister, he urged both sides to accept a workable agreement rather than hold out for an ideal one.
Making a deal politically possible
Sadri and Ghandriz, writing jointly, argued that any agreement must be politically defensible in both Tehran and Washington.
They warned that Democratic opposition to Trump's handling of the war should not be mistaken for opposition to pressure on Iran.
President George W. Bush, they wrote, responded to the Republican defeat in the 2006 midterm elections by ordering a military surge in Iraq rather than withdrawing.
Citing the gradual normalisation of US-Vietnam relations in 1995 as a model, they proposed starting with limited humanitarian and maritime cooperation before expanding civil, academic and business ties.
Above all, they warned that presenting an agreement in Iran as an American surrender would undermine the very figures in Washington whose support would be needed to sustain it.
The danger of a wounded Trump
Rajaei offered the most guarded assessment, comparing Trump to a political gambler who might raise the stakes rather than accept a visible defeat. He stressed that he was describing political behaviour, not making a psychological judgment.
He outlined three possible scenarios: a limited agreement, continued pressure through sanctions and military threats, or renewed escalation triggered by failed negotiations, Israeli pressure or miscalculation.
Rather than trying to predict Trump's next move, Rajaei urged Tehran to strengthen crisis management, civilian resilience and transparent public communication.
His warning comes as Washington continues to combine diplomatic signals with military and economic pressure.
On the eve of the midterms, Trump said a deal with Iran “could happen,” and Tehran has since conveyed proposals through Qatari mediators. Meanwhile, the US naval blockade and sanctions remain in place.
Reports of preparations for a larger US offensive and the expected arrival of an aircraft carrier group in the region have added to uncertainty.
The conflicting signals make it difficult for Tehran to distinguish genuine negotiating opportunities from attempts to extract concessions under pressure.
Trump's record of abrupt changes in negotiating positions, including his public rejection of Iran's account of the Islamabad memorandum in June, adds to the risks of relying on a sweeping agreement rather than limited, reciprocal steps.
Each reversal could also strengthen Iranian hardliners who argue that Washington cannot be trusted, echoing Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's November 4 warning against expecting changes in US policy simply because political control shifts between parties.
The three articles offer a snapshot of reformist thinking at a moment when Tehran faces competing pressures to negotiate and maintain its confrontational posture.
Haghshenas sees an opportunity that should be seized quickly. Sadri and Ghandriz argue that any agreement must withstand political opposition on both sides. Rajaei warns that Trump's electoral defeat could encourage escalation rather than compromise.
What unites them is a warning that Trump's electoral defeat is neither an Iranian victory nor a guarantee of American restraint.
Qatar's prime minister held a 45-minute meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington on Monday amid regional efforts to end the Iran war, following an Iraqi prime ministerial visit to Tehran and a Turkish announcement of planned high-level US-Iran talks in Doha.
Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, who also serves as Qatar's foreign minister, met Vice President JD Vance separately before his talks with Trump, following a visit to Tehran last week.
The Qatari leader sought to persuade Trump to give diplomacy more time, Axios reported, citing sources familiar with the mediation. Vance has been personally involved in indirect negotiations with Iran over the past two weeks, speaking with Al Thani almost daily.
Qatar has been mediating a proposed agreement under which Washington would ease its naval blockade and release frozen Iranian funds, while Tehran would allow international nuclear inspections and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, said in a conference in Ankara on Monday that Qatar would host Vance and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohsen Rezaei next week, Türkiye newspaper reported.
Kalin said the planned Doha meeting could help advance negotiations between Washington and Tehran. He warned that failure to reach an agreement could lead to another US attack on Iran.
IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency subsequently cited an unnamed senior security official in Tehran as denying that such a meeting was planned.
“Iran’s policy and plans regarding negotiations have not changed, and until the American side takes practical action within the framework of the seven conditions, no plans for negotiations with the American side will be considered,” the official said.
The diplomatic activity followed talks in Tehran on Friday between Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi and Iran’s chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, according to IRGC-affiliated Fars news agency.
Citing an informed source, Fars said Zaidi’s visit lasted several hours and focused exclusively on Iraq’s efforts to end the war between Iran and the United States.
Ghalibaf outlined Iran’s “two-day plan” and said Washington needed to respect Iran’s rights within that framework for negotiations to advance, the source said.
Iran’s proposal would halt US bombing, ease sanctions and end the US blockade of Iranian ports in exchange for reopening Hormuz, with nuclear negotiations to follow, Reuters reported.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Sunday that a breakthrough was not imminent, describing Iranian conditions as “outrageous and ridiculous and really not realistic.”
The diplomatic push comes after President Donald Trump played down the prospect of escalating the war in a “60 Minutes” interview aired on Sunday.
“Well I’m not looking to. I don’t think there’s any reason to,” Trump said when asked whether he would escalate the conflict following the US midterm elections.
‘Seven-point agreement’
Speaking at “The Search for a New Regional Social Contract in the Middle East” conference in Ankara, Kalin said Turkey and other regional mediators were working on a seven-point agreement, with the main disagreement concerning which side should act first.
The proposed plan envisages lifting sanctions against Iran and releasing frozen Iranian assets. In return, Tehran would commit not to develop nuclear weapons, begin negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency and lift its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, according to Türkiye newspaper.
Kalin urged Tehran to show greater flexibility and warned that the next few days could be decisive.