With supermarkets in several other European countries also affected, this is more than a bilateral dispute between Paris and Tehran.
It raises a question Europe can no longer postpone: how should it respond to attempts to make European societies bear the costs of confrontation in the Middle East?
On November 10, France summoned Iran’s ambassador after publicly assigning responsibility for the attacks to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Tehran denied the allegations.
French prosecutors have requested international arrest warrants against several individuals linked to the Shahid Kaveh cyber unit. France’s decision to name the institution it holds responsible marks a political threshold.
Disrupting refrigeration can destroy stock, interrupt distribution and impose costs on businesses. It can also undermine public confidence in the authorities’ ability to protect ordinary routines.
This does not establish that the attackers could generate nationwide food shortages. But the implications extend beyond the immediate damage: civilian infrastructure can become vulnerable to a conflict that many Europeans consider geographically remote.
One dimension of France’s confrontation with Tehran is the deterioration of bilateral relations. French engagement with Iran has combined diplomatic dialogue and economic interests with disagreements over nuclear proliferation, regional security and human rights.
Iranian security institutions, however, appear to regard France’s diplomatic and cultural presence with suspicion.
The closure of the French Language Centre in Tehran, condemned by Paris in September, and reported attacks against embassy personnel illustrate the deterioration. Cultural institutions that maintain connections between societies have become pressure points in disputes between states.
Information operations exploiting social tensions in France can serve a similar purpose, increasing the domestic costs of confronting Tehran.
Tehran has long been suspicious of foreign engagement with Iranian civil society, often interpreting cultural contact and public criticism as potential subversion. Such an approach further narrows the space for normal diplomacy.
Another dimension concerns France’s military alliance with the United States, which exposes it to Iranian pressure despite its diplomatic opposition to the war.
France also maintains close security relationships with Washington’s partners in the Persian Gulf, including Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, countries that have faced Iranian retaliation in a war they did not seek.
These relationships help explain why Tehran may regard European states as part of the strategic infrastructure sustaining American power in the Middle East. Several European countries host US military bases, making them potential targets in a confrontation that extends beyond the region.
Iran’s top security official, Mohsen Rezaei, reinforced those concerns on Wednesday, warning that Tehran could strike US military bases in Europe and on distant islands if Washington attacked Iran again.
Such threats illustrate the possibility of horizontal escalation: widening a confrontation geographically and expanding the range of potential targets. Pressure on European territory could be intended to influence Washington indirectly while encouraging European governments to constrain American military action.
Cyber operations are particularly suited to this form of pressure because they can disrupt civilian activity while allowing those responsible to conceal or deny their involvement. Responsibility can remain contested even when governments believe their intelligence establishes a convincing chain of attribution.
Beyond cyber operations, Iran’s announcement that it has lifted its self-imposed 2,000-kilometer missile-range limit adds another dimension to this signaling.
The announcement does not, by itself, establish the deployment of reliable longer-range capabilities. It nevertheless suggests that previously asserted geographical restraints should no longer be taken for granted.
Europe should assess these developments together without treating them as identical threats. Cyber sabotage, hostage diplomacy, intimidation of diplomats, information operations and missile signaling involve different methods and require different responses.
Their possible convergence matters because each can contribute to an effort to deter European involvement through the threat of retaliation.
A credible European response must combine collective political action with practical protection. European governments should share evidence, coordinate investigations and strengthen the security of vulnerable commercial systems. Where responsibility is established, sanctions should target the institutions and individuals involved.
Existing measures also need effective enforcement; otherwise, successive announcements risk becoming largely symbolic. Businesses, meanwhile, need clear security guidance. Diplomatic statements alone cannot protect vulnerable equipment.
Maintaining dialogue with Tehran presents a further difficulty. Official denials by Iran’s Foreign Ministry do not necessarily reflect the activities of its security apparatus, often described as the country’s “deep state.”
Iranian intelligence networks have been accused of exploiting diplomatic access and cover for operations abroad. This creates a challenge for European governments seeking to preserve diplomatic engagement while guarding against the misuse of diplomatic privileges.
Diplomatic channels remain necessary to reduce the risk of miscalculation, but they require scrutiny and safeguards. Europe should make clear both the consequences of further attacks and the possibilities for de-escalation.
France’s attribution could become a European wake-up call if it leads to a common policy that protects civilian infrastructure, supports regional partners and preserves diplomatic engagement while guarding against its exploitation by Tehran’s security apparatus.
