Iranian media claim parliament speaker met Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei

Amin Yousefijam, a former Tehran police lieutenant who has lived in Canada since 2016, helped coordinate shipments of restricted equipment from the United States to Iran through the United Arab Emirates, the board found, according to the report.

The shipments included electronics, motors and other dual-use goods with both civilian and military applications. Global News reported that some of the materials could potentially be used in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

The deportation order was issued in July but only released to Global News this week. The board found that Yousefijam played an essential role in an operation that violated Canadian and US sanctions, although his involvement was more limited than that of his brother, Arash Yousefijam, who led the scheme.

Yousefijam was arrested in Toronto in 2021 and extradited to the United States, where he pleaded guilty to sanctions violations, the report said. After returning to Canada, he legally changed his name to Ameen Cohen.

The immigration board found that he intentionally failed to disclose his US conviction when applying for the name change, rejecting his explanation that he had been advised not to report convictions outside Canada.

The Canada Border Services Agency argued that Yousefijam posed a threat to national security. The board found insufficient evidence that he remained a security threat, however, and instead ordered his deportation on the grounds of membership in a criminal organization.

Global News quoted Yousefijam as saying he remained in Canada and was considering his legal options. He declined to say whether he had appealed the deportation order.

The case comes amid a broader Canadian effort to remove people with ties to the Islamic Republic, although Yousefijam's deportation is separate from proceedings targeting senior Iranian government officials.

According to Canada Border Services Agency figures, authorities had identified 40 senior Iranian officials living in Canada as of October 1. Two had been deported, eight had left voluntarily and two more were awaiting removal.

The meeting adds to signs that Moscow is positioning itself as both an ally of Tehran and a potential intermediary with Washington as diplomatic efforts remain deadlocked over Iran’s nuclear program and the sequencing of commitments.

Earlier this month, Putin said Russia was prepared to do everything it could to help resolve the crisis and subsequently conveyed Tehran’s position to US President Donald Trump. Neither the contents of the message nor Washington’s response was made public.

In Tehran on Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the two countries had “never” worked as closely as they do now, while Lavrov described Iran’s cause as “just” and said Russian specialists who left the Bushehr nuclear power plant during the war were gradually returning.

Yet Iranian media and commentators questioned how much Moscow could achieve as an intermediary given the fundamental differences between Tehran and Washington.

Tabnak, a news website considered close to Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, said Moscow could help by conveying messages, consulting with both capitals and supporting a political solution, but cautioned that no mediator could overcome the underlying disagreements on its own.

“As long as fundamental disagreements over the terms of an agreement persist, no mediator can guarantee success,” it wrote, citing differences over the sequencing of negotiations and the scope of commitments.

The reformist outlet Rouydad24 said there was little evidence Moscow had brought a comprehensive plan capable of breaking the deadlock.

“What has so far been presented by official Iranian and Russian sources points less to a ‘grand peace plan’ than to the continuation of Russia’s traditional role as a facilitator of dialogue,” it wrote.

Uranium emerges as key obstacle

A central obstacle in the diplomatic impasse is Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%.

Russian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, have indicated that Moscow is prepared to receive the stockpile, a move that could address one of the central concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.

Tehran, however, has rejected the idea of transferring its enriched uranium abroad and denied that nuclear negotiations with Washington are under way.

The position was reiterated during Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran on Tuesday. Rezaei told Munir that none of Iran’s enriched material would leave the country, describing it as a national asset intended for domestic use.

Before Lavrov’s arrival, conservative political activist Ali Gholhaki claimed Russia had been partly persuaded by an Iranian proposal, advanced when Ali Larijani was secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, to establish a framework for transferring uranium enriched to 60%.

But following the visit, Gholhaki said Lavrov had produced no tangible result and had left “without any particular achievement.”

The conservative newspaper Khorasan argued that negotiating over Iran’s enriched uranium could increase rather than reduce the danger of another attack.

It argued that while Iran did not possess a nuclear deterrent, its stockpile of highly enriched uranium itself acted as a form of deterrence by raising the risks of further US escalation.

Mohammad-Sadegh Alizadeh, a journalist interviewed by the conservative Farhikhtegan newspaper, said Tehran’s immediate priority should instead be ending the war on terms acceptable to Iran.

“Whether the Russians have agreed to accept Iran’s 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% is a secondary issue to be addressed later,” he said. “First, the question of ending the war must be settled.”

Doubts over Moscow’s interests

Doubts about Russia’s intentions extend beyond whether it can bridge the divide between Tehran and Washington.

Reformist journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi argued that Iranian decision-makers should nevertheless welcome any Russian initiative capable of stopping another war.

“Russian interference is an evil, of course, but compared with the prospect of another war, it is the lesser evil,” he wrote on Telegram.

Commentator Mehran Tabatabaei argued that Moscow’s approach to Iran remained subordinate to its negotiations with Washington over Ukraine.

“Russia will not take any positive steps until it resolves the Ukraine issue and obtains the concessions it wants from the United States over Ukraine,” he wrote.

Journalist Mohammad Aghazadeh offered a starker assessment, saying failure by Lavrov to make progress would suggest diplomacy itself was approaching a dead end.

“Either the current state of uncertainty will continue, or an intense war will begin,” he wrote, “one that will probably not be as easy to end as it is to start.”

Mehr, citing Iran’s Geological Survey, said some of the highest rates were recorded across the plains of Rafsanjan, Anar, Zarand and Sirjan, where annual subsidence was estimated at between 30 and 40 centimeters.

Several villages have already been affected, with cracks and fissures reaching areas close to residential buildings and agricultural land, the report said.

Groundwater depletion drives the damage

Excessive extraction of groundwater is the main driver of the subsidence, according to Mehr, with repeated droughts, declining rainfall, water-intensive farming and thousands of deep and semi-deep wells adding to pressure on underground reserves.

As groundwater is removed, underground soil layers compress and the surface sinks. That compaction is often irreversible, meaning the ground may not recover even if aquifers are later replenished.

Climate change and poor water management have added to the problem, the report said.

Ali-Asghar Zakeri Harandi, Kerman province’s deputy governor for development affairs, said continued depletion of groundwater was threatening infrastructure, farmland and settlements and could damage the province’s long-term development prospects without urgent action.

Farms, roads and villages at risk

The effects go beyond falling ground levels.

Subsidence can crack buildings, damage roads and energy pipelines and alter the structure of agricultural soil. Continued degradation can increase salinity and leave farmland less productive or, in some cases, unsuitable for cultivation.

That is particularly significant in southern Kerman, an important agricultural region where millions of tonnes of produce are grown annually.

Mehr said continued subsidence could threaten rural livelihoods and, over time, contribute to migration from affected settlements.

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  Nearly half of Iranians live in land subsidence zones, report warns

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  Land subsidence accelerating across major Iranian provinces, official warns

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  Iran’s ancient sites face rising land subsidence risk, experts warn

Problem has expanded across Iran

Kerman is part of a much broader national crisis.

Iran’s Geological Survey said in September that the area affected by land subsidence nationwide had expanded tenfold over eight years, with previously separate subsidence zones beginning to merge in some areas.

A report by parliament’s research center cited earlier this year estimated that around 39 million people, nearly half of Iran’s population, live in areas already affected by subsidence or at risk of its spread.

The report put the affected area at about 185,000 square kilometers, roughly 11% of the country, encompassing more than 380 cities and 9,200 villages.

Tehran also among worst-affected areas

Although Kerman is recording some of the country’s fastest rates of sinking, Tehran province is among the most extensively affected.

Around 1,630 square kilometers of Tehran province, about 12.5% of its area, is experiencing subsidence, according to the parliamentary research cited earlier this year.

The most exposed areas include the Varamin plain, parts of southwestern Tehran and the cities of Eslamshahr, Shahriar and Malard.

The capital’s increasing reliance on groundwater has added to the risk. Parliamentary research found that underground sources now provide a significantly larger share of Tehran’s water than they did at the start of the previous decade.

Deep wells add to pressure

Iranian officials have repeatedly linked the problem to uncontrolled groundwater extraction.

Ali Beitollahi, a researcher at the Road, Housing and Urban Development Research Center, said in July that Iran had 1,450 wells deeper than 300 meters and identified excessive pumping as one of the main factors worsening subsidence.

Recent incidents have illustrated the risks in urban areas. Vehicles have fallen into ground collapses in cities including Neyshabur and Isfahan, while officials have also raised concerns about damage to roads, railways, utility networks and historic sites.

Officials call for lower groundwater use

Mehr said curbing groundwater extraction was the most immediate step needed to slow the crisis.

The measures it cited included closing illegal wells, enforcing limits on pumping, shifting agriculture toward less water-intensive crops, expanding greenhouse farming and improving irrigation efficiency.

Reusing treated wastewater and, over the longer term, desalinating seawater have also been proposed as ways to reduce pressure on freshwater reserves.

But because much of the underground compaction is irreversible, experts say slowing further subsidence is more realistic than restoring land that has already sunk.

Yadollah Javani, the Revolutionary Guards' political deputy, warned on Wednesday, October 21, that vital internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz could be targeted if Iranian infrastructure came under attack.

The strait's importance to global oil and gas shipments may suggest that it holds similar significance for international internet traffic. Telecommunications data, however, paints a different picture.

According to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), five active submarine cable segments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for less than one percent of the world's international bandwidth.

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Telecommunications research firm TeleGeography identifies three major cable systems serving the route: Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1), FALCON and Gulf Bridge International (GBI).

The principal data routes linking Europe and East Asia pass through the Red Sea, meaning the strategic importance of Hormuz to global energy markets does not translate into equivalent influence over the internet.

Cables serving Iran's neighbors

Submarine cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz, according to TeleGeography, have been routed through Omani waters because of longstanding political considerations and difficulties in relations with Iran.

These cables primarily serve countries in the Persian Gulf, meaning an attack would pose a more immediate threat to regional connectivity than to the wider global internet.

Damage to submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz could disrupt international connectivity in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, although all four countries have alternative terrestrial connections. Saudi Arabia is less dependent on Persian Gulf cable routes, with most of its international bandwidth carried through systems landing on its Red Sea coast.

Why cutting cables does not mean cutting internet access

The global internet does not depend on a single network or point of failure. Telecommunications operators use multiple submarine and terrestrial routes to carry data and can redirect some traffic when a connection becomes unavailable.

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  IRGC-linked media hints at threat to Persian Gulf undersea internet cables

Such rerouting may reduce speeds, increase latency or disrupt certain services, but it does not necessarily disconnect users entirely.

Damaging a cable is also fundamentally different from depriving a country of internet access. The outcome depends on the number of affected routes, operators' dependence on them and the capacity remaining elsewhere in the network.

Mehdi Saremifar, a Canada-based technology expert, described earlier Revolutionary Guards threats against submarine cables as largely rhetorical in an interview with Iran International.

Referring to similar threats made by Iranian authorities during the summer, Saremifar said their calculations had used the total volume of global submarine cable traffic rather than the much smaller amount passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

"These cables carry much of the traffic for countries along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait, parts of Iraq, Jordan and Syria. That means traffic in these areas would be affected, but not all of it," Saremifar said.

Alternative terrestrial connections, including routes through Saudi Arabia and Egypt, could carry some of the displaced traffic, Saremifar said, adding that Iran's earlier threats had already encouraged consideration of backup routes.

"So it is neither a particularly far-reaching threat nor a particularly serious one," Saremifar said.

He also questioned the operational significance of the earlier warning, noting the institutional background of the Revolutionary Guards official who issued it. Evidence of actual naval movements toward the cables would warrant a different assessment, he said.

Damage could disrupt communications and economic activity in Persian Gulf commercial centres, but would not necessarily produce a prolonged internet outage, Saremifar added.

What the Red Sea disruptions reveal

Previous submarine cable failures have disrupted communications without shutting down internet access across entire regions.

In February 2024, three cables were damaged in the Red Sea, most likely by the dragging anchor of the Rubymar, a cargo ship struck by Houthi missiles. Repairs took six months, according to TeleGeography.

Four submarine cables were damaged in the Red Sea in September 2025, disrupting connectivity across parts of the Middle East and Asia, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In March 2024, damage to four cables off West Africa disrupted internet services in 13 countries. Operators rerouted some traffic through unaffected submarine and terrestrial networks, according to the Internet Society.

These cases illustrate an important distinction: the time required to repair a cable is not necessarily the length of the resulting internet disruption. Operators may restore some services through alternative networks before physical repairs are completed.

Security risks in the Persian Gulf could delay cable repairs by restricting access for specialized vessels. However, the availability of alternative submarine and terrestrial routes means delayed repairs would not necessarily cause a prolonged internet shutdown across the region.

Legal constraints on targeting submarine cables

Submarine communications cables are also subject to international legal protections.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea protects the laying and maintenance of submarine cables under Article 79, while Article 113 requires states to criminalize certain intentional or negligently caused damage to cables beneath the high seas.

Legal responsibility would depend on factors including the location of an attack, applicable jurisdiction and the international obligations of the countries involved.

During armed conflict, international humanitarian law also applies.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, civilian communications infrastructure is generally protected against direct attack unless it meets the specific criteria for becoming a military objective.

Military use of part of a communications network does not automatically make the entire network a lawful target. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must still be observed.

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These requirements are particularly relevant to cables carrying civilian communications for several countries simultaneously.

The gap between the threat and the internet's reality

Javani's warning follows earlier threats by Iranian officials against submarine internet infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.

Yet the Strait of Hormuz's limited share of international bandwidth, together with the availability of alternative routes, means that even substantial damage to cables in the area would not amount to a global internet shutdown.

The more immediate consequences could fall on Persian Gulf Arab states and businesses dependent on regional connectivity.

The threat therefore highlights a gap between the Revolutionary Guards' warnings and the technical and geographical limits of carrying them out: cables in the Strait of Hormuz can be damaged, but the global internet does not depend on them to remain operational.

Some applicants told Iran International they had been waiting since July for appointments despite already receiving preliminary approval from German authorities. They included healthcare and nursing professionals seeking work visas, as well as applicants using Germany’s fast-track procedure for skilled workers.

Some said the delays had caused language certificates or preliminary approvals to expire, forcing them to repeat parts of the process and pay additional costs.

Applicants say delays are costing them jobs

The protesters also include applicants for Germany’s Ausbildung system, which combines workplace training with classroom instruction and typically lasts between two and three-and-a-half years.

Applicants told Iran International that appointments had been released only in small numbers despite repeated protests and correspondence with German authorities. Some said they had lost job offers or places on vocational programs because they could not complete the visa process in time.

Thousands of people are reported to be waiting for appointments to submit German visa applications in Tehran.

Family reunification applicants have also protested

The latest gathering follows repeated protests by Iranians seeking other types of German visas.

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  Iranians protest outside German consulate over frozen visas since June war

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  Germany limits Tehran embassy services as it urges citizens to leave Iran

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  German embassy in Tehran keeps visa services suspended

Family reunification applicants have demonstrated outside the embassy in recent weeks, with some saying they have waited as long as two years for appointments or decisions.

Videos sent to Iran International showed applicants calling for faster processing and an end to prolonged uncertainty.

Students have faced similar delays, with some saying they risk losing university places because they cannot complete the visa process before their courses begin.

Embassy remains on emergency operations

Germany’s Foreign Office told Iran International in August that its embassy in Tehran remained open but that its consular and visa section was operating in emergency mode because of the security situation.

“The visa section is closed to regular visitors until further notice; no regular visa appointments are being issued,” the ministry said at the time.

Applications already submitted through the embassy or an external service provider were continuing to be processed where capacity allowed, and visas already approved could still be issued.

Berlin said the latest crisis had worsened problems that had already affected the visa section since June last year, when conflict between Iran and Israel forced several foreign embassies to reduce or suspend consular operations.

Germany also said staffing had been affected by restrictions imposed by Iranian authorities on diplomatic accreditations.

Germany offers limited alternatives for some visa applicants

Germany’s Foreign Office told Iran International in August that it had introduced alternative arrangements for some Iranians affected by the reduced visa services in Tehran.

Family reunification applicants who had already joined the embassy’s waiting list were being contacted to submit applications in Istanbul through the International Organization for Migration’s Family Assistance Programme. Priority was being given to people whose appointments in Tehran had been canceled because of the war.

The ministry also said visa provider TLScontact was issuing appointments to some applicants with preliminary approval under Germany’s fast-track skilled-worker procedure.

Since July, new waiting lists have also been opened for several national visa categories, including students and doctors, although German authorities had not said when those applicants would receive appointments.