Trump says Iran wants deal but ‘doesn't know how’

Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, told state-owned Press TV on Sunday night that Tehran was prepared for renewed conflict and could target critical technology infrastructure across the Middle East.

He said valuable American assets in the United Arab Emirates and around the Strait of Hormuz had not yet been included among Iran’s targets, but Tehran was prepared to demonstrate new capabilities to strike them. He claimed those assets and the region’s digital infrastructure were worth more than $2 trillion.

“Every miscalculation by the enemy against Iran has resulted in a heavy defeat for them; the next mistake will bring new fronts and greater surprises,” Rezaei wrote on X on Monday.

Hardliners urge pressure on US technology interests

Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, argued in an article titled “Why Is Artificial Intelligence on the Target List?” that attacks on AI centers could undermine US technological competition with China, deter investment and put pressure on US stock markets.

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  Iran finds a new weapon beneath Hormuz

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the hardline Kayhan newspaper and the supreme leader’s representative at the publication, welcomed Rezaei’s threat in an article titled “Well Done, Brother Mohsen!”

He called for using fiber-optic cables running through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to pressure Washington and its allies. He claimed that nearly seven major international cable systems pass through the region and that damage to them could disrupt more than 80 percent of commercial, banking, military and AI-related communications.

Kayhan also accused what it called “Western-oriented” political factions of double standards over internet access. It quoted Shariatmadari as predicting that politicians and parties “not fully aligned with the revolution” would oppose Rezaei’s threat and portray it as fueling war.

“The reformists had previously described internet shutdowns [in Iran] as a cause of deep dissatisfaction and called for stable, free and secure internet access for the public. But now that this same internet has become a strategic weapon for Iran against the United States, they have either remained silent or opposed it in the language of peace,” the article said.

Political analyst Ruhollah Rahimpour, however, told Iran International that while Iran could technically and operationally damage data centers and communications infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, the impact would primarily fall on regional networks rather than seriously affect the global internet.

Such attacks could raise the cost of war for other countries, he said, but also widen the conflict and impose greater security and economic costs on Iran.

Mohsen Zanganeh, a member of parliament’s knowledge-based companies and technology faction, endorsed Rezaei’s warning in an interview with ANA news agency, saying it reflected technological realities.

He said many data centers operated by major technology companies, most of them American, and the main communications routes connecting them were located in countries along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf.

Attacks could damage equipment, cloud networks and processing systems while disrupting US military operations, Zanganeh argued. Because Arab countries host both US bases and American technology infrastructure, he said, the consequences could spread to other countries and increase the global economic cost of war, as had happened in the energy sector.

WANA News described Rezaei’s remarks as an attempt to deter military action by raising its potential cost, saying a declaration of readiness did not necessarily signal a decision to launch operations.

Warnings amid strained diplomacy

Rezaei’s threats came alongside indications of continued differences between Tehran and Washington.

In a separate post on X on Sunday, he said the United States had accepted some of Iran’s seven conditions, but Tehran considered its response insufficient.

“Iran’s diplomacy has changed, and we will not return to the previous situation,” he wrote.

Mostafa Najafi, a commentator supportive of Rezaei, interpreted the remarks as a sign that the two sides remained far from an agreement.

“This position by the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council means that negotiations between Iran and the United States are a long way from an agreement and much closer to tensions,” he wrote on X.

The infrastructure threats also drew criticism on social media.

One user, Mohammad Nikbakht, questioned why Rezaei was announcing potential targets and argued that attacks would encourage Arab countries to unite against Iran.

Another commenter warned that threats without the capability to carry them out could backfire, drawing a comparison with Iran’s efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz, which the commenter said had resulted in a naval blockade of Iran.

“We are much more worried about miscalculations by our country’s executive officials than about miscalculations by the enemy,” a different user wrote.

“The exploitation of children is a horrific crime and we work aggressively to fight it on and off our platforms,” a Meta spokesperson told HRANA. “We investigated the information provided by HRANA and identified external links to underage marriage services. We have removed these entities from Meta platforms.”

Google separately told the group: “The app was removed from Google Play on October 9 for violating our policies.”

HRANA said the action followed an Oct. 8 investigation and a joint appeal by 24 civil society groups urging the companies to remove the app and strengthen protections against services facilitating underage marriage.

The platform had previously drawn scrutiny after Iran’s reformist Shargh newspaper reported in November 2025 that parents could register children as young as 13 as marriage candidates. Reporters were able to create a full profile for a girl born in 2012 without encountering an age restriction or identity barrier.

Shargh said profiles of users under 18 were concentrated in poorer regions where early marriage is more common, with girls most frequently listed between the ages of 13 and 16 and boys between 16 and 18.

The platform’s executive manager, Mohammad-Hossein Asghari, defended the policy at the time, saying Iranian law obliged the service to accept users who fell within the statutory marriage ages.

“Article 1041 of the Civil Code sets the marriage age at 13 for women and 15 for men,” Asghari said. “From a legal standpoint we are obliged to accept membership and cannot block someone who falls within the age range set by law.”

Around 300,000 people had attempted to register with the platform and about 70,000 profiles were active following identity checks and psychological screening, according to Asghari. Minors under 15, he said, were required to have a parent complete the registration form and staff would speak directly with the child before approval.

Child-rights advocates quoted by Shargh warned that formalizing marriage involving minors through a widely promoted digital platform risked further normalizing the practice.

Iran’s Statistical Center recorded about 25,900 marriages involving girls under 15 in 2022, down from roughly 32,000 a year earlier.

Messages presented at Woolwich Crown Court showed Mostafa Sepahvand seeking a meeting with a man saved in his phone as “Navid Embassy ‌Bro,” while separate exchanges detailed his demands for money and assurances relayed by contacts in Iran.

Sepahvand, 41, is on trial alongside Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57. All three deny charges under Britain’s National Security Act.

Prosecutors allege they gathered information for Iranian intelligence in preparation for serious violence against at least one target, with Sepahvand expected to carry out an attack and the other two helping to prepare it. The alleged targets included Iran International journalists Mojtaba Pourmohsen and Kambiz Hosseini.

In a message to Navid dated March 28, 2025, Sepahvand wrote: “hello bro, are you well [w]ill come to see you at the embassy”.

Navid replied that something was troubling him and that he would explain that evening.

The contact was saved under the Persian name “Navid Barar Sefarat,” rendered in court as “Embassy Bro,” and associated with a UK telephone number. The exchanges presented did not establish his role or whether he worked for an embassy. The quoted message did not identify which embassy Sepahvand meant.

A day later, Sepahvand sent Navid a link to an auction listing for a 2024 Mercedes-Benz GLE 450.

On April 2, he wrote: “Brother I am waiting for you call me [w]ill send this friend of mine there”.

Further exchanges followed on April 3. When Sepahvand asked Navid to answer, Navid replied that he was on the phone. An April 30 message asking why Navid had not responded went unanswered.

The purpose of the proposed meeting and any connection between those exchanges and the alleged surveillance operation were not established in the messages described in court.

In separate communications with Mostafa Ghorbani, Sepahvand discussed the financial costs of locating individuals and promises to resolve his legal difficulties in Iran.

In a March 20 voice recording, previously aired during the trial, Sepahvand said he had been promised £150,000 as well as help with his court case if he completed the task.

“They have sent me £3,500, and they keep sending me fifty addresses,” he said, complaining about the money he had spent visiting locations.

Ghorbani also relayed assurances that Sepahvand’s case would be resolved once the work was done, that he would be provided with a house and that people would meet him at the airport.

Sepahvand repeatedly complained that the addresses supplied to him proved incorrect and that the work exposed him to arrest. In a March 20 voice message, he described it as “very seriously illegal” and demanded money to cover expenses.

He said locating the individuals required people to attend addresses and keep watch, and that others would be unwilling to take those risks without payment.

The hearing also examined Sepahvand’s communications with Vahid Malmir, whom he repeatedly questioned about a possible role in criminal investigations.

“I knew from very first day that you were with the criminal investigation department, but I couldn’t bring myself to say it,” Sepahvand wrote on March 28.

In another message, he asked: “Tell me the truth are you an officer with the criminal investigation”.

Malmir responded with assurances that he was at Sepahvand’s service, without explicitly confirming such a role.

Later exchanges returned to Sepahvand’s demands for a formal resolution of his Iranian case.

On April 25, he complained that he had repeatedly been told the matter was resolved even though no court ruling had been issued. He said he would stand at the previously discussed addresses if the ruling came through.

The following day, he claimed that a contact named Amin was threatening him and had said his case would not be resolved until he took action.

In earlier sessions, jurors heard evidence about photographs of locations associated with the journalists, information about Hosseini’s social media accounts and communications concerning Iran International’s offices.

Prosecutors have said Sepahvand’s wish to resolve his Iranian criminal conviction was relevant to his motivation. Jurors were previously told not to treat the conviction itself as evidence against him.

According to the prosecution’s account of his defense, Sepahvand accepts conducting surveillance for Iran but says he feared the consequences of refusing and deliberately did a poor job. Prosecutors reject that explanation.

Javadi Manesh and Noori accept visiting locations and taking photographs and videos but say they did not know they were assisting Iranian intelligence.

The group recorded at least 63 armed incidents between March 31 and October 10, especially in Sistan and Baluchestan province.

The escalation has coincided with the US and Israeli conflict with Iran. HRANA said Iranian authorities had focused much of their attention on western and northwestern Iran while a sustained pattern of armed attacks and security operations developed in the southeast.

Attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys were the most common incidents, with 17 recorded cases, followed by 14 targeted shootings. Seven of the shootings occurred outside victims' homes or workplaces or along their commuting routes.

HRANA also reported a shift toward heavier weapons and more complex attacks.

On October 2, a vehicle allegedly linked to the IRGC Quds Force's Fatemiyoun Brigade was targeted with a booby trap and gunfire near Zahedan.

Five days later, an attack on a police headquarters in Jalegh reportedly involved mines, rocket-propelled grenades and semi-heavy weapons. On October 9, a roadside bomb struck the route of a police convoy near Zahedan.

The People’s Fighters Front, an alliance formed in December 2025 that includes Jaish al-Adl and smaller Baluch armed groups, claimed six of the attacks documented by HRANA, while Ansar al-Furqan claimed one. Most attacks remained unclaimed or could not be reliably attributed, HRANA said.

Government forces also used drones, artillery, armored vehicles and heavy weapons in several operations, HRANA said. In Jahadabad, Gharibabad and Manzalab, homes and sites of armed confrontations were demolished, blown up or set on fire.

The report warned that the use of such weapons in residential areas increased the risk of civilian casualties and property damage.

The region has a long history of clashes between Iranian security forces and Sunni Baluch militants. Jaish al-Adl emerged around 2012 as a successor to Jundullah and has repeatedly targeted security forces, including in a 2019 suicide bombing that killed 27 Revolutionary Guards.

RAF Fairford in southwest England, which had been used by US bombers to carry out strikes on Iran, became the focus of a major security operation after five British men were arrested nearby in the early hours of Sept. 27 on suspicion of terrorism and explosives offences.

US officials have said the suspected plot involved a drone attack. President Donald Trump said last week that an Iran-linked threat had prompted the United States to withdraw its bombers from the base.

“I can confirm our assessment that it is highly likely to have been coordinated in Iran, almost certainly directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard,” Prime Minister Andy Burnham told parliament.

Iran has denied involvement. Iran’s ambassador to Britain, Seyed Ali Mousavi, on Monday rejected any Iranian role in the suspected plot and said Tehran was willing to cooperate with British authorities investigating the incident, state news agency IRNA reported.

Details of the suspected plot remain limited. The five British men were later released on police bail under what authorities described as stringent conditions. Two other arrested men, including a British-Iranian national, were also released.

Police said petrol was found in vans seized during the investigation but no viable explosive was discovered.

“We will not tolerate these threats on our soil,” Burnham said. “We will crack down on Iran's use of criminal networks, using our full range of powers to target them and their funding streams, and we will bring further sanctions to restrict the capacity of Iran and the IRGC to do us harm.”

Sanctions and diplomatic summons

Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said he had instructed his department to summon Iran’s ambassador.

“Iran’s continued attempts to undermine the security of the United Kingdom and international partners through its criminal networks, proxy groups and state-backed malign activity is unacceptable,” Miliband said.

Britain also sanctioned Ruhollah Bazghandi and Shahram Ali Reza Tamarzadeh Jakki under its Iran sanctions regime.

The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office said Bazghandi, whom it identified as the IRGC’s head of counterespionage operations, was suspected of planning or conducting espionage for Iran and of involvement in threatening, planning or conducting attacks against people and assets in Britain or other countries.

Jakki was sanctioned for allegedly supporting or assisting activity involving threats, plans or attacks against people outside Iran. Britain described him as a facilitator for the already sanctioned Zindashti criminal network, which it says has been involved in plots targeting Iranian dissidents.

Joint condemnation

Foreign ministries from nearly 30 countries, including the United States, Canada, France and Germany, issued a joint statement condemning “Iran’s use of violent attacks, including the acts of lethal plotting, arson, sabotage, cyber-attacks, and other hybrid activities against us and our partners.”

“The UK has also concluded this event demonstrates the IRGC’s continued willingness to project hostile activity beyond its borders through covert networks and proxy actors,” the statement said.

British authorities have for years accused Iran of involvement in plots and attempted assassinations in Britain using criminal networks and proxies, allegations Tehran has repeatedly denied. Britain said last year that it had identified 20 credible Iran-backed threats to kill or kidnap people based in the UK.

In July, Britain used new state-threat powers to ban support for the IRGC and Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya, or HAYI, a linked group that had claimed responsibility for seven attacks earlier this year targeting sites connected to Jewish and Israeli communities and Persian-language media.