Iran's hardline Kayhan newspaper accused former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of undermining national security and helping Washington by depicting the Revolutionary Guards as a threat.
Kayhan, whose editor is appointed by Iran's supreme leader, accused Zarif on Saturday of attacking the country's security institutions whenever the United States faced difficulties.
“Indeed, one must ask him: Why, precisely at moments when the United States finds itself deadlocked and helpless in the face of Iran's power, do you give the enemy breathing room by launching a suicidal attack on the arms of national security?” the daily wrote.
The criticism followed the circulation of an older video of Zarif criticizing Tehran's approach to neighboring countries.
In the footage, Zarif said Iran's tendency to view the region through the lens of security threats explained why its ambassadors were representatives of the Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guards' overseas operations arm, rather than conventional diplomats.
"If we see the region as a threat, our ambassadors must be representatives of the Quds Force. If we see it as an opportunity, our ambassadors must be businesspeople and diplomats," Zarif said.
Pointing to longstanding disputes between hardliners and other factions within the Islamic Republic over the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the JCPOA, Zarif argued that the country's political factions should stop dwelling on past disputes and focus on building the future.
Zarif, who served as foreign minister from 2013 to 2021, has previously defended Iran's regional military capabilities while arguing for greater reliance on economic cooperation and diplomacy.
His criticism reflects a longstanding disagreement within the Islamic Republic over the balance between military influence and diplomatic engagement in foreign policy.
The dispute is resurfacing as economic strangulation, US military pressure and growing public unrest intensify the struggle within the Islamic Republic over who bears responsibility for the country's predicament and how the system should respond.
A revisionist argument is emerging in Tehran over Iran’s nuclear strategy: that its longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity failed its most important test when it did not deter the United States and Israel from attacking, and should now be reconsidered.
Nezamoddin Mousavi, a former conservative lawmaker with longstanding ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), gave unusually explicit expression to that argument this week, declaring that “nuclear ambiguity did not prevent war” and raising the prospect of revisiting Iran’s nuclear doctrine and even its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Mousavi, who helped found IRGC-linked media outlets, made the remarks in an interview with Ensaf News, a website close to President Massoud Pezeshkian.
Senior Iranian officials have previously hinted that Tehran could change its nuclear doctrine if sufficiently threatened. But such warnings have generally been directed outward, rather than framed as criticism of an established policy favored by slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Mousavi, however, is effectively arguing that a policy intended to preserve strategic uncertainty while stopping short of weaponization failed to provide the deterrence its architects expected.
That diagnosis feeds into a wider debate over what lesson Iran should draw from the war: whether the failure was one of deterrence, requiring greater military leverage, or of escalation management, requiring a different approach to diplomacy.
Iran has long cited Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons when confronted with accusations that it might seek a bomb.
Critics, however, have questioned how absolute that prohibition would prove in an existential crisis, especially since Khamenei’s predecessor and founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, held that preserving the state was paramount, taking precedence even over religious obligations.
Against that backdrop, Mousavi said Tehran should reassess its international commitments, the value of NPT membership and its broader deterrence strategy following attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
He stopped short of explicitly advocating the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
His reasoning amounts to three premises and a conclusion: Iran refrained from building a nuclear weapon; ambiguity was supposed to contribute to deterrence; yet Iran was attacked and senior leaders and military commanders were killed. The assumptions underlying Iran’s deterrence strategy, he argues, must therefore be reconsidered.
Beyond Khamenei
Mousavi also ventured into another sensitive subject: whether Khamenei’s death would fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic direction.
He argued that he would not expect dramatic change. Foreign and security policy, he said, is not simply the product of one individual but of institutional thinking and long-term calculations developed over decades.
It reflects a distinctly conservative view of regime continuity: leaders matter, but institutions matter more. Major strategic directions, in this reading, are unlikely to change abruptly regardless of who occupies the highest office.
That also gives the nuclear debate greater significance. If Iran’s strategic direction is fundamentally institutional rather than dependent on one leader, the lessons the establishment draws from the war could outlast the present leadership.
Deterrence or de-escalation?
Not everyone in Tehran is drawing the same lesson.
An article published Wednesday in Etemad newspaper highlighted a competing strand of Iranian political thinking. Where Mousavi sees a failure of deterrence, more moderate voices see a failure to manage escalation.
The hardline argument holds that the United States and Israel seek to weaken Iran regardless of its diplomatic behavior and that negotiations cannot guarantee security while military pressure continues.
The more moderate argument sees the conflict as the product of a broader strategic environment shaped by political, regional, military and economic pressures. For this camp, the lesson is not necessarily that Iran needs greater deterrence, but that it needs more effective crisis management.
The emerging argument in Tehran, then, appears to be shifting from how this war ends to what lesson should be drawn from it: whether greater military and potentially nuclear deterrence offers the best protection against another conflict, or whether security ultimately depends on preventing the next escalation before it begins.
Iran has sharpened its criticism of a Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey defense pact after it became operational, warning against intervention in Yemen and questioning Pakistan’s role as a mediator between Tehran and Washington.
The trilateral pact entered its operational phase on October 5 following an escalation in Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi infrastructure. Turkey and Pakistan said they had begun taking measures to support Saudi Arabia.
Under arrangements discussed by the three countries, Pakistani and Turkish forces are expected to provide military, technical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia, including defensive capabilities inside the kingdom. Officials have said the forces will not take part in offensive operations in Yemen.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei, asked on Sunday about reports that tens of thousands of Pakistani troops could be deployed to Saudi Arabia, said: “We have also heard this rumor, and we hope it is not true.”
“The countries of the region are well aware that any intervention in the Yemen issue could have undesirable consequences for the region,” he added, expressing hope that pacts such as the Mecca agreement would not be used “against the interests and welfare of the Muslim community.”
The Saudi Arabia-Turkey-Pakistan defense pact, signed in August in Mecca, stipulates that an attack on any one of the three countries will be treated as an attack on all three.
‘Begging for security’
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, without directly referring to the pact, called on neighboring countries to pursue “self-reliance” and a policy based on “genuine brotherhood.” He also said such agreements would not constrain Iran.
Several lawmakers dismissed the pact as largely symbolic. Ahmad Bakhshayesh, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, called it a “paper and political pact.”
Sharper criticism came from committee member Ebrahim Rezaei.
“The Saudis should know that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan will not bring them security, just as years of one-sided milking of the Americans did not bring them security,” he wrote on X. “Correct your policies so that you do not have to beg others for security.”
That tone has hardened as the pact has moved into its operational phase.
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Thursday that Turkish and Pakistani involvement in the Saudi conflict with Ansarullah, as the Houthis are formally known, would neither weaken the group nor restrict its ability to operate in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
“The entry of Pakistan and Turkey will definitely work to their own detriment,” he told ISNA. “They should learn from history ... Saudi Arabia once had a coalition with a large number of countries, but after seven years of war in Yemen, it was defeated.”
‘Regional intervenor’
Iranian criticism has focused more heavily on Pakistan than Turkey, in large part because of Islamabad’s prominent role in mediating between Tehran and Washington.
Lawmaker Ahmad Naderi wrote on X that “Pakistan’s entry alongside Saudi Arabia into the war against the people of Yemen … shows that Pakistan should no longer be considered a mediator but a regional intervenor.”
The Tabnak news website went further, saying Iran viewed the deployment of Pakistani forces to Saudi Arabia as a threat to its security and “will not tolerate Pakistan’s military presence for military operations in the Yemen war.”
It also warned that Pakistan’s increasingly overt alignment with Saudi Arabia could heighten sectarian tensions at home and bring instability to the Iranian-Pakistani border.
Conservative commentator Hassan Hanizadeh similarly accused Saudi Arabia of seeking to create a religious divide, describing a recent meeting in Riyadh involving Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials as a sign of “the formation of a Shiite-Sunni polarization in the region.”
Boroujerdi pointed to potential domestic opposition in Pakistan, saying its people were “revolutionary, Muslim and highly sensitive to such issues” and that Islamabad would not have an easy path if it entered the war.
‘Alliance against the oppressed?’
Iranian state media have adopted a more confrontational tone as the pact has become operational, while giving extensive coverage to warnings from Houthi officials directed at Turkey and Pakistan.
Tasnim described the development as “Turkey and Pakistan join the Saudi war against the Yemeni people,” while Nour News, which is close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, asked: “Mecca alliance or alliance against the oppressed people of Yemen?!”
In a Thursday commentary, Tasnim warned that if Ankara and Islamabad participate in attacks on Yemen, “they may be directly harmed through attacks on their ships, interests and perhaps even their own territory.”
An editorial questioning Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf’s role as Iran’s lead negotiator has raised an awkward question in Tehran: who exactly is Kayhan criticizing, given that senior officials have said the parliament speaker was given the job with the Supreme Leader’s approval?
In a sharply worded column Wednesday, Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari argued that Ghalibaf’s appointment had effectively sidelined parliament for seven months and said those responsible should explain why they had allowed one of Iran’s central institutions to become largely inactive during wartime.
“If those who made this decision knew that its consequence would be the closure of parliament, they must answer this question: What was their purpose in shutting down parliament?” he wrote. “And if they were unaware of the consequence, that is regrettable.”
Iran’s parliament largely suspended its normal work following the outbreak of war in February, with security conditions and Ghalibaf’s negotiating responsibilities limiting its activities.
‘Coordinated with the Leader’
The criticism is striking because Mahmoud Nabavian, a senior hardline lawmaker, said on April 10 that Khamenei had specifically stipulated that Ghalibaf should lead negotiations with Washington.
Nabavian said the selection had been made “with the opinion and coordination of the leadership.”
Ghalibaf has played a central role in talks with Washington since negotiations began in Islamabad in April. He subsequently said he had not volunteered for the role and took it on following a decision by the country’s governing institutions, while describing the negotiations as having proceeded with Khamenei’s authorization.
Shariatmadari did not name Khamenei or directly question his role in the appointment. But his criticism leaves unclear whom he holds responsible for a decision publicly attributed to Iran’s highest authority.
Who watches the negotiator?
The Kayhan editor went further, arguing that Ghalibaf’s roles as parliament speaker and chief negotiator were fundamentally incompatible.
Parliament is responsible for overseeing the negotiating team, Shariatmadari wrote, meaning Ghalibaf is effectively expected both to supervise the negotiations and to be subject to that supervision.
The argument amounts to a challenge to Ghalibaf’s continued combination of the two roles while negotiations with Washington remain unresolved.
Shariatmadari, a longtime hardline figure appointed to Kayhan by the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, publicly clashed with Ghalibaf in August over his support for negotiations.
Ghalibaf responded by defending diplomacy as a tool of statecraft, writing that negotiations were neither inherently valuable nor taboo and that Iran should “talk when necessary, and fight when necessary.”
Ghalibaf has also acknowledged divisions within the establishment, criticizing both those who reject diplomacy altogether and those he accuses of advocating concessions to Washington.
Shariatmadari’s latest intervention goes further. Rather than challenging Ghalibaf over what he is negotiating, it questions whether the parliament speaker should have been given the job in the first place.
A senior hardline Iranian lawmaker has been named in an allegation involving unauthorized excavation for antiquities and treasure, while parliament is also examining a reported excavation case involving an unnamed member of the legislature.
Investigative journalist Yashar Soltani said he had obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, a lawmaker from Qom and a figure associated with the hardline Paydari Front, was involved in unauthorized digging for historical artifacts and treasure.
“After oil, the Paydari camp is now after treasure,” Soltani wrote on X on Tuesday.
“I have obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, the lawmaker representing Qom, was involved in unauthorized excavation in search of historical artifacts and treasure,” he added.
Soltani did not publish the documents or say where or when the excavation allegedly took place. The allegation has not been independently verified, and Zolnouri has not publicly responded.
Parliament examining excavation case
Journalist Zahra Abdollahi separately said the issue of a lawmaker involved in excavation for buried treasure had been raised at a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee and referred to the body that oversees lawmakers’ conduct.
“At a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee, the issue of a lawmaker’s misconduct in connection with digging for treasure and buried antiquities was raised, and it was decided that the matter should be reviewed by the board overseeing lawmakers’ conduct,” she wrote on X.
Abdollahi did not identify the lawmaker, meaning there is no public evidence establishing that the parliamentary case concerns Zolnouri.
She said she had obtained an official document addressed to a prosecutor concerning excavation at a residential property in a historically sensitive area. According to her account, the letter called for the work to be halted.
Abdollahi said she planned to release further details of the document.
Paydari link comes amid oil-sales scrutiny
Soltani tied his latest allegation to a separate controversy surrounding Iran’s sanctions-era oil sales.
“I previously said that one of the four recipients of 85 million barrels of oil was the son-in-law of the Paydari Front spokesperson,” he wrote.
The reference was to Ruhollah Razavi, whose name has appeared in reporting on the network of trusted intermediaries, known in Iran as “trustees,” used to sell sanctioned oil and move the proceeds back to the country.
The wider system has come under growing scrutiny over billions of dollars in oil revenues that were not returned to Iran. An Iran International investigation found that members of one network collectively failed to repatriate $11 billion, while confidential documents showed 86 million barrels of oil had been assigned to four intermediaries who already owed money from previous sales.
Iran International also reported this week that senior IRGC commander Hossein-Reza Sadeghi and his son Saeed played central roles in efforts to preserve an IRGC Intelligence oil-sales network and shift its financial operations from the United Arab Emirates to Russia.
Two surveys emerging from within or around Iran's political establishment paint a bleak picture of public confidence: deep skepticism toward state institutions, single-digit trust in political officials and overwhelming demand for change.
What they reveal much less clearly is what kind of change Iranians actually want, partly because answering such questions openly can carry serious consequences.
One, presented by Ebrahim Hajiani, a former director of the state-affiliated Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), says the proportion of Iranians seeking "fundamental political change" has risen from 8 to 67 percent in two decades.
The other, supervised by Ali Rabiei, social adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian, found that about 53 percent supported fundamental reforms, 19 percent wanted regime change and 13 percent favored minor structural adjustments. Only 9 percent supported preserving the status quo.
Despite their different methodologies and categories, the findings converge on one broad conclusion: dissatisfaction with Iran's political and social institutions is deep, and relatively few respondents appear content with the status quo. Hajiani's "fundamental political change," however, cannot automatically be equated with regime change.
The trust figures are similarly stark.
According to Hajiani, only 7 to 8 percent of respondents trust political officials, while trust in the three branches of government ranges between 25 and 30 percent.
Rabiei's survey found trust in the judiciary at just over 30 percent, against more than 54 percent who expressed distrust. The executive branch was trusted by just over 25 percent, while more than 59 percent expressed distrust. Parliament was trusted by 23 percent, with more than 59 percent saying they distrusted it.
The security institutions fare better. Hajiani found that 53 percent trust the regular Army, while both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police are trusted by 46 percent.
Both researchers describe the findings in terms of an institutional crisis. Hajiani speaks of a "crisis of authority" or "crisis of reference," while Rabiei identifies a "crisis of efficiency, trust and political representation."
Hajiani also identifies 2022, the year the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising erupted, as a social watershed, dividing Iranian society into a "before" and "after" in attitudes towards dress codes, family dynamics, religion and the role of women.
Rabiei, meanwhile, argues that a "broad social middle" still exists: a large segment of society that is dissatisfied but seeks reform, stability and gradual improvement rather than upheaval. He says this constituency is poorly represented in the media, political parties and state institutions.
His figures provide some support for that interpretation, but the conclusion should be treated cautiously. The surveys themselves illustrate why.
Hajiani says around 70 percent of those approached by pollsters do not respond. That raises an obvious question over whether those willing to participate are representative of those who refuse, particularly when questions concern the legitimacy of the political system.
Sharq newspaper has previously noted that refusals and evasive answers are particularly common on questions touching on the legitimacy of the government and political system.
In an environment where opposition activity can bring serious consequences, respondents may have reason to be cautious about openly expressing support for replacing the Islamic Republic.
That does not necessarily mean the polling itself is dishonest. Even a methodologically rigorous survey can produce guarded responses when the questions are politically sensitive.
There are other limitations. Neither of the reports as publicly presented provides sufficient detail about sample size, methodology or response rates to allow a full assessment of representativeness.
Their institutional connections also warrant caution: Rabiei is a presidential adviser, while Hajiani is a former head of a state-affiliated polling organization.
A potentially more consequential problem is harder to measure: who agrees to answer sensitive questions, how those questions are framed, and which findings ultimately become public.
That makes precise conclusions about how many Iranians want reform, fundamental change or the replacement of the Islamic Republic difficult to draw from these surveys alone.
Still, even research emerging from institutions connected to Iran's establishment describes a society in which confidence in political leaders is extremely low, demand for substantial change is widespread and only a small minority appears satisfied with the status quo.