Military leaders warn Hegseth against extending Iran war operations - WaPo
Several US military leaders have warned Secretary of War Pete Hegseth that prolonging large-scale operations against Iran is unsustainable and risks weakening the military’s ability to confront threats elsewhere, including threats to the US homeland, the Washington Post reported on Sunday, citing people familiar with a recent classified assessment.
The warnings were included in the Aug. 14 edition of the Secretary of Defense Orders Book and came from the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as four-star commanders overseeing US operations in Europe, Asia and Latin America, according to the report.
US Central Command has kept more than 50,000 troops on alert for months in case President Donald Trump orders further attacks on Iran, the report said. The assessment directs some forces deployed in the Middle East to remain through September and others into 2027.
The heads of US European Command, US Pacific Command and US Southern Command, along with the Navy’s top admiral, registered a “non-concur,” meaning they disagreed with orders to extend their forces but would carry them out, people familiar with the assessment told the Post.
The Army and Air Force leadership agreed to extend their deployed forces but warned that doing so would carry significant risks, the report said.
The overall view among military leaders was that the Iran operation, now at the six-month mark, had been “too much for too long,” one person familiar with the assessment told the Post.
Security forces confront protesters during demonstrations in Iran in January 2026.
A Revolutionary Guards veteran who fought in Syria helped command a deadly crackdown on protesters in Shahriar near Tehran, as security forces used coordinated lethal tactics across Tehran province during nationwide protests in January, an Iran International investigation found.
Witnesses and local sources identified Abbas Rasoulifar, a former Guards member with experience fighting alongside forces supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as directing operational groups deployed against protesters in Shahriar.
Parts of this investigative report are based on accounts from witnesses and local sources. The allegations are attributed to those who made them, and their inclusion does not mean that all details have been independently verified by the author.
Witness accounts from Shahriar and other cities around the capital describe security forces firing live ammunition from police stations, mosques and rooftops, deploying snipers and armored vehicles, and dividing urban areas into operational zones.
The accounts point to similarities between some tactics used during the crackdown and methods associated with urban warfare in Syria.
Shahriar religious site emerges as operations hub
The protests began with strikes by shopkeepers in Tehran before spreading rapidly to surrounding cities and much of Tehran province.
Demonstrations peaked on January 8 and 9 following a call by exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi, with a crackdown already underway turning particularly deadly during those two days.
In Shahriar, the locations of reported shootings and security deployments point to the vicinity of the Imamzadeh Esmail shrine as a center for assembling and dispatching forces.
The shrine hosted events associated with Iranian fighters deployed to Syria during the presidency of Ebrahim Raisi, who visited the site several times.
Rasoulifar, the shrine's executive director, emerged as a central figure during Iran International's examination of people connected to the site.
Witness accounts and other findings show that Rasoulifar commanded operational groups during the January crackdown and personally fired a handgun at protesters. Forces under his direction were dispatched across Shahriar from a base near the shrine, according to the investigation.
The base sits in a residential area behind the shrine and next to a boys' high school. Sources said it served as an assembly and preparation point for personnel sent to confront protesters.
From Syria to Shahriar
Rasoulifar, born in 1963, joined the Basij in 1979 and the Revolutionary Guards in 1984, according to published accounts of his background. He has longstanding ties to the Guards and participated in several operations during the Iran-Iraq war.
Abbas Rasoulifar, a Guards member with experience fighting alongside forces supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria
Javan newspaper, which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, documented Rasoulifar's presence in Syria in 2017 as one of the Iranian personnel called by the Islamic Republic as "defenders of the shrine," a misleading title reserved for the forces that were sent to Syria.
At the time, the Quds Force and allied forces were fighting alongside Assad's forces on several fronts in Syria.
Rasoulifar's deployment establishes his involvement in Iran's military operations in Syria, although the available evidence does not establish precisely which battles or urban operations he participated in.
His name has also surfaced in connection with earlier domestic crackdowns, including in 2009 and the November 2019 protests in Shahriar. Witnesses have also accused him of involvement in the killing of protester Nader Momeni in Shahriar in 2019.
Similar tactics reported across Tehran province
Iran International's examination of witness accounts shows that security operations across several cities in Tehran province shared common features, raising questions about the extent to which the crackdown was centrally coordinated rather than shaped by individual decisions by local units.
In Eslamshahr, police and riot-control forces went on alert in Zarafshan and Bagh-e Feyz on January 7 as strikes began.
As protesters moved toward the Saveh road the following day, police vehicles fired flares, according to witnesses. The accounts indicate that the flares were used to illuminate gatherings and help other units locate protesters.
Witnesses in Vavan, near Eslamshahr, said live ammunition was fired that night from the roof of a mosque and around Khomeini Square. Similar accounts of religious buildings being used as firing positions later emerged elsewhere.
In Parand, in Robat Karim county, witnesses said armed personnel speaking Arabic fired directly at protesters from inside mosques and bases on January 8. Some witnesses identified them as members of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, though Iran International could not independently confirm their identity.
Witnesses also described forces apparently retreating to draw protesters toward Parand's Police Station 18 on January 8 and 9 before firing live ammunition once part of the crowd entered the surrounding area. Witnesses said protesters were killed in the shooting.
Snipers, armored vehicles and power cuts
In Pakdasht, southeast of the capital, security forces deployed a large armored vehicle and firearms against protesters around Mamazand and Allameh Street on January 8, according to witness accounts.
Clashes continued the following day, when witnesses described intense gunfire, including machine-gun fire by Basij and Revolutionary Guards forces.
In Gharchak, electricity around Kalantari Square was cut on the evening of January 8 before shooting began from inside a police station, witnesses said. Snipers positioned on the roof and different floors of a restaurant in Khomeini Square also fired at protesters in the darkness, according to local accounts.
Local sources put the number of people killed there in the dozens.
In Varamin, southeast of Tehran, vehicles equipped with loudspeakers played religious chants at high volume as security forces fired tear gas and live ammunition on January 9, according to witnesses.
Shahr-e Qods, also known as Ghaleh Hassan Khan, south of Tehran, experienced severe internet disruption and a power outage on January 8. Witnesses said snipers positioned on the roof of the Milad commercial complex and armed groups fired at protesters on January 8 and 9.
Some witnesses again identified Arabic-speaking personnel as members of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces.
Local accounts said dozens were killed. Among those identified was Ilya Qodsi, who was fatally shot in the head.
Witnesses describe abuse away from protests
Accounts from Pardis and Bumehen, in the east of the capital, describe violence extending beyond shootings at demonstrations.
Mohammadreza Moradgholi, a 19-year-old protester, was detained on the evening of January 8 and taken into a security forces' vehicle, according to one account. The source said that personnel killed him by cutting a blood vessel.
Another account said security forces searched a young man's phone near the Pardis toll station on January 9 and detained him after finding a photograph of Pahlavi.
Personnel severely beat the man and forced him to swallow two pills before leaving him on a street around midnight, according to the account.
Witnesses in the area also described loud religious chants accompanying baton beatings, direct gunfire and tear gas.
Syria experience raises questions over crackdown
Across the cities examined, recurring features included the use of rooftops and elevated positions for gunfire, power cuts, operational zones, live ammunition and coordinated deployments from fixed bases.
Iran International's findings indicate two particular similarities with urban warfare methods used in Syria: dividing cities into operational sectors and assigning units responsibility for controlling designated areas.
Rasoulifar's military background in Syria and his role organizing operational groups in Shahriar provide a direct personnel link between Iran's foreign military campaigns and the January crackdown.
Taken together, witness accounts from cities of Tehran province depict a crackdown in which lethal tactics appeared repeatedly across Tehran's heavily populated outer cities, extending methods of armed urban control to the capital's surrounding belt.
Iranian students take an exam at a testing center.
Iranians described cancelled language tests, soaring costs, visa hurdles and internet restrictions as obstacles increasingly putting study abroad beyond reach, in messages sent to Iran International following new US sanctions.
“Are Trump’s sanctions targeting the Iranian people or Islamic Republic officials? We are looking for a way to escape this situation, but it seems all the doors of the world have been closed to us,” one citizen wrote.
Iran International asked its audience to share their experiences of barriers to studying abroad after new sanctions led to restrictions affecting international language tests for Iranians.
An analysis of responses on Instagram showed that the cost of studying and moving abroad, compounded by the falling value of Iran’s currency, and the cancellation of international language tests were the most frequently cited concerns.
The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, indefinitely suspended General License G on August 24 as part of the Trump administration’s latest campaign to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.
Students take an exam at a testing center in Iran.
The license had since 2014 provided the legal basis for US universities, testing companies and other American entities to offer a range of educational services to Iranian people.
The Duolingo English Test subsequently announced that it would stop providing services from September 1 to people residing in Iran and holders of Iranian identification documents.
Rising costs narrow options
Financial pressures were the most common concern raised in responses to Iran International.
Respondents cited the rising cost of foreign currency, language tests, university applications, tuition, airline tickets and exit bonds as major obstacles to pursuing education overseas.
“With the euro at 2,400,000 rials, visas not being issued to Iranians, war and rising prices, the very high cost of exit bonds, terrible airline ticket prices, internet problems and language tests are all barriers to migration for us in Iran,” one respondent wrote.
Another described being caught between the expense of leaving Iran and the cost of remaining.
“We are imprisoned in Iran. We have neither the money to leave Iran nor the money to live in it,” the respondent wrote.
Some respondents also pointed to rising living expenses after reaching their destination countries, adding another financial hurdle even for those able to secure admission and leave Iran.
Years of preparation disrupted
The suspension or restriction of international language tests was the second major theme to emerge from the messages.
Some respondents said they had switched to TOEFL or the Duolingo English Test after IELTS became unavailable at various periods in Iran, only to see those alternatives restricted as well.
“After several years of studying for TOEFL, getting a high GPA and working to build a good résumé, I was one step away from taking TOEFL, and now the test is no longer being held,” one respondent wrote.
Another said the cancellation of a TOEFL exam was announced on the morning it was due to take place, after years of preparation and with an embassy appointment approaching.
The Duolingo English Test, launched in 2016, has become an alternative to TOEFL and IELTS for some Iranian applicants. The online test can be taken from home and costs less than some other international English proficiency exams.
Several respondents said the latest restrictions showed how sanctions were affecting ordinary Iranians seeking academic opportunities abroad.
“Why should ordinary people be targeted by sanctions? People in Iran are not allowed to take TOEFL and Duolingo tests inside Iran; they are not even allowed to escape this country,” one respondent wrote.
Iranian passport adds to barriers
Some identified their Iranian nationality and passport as another obstacle to academic opportunities abroad.
They described university positions being closed to Iranian applicants or applications being rejected without what they considered serious consideration of their academic records.
“I think the first problem for many people in Iran who want to migrate is the financial cost, followed by the barriers to being accepted as an Iranian,” one respondent wrote.
Another pointed to lengthy security screening of Iranian applicants at embassies, saying delays can prevent students from reaching universities in time to begin their programs.
Internet disruptions cost opportunities
Internet restrictions inside Iran were another recurring concern in the messages, particularly because applications depend on access to university websites, email and international financial services.
One said Iran’s internet was cut off on January 8, a day after an admissions interview with a university in Britain.
The respondent said two weeks without access to email or the university’s website ultimately resulted in the loss of the study opportunity.
Iranian kolbars carry heavy loads through deep snow in a mountainous border area in western Iran.
Economic hardship and a lack of stable jobs are driving children and teenagers in Iran’s border regions into kolbari, the hazardous practice of carrying goods across mountainous frontiers for money, Iran's labor-focused news agency ILNA reported on Sunday.
“The fact that a teenager sets out on a route where there is a risk of being shot, a mine explosion or an accident, either to help their family or cover school and living expenses, should be a serious warning to society,” labor activist Abdollah Belvasi told ILNA. “A child should be sitting at a school desk, not on a kolbari route.”
Poverty and unstable household incomes are increasingly affecting children in families living along Iran’s borders, Belvasi said.
A shortage of jobs has also left many young people, including university graduates and accomplished athletes, facing a choice between kolbari, with its risk of death, or migration away from their homes and families, according to Belvasi.
Unemployment and a lack of prospects have prompted many young people in Kordestan to consider leaving their cities or even Iran, Belvasi added.
Economic pressures deepen
Iran has faced years of high inflation, a weakening currency and unemployment, eroding purchasing power and making basic living costs increasingly difficult for many households.
An Iranian kolbar carries a heavy load through snow in a mountainous border area.
Residents of some border communities have turned to kolbari to earn a living. Kolbars typically carry heavy loads on foot across difficult mountainous terrain, and some have been killed in shootings by Iranian security forces or died in accidents and mine explosions.
The growing gap between wages and living costs, reduced working hours and skilled workers moving into informal employment have highlighted the depth of Iran’s employment problems in recent weeks.
Hormozgan Workers’ House said on Friday that around 20,000 workers had lost their jobs because of an economic slowdown and business closures.
Kolbar deaths risk becoming routine
Deaths among kolbars are gradually being treated as routine news, receiving attention and prompting protests for several days before fading from public discussion, Belvasi warned.
“When a kolbar is killed, a family suffers,” he said. “A breadwinner may be lost, children may be left without a father, or a family may have to contend with medical expenses and disability. If we see kolbari only in terms of numbers and statistics, we ignore the human dimension of the tragedy.”
Government promises have failed to address the underlying conditions driving people into the work, Belvasi went on to say.
“The issue of kolbari cannot be solved simply by confronting the kolbar,” Belvasi added. “If the main causes – poverty, unemployment and the lack of stable job opportunities –are not addressed, the issue will emerge again. The root causes must be addressed.”
Discrimination, uneven development and a lack of employment opportunities remain fundamental problems in Iran’s border regions despite their economic, human and natural resources, according to Belvasi.
Woman with her smartphone poses in front of displayed Duolingo logo in this illustration taken, June 29, 2021.
Iranian students seeking admission to universities abroad are facing new uncertainty over access to tests such as TOEFL, GRE and Duolingo after Washington suspended a 12-year sanctions authorization covering academic exchanges, admissions services and standardized exams.
The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, indefinitely suspended General License G on August 24 as part of the Trump administration’s latest campaign to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.
The license had since 2014 provided the legal basis for US universities, testing companies and other American entities to offer a range of educational services to Iranian people.
OFAC has allowed transactions necessary to wind down activities previously covered by the license until September 8. After that, services that are otherwise prohibited under US sanctions would require another applicable authorization or a specific license from the Treasury Department.
The change does not in itself mean that every international examination will immediately disappear for Iranian applicants. But its first effects are already becoming visible, while uncertainty is growing over tests widely used for university admissions and professional qualifications.
A broad education exemption
General License G, issued under the Obama administration on March 20, 2014, covered far more than university exchange programs. It allowed US institutions to process applications from people in Iran, accept application fees and tuition, establish student exchange agreements with Iranian universities and offer certain online courses.
One provision specifically authorized US persons anywhere in the world to administer professional certification and university entrance examinations, including standardized multiple-choice tests, to people in Iran and to people abroad who were “ordinarily resident in Iran.” It also covered services required for admission to US universities.
That wording gave American testing organizations a broad sanctions exemption for services potentially including exams such as TOEFL and GRE.
Its suspension was part of a much larger package launched under what the Treasury Department calls Operation Economic Outcast. OFAC indefinitely suspended five authorizations in total, covering General License G, US-Iran sporting activities, some educational activities in third countries, certain personal remittances and services connected with conferences.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the broader campaign as an “economic onslaught” against Iran’s international financial connections, saying Washington aimed to “sever every economic lifeline” sustaining the Islamic Republic.
Duolingo becomes the first clear casualty
The clearest immediate impact has come from the Duolingo English Test, an online English-language examination accepted by thousands of universities.
Duolingo’s official support page now states that its English test is “unavailable in Iran and for users with Iranian IDs.”
The wording is significant because the restriction is not limited to people physically inside Iran. Someone who travels from Tehran to Istanbul, Dubai or Yerevan but relies on an Iranian identity document would still fall under the policy.
That has fueled frustration among Iranian students, many of whom already face significant obstacles in applying to universities abroad.
Persian-language social media users responded with anger and dark humor. One user whose post was republished by the Telegram channel University of Tehran Twitter wrote: “It really feels like they’re competing over who wants us less.”
Another, reacting to reports about both TOEFL and Duolingo, wrote that Iranians were effectively being “excluded from the human species.”
A third mocked repeated assertions that US pressure is aimed at the Iranian government rather than ordinary citizens: “They canceled TOEFL because people were making hypersonic missile origami out of the test papers. Otherwise, of course, they have no problem with the Iranian people.”
A Duolingo-focused Telegram channel went further, jokingly announcing a “funeral for the late Duolingo” in a fictional cemetery next to the “TOEFL and GRE section.”
A Change.org petition launched on August 27 calls on Duolingo to restore a legal route for Iranian applicants, arguing that students should be assessed on their abilities rather than their nationality and urging the company to seek an educational exemption or alternative compliance mechanism.
What happens to TOEFL and GRE?
The future of other major US-administered tests remains less clear.
As of August 29, Educational Testing Service, the US organization behind TOEFL and GRE, had not issued a public announcement saying the exams would no longer be available to Iranians. Iran also remained on ETS’s official list of countries where the TOEFL iBT is offered.
There are, however, signs that availability may already be changing.
Two major Iranian test centers said Saturday that TOEFL iBT and GRE exams had been suspended across Iran, with one saying all ETS tests scheduled for the week had been canceled without prior notice to testing centers and another saying new registrations were unavailable until further notice.
TOEFL Resources, an unofficial specialist website that tracks ETS testing appointments, reported on Saturday that TOEFL slots in Iran had been visible through January just a day earlier. It said only September 5 appointments at two centers outside Tehran were subsequently showing, with later dates no longer available.
That does not yet establish that ETS has permanently withdrawn from Iran. The company could potentially rely on another authorization, seek a specific OFAC license or alter how it provides services.
OFAC itself says companies wishing to continue activities previously covered by the suspended licenses may apply for specific authorization.
For Iranian students, that leaves the immediate picture unsettled. Duolingo access has already been restricted, while the fate of TOEFL, GRE and other academic and professional examinations may depend on decisions by individual testing providers — and on whether the US Treasury grants them a new legal route to continue serving Iranian applicants.
IELTS, which now appears to be one of the few remaining major options for Iranian applicants, is in a different position because it is jointly owned by the British Council, Australia’s IDP and Cambridge University Press & Assessment, rather than a US testing organization.
However, while the suspension of General License G does not directly apply to it, IELTS testing inside Iran had already ended on January 31, 2026, after IDP cited separate “financial and regulatory factors” outside its control, requiring Iranian applicants who want to take the test to travel to neighboring countries.
Venezuela's interim President Delcy Rodriguez, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and U.S. Charge d'Affaires for Venezuela Laura Dogu visit oil production facilities at the joint venture between Chevron and state oil company PDVSA in the Orinoco Oil Belt, following an agreement to pursue long-term energy cooperation on Feb. 12, 2026. / Photo by Reuters
The emerging US-Venezuela oil partnership could offer a model for how Iran’s vast but underinvested energy industry might be revived under a future government able to restore ties with the West, while also reshaping oil flows in Europe.
The significance of closer US-Venezuela energy cooperation lies not only in the scale of Venezuela’s oil reserves, but also in the complementary qualities of the two countries’ crude — and in what international capital, technology and access to Western markets could mean for an oil industry weakened by years of isolation.
Most US shale crude is light and sweet, while Venezuela’s Merey 16 is an extra-heavy, high-sulfur grade. A technical estimate suggests that a blend of roughly 60% light US crude and 40% Venezuelan Merey 16 could produce a crude with an API gravity of around 31 to 32 degrees and sulfur content of roughly 1.5%, depending on the specific US grade used.
Those characteristics are close to Russia’s Urals, a medium-sour crude with an API gravity of around 31 degrees and sulfur content of about 1.4%. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Urals was one of the main feedstocks for European refineries.
The United States could therefore potentially offer European refiners three options: its own light crude, Venezuelan heavy crude for plants capable of processing it, and tailored blends suited to refineries that previously relied heavily on Russian medium-sour crude. Complex US Gulf Coast refineries could also process Venezuela’s heavy oil and export diesel, jet fuel and other refined products needed by Europe.
The United States is already the European Union’s largest supplier of petroleum oil, accounting for 17.8% of EU petroleum-oil imports in the first quarter of 2026.
It is still too early, however, to speak of US-Venezuelan dominance of the European market. Venezuela currently produces around 1.25 million barrels per day, while rebuilding its electricity network, pipelines, processing facilities, refineries and ports will require tens of billions of dollars in investment and several years.
In the short term, the agreement is therefore more significant as a political and psychological signal to the market. In the medium term, if it results in substantially higher Venezuelan production, it could increase Atlantic Basin oil supplies, further reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian and some Middle Eastern crude, redirect some Venezuelan oil from China toward Western markets, and put additional pressure on OPEC+’s ability to manage the market.
A potential model for Iran
For Iranians, however, Venezuela may carry a broader message. Like Venezuela, Iran possesses enormous oil and gas reserves, but its energy industry faces deep problems after years of sanctions, insufficient investment, aging infrastructure, limited access to advanced technology, declining pressure in some mature fields and the constraints under which many projects were developed during the sanctions era.
If the Islamic Republic were to fall, followed by a stable political transition and the establishment of a government capable of maintaining normal and constructive relations with the United States, Europe and the global economy, Iran’s oil and gas industry could become one of the main engines of the country’s economic reconstruction.
Under such conditions, the entry of major international companies, including US oil producers and oilfield-services firms, could provide the capital, technology and managerial expertise needed to rehabilitate wells, pipelines, processing facilities, refineries, ports and Iran’s export infrastructure.
American companies have extensive experience in advanced drilling, reservoir management, enhanced oil recovery, rehabilitating low-output wells, processing heavy and sour crude and designing crude blends tailored to refinery requirements. The same basic logic that makes light US crude a useful complement to Venezuela’s extra-heavy oil could also be applied to the marketing and optimization of some Iranian crude grades.
Iran, of course, has its own broad range of light, medium and heavy crudes as well as condensates. The main opportunity would therefore not simply be to import US light crude for blending, but to use Western technology, capital and commercial networks to develop competitive export blends and regain access to global markets.
The return of established American and European companies could also create an opportunity for an independent assessment of projects carried out during the sanctions era, including those undertaken by domestic and Chinese contractors, and for facilities and equipment to be upgraded or replaced where necessary.
Such a transformation could increase Iran’s production capacity, reduce energy waste and the flaring of associated gas, improve environmental standards and create substantial direct and indirect employment.
None of this, however, would happen automatically or immediately after a change of government. The lifting of sanctions, legal protection for investors, transparent oil contracts, efforts to combat corruption, an independent judiciary and political stability would all be prerequisites for attracting investment on the required scale.
Oil revenues would also need to be managed through transparent mechanisms and directed toward rebuilding the country, its infrastructure, education, healthcare and public welfare, avoiding a repeat of Iran’s historic overdependence on oil.
The US-Venezuela partnership therefore matters to Iran for more than the possibility that a blend of light American and extra-heavy Venezuelan crude could emerge as a serious competitor to Russian Urals in parts of the European market.
The more important lesson is that vast hydrocarbon reserves can regain economic value when accompanied by investment, technology and access to international markets. Iran’s oil and gas resources could still underpin a new period of economic growth if a stable and transparent government with constructive international relations emerges after the Islamic Republic.
Cooperation with American and other major international companies could then help rebuild Iran’s aging energy industry and restore the country as a significant and reliable player in the global energy market.
