A silent letter on state TV turned Iran's top diplomat into an enemy of the faith

The growing criticism comes as the national average gasoline price has again climbed above $4 a gallon and Democrats show signs of eroding what has traditionally been a Republican advantage with voters on the economy. Gas prices have risen by more than 25% since the Iran war began in February.

Rep. Nikki Budzinski of Illinois pointed Thursday to the latest increase in gasoline prices, saying the national average had reached a record for this point in the year.

“The national gas average just hit a historic high for this time of year—more than $4 a gallon,” she wrote on X. “Families in Central Illinois are paying the price of the war in Iran every single time they pull up to the pump.”

Rep. Andrea Salinas of Oregon said American farmers spent $1.4 billion more on diesel during the spring planting season than a year earlier, blaming the increase on the conflict.

“With Trump’s ILLEGAL war pushing fuel prices higher and higher, growers are the ones paying the price,” she wrote.

The attacks come as polling suggests the economy is becoming an increasingly difficult issue for Trump and Republicans three months before the November 3 midterms.

A Reuters/Ipsos poll released this month found 37% of registered voters preferred Democrats’ approach to the economy, compared with 36% who favored Republicans—the first Democratic advantage on the issue in roughly a decade.

A separate Washington Post/Ipsos poll last month found the economy and high prices were the most commonly cited factors in voters’ midterm choices, mentioned by 54% of registered voters. Only 33% approved of Trump’s handling of the economy, against 65% who disapproved.

Rep. Jim McGovern of Massachusetts sought to connect the war with Trump’s broader economic agenda, including tariffs and tax policy.

“Trump promised to lower prices on day one,” McGovern wrote. “Instead, his billionaires-first economic policies, stupid tariffs & illegal war with Iran are pushing prices to record highs.”

“His policy choices are making your life more expensive while the ultra rich do better than ever before,” he added.

Inflation eased slightly in July but remained above levels seen before the Iran war, while consumer prices have now risen faster than wages for four consecutive months.

Sen. Bernie Sanders sharpened the argument by contrasting federal spending on the war and tax cuts with the cost pressures facing households.

“$900 million for White House vanity projects? Approved. $1 trillion tax cut for the 1%? Approved. $1 trillion for war with Iran? Approved,” Sanders wrote.

“Lower grocery, housing or gas prices? Sorry, you're on your own. Money for billionaires. Money for war. Nothing for working people.”

The growing Democratic focus on gasoline, groceries and the Iran war suggests the party sees an opportunity to turn an issue that helped return Trump to the White House in 2024 against Republicans in November.

Tehran’s drive to turn that control into lasting economic and political leverage—through shipping routes, mine clearance and potentially revenues from passing vessels—is emerging as a major obstacle to extending its fragile memorandum with the United States, which expires Sunday.

Washington, meanwhile, increasingly claims it has broken Iran’s control of Hormuz.

The June 18 memorandum is formally due to expire on August 16. President Donald Trump pronounced it over after Iran attacked three ships in the Strait of Hormuz, ordering more strikes and the resumption of the US maritime blockade.

Neither side, however, has formally abandoned diplomacy. If no extension is announced before Sunday, the current state of neither war nor peace could continue. An explicit declaration that the arrangement has ended could increase the risk of renewed attacks.

‘More valuable than a nuke’

Pressure against concessions over the strait is also growing inside Tehran.

Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission this week unanimously approved the broad outlines of legislation that would tighten Iran’s control over Hormuz.

The bill includes provisions for inspecting vessels in Iranian territorial waters, banning the passage of assets, equipment and vessels belonging to the United States, Israel and other countries Tehran deems hostile, and charging ships for maritime services.

If enacted, the legislation could constrain Tehran’s room for compromise, much as legislation passed during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency required his government to increase uranium enrichment and suspend implementation of the Additional Protocol unless banking and oil sanctions were lifted.

Alireza Salimi, a member of parliament’s presiding board, told the ISNA news agency Thursday that “the Strait of Hormuz is currently more valuable to Iran than an atomic bomb,” describing it as leverage for lifting sanctions and securing compensation for wartime losses.

Demands put talks in doubt

The tougher approach was also reflected in demands laid out shortly before his departure by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Zolghadr said reopening the strait would require an end to attacks on Iran and its allies, the lifting of the blockade, the withdrawal of US forces from around Iran, sanctions relief, the release of frozen Iranian assets and compensation for damage caused by the wars.

It remains unclear whether those demands represented his personal position or that of the SNSC, and whether his successor, Mohsen Rezaei, will pursue the same approach.

Rezaei’s appointment this week, along with other changes at the top of Iran’s security establishment, has been welcomed by hardline opponents of the government’s approach to negotiations.

Former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi wrote in the Shargh newspaper that if Tehran insisted on the conditions outlined by Zolghadr, “it is highly unlikely that there will be any serious negotiations between Tehran and Washington at all.”

Both sides claim control

The dispute is unfolding as Tehran and Washington offer directly competing accounts of who actually controls Hormuz.

Trump said Wednesday that the United States had complete control of the waterway and that the maritime blockade had deprived Iran of the ability to act.

The spokesman for Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the country’s wartime command center, rejected that assertion Thursday, saying the strait remained under Iranian control and that no vessel could pass safely without authorization from Iran’s armed forces.

Shipping-monitoring data show traffic remains a fraction of pre-war levels. Around 10 to 12 vessels have been crossing the strait daily in recent days, compared with roughly 130 to 140 before the war, with most currently using a route designated by Iran.

Tehran has also stressed that an agreement with Oman over shipping routes would not by itself be sufficient to reopen the strait.

Ali Gholhaki, a political activist close to parliament speaker and senior Islamabad negotiator Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, said Iranian decision-makers currently had no intention of reopening the waterway and had blocked an agreement with Oman because of what they viewed as Muscat’s alignment with Washington.

Tehran and Muscat at odds

The disagreement with Oman offers perhaps the clearest illustration of what Tehran now wants from its control of Hormuz.

Iran has pushed for control over shipping routes and mine clearance and for mandatory payments from vessels using the waterway. Oman has instead favored a joint fund supported by voluntary contributions from governments and companies benefiting from shipping.

Few in Tehran expect Muscat to accept Iran’s terms. Ahad Azadikhah, a lawmaker aligned with Ghalibaf, recently told Khabar Online that if Oman did so, the Islamic Republic would have achieved “the victory of all victories.”

The dispute means Hormuz is increasingly intertwined with the fate of the wider Tehran-Washington dialogue. As Iran seeks to turn control of the strait into leverage over sanctions, compensation and any broader settlement, Washington may increasingly see that same leverage as something that must be neutralized before a deal can be reached.

The dispute centers on plans for a three-country verification mechanism being discussed as Iranian, Omani and Pakistani technical committees work on the operational details of a temporary navigation arrangement.

Hardline lawmakers argue that the government cannot implement the proposed arrangement without parliamentary debate and a formal vote, raising a broader dispute over constitutional authority and military jurisdiction.

Their opposition is focused particularly on third-party verification. Hardliners argue that sharing vessel-tracking responsibilities with Pakistani or Omani personnel, even within a joint cell, would undermine the IRGC Navy’s authority over screening in the Persian Gulf.

Commentators aligned with this view have also warned that external verification channels could be exploited by Western intelligence, potentially giving NATO or US naval forces access to information about Iranian coastal movements under the guise of commercial monitoring.

Regional shield or security risk?

Reformist outlets Shargh and Etemad have argued that involving Pakistan and Oman would instead provide Tehran with a diplomatic shield by reducing pressure for direct US or NATO naval escorts inside the strait’s traffic lanes.

Writing in Shargh, Ahmad Zeidabadi warned that blocking regional verification “does not defend our sovereignty; it locks our economy into a suffocating siege,” adding that a functioning Muscat-Islamabad verification mechanism offered Iran a way to avert deeper economic damage.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei, meanwhile, reaffirmed that any US or NATO military escorts within the strait’s traffic lanes remained prohibited under the draft terms, even as third-party verification continued to be considered in Muscat, according to IRNA.

Parliament pushes tougher terms

The dispute comes as lawmakers are also considering legislation that could further constrain Tehran’s room for compromise over Hormuz.

Iranian media reported that parliament held a closed-door session over the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission’s draft bill restricting the movement of vessels linked to countries Tehran considers hostile.

Hardline lawmakers have pushed for a mandatory transit charge of 5% to 7% on non-exempt commercial bulk cargo to fund coastal defense and infrastructure repairs, alongside tighter inspection requirements.

Pro-Pezeshkian lawmakers and National Security Committee spokesman Hassan Ghashghavi have argued that the proposed verification cell is a technical mechanism operating under the Supreme National Security Council framework rather than a new international treaty requiring lengthy parliamentary ratification.

Government representatives have also warned that imposing statutory tolls could undermine the Muscat negotiations and discourage foreign shipping lines from using Iranian ports.

The competing approaches reflect a wider struggle in Tehran over what Iran should seek to preserve from its wartime control of Hormuz: maximum control and economic leverage, or a regional mechanism that could restore shipping without opening the waterway to a greater US or NATO role.

The dispute could prove consequential for the Muscat talks, as any agreement requiring Omani or Pakistani participation in monitoring traffic would have to overcome objections from lawmakers, while tougher statutory restrictions on shipping could further narrow the government’s room to negotiate.

The United States is preparing to send the USS George Washington to the Middle East in a previously scheduled rotation, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Thursday that rotating ships would allow the US Navy to maintain its blockade for as long as necessary.

“Indefinitely the United States Navy can maintain a blockade like that because we'll rotate ships in and out, as we have, and we'll continue to,” Hegseth told reporters.

The George Washington is expected to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing US officials. The Lincoln was redirected to the Middle East in January ahead of the US war against Iran and has now spent more than 250 days deployed.

CENTCOM also announced Thursday the creation of its first multinational, multi-domain attack drone task force, building on the use of one-way unmanned systems during Operation Epic Fury and strikes on Iranian port facilities in July.

Task Force Falcon Strike will use one-way attack drones in the air, on the surface and below it, with US Special Operations Command Central personnel leading the unit and regional partners being formally invited to join.

Iran signals offensive posture

In Tehran, Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, said Thursday that Khamenei’s strategy was to shift the war to an offensive posture if Iran’s conditions were not met.

That emphasis was also reflected in Khamenei’s appointment of six senior military commanders earlier this week.

His decree naming Ahmad Vahidi commander-in-chief of the IRGC instructed him to strengthen the force’s capabilities for “maximum deterrence” and maintain readiness for “powerful offensive operations against the enemy.”

IRGC Navy commander Ali Azmaei, also formally appointed this week, said Thursday that the Strait of Hormuz remained closed and that no movement through it escaped the force’s notice.

Rasoul Sanaei-Rad, a senior military official, said Iran was preparing for “worst-case” war scenarios and needed offensive capabilities alongside defensive ones. “Our fighters have their fingers on the trigger,” he said, adding that Iran would seek to impose a much heavier defeat if attacked again.

All about Hormuz

Hormuz remains the immediate test of those competing claims of endurance.

Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said Thursday that no commercial ship or oil tanker could safely pass through the waterway without Tehran’s permission and oversight.

The United States, meanwhile, says its blockade remains in force. CENTCOM said that as of Wednesday, US forces had redirected 59 commercial vessels, disabled three and boarded two others while enforcing what it calls its “steel wall blockade” against Iran.

Off the water, diplomatic contacts have continued despite the military buildup.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned Washington Thursday against what he called a “bigger miscalculation” over the Strait of Hormuz, while Vice President Majid Ansari said war and negotiations were “complementary” and that Iran would pursue its objectives in the waterway and the wider region.

The parallel military and diplomatic tracks have yet to produce a breakthrough over Hormuz. Instead, Thursday’s statements suggested both sides are preparing for the possibility that the standoff will last.

The defining struggle in Tehran is not between moderates and hardliners. It is a contest within the hardline establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over power, patronage, and coercion.

The transition has occurred during a very turbulent time for the Islamic Republic, in the midst of a war with both the U.S. and Israel and only months after the largest anti-regime uprising. Mojtaba has also remained largely out of public view for months, fueling uncertainty over his status and capacity to lead. This vacuum gave rival security networks room to advance their own interests, but Washington should not mistake competition within the regime for a pragmatic opening.

The SNSC is the body that coordinates defense, intelligence, and foreign-policy decisions and its resolutions take effect only after approval by the supreme leader. The secretary therefore operates at the intersection of war, diplomacy, and internal security. Rezaei commanded the IRGC from 1981 to 1997, founded its intelligence unit, and served as Mojtaba’s military adviser since March. Mojtaba first named him his representative on the council and Pezeshkian then formally appointed him secretary.

The removal of Rezaei’s predecessor, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is equally revealing. He held the secretary position for less than five months, an extraordinarily short tenure for a post usually held for years. Pezeshkian had reportedly asked him to remain and later acknowledged unspecified “differences,” exposing the friction between the presidency and Mojtaba’s emerging power center.

Zolghadr was a close ally of Ahmad Vahidi, the IRGC commander who played a central role in running the country during the war, while Rezaei has shown he is fully aligned with Mojtaba. Replacing one hardline IRGC veteran with another, therefore, reflects a shift in networks rather than ideology, placing the regime’s most important security forum under Mojtaba’s orbit.

The dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Washington and Tehran deepened that divide. Zolghadr voted in favor of it, while Rezaei had publicly questioned the agreement and later argued that Mojtaba had favored a different path. Zolghadr’s support for the memorandum made him less compatible with a leader determined to impose his own authority on the security establishment.

Taeb’s appointment is equally significant. He and Mojtaba both served in the Habib battalion during the Iran-Iraq War, beginning an alliance that later extended into years of behind-the-scenes schemes to influence Iranian politics. Taeb was sidelined late in Ali Khamenei’s rule after his removal as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization in 2022, but Mojtaba has now restored him to lead the Basij once again.

The Basij paramilitary embeds itself across various sectors of Iranian society and mobilizes regime loyalists to surveil and repress dissidents. Taeb sharpened that coercive machinery during his tenure, a record that later drew sanctions from the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. Mojtaba now has a trusted loyalist at the center of the institution most crucial for suppressing another nationwide uprising.

Taeb’s appointment decree instructed him to strengthen the Basij’s ‘intelligence network,’ expand its use of technology and improve coordination with other regime bodies. The priority is unmistakable: consolidation at the top and more effective control of the streets.

Ali Khamenei’s death was bound to trigger a struggle for power. For decades, access to political office, economic privilege, and security authority depended on proximity to him and his office. His death disrupted that system of patronage.

Mojtaba’s task is threefold. He must strengthen his own network, balance the influence of officials tied to rival centers of power, and sideline networks that flourished under his father and were opposed to Mojtaba. Rezaei’s elevation and Taeb’s return serve that purpose.

Washington should treat this reshuffle as a warning that Mojtaba is placing loyalists at the helm of the institutions that shape external and internal national security doctrines. This should put an end to Washington’s hope that pragmatists inside the regime can lead the country toward a different path.

The United States should reject bargains that strengthen the regime without verified changes in Tehran’s conduct. It should work with Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and constrain Tehran’s military partnership with Russia and China. It should also deny the regime’s repressive organs the finance and technology they need while expanding support for the Iranian people confronting the regime’s apparatus of oppression.