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Saudi, Pakistani foreign ministers back US-Iran mediation efforts

Jul 11, 2026, 15:45 GMT+1

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan and Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar discussed regional developments on Saturday and stressed the importance of ongoing efforts to mediate between the United States and Iran and promote regional stability.

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A remote bridge shows how US-Iran war is expanding
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ANALYSIS

A remote bridge shows how US-Iran war is expanding

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Ali Khamenei buried in Mashhad after days-long funeral

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INSIGHT

Tehran torn between war and deal as Khamenei is buried

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Iran turns Friday prayers into nationwide campaign for revenge

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INSIGHT

Revenge becomes Iran's language of unity after Khamenei’s death

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Spotlight

  • Iran faces region’s harshest mix of wartime contraction and inflation

    Iran faces region’s harshest mix of wartime contraction and inflation

  • Is the Iran-US MoU dead – or are we asking the wrong question?
    PODCAST

    Is the Iran-US MoU dead – or are we asking the wrong question?

  • For many Iranians, paychecks now barely cover food
    INSIGHT

    For many Iranians, paychecks now barely cover food

  • Iran’s economic pain deepens as factions trade blame
    INSIGHT

    Iran’s economic pain deepens as factions trade blame

  • A remote bridge shows how US-Iran war is expanding
    ANALYSIS

    A remote bridge shows how US-Iran war is expanding

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Iran denies report of 10 aircraft joining fleet from Saudi Arabia

Jul 11, 2026, 14:02 GMT+1

Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization has denied reports claiming that 10 aircraft had arrived from Saudi Arabia to join the country’s commercial aviation fleet.

The head of the organization said the claim was false, explaining that while private airlines independently pursue aircraft purchases, no such transfer had taken place.


Iran faces region’s harshest mix of wartime contraction and inflation

Jul 11, 2026, 12:32 GMT+1
•
Arash Sohrabi
100%

War has erased Iran’s already weak growth prospects. The economy shrinks as prices rise at one of the region’s fastest rates, forcing households to bear war, sanctions and years of economic mismanagement through fewer jobs, weaker incomes and collapsing purchasing power.

The International Monetary Fund expects Iran’s economy to contract by 6.1% in 2026, after an estimated decline of 1.5% last year. Average consumer-price inflation, already above 50% in 2025, is forecast to accelerate to 68.9%.

The combination matters more than either number alone. A recession means the economy is producing less, companies are selling less and opportunities for work and investment are narrowing. Inflation approaching 70% means the income that remains loses value at extraordinary speed.

  • For many Iranians, paychecks now barely cover food

    For many Iranians, paychecks now barely cover food

  • Iran’s economic pain deepens as factions trade blame

    Iran’s economic pain deepens as factions trade blame

For Iranian households, the result is a squeeze from both directions: fewer ways to earn money and far less purchasing power once they receive it.

The scale of the deterioration is also visible in the IMF’s revision. Only three months earlier, it had expected Iran to record modest growth of about 1.1%. It has now cut that estimate by 7.2 percentage points, one of the sharpest downgrades in the report.

“Growth in Iran in 2026 is revised downward by 7.2 percentage points, relative to January, to –6.1 percent,” the IMF said.

The fund links the reversal to damage to energy and transport infrastructure, diminished production and exports, and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. It places Iran alongside Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain among the regional economies most directly exposed to the conflict.

The downturn is expected to reach the labor market. Unemployment is forecast to rise from 8% to 9.2%, though that figure captures only part of the pressure in an economy where informal work, underemployment and falling real wages are widespread.

  • Two-week banking disruption leaves Iranians struggling to access money

    Two-week banking disruption leaves Iranians struggling to access money

  • Iran's costly farewell for supreme leader draws backlash

    Iran's costly farewell for supreme leader draws backlash

The inflation data are even more severe. The IMF forecasts average inflation of 68.9% over the year and an end-of-year rate of 48.7%. The difference suggests the pace of price rises may slow later in the year, but not enough to restore anything resembling price stability.

It also means that a lower inflation rate would not make goods cheaper. Prices would still be rising rapidly from an already much higher base, leaving food, housing and other essentials increasingly beyond the reach of households whose wages have failed to keep pace.

The regional comparisons make Iran’s position clearer. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are each expected to grow by 3.1%, while Oman is projected to expand by 3.5%. Their inflation rates are forecast at 2.3%, 2.5% and 1.7% respectively.

Qatar and Iraq face even deeper contractions, at 8.6% and 6.8%, largely because of damage and disruption to energy production. But inflation in both is expected to remain close to 3% or 4%. Iran’s particular crisis is that it combines a wartime recession with an inflation problem that was already deeply entrenched before the fighting.

Türkiye offers another useful comparison. It has struggled with years of high inflation, yet the IMF still expects its economy to grow by 3.4% in 2026 while inflation averages 28.6%. Iran’s inflation rate is more than twice as high, while its economy is moving sharply in the opposite direction.

Iran’s external position is also weakening. The current account – the broad measure of money flowing into and out of the country through trade and other transactions – is expected to move from a surplus of 0.6% of GDP to a deficit of 1.8%.

For a major oil and gas producer, that reversal points to lost export earnings, damaged production and less access to foreign currency. By contrast, the UAE is expected to retain a surplus of 11.4%, Qatar 11% and Oman 7.5%, giving those governments far larger financial cushions.

The figures should still be treated with caution. The IMF’s Iran data depend partly on national accounts, inflation and balance-of-payments information supplied by the Islamic Republic’s finance and monetary institutions. The fund also uses staff estimates where complete information is unavailable and says the timeliness, accuracy and completeness of its database cannot be guaranteed.

That makes the report an informed estimate, not an independent audit of Iran’s economy. Official statistics under the Islamic Republic are often delayed, incomplete or shaped by a system with several exchange rates and limited transparency.

The IMF itself uses the NIMA (an acronym for integrated system of foreign exchange) trade-related rate to convert Iranian GDP into dollars from 2018 onward, rather than the official rate that is lower, because it considers NIMA more representative of transactions.

  • Inside Iran’s maze of multiple exchange rates

    Inside Iran’s maze of multiple exchange rates

Even that does not fully reflect the much weaker market rate experienced by many Iranians because it still overstates the rial’s value compared with the open market: the dollar is about 1.48 million rials at the NIMA rate today, against roughly 1.78 million rials on the street, a gap of about 21%.

South Pars carries the shock beyond Iran

The damage is not confined to Iran. The IMF says strikes on the South Pars gas field sharply reduced the prospect of a quick recovery in regional gas supplies and were followed by Iran’s attacks on Persian Gulf energy facilities, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex.

  • Iran’s energy growth slows to a crawl as demand races ahead

    Iran’s energy growth slows to a crawl as demand races ahead

European benchmark gas prices rose 61% between August 2025 and March 2026, while Asian LNG prices jumped by more than 80%. Asia is particularly exposed because more than three-quarters of LNG shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz are bound for Asian markets.

The IMF’s central forecast still assumes a relatively short conflict and a gradual restoration of production and transport. Under that assumption, global growth slows to 3.1% and inflation rises to 4.4%. But the report says a longer disruption could push global growth close to 2% and inflation toward 6%.

The same warning applies more acutely to Iran: the forecast contraction of 6.1% is not a worst-case estimate, but one built on the assumption that the war’s economic damage begins to ease.

Hardline lawmaker says negotiations have always benefited Iran’s enemies

Jul 11, 2026, 12:25 GMT+1

Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, said the Islamic Republic’s negotiations had repeatedly ended in deception and gains for its enemies.

“The record of negotiations has always ended with broken promises, deception and benefits for the enemy, leaving only a bitter experience,” Nabavian wrote on X.

Posting an image pairing Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi with former president Hassan Rouhani and former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, he said negotiations were themselves “a form of war.”

Nabavian warned that trust, optimism and poorly drafted agreements could allow an adversary to turn what he described as victory on the battlefield into defeat.

Is the Iran-US MoU dead – or are we asking the wrong question?

Jul 11, 2026, 12:18 GMT+1
•
Negar Mojtahedi
100%
Smoke rises from boats on fire at a fishing pier in Banood, Bushehr Province, Iran, after a U.S. projectile struck the area around Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant on Thursday, according to the deputy governor of Bushehr Province, in this screengrab from a video obtained from social media and released on July 9, 2026. Social Media via Reuters

Less than three weeks after Washington and Tehran began implementing a 60-day memorandum, the ceasefire is broken, commercial ships have again come under attack in the Strait of Hormuz, and US forces have struck Iran. Yet the two sides are still talking.

President Donald Trump declared the ceasefire over after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fired on three merchant vessels, but said negotiations would continue because Iran “wants to make a deal so badly.”

The contradiction suggests the memorandum may be doing something narrower than ending the conflict. It has failed to prevent renewed violence, but may still provide a structure through which Washington and Tehran can contain escalation, preserve communication and negotiate between military exchanges.

The latest crisis has already damaged one of the memorandum’s main objectives: restoring safe commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz while the two sides pursued a broader agreement over Iran’s nuclear program and other disputes.

The question is no longer simply whether the ceasefire survived. It is whether the memorandum was ever a peace agreement, or a system for managing an unfinished war.

Experts who spoke to Iran International’s Eye for Iran podcast differed over whether the arrangement remains viable, but broadly agreed that both Washington and Tehran still have reasons to prevent the confrontation from returning to full-scale war.

Jonatan Sayeh, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said Tehran may have calculated that it could test US limits, absorb a contained response and retain many of the economic benefits it secured under the agreement.

“That to them was a gamble that was kind of worth it,” Sayeh said.

From the IRGC’s perspective, the outcome may still fall short of its worst-case scenario. Iran was struck, but the broader maritime blockade has not been fully restored, Tehran can continue selling oil to China, and the confrontation did not immediately return to all-out war.

Sayeh also questioned claims that Iran’s civilian government had simply lost control of the Guards.

Tehran may instead be using a new version of its longstanding “good cop, bad cop” strategy, he said, with civilian officials seeking concessions while presenting the IRGC as an independent force they cannot fully restrain.

Historian and Atlantic contributing writer Arash Azizi said the attacks had not necessarily destroyed the broader framework.

“I certainly don’t think it was doomed to fail,” Azizi said. “And I don’t, in fact, think it has failed actually yet.”

Neither Washington nor Tehran appears eager to resume full-scale war, he said. That shared interest could preserve negotiations even after the immediate ceasefire collapsed.

Azizi said hardline pressure on President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi may also help explain the attacks. Factions opposed to the agreement could fear that 60 days of normal traffic through Hormuz would make it harder for Iran to reassert control of the waterway as a source of leverage.

Fatima Al-Asrar, a senior policy analyst at Ideology Machine, argued that the memorandum’s ambiguity may have benefited the IRGC from the outset.

She called it a “memorandum of undoing,” saying it postponed or weakened earlier US demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program, armed allies and regional conduct.

“The MoU gives you this kind of maybe false sense of progress, and I think it’s performative mostly,” Al-Asrar said. “It’s a truce, and that’s great, but it’s driven by short-term political wins.”

Rather than removing Iran’s capacity to threaten shipping, she said, the arrangement may have allowed Tehran to retain what amounts to a geopolitical switch.

Iran can reduce tensions when it seeks sanctions relief, oil revenue or diplomatic concessions, then disrupt the strait again when it wants greater leverage.

The consequences extend far beyond Washington and Tehran. Disruption in Hormuz raises shipping and energy costs and can affect fertilizer supplies and food prices across Asia and other import-dependent regions.

Itai Reuveni, director of communications at NGO Monitor, described the memorandum as a deliberately flexible answer to the immediate needs of all sides.

Iran wanted to stop US and Israeli strikes before they threatened the survival of the Islamic Republic. Washington wanted to avoid another prolonged Middle Eastern war. Israel had demonstrated its ability to strike Iran but also faced the costs and risks of a sustained campaign.

The agreement reduced the intensity of the war without settling the disputes that caused it.

“It seems to me that the line is always being pushed,” Reuveni said.

The United States, Israel and Iran may now be entering a prolonged cycle in which each side tests how far it can go without triggering another major war.

That may explain why military action and diplomacy are continuing at the same time.

The memorandum did not create a conventional peace process in which violence stopped before negotiations began. It created a framework in which strikes, threats, retaliation and mediation could unfold alongside one another.

The attacks in Hormuz have damaged that framework and increased the danger of miscalculation. Another round of fighting could be broader and more destructive.

But whether the memorandum is dead depends on what it was expected to achieve.

The ceasefire may be over. The managed confrontation it created may only be beginning.

Episode 111 of Eye for Iran is available on YouTube and all major podcast platforms.

Mojtaba Khamenei vows global revenge for father’s killing

Jul 11, 2026, 11:58 GMT+1

Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said revenge for the killing of his father and others killed in the two recent wars would be carried out regardless of whether he or other officials remained in office.

“We pledge to avenge your pure blood and the blood of all the martyrs of these two wars against the criminal and disgraced killers,” Khamenei said. “This revenge is the demand of our nation, and it must certainly take place.”

He said those responsible would “take the hope of a peaceful death in their beds to the grave,” adding that retaliation did not depend on his own presence or that of other officials.

“Whether we are here or not, this will be achieved, and soon individuals among the freedom-seekers across the world will each carry out part of this divine mission,” he said.

The message was dated July 9, the day Ali Khamenei was buried in Mashhad, but was released on Saturday.