Return of Iran-US thaw advocate ignites hardline debate

Amirahmadi is a retired Rutgers University professor and founder of the American Iranian Council, whose shifting political positions over the years have made him a controversial figure.

Before his latest trip, Amirahmadi said his goal was not friendship between Tehran and Washington but the normalization of diplomatic relations.

"Friendly relations are different from normal relations," he said in an interview with Voice of America before traveling to Iran, adding that he hoped his ideas could help normalize ties between the two countries. He declined to say which groups inside Iran he had been speaking with.

While some pro-government media portray him as an opposition figure, some government opponents view him as an apologist for the Islamic Republic, citing his occasional defense of its leadership and institutions, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In 2019, he attended rallies organized by Iranian opposition groups abroad and described himself as a supporter of regime change. After the killing of Qassem Soleimani, however, he publicly defended both the late commander and the IRGC in media interviews.

In a recent interview with Iran's hardline Student News Network (SNN) following his return, Amirahmadi referred to slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a "martyr" and argued that "history will gradually prove that Iranians misunderstood him."

He also accused government opponents of failing to understand the realities of Iranian society.

Some conservative outlets portrayed his visit as evidence that critics of the Islamic Republic were recognizing political realities inside Iran.

SNN wrote that Amirahmadi's return "is not an ordinary event," arguing that remaining within the opposition abroad without clearly distancing oneself from groups hostile to the Islamic Republic risked being interpreted as indirect alignment with the country's enemies.

"In these circumstances, returning to the embrace of the Iranian nation and redefining one's relationship with the realities inside the country has become an unavoidable necessity," it wrote.

Not all conservative media welcomed his return. Hardline newspaper Kayhan questioned why authorities had allowed Amirahmadi into the country.

"What is Houshang Amirahmadi, America's broker and Western operative, seeking by traveling to Iran?" the newspaper wrote. "Officials must remain vigilant against this longtime spy of the Great Satan."

Some social media users rejected attempts to portray him as an opposition figure and argued that his return served the government's efforts to weaken the exiled opposition.

"They brought Houshang Amirahmadi back to Iran so they can claim the country has become a paradise and tell all opponents to return as well," one X user, Omid Roshan, wrote. "They want people to believe resistance against the government no longer works and that everyone should repent and come back."

Describing himself as a reformist, Amirahmadi unsuccessfully sought Iran's presidency in 2005, 2013 and 2017, but the Guardian Council disqualified him on each occasion.

Reports surrounding the 2005 election cited his US citizenship and some of his political positions among the factors believed to have contributed to the decision.

Some linked his return to growing speculation that Tehran and Washington could eventually restore full diplomatic relations and reopen their embassies.

"The interests of the Iranian and American people require normal diplomatic relations between the two countries," Siamak Shojaei, a university professor in Iran, wrote on X. "I hope Amirahmadi succeeds this time."

A mourning site set up near the place where Ali Khamenei was killed has been shut down after shroud-wearing ultra-hardliners turned it into a three-day sit-in, exposing a widening rift inside Iran’s loyalist camp over how to use the slain leader’s memory.

The site, known as Ravagh Keshvardoust, had been turned into a shrine-like space in central Tehran for prayer, mourning and ritual gatherings after Khamenei’s killing.

In Iranian religious architecture, a ravagh usually refers to a covered hall or portico attached to a shrine. In this case, the term was being used for a temporary devotional space around the site of Khamenei’s death.

According to Jamaran, a news outlet close to the family of the Islamic Republic’s founder Ruhollah Khomeini, organizers closed the site after a group of kafan-poushan, or shroud-wearers, arrived from Mashhad on Ashura (June 25) and occupied the space under the banner of “avenging the blood of the slain leader.”

Read the full article here.

The site, known as Ravagh Keshvardoust, had been turned into a shrine-like space in central Tehran for prayer, mourning and ritual gatherings after Khamenei’s killing. In Iranian religious architecture, a ravagh usually refers to a covered hall or portico attached to a shrine. In this case, the term was being used for a temporary devotional space around the site of Khamenei’s death.

According to Jamaran, a news outlet close to the family of the Islamic Republic’s founder Ruhollah Khomeini, organizers closed the site after a group of kafan-poushan, or shroud-wearers, arrived from Mashhad on Ashura (June 25) and occupied the space under the banner of “avenging the blood of the slain leader.”

• 

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The term kafan-poushan refers to activists who wear white burial shrouds in political or religious demonstrations, presenting themselves as ready for death or martyrdom. The symbolism has long been used by hardline factions in the Islamic Republic, especially when they want to frame a political demand as a sacred duty.

Organizers said the group’s three-day sit-in changed the function of the site. What had been a place for prayer, mourning, daily ceremonies and congregational prayers became, in their words, a place for overnight stays, food distribution and protest equipment. They said repeated requests and mediation failed to persuade the protesters to leave.

The decision to close the site was presented as an effort to protect the sanctity of a site named after the slain leader. But politically, it showed something more sensitive: even parts of the pro-Khamenei establishment now appear to see some of the most radical mourners as disruptive, not useful.

The conflict is not between supporters and opponents of the Islamic Republic. It is between two loyalist currents.

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One side wants Khamenei’s death to be used as a managed symbol of unity, grief and continuity under the new leadership. The other wants to turn that grief into a permanent pressure campaign against officials accused of compromise, especially over talks with the United States and the interim memorandum meant to end the war.

That split has been visible for weeks.

Ultra-hardline figures linked to the Paydari Front have attacked the negotiating team led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, accusing them of crossing the late leader’s red lines. Some protesters at hardline rallies have chanted against Ghalibaf and Araghchi, asking what happened to “the blood” of their leader. Some went further, calling for their death or execution.

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Iran International previously reported that supporters of the Paydari Front were removed from nightly state-organized rallies in Tehran after requests by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf, in an apparent attempt to contain pressure from the ultra-hardline street while talks with Washington continued.

The same divide has appeared in parliament and in the media. Lawmakers close to the ultra-hardline camp have accused Ghalibaf of keeping parliament closed to shield negotiations from criticism. Conservative activist Mohammad Mohajeri accused hardline lawmakers of trying to use parliament’s podium for factional purposes after the US-Iran memorandum.

Earlier, Iran International reported that the dispute had spilled into a public clash between Raja News, close to Saeed Jalili’s ultraconservative camp, and the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency. The argument centered on how far Iran should go in negotiations and whether maximalist demands, including sweeping sanctions relief and regional ceasefires, were realistic.

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The closure of the site brings that fight into the religious arena.

State-linked outlets had spent weeks giving the site a sacred vocabulary. Some described it as a place where mourners could approach the “killing site” of the slain leader. Others compared it to Tel Zaynabiyya, a deeply emotional reference in Shiite memory. In Karbala, Tel Zaynabiyya is associated with the place from which Zaynab, the sister of Imam Hussein, is believed to have witnessed the battlefield after Hussein’s killing in 680. Using that phrase for Khamenei’s death places the site inside the language of Ashura, martyrdom and sacred grief.

Ashura is not just a mourning ritual in the Islamic Republic’s political culture. It is also a vocabulary of legitimacy, sacrifice and confrontation. Since 1979, the state has repeatedly used the story of Imam Hussein’s stand at Karbala to frame political loyalty as moral resistance and compromise as betrayal.

But the Keshvardoust dispute shows the risk of that language for the state itself. Once Khamenei’s death is framed as a sacred wound demanding revenge, the most radical loyalists can use the same symbolism against the government, parliament speaker, foreign minister or any official seen as too “pragmatic.”

That is why the incident is politically revealing. The establishment wants mourning that strengthens the system. The ultra-hardliners want mourning that disciplines the system.

They say Tehran must use the post-war period to impose budgetary discipline, avoid past currency-stabilization mistakes and overhaul its bureaucracy to attract foreign investment, rather than treating the current pause as a short-lived tactical opportunity.

Business strategy consultant Ali Nazemzadeh argued that historical experience—from post-World War II Germany and Japan to Iran's reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq War and the 2008 global financial crisis—suggests economies rarely collapse permanently after major shocks.

Instead, they undergo periods of restructuring and renewal.

Writing in Jahan-e Sanat earlier this week, Nazemzadeh urged business leaders to abandon a passive "waiting mode" and prepare for a post-crisis economy that could unleash pent-up demand and redistribute market share toward the most resilient firms.

Although the 12-day and 40-day wars constrained business decision-making through currency volatility, internet disruptions, the triggering of the UN snapback mechanism, domestic unrest and military tensions, he argued that economic recovery remains historically inevitable.

With its natural resources, strategic location and population of 90 million, "Iran cannot fail to develop after a wartime era," he wrote, describing crises as an "economic sieve" that allows businesses with liquidity, disciplined management and clear strategy to emerge stronger.

Economist Pouya Jabal Ameli echoed that view, arguing that while the interim agreement may not permanently end the cycle of war and ceasefire, it creates a crucial window ahead of the 60-day deadline for negotiating a comprehensive settlement.

He urged policymakers to treat the period not as a tactical pause but as a launchpad for deep structural reforms.

By taking advantage of falling inflation expectations, enforcing budgetary discipline, avoiding historical currency-stabilization traps such as Dutch disease, and preparing a bureaucratic overhaul capable of attracting foreign investment, Iran could shift its global image from conflict toward economic renewal.

Jabal Ameli concluded that Iranian officials should view the memorandum—and any subsequent agreement with the United States—as an opportunity for structural reform rather than a short-term tactical maneuver.

Offering a more optimistic political assessment, pro-reform daily Sharq described the memorandum as "the first direct official agreement between the presidents of Iran and the U.S. in over four decades."

Columnist Abdolrahman Fathollahi argued the agreement could pave the way for a durable ceasefire, economic recovery and the gradual lifting of sanctions while noting that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the talks only conditionally and continued to stress distrust of Washington.

He also pointed to repeated warnings from the IRGC and the Supreme National Security Council that Iran had prepared retaliatory measures should the United States fail to honour its commitments.

Despite criticism from a handful of hardline lawmakers, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who also serves as Iran's chief negotiator, declared parliament's backing for the process.

"With the finalization of the memorandum, the difficult path of fulfilling commitments and reclaiming the rights of the Iranian nation has only just begun," he said.

Fathollahi cautioned against excessive optimism, arguing that the agreement's ultimate success "will be determined not in its text, but in the degree of adherence to commitments, the management of regional crises, and the tests ahead."

Iran's Ashura commemorations have again become a stage for competing political narratives, with government supporters and opponents alike using Shi'ite mourning rituals to advance sharply different messages.

Every year during the Islamic month of Muharram, millions of Shi'ite Muslims across Iran commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad who was killed in 680 AD.

Hardliners often invoke his example to argue Iran should continue confronting the United States, while government critics use the same symbolism to condemn injustice at home.

Political messaging also comes through speeches by eulogists (maddahs), who preside over ceremonies recounting Hussein's sacrifice and heroism.

Read the full article here.