Iran International
The preliminary memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington to end the 70-day conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz has reshaped the regional balance, with consequences extending far beyond the battlefield.
The agreement has created clear political and economic winners—and at least one conspicuous loser—as governments reassess their security, energy and diplomatic priorities.
The principal beneficiaries are the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, along with China and Pakistan, all of which have a strong interest in restoring regional stability and safeguarding trade. Israel, by contrast, emerges as the most politically isolated actor, increasingly at odds with Washington's approach and the broader diplomatic direction of the region.
For much of the world, the central issue is not the ideological rivalry between Iran and Israel but the security of maritime trade.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical artery for global energy flows and for imports of food and consumer goods into the Persian Gulf. Its closure disrupted oil and gas exports, slowed economic activity and heightened inflation across the region.
According to the moderate outlet Fararu, a former British ambassador to Iran argued that many Persian Gulf states believe the agreement should have been reached much earlier given the scale of the economic damage caused by the crisis.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states did not respond uniformly to the conflict. Qatar and Oman opposed the escalation from the outset, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE adopted more cautious positions.
Qatar played a particularly important mediating role, helping facilitate communication between Tehran and Washington. Oman, meanwhile, faced Iranian pressure to endorse the idea of tolling the Strait of Hormuz—a proposal rejected by regional states and the wider international community, which regard the waterway as an international passage rather than a commercial asset.
Despite those differences, the agreement has narrowed intra-GCC divisions. It has also deepened doubts about Washington's long-term reliability as a security guarantor, even as Iran's Arab neighbours remain dependent on American military infrastructure.
China appears to have emerged as one of the agreement's biggest beneficiaries. Throughout the crisis, Beijing's overriding concern was global economic stability.
The reopening of the Strait lowers energy import costs, supports Chinese economic recovery and reinforces Beijing's preferred image as a power that benefits from stability without becoming directly involved in regional conflicts.
Pakistan likewise stands to gain. Having played a central mediating role, Islamabad strengthens its diplomatic standing while reducing the risk that instability on its western border could spill over into its own security and economy.
For Russia, the picture is more mixed. The closure of the Strait pushed global oil prices higher, boosting Moscow's revenues. The agreement is reversing that trend, reducing those gains. On the other hand, a more stable Middle East makes it less likely that Arab states will deepen military cooperation with Ukraine, particularly in air defense—an outcome Moscow is likely to welcome.
Israel appears to be the agreement's principal political loser. Donald Trump had hoped to expand the Abraham Accords, but Arab governments are now focused primarily on securing a durable arrangement that contains Iran's nuclear program and prevents another regional war.
Israel's current government, which appears intent on undermining the agreement, has further reduced regional enthusiasm for normalization, leaving it increasingly isolated from the emerging diplomatic consensus.
The agreement has also revived debate inside Iran over whether any future nuclear arrangement can endure on its own.
Former ambassador Hossein Mousavian argues that no nuclear deal can survive unless it also addresses the deeper Iran-Israel confrontation.
In remarks quoted by Rouydad24, he described the current moment as a "golden opportunity" to transform Tehran-Washington relations, but warned that any agreement focused solely on the nuclear file would remain fragile unless embedded within a broader regional security framework.
His assessment reflects a broader recognition emerging from the conflict: the ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz may have created new diplomatic opportunities, but whether they endure will depend on addressing the deeper regional rivalries that have repeatedly undermined previous agreements.
The agreement could eventually unlock tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue and frozen assets while paving the way for a proposed $300 billion reconstruction program.
Much of that money would depend on further negotiations during a 60-day window, but analysts say the direction of US policy has already changed.
"If the MOU is acted upon based on what we've seen in the text... I fear that we are at risk of moving from maximum pressure to maximum appeasement," he told Eye for Iran.
Economist Mohamad Machine-Chian sees the same policy shift, though he describes it differently.
"To my understanding, it seems like the US administration has concluded it is moving toward a different paradigm," he said.
"Before that they were relying on sanctions and maximum pressure. Now they're trying to provide incentives and basically direct and control using incentives."
The economic package outlined in the MOU has three main components: expanded oil revenue, access to frozen Iranian assets and a proposed reconstruction and economic development plan worth at least $300 billion. Each would operate differently.
According to Meizlish, the biggest immediate change is Treasury's General License X.
The significance of the license, he says, goes far beyond allowing Iran to export oil. It authorizes much of the commercial activity surrounding those exports, including associated financial transactions.
That means Iran is not simply allowed to sell oil. It is allowed to receive and use the proceeds.
"We're talking about potentially tens of billions of dollars in a relatively short period of time," Meizlish said. "It's unconditioned, unrestricted sanctions relief that's going to provide billions of dollars to the regime."
According to Meizlish, the license appears to contain no escrow mechanism or reporting requirements, distinguishing it from previous arrangements in which unfrozen Iranian assets were held in restricted accounts and designated for humanitarian purposes.
Frozen assets
Separate from oil revenue are Iran's frozen assets.
The MOU states that those funds would be made available under procedures to be negotiated during the 60-day talks.
The Trump administration has suggested released assets could be used to purchase humanitarian goods, including American agricultural products.
But Machine-Chian says there is no practical way to guarantee those goods ultimately benefit ordinary Iranians.
"I don't think there's any way to make sure it actually reaches ordinary Iranians," he said.
Even if wheat, medicine or other humanitarian supplies are purchased, he said, Washington has little control over how they are distributed once inside Iran.
The reconstruction fund
The agreement also proposes developing a reconstruction and economic development plan worth at least $300 billion with regional partners.
Exactly how the fund would operate remains unclear. President Donald Trump has repeatedly said US taxpayers would not finance reconstruction, while administration officials have suggested Persian Gulf partners and private investment could provide much of the funding if a final agreement is reached.
Unlike oil revenue, however, the reconstruction plan remains largely conceptual and would require further agreements before any large-scale investment materializes.
Have sanctions really disappeared?
Not entirely.
Machine-Chian cautioned that sanctions relief alone would not fully reconnect Iran to the global economy.
Iranian banks remain largely cut off from the international financial system, and restoring normal banking ties would likely require Tehran to comply with standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a politically contentious step that hardline factions have long resisted.
As a result, sanctions relief alone is unlikely to normalize Iran's banking sector.
Who benefits?
The central debate surrounding the agreement is not simply how much money Iran could receive but who ultimately controls it.
Machine-Chian argues Iran's Central Bank is under severe pressure from inflation, a weakening rial and dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Fresh access to foreign currency, he says, could help stabilize the economy and prevent a deeper financial crisis.
"In that regard, these funds are going to help the Islamic Republic immensely," he said.
Whether that ultimately improves life for ordinary Iranians, however, remains uncertain.
Meizlish warns that fresh revenue could help rebuild military infrastructure damaged during the war while flowing into sectors such as oil, construction and petrochemicals, which he argues are deeply connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
"So what has Iran actually done?" Meizlish asked, arguing that reopening the Strait of Hormuz and agreeing to continue negotiations fall well short of the scale of economic relief now being offered.
Whether the strategy succeeds will depend less on the size of the promised economic package than on whether Washington can convert financial incentives into lasting nuclear concessions.
For now, the agreement represents a clear break from the sanctions-first approach that has defined US policy toward Iran for much of the past decade.
You can watch Eye for Iran on YouTube or listen on any podcast platform of your choosing.
