Oil pressure and economic strain drive Iran-US talks

Concerns intensified after a former head of Iran’s state broadcaster said Tehran had imported Chinese equipment for a “permanent internet shutdown,” while millions of Iranians endure what monitoring group NetBlocks says is now the world’s longest ongoing nationwide blackout.

Experts warn the Islamic Republic may not be trying to shut the internet off forever but instead attempting to build a controlled and heavily surveilled online ecosystem designed to filter information, monitor communications and isolate Iranians from the outside world while still keeping parts of the economy online.

Mohammad Sarafraz, the former head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and a current member of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, said in an interview with the online newspaper Faraz that factions in Tehran are seeking to restrict global internet access for the general public while preserving it for a limited and controlled group.

He said the Islamic Republic had imported Chinese equipment for “permanently cutting off the internet.”

Spectre of digital control

Laura Edelson, assistant professor of computer science at Northeastern University, said the closest comparison may be China’s internet crackdown in Xinjiang after unrest there in 2009, when authorities isolated the Uyghur-majority region from the outside internet for 10 months.

“Functionally, for the vast majority of the population, they were effectively cut off entirely from the outside world,” Edelson said.

She said China’s model is far more sophisticated than simply blocking websites, relying on centralized state control to filter content, surveil users and selectively determine what information people can access.

“This centralized model is one that a lot of other countries, including and almost especially Iran, has been moving toward,” she told Iran International.

She added that turning off the internet forever “is not useful,” meaning authoritarian governments increasingly favor adaptable systems that can tighten restrictions during politically sensitive moments and loosen them when economic activity is needed.

“Iran’s government doesn’t trust its own people,” Edelson said. “The vast majority of people don't support the government.”

“If you can have an internet that you can adaptively not just turn on and off, but control what people can reach and what they can’t reach — that’s a set of internet censorship and surveillance systems that I would be more afraid of personally,” she said.

Can Tehran pull it off?

Max Meizlish, Senior Research Analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former US Treasury official focused on sanctions enforcement, said China has long exported censorship technologies and surveillance capabilities to authoritarian partners.

“We know that China has been a significant partner to several malign actors, including Iran, but also Russia and North Korea, with respect to cyber technology censorship capabilities,” Meizlish told Iran International.

He said China’s own internet system gives Tehran both a blueprint and a commercial partner.

According to Meizlish, Iran’s centralized control over internet infrastructure already gives authorities the ability to regulate what information enters or leaves the country.

“What we could actually see is Iran building out its own internet,” he said, “so that the people of Iran are only able to view what the government wants them to view.”

He said technology transfers between Beijing and Tehran should increasingly be viewed through the lens of human rights abuses and digital repression.

“There’s an argument to be made that this form of censorship constitutes a wide-scale human rights abuse,” Meizlish said.

But Amin Sabeti, founder of cybersecurity research group CERTFA, cautioned that Iran still lacks many of the domestic technological capabilities that made China’s censorship system possible.

“The Iranian regime imports the technology; it doesn't own the technology,” Sabeti said.

Unlike China, he said, Iran lacks strong domestic alternatives to many global services and remains heavily dependent on foreign infrastructure and technology.

“In China, there isn't a need for Gmail because they have good services in terms of email,” Sabeti said. “In Iran, there isn't any proper email service.”

Sabeti said Iran has repeatedly shown it can temporarily shut down the internet during protests and unrest, but questioned whether the regime could sustain a truly permanent nationwide blackout over the long term.

“I don't think it will happen,” he said.

Iran’s rulers may not want to permanently disconnect Iranians from the global internet, but they appear to be moving toward a more sustainable architecture of digital control that allows the state to keep commerce functioning while isolating citizens from independent information, encrypted communications and even family members abroad.

For many Iranians, the question is no longer whether the internet will fully return, but what kind of internet the state intends to allow back.

What began as a military and geopolitical standoff has evolved into a contest over economic endurance, one that neither Iran nor the global economy appears capable of sustaining indefinitely.

After weeks of escalation, diplomacy has regained momentum. Talks involving Tehran, Washington and regional mediators have intensified, while US President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested a deal may be close.

At the center of the latest negotiations lies the issue of frozen Iranian assets.

Iranian officials are demanding guaranteed access to billions of dollars held abroad before accepting any preliminary understanding, while reports from Tehran suggest Qatar may be exploring financial mechanisms that would allow limited transfers without direct US payments to Iran.

The diplomacy reflects mounting pressure on both sides.

The head of the International Energy Agency warned in May that unless progress is made toward ending the crisis with Iran, the global oil market could enter a “red zone” by summer.

Beginning in mid-March — roughly two weeks after Iran moved to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — IEA member states began gradually releasing strategic petroleum reserves to offset sharp declines in Gulf energy exports.

Hundreds of millions of barrels have already been released from emergency stockpiles, according to market estimates, as governments attempt to stabilize prices and prevent a broader supply shock.

But strategic reserves are not unlimited.

Even when commercial inventories are included, only part of global oil storage can realistically be released to the market. Much of the world’s inventories are tied to operational infrastructure, while many governments face legal and political constraints on how deeply emergency reserves can be depleted outside wartime conditions.

The strain is increasingly visible across the global economy.

High energy prices have weakened demand growth and raised recession fears in major economies, while shipping disruptions in the Persian Gulf continue to inject volatility into global markets.

Iran, meanwhile, faces mounting economic pressure of its own.

Exports of crude oil and petroleum products, which account for a large share of the country’s export revenues, have sharply declined under blockade conditions. Iranian steel and petrochemical facilities have also faced repeated disruptions and attacks during the conflict.

According to estimates by Kpler, Iran’s floating oil storage near East Asian waters has fallen sharply in recent weeks as Tehran struggles to maintain exports to China despite mounting logistical constraints.

The United States and its allies retain significant escalation options economically and militarily, while Iran’s ability to sustain prolonged confrontation increasingly appears tied to its capacity to continue threatening shipping routes and regional stability.

But Washington also faces limits. A prolonged energy crisis, rising oil prices and fears of a wider regional war are creating growing pressure on the United States and Gulf allies to secure at least a temporary understanding with Tehran.

That pressure helps explain the renewed urgency surrounding the Doha talks.

What now seems increasingly clear is that neither Iran’s economy nor the global economy can sustain the current trajectory for much longer.

The question is no longer whether economic pressure is being felt. It is whether the pressure forces compromise before miscalculation produces another round of escalation.

The internet was once seen in Iran as a gateway to the outside world, but it is increasingly being reshaped into something narrower and more conditional: a privilege that can be restricted, filtered or priced at will.

After two months offline, Morteza finally managed to reconnect for a few minutes and send a message to a group of old friends.

“Hi guys, do you know any VPN that actually works?” he wrote. “I’m locked out of my hearing-aid account. I can’t update it.”

The message captured something many Iranians have been trying to explain for months: the country’s internet crisis is no longer just about Instagram, Telegram or access to foreign news websites. The internet has become woven into nearly every aspect of daily life: from work and banking to transportation, education and healthcare.

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After two months offline, Morteza finally managed to reconnect for a few minutes and send a message to a group of old friends.

“Hi guys, do you know any VPN that actually works?” he wrote. “I’m locked out of my hearing-aid account. I can’t update it.”

The message captured something many Iranians have been trying to explain for months: the country’s internet crisis is no longer just about Instagram, Telegram or access to foreign news websites. The internet has become woven into nearly every aspect of daily life: from work and banking to transportation, education and healthcare.

Iran’s latest shutdown, which began on February 28 and continues in various forms, has become one of the longest nationwide internet disruptions in the world.

Even global tech companies have begun to feel its effects. Meta, the owner of WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, recently reported that the average daily users of its apps fell from 3.58 billion to 3.56 billion in the first quarter of the year, partly because of internet disruptions in Iran.

The decline was small by Meta standards but striking nonetheless: Iran’s blackout had become large enough to leave visible marks on the usage charts of some of the world’s biggest technology platforms.

The whitelist

During wars, outages caused by attacks on infrastructure are not unusual. But in Iran’s case, the authorities themselves ordered and implemented the restrictions while simultaneously insisting that no real “internet shutdown” had occurred.

Officials instead describe the measures as restrictions on “foreign platforms” imposed because of wartime conditions.

Rasool Jalili, a member of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, argued that when foreign media speak about an internet shutdown, they really mean access to Instagram and Telegram. He went further, placing those platforms in the same category as American fighter jets and missiles.

The comparison reflects a broader shift in how parts of the Iranian establishment increasingly view the internet: not as infrastructure, but as a threat to governance and security.

The same argument is often echoed abroad by commentators close to the government. Mohammad Marandi, for example, argued in response to an Al Jazeera report that because some domestic applications and services remained functional, describing the situation as an “internet blackout” was misleading.

Technically, internet filtering usually means blocking specific websites or services from a global network—a system based on blacklists.

But what Iran is now moving toward goes further than blocking Instagram, X or Telegram. Increasingly, access itself is being reorganized around approved users and approved services through a system marketed as “Internet Pro.”

Internet as privilege

The idea emerged publicly after the ceasefire alongside official talk of domestic governance of foreign platforms. 

The government presented the plan—reportedly approved by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council—as a temporary measure designed to reduce pressure on businesses during wartime.

In practice, it creates different layers of internet access based on profession, identity and official approval.

A doctor’s package may allow access to YouTube while keeping Instagram blocked. A businessman’s package may permit Instagram but not other services. The result is a more formalized version of what critics inside Iran have long described as “class-based internet.”

The prolonged restrictions have inflicted severe damage on businesses already weakened by inflation and war. But they have also created new economic opportunities.

Pursuit of workarounds

VPNs sold in Iran vary widely. Some are commercial products, others are homemade “configurations” that function only through specific servers and routes, while some reportedly rely indirectly on systems such as Starlink.

For users, however, they all mean the same thing: paying increasingly large sums for fragments of connection to the outside world.

Reports suggest VPN prices have multiplied several times since the beginning of the war, though free anti-censorship tools developed by independent developers occasionally disrupt the market and drive prices down.

But here is the contradiction: if unrestricted internet access is truly considered a security threat, why does that same access become available to approved groups through money, permits or connections?

Independent investigative journalist Yashar Soltani has argued that the “Internet Pro” system is tied partly to the financial interests of major telecom operators and networks linked to powerful state institutions.

Whether or not all aspects of those claims withstand scrutiny, one reality is already visible inside Iran: alongside the shutdown itself, a market has emerged for selling different levels of digital access.

The result is a growing divide between those who remain connected and those effectively cut off from the outside world.

At the same time as restricting access to the global internet, the Islamic Republic has increasingly redefined connectivity not as a public right but as a controlled privilege—one that can be priced, restricted and distributed according to political and economic priorities.

In Iran today, internet access is becoming not just a tool of communication, but a commodity and an instrument of control.

Munir’s visit on Friday follows days of lower-level negotiations that have reportedly narrowed some of the major disagreements between Tehran and Washington.

The Pakistani commander visited Tehran last month as well, where he held meetings with senior Iranian civilian and military officials.

Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi also traveled twice to Tehran and remained there on Friday as negotiations continued.

Iranian and Pakistani media reports described the visit as part of Islamabad’s broader mediation effort aimed at reducing tensions over Iran’s uranium enrichment program and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Axios reported on Friday that Munir’s visit could represent a “final push” by Pakistan to secure a temporary agreement under which both sides would halt hostilities and continue negotiations for another 30 days over unresolved disputes, including Iran’s nuclear program.

Media speculation

However, expectations of an imminent breakthrough remain cautious.

An Iranian source close to the negotiations told the Arabic outlet Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that Pakistan’s interior minister had not delivered any new American proposal to Tehran and that reports about a finalized draft agreement were “media speculation.”

According to the source, “the visits by Pakistani officials to Tehran are aimed at strengthening Islamabad’s mediation role and preventing further escalation.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman downplayed the significance of the Pakistani top general's trip to Tehran, saying, "Despite becoming more frequent, such exchanges are a continuation of the same diplomatic process. We cannot necessarily say we have reached a point where a deal is near."

“The differences between Iran and the United States are so deep and extensive that it cannot be said we must necessarily reach a result after a few rounds of visits or negotiations within a few weeks," Iran's foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Friday.

Iranian outlet Farda News, considered close to parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf who is leading Iran’s negotiating team, wrote that “Islamabad is not merely a messenger, but is playing a role beyond transmitting messages and below that of a direct negotiator.”

Pakistan, Iran’s eastern neighbor, has emerged over the past two months as the principal intermediary between Tehran and Washington.

Its mediation efforts accelerated after Islamabad helped broker a ceasefire on April 7. But the first round of direct talks between Iran and the United States failed to produce a lasting agreement, and recent weeks have shown signs of growing diplomatic deadlock.

‘Unprecedented progress’

Oman had previously served as the primary mediator. Talks between Tehran and Washington were underway in Muscat before US and Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28.

At the time, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi publicly said that “significant and unprecedented progress” had been achieved before diplomacy collapsed following the outbreak of war.

Unlike Oman, which largely positioned itself as a neutral intermediary, Pakistan enters the process with closer security ties to Saudi Arabia.

Some analysts argue this complicates Islamabad’s role. Pakistan signed a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2025 committing both countries to support one another in the event of an attack. Iran repeatedly targeted Saudi territory during the war, raising questions among some observers about Pakistan’s neutrality.

London-based Amwaj Media wrote that the Islamabad-Riyadh defense pact demonstrates “the limits of Pakistan’s neutrality” in mediating between Iran and the United States.

Iranian state news agency IRNA described Pakistan’s primary concern as preventing the conflict from spreading beyond Iran into the wider region.

The report said Pakistan fears the war could spill into South Asia and destabilize its western border regions at a time when Islamabad is already managing tensions with India along its eastern frontier.

‘The limits of Pakistan’s neutrality’

At the same time, Pakistani officials appear to see strategic opportunities in successful mediation.

IRNA argued that if Islamabad helps secure a diplomatic settlement, it could strengthen Pakistan’s regional standing and deepen economic ties with a post-sanctions Iran.

“Honest mediation by Islamabad could elevate Pakistan’s position in a future Iran free from sanctions and transform it into an important partner,” IRNA wrote.

Pakistan’s mediation effort has also drawn support from China, one of Tehran’s closest strategic partners. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has confirmed that Islamabad’s diplomatic efforts are backed by Beijing.

Although Beijing has avoided taking on a direct mediation role, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently said China supports Pakistan playing a “greater role” in resolving the conflict.