Iran is turning the internet into a privilege

After two months offline, Morteza finally managed to reconnect for a few minutes and send a message to a group of old friends.

“Hi guys, do you know any VPN that actually works?” he wrote. “I’m locked out of my hearing-aid account. I can’t update it.”

The message captured something many Iranians have been trying to explain for months: the country’s internet crisis is no longer just about Instagram, Telegram or access to foreign news websites. The internet has become woven into nearly every aspect of daily life: from work and banking to transportation, education and healthcare.

Iran’s latest shutdown, which began on February 28 and continues in various forms, has become one of the longest nationwide internet disruptions in the world.

Even global tech companies have begun to feel its effects. Meta, the owner of WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, recently reported that the average daily users of its apps fell from 3.58 billion to 3.56 billion in the first quarter of the year, partly because of internet disruptions in Iran.

The decline was small by Meta standards but striking nonetheless: Iran’s blackout had become large enough to leave visible marks on the usage charts of some of the world’s biggest technology platforms.

The whitelist

During wars, outages caused by attacks on infrastructure are not unusual. But in Iran’s case, the authorities themselves ordered and implemented the restrictions while simultaneously insisting that no real “internet shutdown” had occurred.

Officials instead describe the measures as restrictions on “foreign platforms” imposed because of wartime conditions.

Rasool Jalili, a member of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, argued that when foreign media speak about an internet shutdown, they really mean access to Instagram and Telegram. He went further, placing those platforms in the same category as American fighter jets and missiles.

The comparison reflects a broader shift in how parts of the Iranian establishment increasingly view the internet: not as infrastructure, but as a threat to governance and security.

The same argument is often echoed abroad by commentators close to the government. Mohammad Marandi, for example, argued in response to an Al Jazeera report that because some domestic applications and services remained functional, describing the situation as an “internet blackout” was misleading.

Technically, internet filtering usually means blocking specific websites or services from a global network—a system based on blacklists.

But what Iran is now moving toward goes further than blocking Instagram, X or Telegram. Increasingly, access itself is being reorganized around approved users and approved services through a system marketed as “Internet Pro.”

Internet as privilege

The idea emerged publicly after the ceasefire alongside official talk of domestic governance of foreign platforms. 

The government presented the plan—reportedly approved by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council—as a temporary measure designed to reduce pressure on businesses during wartime.

In practice, it creates different layers of internet access based on profession, identity and official approval.

A doctor’s package may allow access to YouTube while keeping Instagram blocked. A businessman’s package may permit Instagram but not other services. The result is a more formalized version of what critics inside Iran have long described as “class-based internet.”

The prolonged restrictions have inflicted severe damage on businesses already weakened by inflation and war. But they have also created new economic opportunities.

Pursuit of workarounds

VPNs sold in Iran vary widely. Some are commercial products, others are homemade “configurations” that function only through specific servers and routes, while some reportedly rely indirectly on systems such as Starlink.

For users, however, they all mean the same thing: paying increasingly large sums for fragments of connection to the outside world.

Reports suggest VPN prices have multiplied several times since the beginning of the war, though free anti-censorship tools developed by independent developers occasionally disrupt the market and drive prices down.

But here is the contradiction: if unrestricted internet access is truly considered a security threat, why does that same access become available to approved groups through money, permits or connections?

Independent investigative journalist Yashar Soltani has argued that the “Internet Pro” system is tied partly to the financial interests of major telecom operators and networks linked to powerful state institutions.

Whether or not all aspects of those claims withstand scrutiny, one reality is already visible inside Iran: alongside the shutdown itself, a market has emerged for selling different levels of digital access.

The result is a growing divide between those who remain connected and those effectively cut off from the outside world.

At the same time as restricting access to the global internet, the Islamic Republic has increasingly redefined connectivity not as a public right but as a controlled privilege—one that can be priced, restricted and distributed according to political and economic priorities.

In Iran today, internet access is becoming not just a tool of communication, but a commodity and an instrument of control.

Munir’s visit on Friday follows days of lower-level negotiations that have reportedly narrowed some of the major disagreements between Tehran and Washington.

The Pakistani commander visited Tehran last month as well, where he held meetings with senior Iranian civilian and military officials.

Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi also traveled twice to Tehran and remained there on Friday as negotiations continued.

Iranian and Pakistani media reports described the visit as part of Islamabad’s broader mediation effort aimed at reducing tensions over Iran’s uranium enrichment program and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Axios reported on Friday that Munir’s visit could represent a “final push” by Pakistan to secure a temporary agreement under which both sides would halt hostilities and continue negotiations for another 30 days over unresolved disputes, including Iran’s nuclear program.

Media speculation

However, expectations of an imminent breakthrough remain cautious.

An Iranian source close to the negotiations told the Arabic outlet Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that Pakistan’s interior minister had not delivered any new American proposal to Tehran and that reports about a finalized draft agreement were “media speculation.”

According to the source, “the visits by Pakistani officials to Tehran are aimed at strengthening Islamabad’s mediation role and preventing further escalation.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman downplayed the significance of the Pakistani top general's trip to Tehran, saying, "Despite becoming more frequent, such exchanges are a continuation of the same diplomatic process. We cannot necessarily say we have reached a point where a deal is near."

“The differences between Iran and the United States are so deep and extensive that it cannot be said we must necessarily reach a result after a few rounds of visits or negotiations within a few weeks," Iran's foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Friday.

Iranian outlet Farda News, considered close to parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf who is leading Iran’s negotiating team, wrote that “Islamabad is not merely a messenger, but is playing a role beyond transmitting messages and below that of a direct negotiator.”

Pakistan, Iran’s eastern neighbor, has emerged over the past two months as the principal intermediary between Tehran and Washington.

Its mediation efforts accelerated after Islamabad helped broker a ceasefire on April 7. But the first round of direct talks between Iran and the United States failed to produce a lasting agreement, and recent weeks have shown signs of growing diplomatic deadlock.

‘Unprecedented progress’

Oman had previously served as the primary mediator. Talks between Tehran and Washington were underway in Muscat before US and Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28.

At the time, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi publicly said that “significant and unprecedented progress” had been achieved before diplomacy collapsed following the outbreak of war.

Unlike Oman, which largely positioned itself as a neutral intermediary, Pakistan enters the process with closer security ties to Saudi Arabia.

Some analysts argue this complicates Islamabad’s role. Pakistan signed a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2025 committing both countries to support one another in the event of an attack. Iran repeatedly targeted Saudi territory during the war, raising questions among some observers about Pakistan’s neutrality.

London-based Amwaj Media wrote that the Islamabad-Riyadh defense pact demonstrates “the limits of Pakistan’s neutrality” in mediating between Iran and the United States.

Iranian state news agency IRNA described Pakistan’s primary concern as preventing the conflict from spreading beyond Iran into the wider region.

The report said Pakistan fears the war could spill into South Asia and destabilize its western border regions at a time when Islamabad is already managing tensions with India along its eastern frontier.

‘The limits of Pakistan’s neutrality’

At the same time, Pakistani officials appear to see strategic opportunities in successful mediation.

IRNA argued that if Islamabad helps secure a diplomatic settlement, it could strengthen Pakistan’s regional standing and deepen economic ties with a post-sanctions Iran.

“Honest mediation by Islamabad could elevate Pakistan’s position in a future Iran free from sanctions and transform it into an important partner,” IRNA wrote.

Pakistan’s mediation effort has also drawn support from China, one of Tehran’s closest strategic partners. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has confirmed that Islamabad’s diplomatic efforts are backed by Beijing.

Although Beijing has avoided taking on a direct mediation role, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently said China supports Pakistan playing a “greater role” in resolving the conflict.

For years, Tehran portrayed fuel self-sufficiency as proof that sanctions had not crippled the energy sector. But recent comments by officials suggest the country was already facing a daily shortfall of roughly 20 million liters before the latest war.

MP Reza Sepahvand recently said production stands at around 105 million liters a day while consumption is closer to 135 million.

War damage, disrupted imports and pressure on petrochemical units have now pushed a long-running structural problem into public view.

Why a producer runs short of gas

Iran may hold vast oil reserves and operate sizable refineries, but that does not automatically guarantee enough gasoline for domestic use.

Much of the country’s refining system depends on aging infrastructure, limited maintenance and technology constrained by years of sanctions, leaving production increasingly out of step with demand.

Fuel consumption is also on the rise. Expanding cities, heavy reliance on private cars and millions of older, fuel-inefficient vehicles place constant pressure on supply.

Cheap subsidized gasoline also encourages overuse, while large price gaps with neighboring countries fuel widespread smuggling that pulls millions of liters out of Iran each day.

The crisis is tied to politics as much as energy. Subsidies help keep fuel affordable and reduce public frustration, but they also deepen waste, smuggling and financial pressure on the state.

Iranian leaders know reforms are necessary, yet past fuel-price increases have triggered unrest, leaving the government trapped between avoiding social anger and managing a system that is becoming harder to sustain.

How war made things worse

The latest war has turned a chronic imbalance into a more immediate stress test. Strikes on energy infrastructure and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz have affected refining, storage, distribution and imports.

Even when refineries are not completely knocked offline, damage to depots, logistics networks and supporting industrial units can sharply reduce the amount of usable gasoline reaching consumers.

One overlooked issue is Iran’s reliance on petrochemical components for gasoline blending.

When refineries cannot produce enough high-quality gasoline, producers blend in octane-boosting components to improve fuel performance. These can include aromatic-rich streams such as benzene, toluene and xylenes, as well as additives such as MTBE.

Such components are widely used in global fuel production because they raise octane levels. The difference lies in regulation.

Many countries tightly restrict substances such as benzene because of health and environmental risks. Iran’s heavier reliance on petrochemical blending can worsen pollution if quality controls weaken or blending exceeds safer limits.

Higher levels of benzene and aromatics increase harmful emissions, especially in congested cities such as Tehran, where air quality is already poor. MTBE also carries environmental risks, particularly for groundwater contamination.

Damage to petrochemical facilities therefore matters for two reasons: it can reduce the supply of components Iran needs to stretch gasoline production while also increasing pressure to rely on lower-quality blending practices to keep fuel flowing.

Either outcome creates problems: tighter supply or worsening health and environmental costs.

When will it really bite?

Before the war, Iran managed the imbalance through imports, rationing, fuel cards, blending and informal restrictions. Those measures helped prevent a full public breakdown but never solved the underlying problem.

If the reported daily shortfall of 20 to 30 million liters persists, shortages could become more visible within weeks or months, especially during peak summer demand.

Longer queues, tighter quotas, regional outages, rising black-market prices and growing pressure on transport and agriculture are among the most likely consequences.

Recent public comments by lawmakers suggest officials are no longer able to present the issue as a temporary inconvenience.

War damage has made repairs and imports more difficult, while years of overworking refineries, postponing maintenance and relying on imports and petrochemical blending left little room to absorb new shocks.

Partial recovery of refining and distribution capacity may be possible within one or two months if damage is limited and supply routes remain open. Full normalization would likely take far longer because the deeper causes are structural: rising demand, old vehicles, sanctions, smuggling, weak investment and distorted pricing.

Iran’s gasoline shortage is therefore not only an energy problem but also a governance problem.

For ordinary Iranians, the consequences are increasingly visible in longer fuel lines, higher unofficial prices, rising transport costs and worsening air pollution: exposing the widening gap between official claims of resilience and economic reality.

Even as Tehran engages in hardheaded diplomatic maneuvering with Washington, it is advancing a parliamentary proposal offering a €50 million reward for President Trump’s killing.

The ruling establishment, they argue, is trying to project strength after weeks of military and political pressure while using the prospect of talks not as a concession but as another arena of confrontation.

“The Iranian regime is trying to, in their own mind, basically say that we are on par,” Dr. Shahram Kholdi, a Middle East historian, told Iran International. “Even if you're not on par with Trump, we are actually beating him at all levels.”

The proposed bounty, he said, should be read partly as psychological warfare against Trump.

Read the full article here.

After an 80-day shutdown, the Tehran Stock Exchange reopened on Tuesday under heavy state controls, with 42 major firms still suspended and reported curbs on large-scale selling amid uncertainty over war damage and corporate losses.

Trading resumed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) under strict and highly managed conditions, with parts of the market reopening while 42 major, mostly export-oriented companies remained suspended.

The restart marked a procedural return to activity, but within a framework designed to tightly control selling pressure and limit volatility.

Steel and petrochemical companies — traditionally among the most influential drivers of the TEDPIX index — did not reopen.

Read the full article here.