Iran’s president defends US talks as he lays bare economic strain

US President Donald Trump said during his recent visit to Beijing that Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.

China’s foreign ministry has also repeatedly called for the Strait of Hormuz to reopen “as soon as possible” and urged a “comprehensive and lasting ceasefire” between Iran and the United States.

Before the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, roughly 45 percent of China’s oil imports passed through the strategic waterway.

As Brent crude futures surged to $117 per barrel and physical oil cargoes traded at prices as high as $150, China responded by cutting oil imports by 20 percent last month and raising domestic gasoline and diesel prices on May 9.

Reuters reported that China’s producer prices climbed to a 45-month high in April, while consumer inflation also accelerated.

But the damage to China’s economy goes far beyond energy supplies.

Although Beijing has yet to release customs data for April, March figures already point to a sharp collapse in Chinese exports to the region.

According to Chinese customs statistics, exports to Persian Gulf countries fell to just $5.7 billion during March—the first month of Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—down from $13.2 billion the previous month.

In other words, Chinese exports to the Persian Gulf region plunged by 57 percent within a single month.

These figures represent only part of the economic fallout facing China. Chinese companies implemented or invested in approximately $39.4 billion worth of projects across the Middle East last year.

But with the region sliding deeper into conflict and Iran launching extensive attacks against its Arab neighbours, many of Beijing’s regional investments are facing growing uncertainty.

Expectations among those states that China should pressure Tehran should not be underestimated. China exported roughly $340 billion worth of goods to Iran’s Arab neighbours. That’s roughly equivalent to the entire size of Iran’s economy.

Beijing cannot simply ignore the concerns of its wealthy regional partners.

One potential lever available to China may be reducing purchases of Iranian crude. Data from Kpler shows that despite strong demand, China cut imports of Iranian oil by nearly one-third in April compared to March, reducing purchases to 1.16 million barrels per day.

China also remains Iran’s largest non-oil trading partner.

Beijing has nevertheless continued to back Tehran diplomatically. China and Russia opposed recent US-backed UN resolutions on the Strait of Hormuz, arguing the measures were one-sided and risked fueling further escalation.

China’s UN envoy Fu Gong said the proposed resolution was “not helpful” and argued that both its timing and content were wrong.

Still, Iran continues to serve as an important strategic card for Beijing in its broader rivalry with the West. But despite the growing economic costs, China is unlikely to support any outcome that would leave Tehran strategically defeated by Washington.

Trump’s visit had fueled speculation in parts of the Iranian press that China might play a more active mediating role or pressure the United States toward concessions over the Strait of Hormuz and the broader conflict.

Instead, Chinese statements after the summit largely emphasized stability in global trade and uninterrupted shipping flows, reinforcing perceptions in Tehran that Beijing would ultimately prioritize its own economic interests.

Part of the disappointment stems from signs that Trump saw little value in seeking China’s help on Iran, while Beijing itself appears unwilling to meaningfully intervene unless its own strategic and economic interests are directly threatened.

Hamid Reza Taraghi, a senior figure in the traditional conservative Islamic Coalition Party, said no real negotiations are currently taking place between Tehran and Washington.

While the two sides continue exchanging written messages through Pakistan, he said Trump has offered no positive response to Iran’s proposals.

“The prolonged limbo,” he told moderate outlet Khabar Online, "is worsening economic pressures inside Iran," complicating efforts to stabilize markets and deepening public uncertainty about the future.

Taraghi also acknowledged internal divisions within Iran, saying domestic opposition to negotiations continues to disrupt the process and is amplified by prime-time coverage on state television.

Like many Iranian commentators in recent days, Taraghi described the greatest danger facing the country as the risk of another round of conflict.

That sense of strategic deadlock was echoed Friday in a lengthy analysis published by the reform-leaning Fararu website, which argued that Washington now finds itself trapped in a “no victory, no exit” situation.

The report said the United States appears torn between several risky paths: reviving indirect diplomacy through regional intermediaries, escalating military pressure through a heavier regional presence, or tightening maritime restrictions to further squeeze Iran’s trade and access to sea routes.

None, Fararu argued, offers a clear path to success.

The analysis also pointed to divisions inside Washington, with Republican hawks pressing for stronger military action while Democrats continue advocating diplomacy and warning against deeper entanglement in the Middle East.

According to analysts cited by the outlet, the current US approach has failed to achieve its central objectives, while Iran has largely preserved both its deterrence posture in the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear leverage.

Some of the unnamed experts warned that Washington risks repeating long-standing miscalculations about Iran’s vulnerabilities, potentially deepening rather than resolving the crisis.

Fararu suggested the Trump administration may ultimately seek a symbolic off-ramp—potentially even through rebranding or redefining its military campaign to justify limited renewed strikes while claiming a form of victory.

But the analysts cited by the publication argued that Iran is unlikely to yield under pressure, leaving Washington facing an increasingly unappealing choice between renewed escalation and acceptance of a costly stalemate.

Reports during and after the summit, including comments highlighted by Fox News, suggested China had signaled readiness to play a more active role in stabilizing the situation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. But any Chinese cooperation is likely to remain limited, transactional and tied to Beijing’s broader strategic priorities.

Before Trump’s departure from Washington, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent accused China of “funding the largest state sponsor of terrorism,” while Trump himself said he was going to have “a long talk” with Xi. Earlier, the Treasury Department sanctioned five of the so-called “teapot” refineries that process Iranian oil in China.

These moves were not surprising. The war involving the United States, Israel and Iran has shaken the Middle East, threatened global energy flows and become increasingly unpopular among American voters and consumers. Iran has become a priority issue for the White House.

China has reasons to listen. Beijing has already shown some willingness to restrain Tehran, including by nudging Iran toward the Islamabad talks. It does not want the fragile ceasefire to collapse. It does not want the Strait of Hormuz closed. Nor does it want a global downturn that would damage Chinese exports.

China’s investments in electrification and renewable energy have increased its resilience, but they have not made it immune to a major shock in the Middle East. Yet Xi’s help, if it comes, will not be free.

In his recent conversation with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made clear that Taiwan remains the core issue for China and the greatest risk in US-China relations. Chinese readouts of the Trump-Xi meeting also placed Taiwan at the center of discussions, with the “situation in the Middle East” appearing much lower on the agenda.

The implication is difficult to miss: if Washington wants Chinese cooperation, Beijing will expect a more accommodating US position on Taiwan. Several current and former American officials have expressed concern that Trump, who said he intended to have “that discussion” with Xi, could delay or reduce the $14 billion weapons package for Taiwan approved by Congress in January.

In other words, China has strong reasons to support de-escalation over Iran, but Beijing also appears to view the crisis through the lens of a much larger strategic bargain with Washington.

Xi’s help is also likely to remain limited. Beijing and Tehran still share a fundamental objective. Both want the Iranian regime to survive. Both want Iran to avoid emerging from the conflict as a defeated and humiliated loser. Both oppose a regional order shaped by the United States and Israel.

For Tehran, defeat would be a regime-threatening disaster. For Beijing, it would be another demonstration that American coercive power can still break an anti-US partner.

China may therefore encourage Tehran to negotiate, support language about regional stability or help Trump claim diplomatic progress. It may even make quiet tactical adjustments to its economic dealings with Iran. But any such move will be carefully calibrated to serve China’s own interests.

China may help stabilize the situation; it will not help Washington defeat Tehran.

The fact that the Chinese embassy in Washington has not denied reports that Wang Yi and Rubio agreed in April that the Strait of Hormuz must remain toll-free is a good example of this dynamic. So too is the American readout stating that China opposes Iran developing nuclear weapons. Both signal goodwill, but neither represents a meaningful shift in Beijing’s position or a compromise of its interests.

This means Trump may have secured Chinese support for de-escalation. He may even have persuaded Xi that a prolonged conflict is too costly for China and that Beijing has an interest in pushing Tehran toward compromise. But he cannot force China to choose Washington over Tehran. Pressure alone is unlikely to work, especially if it requires Xi to appear publicly subordinate to American demands.

There is another problem: it remains unclear what Washington actually wants. It is not enough to accuse China of enabling Iran. The United States still lacks a clearly defined objective. Does it want a ceasefire, renewed nuclear talks, limits on Iranian regional activity, security guarantees for regional partners or some combination of these?

Without a coherent strategy, China will continue using the crisis to extract concessions elsewhere while offering only limited help.

The summit may not have determined the future of the Middle East. But it did reveal something important about the emerging great-power rivalry. The United States remains militarily dominant but strategically erratic. China is economically central but cautious as a security actor.

Trump arrived in Beijing seeking Chinese help on Iran. Xi may offer some. But the price will be high, and the help will not come at Tehran’s expense.

Ebrahim Azizi, head of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told the state TV that lawmakers had prepared several bills since the start of the March war, including one on “countermeasures by military and security forces.”

“We believe the vile president of the United States, the ominous and disgraceful Zionist prime minister, and the CENTCOM commander must be targeted and subjected to reciprocal action,” Azizi said.

“This is our right,” he added. “Just as our Imam was martyred, the president of the United States must be dealt with by any Muslim or free person.”

Azizi said the bill stipulates that “if any natural or legal person carries out this religious and ideological mission, the government is obliged to pay €50 million as a reward.”

Earlier in March, a mass text message sent to mobile users in Iran promoted what it described as an “international campaign to reward the assassination of Trump,” according to screenshots of the message shared with Iran International.

The message urged recipients to register their support through a website and to confirm participation by sending a number via SMS.

Tehran-based Didban Iran reported that the campaign has gained around 290,000 supporters, with total pledged amounts reaching $25 million.

In February, an undercover video shown in a Brooklyn courtroom was released capturing an alleged Iran-linked operative describing a 2024 plot to assassinate Trump.

The operative who prosecutors say tried to hire two men to kill Trump for $5,000 upfront demonstrated the plan by placing a vape pen on a napkin to signify his “target,” the hidden camera video released by the New York Post shows.

In November 2024, the US Department of Justice unsealed criminal charges regarding a thwarted plot by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to assassinate Trump prior to the 2024 presidential election.

Trump has been a target for assassination threats since he ordered the 2020 killing of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force in Iraq.

Most outlets framed negotiations as deadlocked. Reform-leaning Fararu warned of “the increasing possibility of yet another escalation.”

In an article titled “Negotiating About Negotiating” published by Sharq, former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi examined the growing impasse after Trump reportedly rejected Iran’s latest 14-point proposal as “completely unacceptable.”

According to Tasnim and IRIB, Tehran’s proposal included demands for the withdrawal of US forces from Iran’s periphery, war reparations, full sanctions relief and a new legal framework for the Strait of Hormuz.

Ahmadi argued that the recent exchange of written messages marked a regression from even the already limited framework of indirect negotiations.

“This is no longer substantive diplomacy,” he wrote, describing the process instead as “negotiating about the method of negotiation.”

He argued that Trump remains focused on Iran’s 60 percent uranium enrichment while Tehran continues prioritizing sovereignty and economic compensation, leaving little common ground.

Rather than full-scale war, Ahmadi predicted prolonged “low-intensity military encounters,” tighter naval blockades and sustained economic pressure aimed at keeping Iran unstable.

In Etemad, foreign policy analyst Morteza Makki argued that after 40 days of military confrontation both Tehran and Washington are now effectively “forced” to seek some form of agreement.

Makki said the conflict had reshaped regional dynamics, arguing that despite heavy costs Iran had preserved key strategic objectives and demonstrated deterrence in the Persian Gulf, while Washington had failed to secure broader goals despite military escalation and operations such as Operation Freedom.

“The White House is now managing the costs of war rather than leading an offensive,” he said.

Makki pointed to domestic pressures in the United States, fears of rising energy prices and reluctance among Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia to enter a broader conflict.

He concluded that both the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz remain negotiable if political will exists, but argued that China is now the only power capable of offering guarantees Tehran would trust.

“It seems China is the only country that can play an effective role in creating space for dialogue and guaranteeing a stable agreement between Iran and the U.S.,” he said.

Expanding on China’s role, Iran’s former ambassador to Beijing Hamid Aboutalebi argued in a Fararu commentary that the confrontation has evolved beyond a regional crisis into a test of China’s willingness to defend partners against US pressure.

He wrote that the conflict was no longer simply about sanctions or Iran’s nuclear program, but about whether Beijing is prepared to challenge a US-centered global order.

According to Aboutalebi, if China succeeds in building alternative financial and energy networks while defending partners such as Iran, Tehran could evolve from an isolated sanctioned state into a key player in an emerging multipolar order.

But if Beijing retreats under pressure, he warned, it would expose the limits of Chinese power despite its global ambitions.

He argued that tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have elevated the conflict into a broader geopolitical contest, increasingly forcing China to balance its ambitions as a global power against its dependence on stability and open trade routes.