• العربية
  • فارسی
Brand
  • Iran Insight
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Analysis
  • Special Report
  • Opinion
  • Podcast
  • Iran Insight
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Analysis
  • Special Report
  • Opinion
  • Podcast
  • Theme
  • Language
    • العربية
    • فارسی
  • Iran Insight
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Analysis
  • Special Report
  • Opinion
  • Podcast
All rights reserved for Volant Media UK Limited
volant media logo
ANALYSIS

China’s Iran balancing act grows more costly

Dalga Khatinoglu
Dalga Khatinoglu

Oil, gas and Iran economic analyst

May 16, 2026, 03:28 GMT+1
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near Bandar Abbas, Iran, May 4, 2026.
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near Bandar Abbas, Iran, May 4, 2026.

China is showing growing unease over the economic and strategic costs of Iran’s confrontation with the United States, even as it continues to shield Tehran diplomatically at the United Nations.

US President Donald Trump said during his recent visit to Beijing that Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.

China’s foreign ministry has also repeatedly called for the Strait of Hormuz to reopen “as soon as possible” and urged a “comprehensive and lasting ceasefire” between Iran and the United States.

Before the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, roughly 45 percent of China’s oil imports passed through the strategic waterway.

As Brent crude futures surged to $117 per barrel and physical oil cargoes traded at prices as high as $150, China responded by cutting oil imports by 20 percent last month and raising domestic gasoline and diesel prices on May 9.

Reuters reported that China’s producer prices climbed to a 45-month high in April, while consumer inflation also accelerated.

But the damage to China’s economy goes far beyond energy supplies.

Although Beijing has yet to release customs data for April, March figures already point to a sharp collapse in Chinese exports to the region.

According to Chinese customs statistics, exports to Persian Gulf countries fell to just $5.7 billion during March—the first month of Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—down from $13.2 billion the previous month.

In other words, Chinese exports to the Persian Gulf region plunged by 57 percent within a single month.

These figures represent only part of the economic fallout facing China. Chinese companies implemented or invested in approximately $39.4 billion worth of projects across the Middle East last year.

But with the region sliding deeper into conflict and Iran launching extensive attacks against its Arab neighbours, many of Beijing’s regional investments are facing growing uncertainty.

Expectations among those states that China should pressure Tehran should not be underestimated. China exported roughly $340 billion worth of goods to Iran’s Arab neighbours. That’s roughly equivalent to the entire size of Iran’s economy.

Beijing cannot simply ignore the concerns of its wealthy regional partners.

One potential lever available to China may be reducing purchases of Iranian crude. Data from Kpler shows that despite strong demand, China cut imports of Iranian oil by nearly one-third in April compared to March, reducing purchases to 1.16 million barrels per day.

China also remains Iran’s largest non-oil trading partner.

Beijing has nevertheless continued to back Tehran diplomatically. China and Russia opposed recent US-backed UN resolutions on the Strait of Hormuz, arguing the measures were one-sided and risked fueling further escalation.

China’s UN envoy Fu Gong said the proposed resolution was “not helpful” and argued that both its timing and content were wrong.

Still, Iran continues to serve as an important strategic card for Beijing in its broader rivalry with the West. But despite the growing economic costs, China is unlikely to support any outcome that would leave Tehran strategically defeated by Washington.

Most Viewed

Iran and UAE clash at BRICS foreign ministers meeting
1

Iran and UAE clash at BRICS foreign ministers meeting

2

Iran to cast regional conflict as resistance to US power at BRICS meeting

3

Iran parliament working on bill that proposes €50m reward for killing Trump

4
INSIGHT

Earthquakes and storm revive Tehran’s fears of 'the big one'

5
ANALYSIS

Xi may help Trump on Iran, but at a price

Banner
Banner

Spotlight

  • China’s Iran balancing act grows more costly
    ANALYSIS

    China’s Iran balancing act grows more costly

  • Tehran media sees rising risk of war as US talks stall
    INSIGHT

    Tehran media sees rising risk of war as US talks stall

  • 'Class internet' fuels anger in blackout-hit Iran
    INSIGHT

    'Class internet' fuels anger in blackout-hit Iran

  • Xi may help Trump on Iran, but at a price
    ANALYSIS

    Xi may help Trump on Iran, but at a price

  • How one Tehran hospital became a window into Iran’s January massacre
    SPECIAL REPORT

    How one Tehran hospital became a window into Iran’s January massacre

•
•
•

More Stories

Tehran media sees rising risk of war as US talks stall

May 15, 2026, 22:52 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani

Tehran media coverage of the impasse with Washington following President Donald Trump’s visit to China points to growing frustration, with many insiders voicing concern that diplomacy has stalled and more confrontation may lie ahead.

Trump’s visit had fueled speculation in parts of the Iranian press that China might play a more active mediating role or pressure the United States toward concessions over the Strait of Hormuz and the broader conflict.

Instead, Chinese statements after the summit largely emphasized stability in global trade and uninterrupted shipping flows, reinforcing perceptions in Tehran that Beijing would ultimately prioritize its own economic interests.

Part of the disappointment stems from signs that Trump saw little value in seeking China’s help on Iran, while Beijing itself appears unwilling to meaningfully intervene unless its own strategic and economic interests are directly threatened.

Hamid Reza Taraghi, a senior figure in the traditional conservative Islamic Coalition Party, said no real negotiations are currently taking place between Tehran and Washington.

While the two sides continue exchanging written messages through Pakistan, he said Trump has offered no positive response to Iran’s proposals.

“The prolonged limbo,” he told moderate outlet Khabar Online, "is worsening economic pressures inside Iran," complicating efforts to stabilize markets and deepening public uncertainty about the future.

Taraghi also acknowledged internal divisions within Iran, saying domestic opposition to negotiations continues to disrupt the process and is amplified by prime-time coverage on state television.

Like many Iranian commentators in recent days, Taraghi described the greatest danger facing the country as the risk of another round of conflict.

That sense of strategic deadlock was echoed Friday in a lengthy analysis published by the reform-leaning Fararu website, which argued that Washington now finds itself trapped in a “no victory, no exit” situation.

The report said the United States appears torn between several risky paths: reviving indirect diplomacy through regional intermediaries, escalating military pressure through a heavier regional presence, or tightening maritime restrictions to further squeeze Iran’s trade and access to sea routes.

None, Fararu argued, offers a clear path to success.

The analysis also pointed to divisions inside Washington, with Republican hawks pressing for stronger military action while Democrats continue advocating diplomacy and warning against deeper entanglement in the Middle East.

According to analysts cited by the outlet, the current US approach has failed to achieve its central objectives, while Iran has largely preserved both its deterrence posture in the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear leverage.

Some of the unnamed experts warned that Washington risks repeating long-standing miscalculations about Iran’s vulnerabilities, potentially deepening rather than resolving the crisis.

Fararu suggested the Trump administration may ultimately seek a symbolic off-ramp—potentially even through rebranding or redefining its military campaign to justify limited renewed strikes while claiming a form of victory.

But the analysts cited by the publication argued that Iran is unlikely to yield under pressure, leaving Washington facing an increasingly unappealing choice between renewed escalation and acceptance of a costly stalemate.

Hormuz gives battered Iran room to wait out Trump, experts say

May 15, 2026, 22:45 GMT+1

The Iran war has entered a more ambiguous phase, with the regime battered but not broken, the US struggling to define victory, and the Strait of Hormuz emerging as Iran’s most potent bargaining tool, two Middle East experts said at an Iran International townhall in Washington DC.

The panel, moderated by Iran International’s Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, brought together Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute and Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies to discuss what comes after a ceasefire that has not ended the wider confrontation.

The debate, held on May 14, came a month after the US naval blockade of Iranian ports began on April 13, intensifying pressure on Tehran’s economy and maritime trade. But the blockade has also pushed shipping, insurance risk and control of Hormuz to the center of the conflict.

A regime under pressure, but not necessarily near collapse

Alterman said the Iranian regime has changed since the war began, but “not in a positive way.” He warned that the war may not have pushed the Islamic Republic toward compromise, but further into the hands of its security establishment.

With Mojtaba Khamenei less visible and Revolutionary Guard hardliners appearing more influential, he said Tehran’s instinct seems to be to “hunker down and wait out” President Donald Trump.

“It feels like the default is toward confrontation rather than compromise,” Alterman said.

For Alterman, that does not necessarily mean the regime is closer to falling. It may instead mean Tehran is more likely to absorb pressure and wait for Trump’s political calendar to become more difficult.

Pletka also warned against assuming that a weakened regime automatically produces a better outcome. She said Washington often frames Iran’s power struggle as one between hardliners and moderates, but the reality is more complicated.

“These are all people who support the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” she said. “Some of them want to kill fewer people. Some of them want to kill more people.”

The danger, she suggested, is that US and Israeli strikes weaken Iran militarily while empowering the most repressive factions at home. Alterman put the question more starkly: does the pressure lead to regime collapse, or “just lead to more Iranians suffering for a longer period of time”?

Hormuz changes the balance

The clearest divide between the two experts came over the Strait of Hormuz.

Alterman argued that the war has revealed an uncomfortable truth for Washington: even a damaged Iran can still disrupt one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.

“Even a weak Iran, a battered Iran, can control the strait,” he said.

It only needs to create enough fear to alter the behavior of shipping companies, insurers, and neighbouring Arab states and energy markets. In that sense, the threshold for disruption is lower than many had assumed.

Pletka sharply disagreed with the idea that Iran truly controls the strait.

“The reason the Iranians control the Strait of Hormuz right now is because we’re letting them,” she said. “We can take control of it. We can do what we want. We can move traffic through.”

She said the issue is no longer only military. It is also about risk, insurance and the willingness of shipowners to send vessels into waters where even a single strike, mine or ambiguous threat can have major consequences.

The result is a paradox: Iran may be weaker than before the war, but it may have discovered a tool it can use more confidently than before.

No clear road to victory or a deal

Both experts were skeptical that the current diplomatic track can quickly produce a comprehensive settlement.

Alterman said the two sides have persuaded themselves that they are excellent negotiators, which makes compromise harder. The best Washington may get, he argued, is not a grand bargain but a framework for drawn-out talks.

“The best-case scenario from a US perspective is locking yourself into negotiations with the Iranians through the end of the Trump administration,” he said.

Such a process could include talks over the nuclear file, missiles and freedom of navigation, but it would likely remain incremental and fragile, with both sides preserving the option to resume escalation.

Pletka said Trump appears most focused on removing Iran’s fissile material and its ability to produce more. But she warned that narrowing the issue to the nuclear file would repeat a familiar mistake.

“Everybody focuses on the nuclear when they need to focus on all of it at once,” she said, pointing to missiles, proxies and Iran’s regional conduct as inseparable parts of the challenge.

That leaves the conflict suspended between competing assumptions. Trump appears to believe economic pressure will force Iran to blink. Alterman suggested Tehran may believe it can outlast him by enduring pain, repressing dissent and waiting for US domestic politics to intervene.

Fuel shortages and rationing push Iranians into gasoline black market

May 15, 2026, 09:04 GMT+1
•
Saba Heidarkhani

Fuel shortages and tighter rationing are pushing drivers across Iran into a growing gasoline black market, with citizens describing long lines at gas stations and sharply inflated prices in messages sent to Iran International.

The accounts describe growing frustration over restricted access to subsidized gasoline and arbitrary limits imposed by operators, leaving many motorists dependent on costly unofficial sales.

“One day there’s quota left on your card, the next day it says your quota is finished,” one citizen said. “They even steal the few drops of gasoline they give people.”

Iran uses a subsidized fuel quota system controlled through electronic fuel cards. Every private vehicle receives a monthly gasoline allocation at discounted prices, while extra consumption is charged at higher rates.

Under Iran’s latest pricing system introduced in late 2025, the first 60 liters of gasoline each month cost 15,000 rials per liter (about $0.008), the next 100 liters cost 30,000 rials ($0.017), and any amount above 160 liters costs 50,000 rials ($0.028).

Despite heavy fuel subsidies, Iran’s minimum monthly wage is now worth less than $90 because of inflation and the sharp decline of the rial.

  • Iran begins pilot sales of imported gasoline at market price

    Iran begins pilot sales of imported gasoline at market price

Another driver said he could not use his personal fuel card on Wednesday because his monthly allocation had already run out. The station operator, he said, agreed to provide a fuel card only if payment was handed directly to him, and even then limited sales to 15 liters at 70,000 rials ($0.038) per liter.

President Masoud Pezeshkian said in late April that the country faced “some shortages” in sectors including energy and fuel.

On May 9, Esmail Saghab Esfahani, vice president and head of Iran’s Strategic Energy Policy and Management Organization, said damage during the war had affected parts of the country’s gas and fuel infrastructure and disrupted some gasoline production capacity.

He said Iran had “no choice but to conserve” fuel consumption for at least the next 18 to 24 months.

But Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said on April 29 there were no concerns over fuel supply or distribution.

File Photo: A worker adjusts fuel pumps at a gas station in Iran
100%
File Photo: A worker adjusts fuel pumps at a gas station in Iran

Black market prices rise

A resident of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran said drivers often wait more than an hour at gas stations, even with personal fuel cards, while gasoline is “widely available” on the black market at 150,000 rials, about $0.08, per liter.

In Zahedan, in southeastern Iran, one resident said gasoline shortages and tighter controls had accelerated illegal fuel sales.

“Everything has been left without oversight,” the resident said. “Sometimes 20 liters of gasoline is sold on the street for 10 million rials ($5.5).”

One driver from Isfahan said operators demanded between 1 million rials ($0.55) and 4 million rials ($2.22) to provide access to only 15 liters.

  • Iran officially rolls out higher gas price under new three-tier system

    Iran officially rolls out higher gas price under new three-tier system

Citizens also described growing congestion at gas stations nationwide, with drivers saying some stations on major routes had limited purchases to 15 liters.

A resident of Sistan and Baluchestan said 70 liters of gasoline now costs around 50 million rials, about $28, while many villagers must drive hundreds of kilometers to reach hospitals or provincial centers.

For many Iranians, the shortages have become less a matter of conservation than another daily pressure in an increasingly strained economy.

'Class internet' fuels anger in blackout-hit Iran

May 15, 2026, 04:37 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee

President Masoud Pezeshkian has ordered the creation of a special committee to end Iran’s internet blackout, but many Iranians doubt it can overcome resistance from powerful state institutions.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has ordered the creation of a special committee to end Iran’s internet blackout, but many Iranians doubt the government can override the powerful institutions controlling cyberspace policy.

Earlier this week, Pezeshkian tasked First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref with forming a body aimed at restoring access to the global internet after more than two and a half months of severe restrictions.

Reformist newspaper Shargh reported that the committee is expected to restore broader access within a month.

Pezeshkian announced the move on X, saying he had instructed Aref to carry out the task while considering “governance sensitivities, the Supreme Leader’s views, and the promise I made to the people.”

During his presidential campaign, Pezeshkian repeatedly promised to ease internet filtering and restrictions. But ordinary Iranians have effectively been cut off from the global internet since US-Israeli strikes began on February 28.

Before the war, some individuals had access to so-called “white SIM cards,” exempt from ordinary filtering restrictions. After the ceasefire, authorities expanded selective access to businesses and approved individuals through services branded as “Internet Pro.”

Many users responding to Pezeshkian’s X post expressed frustration and skepticism.

“Mr. President, don’t make us regret voting for you,” one voter wrote. “End this discrimination, these white SIM cards, these Pro subscriptions, and this class-based treatment of a natural right. We want free internet.”

Another user reminded Pezeshkian that during the election campaign he had said he would resign if he failed to fulfill major promises, including lifting internet restrictions.

It remains unclear whether recent decisions were made by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) or the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Both are formally chaired by Pezeshkian, but other figures and institutions — including the Revolutionary Guards — wield significant influence within them.

The appointment of Aref to lead the new “Special Taskforce for Organizing and Guiding Cyberspace” also drew criticism from conservative figures.

Former Cultural Heritage Minister Ezzatollah Zarghami, himself a member of the SCC appointed by Khamenei, described the initiative as parallel decision-making overlapping with the council’s responsibilities.

“Transformation and restructuring in the decision-making system must be fundamental and involve changing the governance model in cyberspace,” he wrote on X.

One social media user responded sarcastically: “The president realized he can’t stand up to the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, so he created another council that can do absolutely nothing.”

‘Class-based internet’

The prolonged disruption of international internet access has created serious technical and economic problems inside Iran.

Domestic websites and online platforms have struggled because technical teams lost access to international tools and services. Software licenses expired, search engines failed to properly index Iranian sites, and server disruptions affected service delivery.

The impact on employment has also been severe. Millions of jobs linked to online businesses, social media and international digital services have been disrupted, including work done by programmers, online sellers and content creators.

Selective access programs such as “Pro Internet” and white SIM cards have meanwhile become symbols of inequality for many Iranians.

Some groups offered privileged access — including nurses and certain lawyers — refused to accept it, branding it institutionalized discrimination.

Restrictions on ordinary users have also fueled a growing black market.

According to Iranian media reports, while the official price for a 50-gigabyte Pro Internet package is around 20 million rials, the same service is being resold for as much as 120 million rials. White SIM cards are reportedly advertised on Telegram starting at 440 million rials, depending on the level of access provided.

Even before the current near-total shutdown, millions of Iranians already relied on paid VPN services to access blocked platforms such as Instagram and YouTube.

The high cost has effectively turned internet access into a luxury product many cannot afford in a country where some public sector workers, including teachers, earn roughly 150 million rials per month.

Journalist Sadegh Zangeneh wrote in Khabar Online: “The level of anger and dissatisfaction among the people over the internet shutdown and its divisive consequences should not be sought in reports written by those who have monopolized the internet themselves.”

He added: “Either those who deprive people of the internet in the name of security are betraying the country, or those who auction off national security under the label of ‘Pro Internet’ and other forms of class-based internet are doing so.”

Sociologist Mohammad Fazeli also warned about the social consequences of unequal access, arguing that “discriminatory internet” would become yet another reason for people to confront the state.

Xi may help Trump on Iran, but at a price

May 15, 2026, 00:32 GMT+1

President Trump’s visit to Beijing appears to have confirmed two things about China’s approach to the Iran crisis: it is willing to help prevent further escalation, but not at Tehran’s expense.

Reports during and after the summit, including comments highlighted by Fox News, suggested China had signaled readiness to play a more active role in stabilizing the situation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.

But any Chinese cooperation is likely to remain limited, transactional and tied to Beijing’s broader strategic priorities.

Read the full article here.