The protests were the result of several crises converging at once. Economic collapse, political exclusion and a growing sense of humiliation pushed society beyond its tolerance threshold and created a shared feeling across social groups that life in Iran had become increasingly unlivable.
When demonstrations erupted across the country, many slogans targeted the Islamic Republic itself.
The roots of the unrest run deep in provinces that host major oil and industrial projects but have long seen little improvement in living standards.
From Abadan to Bushehr and from Kangan to Gilan-e Gharb, many of the cities that first erupted in protest are places where people have spent years asking the same question: where did the country’s oil wealth go?
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government attempted to calm tensions by announcing direct cash payments to households after eliminating subsidized exchange rates. The payment amounted to about one million tomans—roughly seven dollars.
The gesture came at a time when food prices were soaring. Cooking oil prices had risen more than 200 percent, eggs were more than twice as expensive as a year earlier, and some shopkeepers had begun selling basic dairy products on installment plans.
For many Iranians the payment symbolized not relief but humiliation.
The middle class and the bazaar
One of the defining features of the January protests was the erosion of the social distance between Iran’s middle class and its poorer citizens.
Historically, Iran’s middle class has been a carrier of civil and political demands. But by early 2026 many middle-class families were struggling simply to avoid falling into poverty.
Political sociologists have long argued that revolutions are rarely led by the poorest members of society. They tend instead to emerge among groups that once enjoyed relative stability but now feel they are falling.
In Iran, the middle class had not only lost income but also social status. That loss helped create an unwritten alliance between middle-class citizens and poorer groups, both of whom felt they were suffering under the same policies.
Another signal that the unrest had entered new territory came when parts of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed on January 7.
The bazaar has historically been one of the most cautious institutions in Iran’s political life. Even during severe economic crises it has often preferred negotiation and indirect pressure to open confrontation. During the 2009 protests many merchants stayed silent, and in 2022 they largely remained on the sidelines. This time was different.
Currency volatility made supply chains chaotic and pricing unpredictable. A product purchased in the morning could be worth something entirely different by the afternoon. Many traders said they could no longer price goods reliably, and keeping shops open risked losses rather than gains.
When sections of the bazaar shut their doors, it signaled that dissatisfaction had spread beyond traditional protest groups. A conservative economic institution had concluded that the existing order itself had become a source of instability.
The collapse of reformist hopes
For some voters, President Pezeshkian had represented a final opportunity for reform and for avoiding war.
As protests intensified, however, he adopted increasingly hardline rhetoric. On January 11 he described protesters as “terrorists” and called on security forces to respond decisively.
Even some reformist figures who had supported him began to express frustration.
The shift reinforced a broader perception among many Iranians that the political system was incapable of meaningful change.
Combined with the economic crisis and the aftermath of the 12-day war, this sense of political closure deepened public despair.
From scattered anger to mass protest
The January protests also unfolded against a tense geopolitical backdrop.
Statements from foreign political figures—including remarks by Donald Trump warning Tehran against violent repression—were widely circulated among Iranian audiences. At the same time, Iran’s exiled prince Reza Pahlavi called for coordinated demonstrations and nightly slogans across the country.
Such messages helped focus attention on specific moments of protest. But they did not create the anger that drove people into the streets. That anger had been building for years.
The protests occurred as the Islamic Republic appeared to be shifting toward what might be described as a more defensive style of governance.
In this approach, economic grievances and social demands are increasingly treated as potential security threats. Limited cultural concessions—such as relaxing enforcement of the hijab law or allowing controlled concerts—serve mainly as tools for managing pressure rather than as signs of genuine reform.
The January protests tested this model. The state ultimately suppressed the demonstrations. Yet repression alone cannot address the deeper structural tensions that produced the uprising in the first place.
The streets may have emptied. But many Iranians now believe that the country cannot return to the conditions that existed before January.
