US journalist kidnapped in Baghdad by plainclothes forces, source says


American journalist Shelly Kittleson was abducted on Palestine Street in central Baghdad by masked plainclothes forces likely linked to the intelligence wing of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces, an informed source in Baghdad told Iran International.
Iraq’s Interior Ministry said the journalist was abducted by unidentified individuals, adding that security forces have launched a manhunt, arrested one suspect after a pursuit and vehicle crash, and are continuing efforts to rescue the victim and apprehend the remaining suspects.








A leaked internal directive from the IRGC’s missile command appears to show that the use of civilian locations to conceal, support and in some cases facilitate missile launch operations is not ad hoc, but structured, documented and built into operational planning.
The 33-page document shared with Iran International by the hacktivist group Edalat-e Ali (Ali’s Justice) has been marked “very confidential” and is titled Instruction for Identification, Maintenance, and Use of Positions.
The document is attributed to the Specialized Documents Center of the Intelligence and Operations Deputy of the IRGC's missile command.
A framework for missile operations
What emerges from the directive is a bureaucratic framework for missile deployment that goes well beyond hardened silos or underground “missile cities.”
The text lays out categories of launch positions, inspection procedures, coding systems, site records, chains of responsibility and rules for maintaining access to a wide network of locations that can be used before, during and after missile fire.
Its significance lies not only in the variety of launch positions it defines, but in the explicit inclusion of non-military environments in that system.
In its introduction, the document says missile positions are an inseparable part of missile warfare tactics and argues that the enemy’s growing ability to detect, track and destroy missile systems requires special rules for identifying, selecting, using and maintaining such positions.
It adds that the use of “deception,” “cover” and “normalization” alongside other methods would make the force more successful in using those positions.
That language is important. It suggests the document is not merely about protecting fixed military assets. It is about making missile units harder to distinguish from their surroundings and harder to detect in the first place.
Civilian locations as missile cover
The implication of the directive is that it describes a system for embedding missile activity within ordinary civilian geography.
Rather than relying only on conventional military facilities, the document sets out a model in which missile units can move across a wider landscape of pre-identified sites selected for concealment, access and operational utility.
The result is a structure that appears designed to preserve launch capability while reducing visibility and complicating detection.
The clearest indication comes in the section on what the document describes as artificial dispersion or cover positions. These include service, industrial and sports centers, as well as sheds and warehouses – places that are civilian in function or appearance, but can be repurposed to hide missile units.
The conditions listed for such sites include being enclosed, not overlooked by surrounding buildings, and either lacking CCTV cameras or allowing them to be switched off.
Taken together, those requirements point to a deliberate screening process for civilian sites that can be used as missile cover. The concern is not only protection from attack, but invisibility within the civilian landscape.
The broader structure of the document reinforces that conclusion. It contains sections on site identities, naming and coding, inspections of routes and positions, record maintenance and responsibilities across intelligence, operations, engineering, communications, safety, health and counterintelligence.
This is the language of a standing system, not an improvised wartime workaround.

A system for concealment
Farzin Nadimi, a senior defense and security analyst at the Washington Institute who reviewed the document for Iran International’s The Lead with Niusha Saremi, said the text points to a database-driven effort to identify areas around missile bases that can be used for different kinds of positions.
He said the IRGC missile force appears to have mapped not only launch positions, but also dispersal, deception and technical positions – the latter being places suitable for storing launchers and support vehicles and, when needed, preparing missiles for firing.
“These technical positions,” Nadimi said, “can include large, covered spaces such as industrial sheds or sports halls, where missile launchers and support vehicles can be brought inside, and where missiles can be mounted onto launchers, warheads attached and, in the case of liquid-fueled systems, fueling operations carried out.”
That point is critical. If civilian-looking or civilian-owned structures are being used not only to shelter launchers, but also to prepare them for launch, then the document describes more than concealment. It describes the embedding of missile operations inside civilian infrastructure.
A network built for dispersal
Nadimi also said the directive places repeated emphasis on speed – getting launch vehicles into these buildings quickly before launch and returning them to cover quickly afterward.
In his reading, the database tied to these positions includes technical features of each site, access routes and nearby facilities, including the nearest medical center, police station and military post.
It also, he added, records whether use of the property can be coordinated in advance with the owner, including contact details, or whether occupation could occur without prior coordination in urgent cases.
If so, that would suggest the system extends down to the level of property access and local civilian surroundings, turning seemingly ordinary sites into preplanned nodes in a missile network.
The document’s own emphasis on route inspection, site profiles, records and coded classification supports the picture of a missile force operating through a dispersed support architecture rather than through fixed bases alone.

Why this puts civilians at risk
Nadimi warned that the use of civilian environments is especially troubling because many IRGC launchers are themselves designed to blend into civilian traffic.
“Many of these launchers essentially resemble civilian vehicles or trailers,” he said.
He added that larger launchers for Khorramshahr missiles can be covered with a white casing that makes them look like an ordinary white civilian trailer, while the towing vehicle is also typically white.
Smaller launchers, he said, are often painted not in conventional camouflage but in ways that make them less conspicuous in civilian surroundings.
That observation fits closely with the document’s emphasis on cover, concealment and post-launch disappearance. The combination of disguised launch vehicles and preidentified civilian sites suggests an operational doctrine built around blending missile units into non-military space.
According to Nadimi, this has direct consequences under the laws of war.
“The use of civilian environments, structures and buildings for this purpose is unlawful under the laws of war,” he said. “It removes the protection those buildings would otherwise have and turns them into legitimate military targets.”
The danger, he added, is that civilians living or working in such places may have no idea a missile launcher is being hidden in their vicinity until they themselves are exposed to attack.
An organized doctrine, not an exception
The leaked directive therefore appears to document something broader than the existence of underground missile facilities or dispersed launch sites.
It points to an organized method for extending missile operations into the civilian sphere – using industrial buildings, service facilities, sports complexes, warehouses and other non-military spaces as part of a launch architecture designed to survive surveillance, evade detection and preserve firing capability under wartime pressure.
In that sense, the document is not just about positions where missiles are launched from. It is about how a military force can fold launch operations into everyday civilian geography – and in doing so, transfer the risks of missile warfare onto places and people that outwardly have nothing to do with it.
Dozens of money changers linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards were arrested in the United Arab Emirates after tensions rose following attacks by the Islamic Republic, sources familiar with the matter told Iran International.
The sources said the detainees had worked with financial entities tied to the Islamic Republic, including companies linked to the Guards, helping transfer funds on their behalf.
They said companies linked to those arrested were shut down and their offices closed.
UAE authorities also summoned some other money changers and told them to leave the country, the sources said.
The development follows earlier measures targeting Iranian nationals in the UAE. In recent days, some Iranian residents outside the country found their residency visas revoked before returning, preventing re-entry, according to accounts received by Iran International on Saturday.
Several affected individuals said the cancellations were carried out without prior notice. One Iranian resident said that after traveling to India with his family following the outbreak of war, he discovered his residency had been revoked, while his non-Iranian family members were still allowed to return to the UAE.
Earlier reports had also pointed to the cancellation of tourist visas for Iranian nationals traveling to the country.
Serious disagreements have emerged between Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and IRGC chief-commander Ahmad Vahidi over how to manage the war and its damaging impact on people’s livelihoods and the economy, sources with knowledge of the matter told Iran International.
Pezeshkian has criticized the approach of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps regarding escalating tensions and continuing attacks on neighboring countries, warning about the economic consequences of the situation, according to the sources who spoke on condition of anonymity.
He has stressed that without a ceasefire, Iran’s economy could face total collapse within three weeks to one month, the sources said.
On March 7, Pezeshkian in a video message apologized for what he called “fire at will” attacks by the country’s armed forces on neighboring countries and instructed them to stop such attacks.
However, the attacks continued shortly after the release of his message.
Call for restoration of executive power
Informed sources told Iran International that Pezeshkian has called for executive and managerial powers to be returned to the administration, a demand that has been firmly rejected by Vahidi.
In response to the criticism, the IRGC commander blamed the current situation on the government’s failure to implement structural reforms before the conflict began, the sources said.
In recent days, Israeli media have also reported signs of divisions within Iran’s ruling system. The Times of Israel, citing a senior Israeli official, wrote: “There are signs of cracks in the Iranian regime. We are now creating conditions for its overthrow, but ultimately everything depends on the Iranian people.”
The Israeli outlet Ynet also reported similar internal divisions earlier this month.
Economic impacts
As the war enters its fifth week, its economic effects are increasingly visible. Reports from major cities indicate that many ATMs are out of cash, not functioning, or physically inaccessible, while online banking services for several major banks, including Bank Melli, are periodically disrupted.
Government employees have told Iran International that salaries and benefits for large segments of workers have not been paid regularly over the past three months.
In February, before the outbreak of the ongoing war, average inflation for basic necessities reached triple digits, estimated between 105% and 115%.
Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council under direct pressure from senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including newly installed IRGC chief Ahmad Vahidi, according to informed sources.
The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, said the appointment was imposed on Pezeshkian and other members of the council amid intensifying internal struggles within the Islamic Republic’s new leadership and as part of the IRGC’s effort to consolidate full control over power.
According to the sources, following the killing of Ali Larijani—and with no visible sign of Mojtaba Khamenei participating in decision-making—the IRGC selected Zolghadr as the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
Despite opposition from some remaining senior officials and Pezeshkian’s own dissatisfaction, the Guards compelled the president to issue the appointment decree.
Mehdi Tabatabaei, deputy for communications and information at Pezeshkian’s office, confirmed the appointment on Tuesday in a post on X, writing: “With the opinion and approval of the esteemed leader of the Islamic Revolution, and by decree of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr has been appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.”
Sources told Iran International that the move reflects the diminishing role of Pezeshkian’s government and other power centers within the Islamic Republic’s highest security decision-making body.
It also highlights the IRGC’s expanding dominance over the country’s power structure, particularly over the Supreme National Security Council.
Mohammad Bagher Ghaziani, better known as Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, currently also serves as secretary of the Expediency Council. In 2021 he replaced Mohsen Rezaei in that position by decree of Sadegh Amoli Larijani.
Following the killing of Mohammad Pakpour, Ahmad Vahidi was introduced as commander-in-chief of the IRGC, although no formal appointment decree signed by Mojtaba Khamenei—the Islamic Republic’s new leader and commander-in-chief—has been made public.
Vahidi Shahcheraghi, known as Ahmad Vahidi, had previously been appointed deputy commander of the IRGC by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on December 27, 2025, replacing Ali Fadavi. After Hossein Salami was killed during the 12-day war, Ali Khamenei had named Mohammad Pakpour as IRGC commander-in-chief.
Despite the absence of any publicly released decree signed by Mojtaba Khamenei, Vahidi has now been introduced as commander-in-chief of the IRGC.
At the same time, Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander, has reportedly been appointed as Mojtaba Khamenei’s military adviser under a decree attributed to the new leader.
Since Mojtaba Khamenei was introduced as the Islamic Republic’s third supreme leader, he has not appeared in public, and only a few written messages attributed to him have been released.
US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration—including Vice President J.D. Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth—have said Mojtaba Khamenei is alive but seriously wounded. They have also emphasized that there is no sign of him actively exercising authority in the Islamic Republic.
Senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have likewise reported that Mojtaba Khamenei was injured and warned that there is no guarantee he will survive.
Staff of an Iranian hospital in Dubai have vacated accommodation linked to the facility after an order by authorities in the United Arab Emirates, Iran International has learned.
Residents were initially given one month to leave, but the deadline was cut to one week after the hospital was shut. Doctors, nurses and other staff living in the housing began leaving on Tuesday, and the evacuation was completed on Wednesday.
The visas of some employees whose residency was tied to the hospital were canceled. Those affected have had to return to Iran through third countries, including Afghanistan.
Earlier, housing linked to Iranian schools in Dubai was also vacated after those schools were shut, and staff returned to Iran.