Jailed Nobel laureate denied treatment, is in ‘critical’ condition - family
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi is in critical condition after suffering a heart attack in Zanjan prison and has been denied access to specialized medical care, the Narges Foundation said.
In a statement on Tuesday, the foundation said Iranian authorities have refused to transfer Mohammadi to a hospital or allow her to be examined by a specialist, despite reports of her losing consciousness, experiencing severe chest pain and medical recommendations for an urgent angiography.
The group warned that her life is at risk in prison and criticized what it described as continued restrictions on her basic rights, including limited phone contact, a ban on communication with lawyers and the requirement that visits take place in the presence of security officials.
The foundation called for the immediate and unconditional release of Mohammadi and other political inmates and prisoners of conscience.
Explosions and bombardments were reported across several Iranian cities on Tuesday evening, including Bushehr, Shiraz, Kermanshah, Ramhormoz and Andimeshk, according to Iranian media.
Reports also pointed to blasts near the Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) in Bushehr in southern Iran, and a local official confirmed a missile strike in a Kermanshah in the west.
State-affiliated outlets said air defenses were activated over Tehran to counter “hostile targets".
The United Arab Emirates has imposed a ban on the entry and transit of Iranian nationals through Dubai, according to a notice by FlyDubai.
The directive, which takes immediate effect, says that Iranian passport holders are not permitted to enter or transit via Dubai International Airport. The restriction applies broadly to all Iranian citizens, including those holding valid UAE residency visas across all categories as well as holders of UAE visit and tourist visas.
The notice also says Iranian nationals currently outside the UAE, including residents, will be denied entry into the country, with the measure reflected in official application responses.
China and Pakistan in a joint statement on Tuesday proposed a five-point initiative aimed at restoring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East amid the Iran war, following talks between senior officials in Beijing.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar met on March 31, 2026, to review the situation in the region and outline a joint framework for de-escalation.
The meeting comes as Pakistan has in recent weeks positioned itself as a mediator in the Iran war, hosting talks in Islamabad with Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia days earlier and reportedly facilitating indirect exchanges between Iran and the United States.
In the statement, the Pakistani and Chinese sides called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and urged all parties to take maximum efforts to prevent further escalation. They stressed that humanitarian assistance must be allowed to reach all war-affected areas without obstruction.
Beijing and Islamabad also emphasized the need to start peace talks as soon as possible, underscoring that dialogue and diplomacy are the only viable means to resolve conflicts.
They called for safeguarding the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national independence and security of Iran and its Arab neighbors, and urged all sides to commit to peaceful dispute resolution and refrain from the use or threat of force during negotiations.
The initiative highlighted the importance of protecting civilians and non-military targets, calling on all parties to immediately halt attacks on civilian populations and infrastructure.
It stressed adherence to international humanitarian law and specifically warned against targeting critical facilities, including energy, desalination and power plants, as well as peaceful nuclear infrastructure such as nuclear power stations.
China and Pakistan also drew attention to the security of maritime routes, describing the Strait of Hormuz as a vital global shipping lane for goods and energy. They called for measures to ensure the safety of vessels and crews in the area, facilitate the safe passage of civilian and commercial ships, and restore normal transit through the strait as soon as possible.
Finally, the two countries reaffirmed the primacy of the United Nations Charter, urging stronger multilateral cooperation. They called for efforts to support a comprehensive peace framework and achieve lasting peace based on international law and the principles of the UN Charter.
A leaked internal directive from the IRGC’s missile command appears to show that the use of civilian locations to conceal, support and in some cases facilitate missile launch operations is not ad hoc, but structured, documented and built into operational planning.
The 33-page document shared with Iran International by the hacktivist group Edalat-e Ali (Ali’s Justice) has been marked “very confidential” and is titled Instruction for Identification, Maintenance, and Use of Positions.
The document is attributed to the Specialized Documents Center of the Intelligence and Operations Deputy of the IRGC's missile command.
A framework for missile operations
What emerges from the directive is a bureaucratic framework for missile deployment that goes well beyond hardened silos or underground “missile cities.”
The text lays out categories of launch positions, inspection procedures, coding systems, site records, chains of responsibility and rules for maintaining access to a wide network of locations that can be used before, during and after missile fire.
Its significance lies not only in the variety of launch positions it defines, but in the explicit inclusion of non-military environments in that system.
In its introduction, the document says missile positions are an inseparable part of missile warfare tactics and argues that the enemy’s growing ability to detect, track and destroy missile systems requires special rules for identifying, selecting, using and maintaining such positions.
It adds that the use of “deception,” “cover” and “normalization” alongside other methods would make the force more successful in using those positions.
That language is important. It suggests the document is not merely about protecting fixed military assets. It is about making missile units harder to distinguish from their surroundings and harder to detect in the first place.
The implication of the directive is that it describes a system for embedding missile activity within ordinary civilian geography.
Rather than relying only on conventional military facilities, the document sets out a model in which missile units can move across a wider landscape of pre-identified sites selected for concealment, access and operational utility.
The result is a structure that appears designed to preserve launch capability while reducing visibility and complicating detection.
The clearest indication comes in the section on what the document describes as artificial dispersion or cover positions. These include service, industrial and sports centers, as well as sheds and warehouses – places that are civilian in function or appearance, but can be repurposed to hide missile units.
The conditions listed for such sites include being enclosed, not overlooked by surrounding buildings, and either lacking CCTV cameras or allowing them to be switched off.
Taken together, those requirements point to a deliberate screening process for civilian sites that can be used as missile cover. The concern is not only protection from attack, but invisibility within the civilian landscape.
The broader structure of the document reinforces that conclusion. It contains sections on site identities, naming and coding, inspections of routes and positions, record maintenance and responsibilities across intelligence, operations, engineering, communications, safety, health and counterintelligence.
This is the language of a standing system, not an improvised wartime workaround.
An Iranian couple walks near Iranian missiles in a park in Tehran, March 26, 2026.
A system for concealment
Farzin Nadimi, a senior defense and security analyst at the Washington Institute who reviewed the document for Iran International’s The Lead with Niusha Saremi, said the text points to a database-driven effort to identify areas around missile bases that can be used for different kinds of positions.
He said the IRGC missile force appears to have mapped not only launch positions, but also dispersal, deception and technical positions – the latter being places suitable for storing launchers and support vehicles and, when needed, preparing missiles for firing.
“These technical positions,” Nadimi said, “can include large, covered spaces such as industrial sheds or sports halls, where missile launchers and support vehicles can be brought inside, and where missiles can be mounted onto launchers, warheads attached and, in the case of liquid-fueled systems, fueling operations carried out.”
That point is critical. If civilian-looking or civilian-owned structures are being used not only to shelter launchers, but also to prepare them for launch, then the document describes more than concealment. It describes the embedding of missile operations inside civilian infrastructure.
A network built for dispersal
Nadimi also said the directive places repeated emphasis on speed – getting launch vehicles into these buildings quickly before launch and returning them to cover quickly afterward.
In his reading, the database tied to these positions includes technical features of each site, access routes and nearby facilities, including the nearest medical center, police station and military post.
It also, he added, records whether use of the property can be coordinated in advance with the owner, including contact details, or whether occupation could occur without prior coordination in urgent cases.
If so, that would suggest the system extends down to the level of property access and local civilian surroundings, turning seemingly ordinary sites into preplanned nodes in a missile network.
The document’s own emphasis on route inspection, site profiles, records and coded classification supports the picture of a missile force operating through a dispersed support architecture rather than through fixed bases alone.
Iranian missiles displayed in a park (March 26, 2026)
Why this puts civilians at risk
Nadimi warned that the use of civilian environments is especially troubling because many IRGC launchers are themselves designed to blend into civilian traffic.
“Many of these launchers essentially resemble civilian vehicles or trailers,” he said.
He added that larger launchers for Khorramshahr missiles can be covered with a white casing that makes them look like an ordinary white civilian trailer, while the towing vehicle is also typically white.
Smaller launchers, he said, are often painted not in conventional camouflage but in ways that make them less conspicuous in civilian surroundings.
That observation fits closely with the document’s emphasis on cover, concealment and post-launch disappearance. The combination of disguised launch vehicles and preidentified civilian sites suggests an operational doctrine built around blending missile units into non-military space.
According to Nadimi, this has direct consequences under the laws of war.
“The use of civilian environments, structures and buildings for this purpose is unlawful under the laws of war,” he said. “It removes the protection those buildings would otherwise have and turns them into legitimate military targets.”
The danger, he added, is that civilians living or working in such places may have no idea a missile launcher is being hidden in their vicinity until they themselves are exposed to attack.
An organized doctrine, not an exception
The leaked directive therefore appears to document something broader than the existence of underground missile facilities or dispersed launch sites.
It points to an organized method for extending missile operations into the civilian sphere – using industrial buildings, service facilities, sports complexes, warehouses and other non-military spaces as part of a launch architecture designed to survive surveillance, evade detection and preserve firing capability under wartime pressure.
In that sense, the document is not just about positions where missiles are launched from. It is about how a military force can fold launch operations into everyday civilian geography – and in doing so, transfer the risks of missile warfare onto places and people that outwardly have nothing to do with it.
The United States is confronting efforts by Russia and China to support Iran where necessary, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on Tuesday.
“As far as Russia and China, we know exactly what they’re doing... where necessary, we’re addressing it, we’re mitigating it or we’re confronting it head on,” Hegseth told a briefing.
He said the next few days in the conflict could be decisive and added US strikes were weakening Iran’s military.
“We have more and more options, and they have less... the upcoming days will be decisive,” he said.
