State-backed rallies in Iran add matchmaking stalls to push marriage drive

Sara Kanaani, a social media influencer, documented what she described as “40 days of motherhood” after taking custody of a baby through Iran’s Mizban temporary foster care scheme run by the State Welfare Organization.

State-affiliated outlets including IRNA and Hamshahri newspaper amplified the story with emotional coverage focused on the woman’s attachment to the child and the separation that followed.

Images of Kanaani without mandatory hijab also circulated through state media, drawing further attention online.

Foster care program under spotlight

The Mizban program, launched in 2023, allows children from welfare institutions to be placed temporarily with approved families or individuals while remaining under state supervision.

Unlike adoption, custody under the program is limited in duration and does not transfer permanent parental rights.

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Iran’s Welfare Organization says applicants are assessed for financial stability, mental health and caregiving capacity before approval.

Similar foster care systems exist in many countries, where temporary family-based care is generally viewed by specialists as preferable to institutional care for infants and young children.

The controversy intensified after critics accused Kanaani of turning the experience into a sustained social media project through daily videos, emotional posts and photographs of the child.

Some users questioned whether a child unable to consent should become part of a personal online brand or public campaign.

Others raised concerns after Kanaani discussed details about the infant’s biological mother in social media posts.

Wider criticism follows media coverage

Psychologists and child welfare advocates also debated the emotional impact of repeated attachment and separation during infancy.

Some specialists argued temporary family care can still benefit children when conducted under stable and professionally supervised conditions.

Others pointed to a lack of public information about oversight, caregiver training and welfare standards in Iran’s implementation of the program.

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Part of the attention surrounding the case focused on Kanaani’s status as a single woman.

Iranian law permits unmarried women over 30 to adopt girls under certain conditions, though couples remain prioritized in most custody arrangements.

Critics also questioned the role of state media, saying the extensive coverage reflected efforts to promote emotionally driven narratives centered on women, family and social solidarity during a period of economic and social strain in Iran.

The report said officials had begun speaking more openly about Khamenei’s condition amid speculations that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards were effectively running decision-making.

“They are projecting that there’s no change . . . the supreme leader was the apex of the system and is still the apex,” Vali Nasr, a former US official and professor at Johns Hopkins University was quoted as saying. “And that he’s alive, functioning and in control.”

He added that the guards were also seeking to project that “they are not running the show and [Khamenei is] not just a figurehead.”

The report referred to remarks by Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and Mazaher Hosseini, a senior official in the Supreme Leader’s office.

Pezeshkian said on earlier this month that he had met with the Supreme Leader, offering a first public account of him meeting Mojtaba Khamenei since he suffered severe wounds at the start of the Iran war on February 28.

Hosseini said later that Mojtaba Khamenei suffered minor injuries to his kneecap, back and behind his ear in the airstrikes that killed his father and wife, insisting he is now in “full health” and dismissing reports of a serious head injury as “lies.”

The novel, translated from German by Ruth Martin, begins after Iran’s 1979 revolution and follows different family members, including a revolutionary father, a literature-loving mother, a daughter visiting Iran for the first time and a son drawn into politics by the 2009 Green Movement.

Prize organizers described the book as a moving novel about oppression, resistance and the desire for freedom.

The International Booker Prize is awarded annually to a book translated into English and published in the UK or Ireland.

“Taiwan Travelogue” by Yáng Shuāng-zǐ, translated from Mandarin Chinese by Lin King, won the 2026 International Booker Prize.

The other shortlisted books were “She Who Remains” by Rene Karabash, “The Witch” by Marie NDiaye, “On Earth As It Is Beneath” by Ana Paula Maia, and “The Director” by Daniel Kehlmann.

The ruling establishment, they argue, is trying to project strength after weeks of military and political pressure while using the prospect of talks not as a concession but as another arena of confrontation.

“The Iranian regime is trying to, in their own mind, basically say that we are on par,” Dr. Shahram Kholdi, a Middle East historian, told Iran International. “Even if you're not on par with Trump, we are actually beating him at all levels.”

The proposed bounty, he said, should be read partly as psychological warfare against Trump.

“This award to be passed as a piece of legislation by the Islamic Republic Parliament is effectively part of that psychological war that the Islamic Republic thinks it has to unleash upon Trump,” Kholdi said.

But the rhetoric is unfolding alongside more concrete threats. Tehran has also signaled it could disrupt navigation through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, while pro-government voices have floated attacks on satellite infrastructure, including systems such as Starlink.

'Not rational'

That combination of assassination rhetoric, military pressure and possible diplomacy may appear irrational from the outside. Kholdi argues the problem is that Washington is not dealing with a conventional negotiating actor.

“The problem with these people is that they think … if they behave sanely and rationally, that's insane and irrational,” he said. “That’s the kind of actor Trump is dealing with … The art of the deal does not work with an irrational actor.”

Dr. Eric Mandel, founder of the Middle East Political Information Network (MEPIN), framed the issue as a clash of political cultures and timelines. Western governments may look at the damage inflicted on Iran’s military and industrial infrastructure and conclude Tehran should be searching for a way out. The regime may see the same moment very differently.

“This is a perfect opportunity to realize they don't think like us,” Mandel said.

From Tehran’s perspective, he argued, the fact that the regime has survived is itself a form of victory.

“The Iranians think we have survived. We have survived and that means we are victorious,” he said. “We could outlast the Americans and eventually they're going to have to acquiesce to us.”

The time factor

That survival-first mindset helps explain why Tehran may threaten Trump while still leaving room for talks. In Mandel’s view, negotiations, ceasefires and delays all serve a purpose: they buy time.

“The Iranians got a ceasefire. They rebuilt, they rearm, they dug out missiles that were buried because they know that the longer they can either prolong negotiations, the longer they have ceasefires, that they believe that time will eventually make them the winner here,” he said.

This is why the apparent contradiction may not be a contradiction at all. The threats signal defiance. The talks buy time. The survival narrative sustains the regime internally.

Former State Department appointee Shayan Samii said Tehran’s assassination rhetoric may also backfire by strengthening Washington’s case for escalation.

“These numbskulls in Tehran don't understand that by the mere fact of just saying we want to assassinate the President of the United States—mind you, the sitting President of the United States—we're not talking about a national security threat anymore,” Samii said. “We're talking about a government apparatus coming under attack.”

That, he said, could allow the United States to frame any military response not simply as regional intervention, but as self-defense.

“They can tell the world these guys wanted to assassinate our president, we're not going to sit by,” Samii said.

'Military readiness'

Samii also rejected the idea that Trump’s latest delay should be read mainly as a response to pressure from Persian Gulf Arab states. He said the timing was more likely tied to military planning and target selection.

“It has nothing to do with the request of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region,” he said. “It has everything to do with machinations and military readiness and coming up with a solution for the targets that they want to hit.”

The danger, analysts say, is that both sides may be using time for very different purposes. Trump may be waiting for better military and economic conditions. Tehran may be trying to stretch the crisis into a war of attrition.

“They think that they are going to run the United States out of the stamina,” Kholdi said.

For Mandel, that gap in thinking is central to the crisis. American politics operates on elections, markets and public pressure. The Islamic Republic, he said, operates with a far longer and harsher sense of time.

“We're dealing with, trying to say from so many different angles, the calculus that they're making is so different than what ours is,” he said.

That difference may be what makes the current moment especially volatile. Tehran appears to believe threats increase leverage. Washington increasingly risks viewing those same threats as proof diplomacy cannot work.

Ebrahim Zolfaghari, spokesperson for Iran's military command center, wrote on X last week: “We will impose tolls on internet cables.”

Media outlets close to the IRGC have also said companies such as Google, Microsoft, Meta and Amazon must comply with the Islamic Republic’s laws, and that cable-owning companies must pay permit fees for cables to pass through.

Subsea cables carry the overwhelming majority of the global internet and financial traffic, connecting Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf through a vast underwater network that powers everything from banking systems and cloud computing to government communications and energy markets.

The risk is no longer theoretical. Alcatel Submarine Networks, the world’s largest cable-laying company, has already paused subsea cable repair operations in the Persian Gulf after issuing force majeure notices tied to growing security risks in the region.

“The undersea network of undersea cables, it's not just important, it’s absolutely critical – trillions of dollars of financial transactions take place through these cables,” said Tom Sharpe, who served 27 years as a Royal Navy officer commanding four warships.

“It’s the internet, which of course if enough of that collapses can have a devastating effect," he said.

While these networks are global, experts say the Persian Gulf is uniquely vulnerable because there are fewer redundant cable routes compared to regions like the Atlantic.

“When you go to other places in the world, let’s say the [Persian] Gulf, there are far fewer, and therefore that redundancy becomes less and less, and therefore the vulnerability goes up,” Sharpe explained.

Iranian lawmakers discussed plans last week that could target submarine cables linking Persian Gulf littoral states to Europe and Asia. Iranian state-linked media have also floated proposals requiring foreign operators to comply with Iranian licensing laws and pay fees for maintenance and repair access.

The proposals appear to be part of a broader effort by Iranian hardliners to test how far Tehran can extend its authority over infrastructure crossing the Persian Gulf, even when that infrastructure is privately owned or tied to foreign governments.

Escalate, test, adjust

Sharpe believes Tehran is following a familiar escalation model — gradually testing international reactions before potentially taking more aggressive steps.

“I think, look, it seems to me at the moment we’re in the sort of inject uncertainty phase. Let’s see what the markets do. Let’s see how the companies react. Let’s see what insurers do,” Sharpe said. “They escalate. They test. They adjust.”

According to Sharpe, the strategy mirrors tactics previously employed by Russia around undersea infrastructure and later adapted by the Houthis in the Red Sea.

“They’re very good at escalation management,” he added. “They don’t go straight to the nuclear option and start just snipping cables.”

Charlie Brown, Senior Advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran, who specializes in maritime sanctions enforcement and the tracking of illicit shipping, said the issue extends far beyond internet access alone because submarine cables often cross multiple jurisdictions and are owned by consortiums involving companies and governments from around the world.

“This goes beyond merely the cable itself and the data on it,” Brown told Iran International. “These are cross-jurisdictional issues that affect many people in many different jurisdictions.”

New toll booth under the sea

Brown described the Islamic Republic’s approach as resembling a mafia-style protection racket aimed at controlling — rather than immediately destroying — critical underwater infrastructure.

“Yeah, it’s very interesting. I mean, so this ends up showing that it’s a money-making racket threatening. So it’s basically a gangster move,” Brown said.

“The IRGC is trying to extend their control to include things on the seabed that don’t belong to them,” he added.

Experts say global internet infrastructure has enough redundancy to prevent a total communications collapse, but warn the bigger risk is the normalization of payments to Tehran.

Max Meizlish, Senior Research Analyst for the Center on Economic and Financial Power at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, sees the cable issue as an extension of Iran’s broader attempts to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz.

“I think that this is just another instance of the Iranian regime putting in place essentially a shakedown in the strait,” Meizlish said.

Since the war began, he said, hardline factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have increasingly pushed to expand Tehran’s leverage over both maritime and digital chokepoints.

“We see slowly Iran extending its sphere of influence,” Meizlish said. “The IRGC hardliners want to come out of this conflict actually from a position of relative strength.”

A warning to Washington

Much of what happens next may ultimately depend on enforcement. Existing US sanctions prohibit dealings with the IRGC, meaning companies that pay such fees could expose themselves to secondary sanctions.

But if enforcement weakens, Meizlish warns, firms may gradually begin viewing payments to Tehran as simply another cost of operating in the region.

“Already it’s come out within the shipping sector,” Meizlish told Iran International. “Some ships have made these payments. We’ve seen traffic go through the Tehran toll booth.”

“If the US doesn’t step up pressure and actually actively enforce these sanctions, then some firms will determine that maybe in their risk-based approach, they can go ahead and do this,” he said.

“That would be a strategic error.”