Tehran steps up threats against critics at home and abroad

The death of Khamenei in the February 2026 US–Israeli airstrikes on Tehran has triggered the most consequential constitutional transition in the Islamic Republic since 1989—and revived a question that has long shadowed the system since its founding: whether supreme authority rests primarily on religious legitimacy or political power.

Within days, Iranian state media announced that the Assembly of Experts had selected his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, a figure long powerful behind the scenes but lacking broad clerical standing, as the new Supreme Leader.

The office of Supreme Leader is defined primarily by Articles 5, 107, 109 and 110 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Article 5 establishes the principle of velayat-e faqih, entrusting governance during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam to a qualified jurist combining religious authority with political competence. Article 107 assigns the Assembly of Experts the responsibility of selecting the Supreme Leader, while Article 109 sets out the required qualifications, including justice, political insight and administrative ability.

The precedent of 1989

When Khomeini died in June 1989, the Islamic Republic faced an immediate leadership vacuum. No obvious successor possessed comparable clerical stature.

The Assembly of Experts ultimately chose Ali Khamenei, then president, despite his limited standing as a senior jurist; the constitution was soon revised to accommodate the decision, stating that the leader need not possess the full recognition as a grand ayatollah.

The amendment reflected political calculation rather than abstract principle.

The episode established an enduring precedent: constitutional interpretation could adapt to political necessity. In practice, legitimacy rested not only on religious authority but also on institutional alignment and security power.

Mojtaba Khamenei now confronts a similar dilemma. Like his father in 1989, he is not widely recognised within the traditional hierarchy of Shiʿi scholarship as a senior jurist.

Wartime succession

Under Article 107, the Assembly of Experts must deliberate and appoint the Supreme Leader, ordinarily implying a formal session. Yet Mojtaba’s selection occurred amid ongoing war and severe disruption following the airstrikes that killed Ali Khamenei.

Public information about the process remains sparse. It is unclear whether the assembly gathered physically, voted remotely or reached its decision through emergency consultation. Iranian state media confirmed his appointment but provided few procedural details.

Such ambiguity does not necessarily invalidate the decision within the Islamic Republic’s flexible constitutional practice. Still, the opacity surrounding the process has intensified debate over the legitimacy of the succession.

For more than a decade Mojtaba sought to strengthen his clerical credentials. Beginning in 2009, he taught dars-e kharej—advanced jurisprudence seminars traditionally led by senior clerics aspiring to marjaʿ status. Observers widely interpreted the move as preparation for a possible future succession.

Reports from Persian-language sources suggest some senior grand ayatollahs objected to what they saw as a politically engineered effort to manufacture clerical authority. Attempts were reportedly made to obtain written attestations of Mojtaba’s ijtihad, though evidence of broad clerical recognition remains limited.

After roughly thirteen years, Mojtaba suspended the classes in September 2024 as succession speculation intensified.

Power without office

Power in the Islamic Republic has rarely flowed through formal titles alone. It often moves through the networks surrounding the Supreme Leader.

Over two decades Mojtaba emerged as one of the most influential yet least publicly visible figures in the Iranian state. His authority derived not from elected office but from his role inside Beit-e Rahbari, where he functioned as a gatekeeper to his father—managing access, filtering political actors and coordinating with security institutions.

In practice this amounted to a tightly controlled security network of clerical aides, intelligence officials and Revolutionary Guard commanders whose influence depended less on formal office than on proximity to the Leader.

This informal authority allowed Mojtaba to cultivate a patronage base closely tied to the IRGC. The United States Treasury sanctioned him in 2019, stating that he acted on behalf of the Supreme Leader while maintaining close relationships with IRGC elements and the Basij militia.

The Guards connection

The relationship between the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards deepened decisively during the 2009 post-election unrest.

Following the disputed presidential vote that returned Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power, mass protests erupted across Iran. The Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia ultimately played the decisive role in suppressing the demonstrations.

The events of 2009 reaffirmed the supremacy of the Supreme Leader while strengthening the alliance between the leadership and the security apparatus. Many analysts argue Mojtaba played a coordinating role inside the Leader’s office during the crisis.

One figure embodied the partnership between the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards more fully than any other: General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force.

Soleimani maintained unusually direct access to Ali Khamenei and operated with a degree of autonomy rare within the Islamic Republic’s formal hierarchy, shaping Tehran’s regional military strategy across Iraq, Syria and beyond.

His killing by a United States drone strike in January 2020 removed a central node in the system that linked the Leader to the Guards’ external operations.

Although the IRGC remained institutionally powerful, no successor fully replicated Soleimani’s combination of battlefield authority, political influence and personal access to the Supreme Leader..

Continuity and uncertainty

Another turning point came with the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024.

Long viewed as a plausible successor with stronger clerical credentials, Raisi’s absence narrowed the field and sharpened attention on Mojtaba Khamenei, whose embedded position within Beit-e Rahbari and longstanding ties to the security apparatus left him uniquely placed when wartime succession arrived.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s accession does not resolve the deeper tensions within the Islamic Republic. Like his father in 1989, he assumes power without universally recognised clerical authority. His legitimacy rests instead on political coalition, institutional continuity and the support of the Revolutionary Guards.

At the same time, the war that accompanied his elevation has destabilised the very networks that sustained his rise. The destruction of Beit-e Rahbari and the deaths within the leadership circle have left the inner workings of the system partially obscured.

Mojtaba inherits the same contradiction that shaped his father’s rise: a system that claims religious authority yet repeatedly turns to political necessity in moments of crisis.

In 1989, that necessity elevated Ali Khamenei as the republic emerged from the long shadow of the Iran–Iraq War. In 2026, it has elevated his son amid war once again—leaving the durability of Iran’s constitutional order dependent, as before, less on theology than on power.

Following the death of Ali Khamenei and the elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) emphasized that the state—not any individual—is the true source of stability.

IRIB’s rolling news channel, IRINN, repeatedly declared: “The Islamic Republic of Iran is not dependent on a single individual. It is a system based on the rule of law and divine values.”

After the Assembly of Experts named Mojtaba leader on March 9, state television pivoted to stressing the decisiveness of the vote.

Despite reports of clerical unease about the process, IRIB described the outcome as reflecting an 85 percent consensus and presented it as both legally sound and religiously sanctioned.

Broadcasts featured pledges of allegiance from the Revolutionary Guards, the military, the diplomatic corps and even the national football team as evidence of unified support.

Because the transition unfolded during an active conflict with Israel and the United States, state television fused the succession narrative with imagery of military strength.

Shortly after Mojtaba’s appointment, IRIB aired footage of missile launches toward Israel under the caption: “At your command, Sayyid Mojtaba,” invoking both his lineage and his role as wartime commander-in-chief.

The messaging aligned with broader official rhetoric, with security chief Ali Larijani and parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf both rejecting calls for a ceasefire and signaling that Iran would continue strikes.

These narratives circulated even as Mojtaba himself remained absent from public view. His silence fueled speculation about his condition, with some commentators drawing religious analogies to the occultation of the 12th Imam, while others circulated unverified claims about his whereabouts.

At home, the messaging has been accompanied by tighter control. Iran’s police chief warned that anyone taking to the streets after encouragement from US and Israeli leaders would be treated as an “enemy” rather than a civilian protester—a signal that the space for dissent is narrowing further under wartime conditions.

References to dissent or worsening economic conditions have meanwhile largely disappeared from state coverage.

Skepticism about the hereditary nature of the succession has been framed as foreign psychological warfare, while relatively small pro-government gatherings are presented as signs of broad public enthusiasm.

For now, the message is clear: continuity over disruption, system over individual. But the carefully managed narrative also reflects the pressures facing the leadership at a moment of unusual uncertainty.

Supporters of the Islamic Republic have gathered in several cities to show loyalty to the new leader. The officialdom has congratulated him in unison. But Khamenei Jr is yet to appear.

There has been no speech, no televised address and very few photos or videos of the new leader. The only recording attributed to him so far is a short old video announcing that his religious classes have been canceled.

The lack of information has been so striking that even state media appears uncertain about how to present him to the public.

Older photographs have been circulated, stylized illustrations or AI-generated renderings have appeared online to fill the visual vacuum. These images are not presented as authentic photos but symbolic representations.

The situation raises a central question: what scenario may explain the unusual debut of Iran’s new Supreme Leader?

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  The ascendency of Khamenei Jr was a long-planned improvisation

Scenario one: delayed unveiling

The simplest explanation is that the Islamic Republic intends to introduce Mojtaba through a carefully managed televised address or recorded message once security conditions allow.

In this scenario, the leadership transition would be framed as orderly and unified, with Mojtaba reiterating familiar themes of resistance, continuity and cohesion under wartime pressure.

Even so, the delay itself invites scrutiny. Authorities could cite security concerns, but the absence of even a brief recorded message—particularly after the steady stream of congratulatory statements from senior officials—has raised questions about the pace and choreography of the transition.

For now, the silence has only heightened curiosity about how and when the new leader will first address the public.

Scenario two: leadership by statement

A second possibility is that Mojtaba may initially govern largely through written statements rather than public appearances. Such an approach would allow the system to project continuity while limiting exposure during a volatile security moment.

Iran’s leadership has long relied on tightly managed messaging, and written statements attributed to Mojtaba could reiterate established positions while reinforcing the central role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which appears to wield growing influence over wartime decision-making.

State television has already described Mojtaba as a veteran of the “Ramadan war,” part of an emerging narrative that presents him as shaped by wartime experience. Under this scenario, his absence would reflect caution rather than weakness.

Scenario three: managed vacuum

A third possibility is that Mojtaba’s continued absence reflects deeper uncertainty within the leadership itself.

The Islamic Republic is operating under sustained Israeli and US strikes, and the rapid announcement of his succession may have served primarily to prevent internal competition at a moment of acute vulnerability.

Another explanation is that Mojtaba may have been injured in the same attacks that killed his father and other senior figures—a scenario that would help explain both the speed of his appointment and his continued absence.

Naming him quickly could have forestalled rivalries among powerful factions while allowing the Revolutionary Guards and other security institutions to consolidate operational control.

In such circumstances, Mojtaba would function largely as a symbolic leader while practical authority remained concentrated within the security establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular.

Presenting an absent or wounded successor could also suppress dissent by discouraging open criticism of someone portrayed as a victim of the same war that killed the previous Supreme Leader.

Continuity and risk

Such a strategy, however, carries risks. If the leader continues to remain unseen for an extended period, public skepticism could deepen further, particularly among a population already wary of official narratives.

The lack of clarity may also reinforce uncertainty within the elite at a time when the system is under exceptional strain.

In the short term, projecting continuity appears to be the system’s priority. By naming a successor quickly, even if still absent, the establishment in Tehran may hope to signal stability to both domestic and international audiences.

Whether that image can be sustained, however, may ultimately depend on one simple question: when and if Iran’s new Supreme Leader finally appears.

The longer he remains unseen, the more his absence risks becoming a political fact in its own right—one that could deepen uncertainty at a moment when Tehran can least afford it.

Rather than confronting the official narrative head-on, many posts mocked the opaque and unusual circumstances of Mojtaba’s rise – especially the emergence of a leader who, for many Iranians, remains almost entirely unseen.

The jokes fall broadly into several recurring themes.

‘A leader no one has seen'

Many jokes focus on Mojtaba Khamenei’s near-total absence from public life.

Unlike most senior political figures, Mojtaba has rarely appeared in speeches or interviews, and only a handful of recordings of his voice are publicly known.

Some users turned this into a technological joke. One widely shared post said:

“There isn’t even enough audio of Mojtaba Khamenei for AI to train on to make a fake voice of him.”

Others simply pointed to the unusual situation more directly.

“We are entering the second day of Mojtaba Khamenei's leadership, and still nobody has seen him.”

Several posts framed the absence through humor about remote work – a concept familiar to many younger Iranian users.

“If you like working remotely, the best job is Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Nobody asks where you are, what you’re doing, or even whether you’re alive.”

Another post used religious imagery to exaggerate the idea that he has remained invisible.

“We’re in a situation where the appearance of Mahdi is more likely than the appearance of Mojtaba.”

Mahdi – the messianic figure awaited in Shiite Islam – frequently appears in Iranian satire as a way of describing events considered extremely unlikely.

Another viral joke suggested Mojtaba’s leadership was almost abstract.

“In the phrase ‘Mojtaba’s leadership,’ the literary device being used is personification.”

The remark plays on a Persian rhetorical term used in literature classes, implying that leadership is being attributed to something that has not visibly acted.

'The only known quote'

Another recurring joke centers on how little Mojtaba Khamenei has publicly said.

One of the few widely circulated videos attributed to him shows him announcing that his religious classes would be canceled.

That short clip has now become a punchline.

One post summarized the situation: “The only existing quote from Imam Mojtaba Khamenei: ‘Next week there will be no class.’”

The post was accompanied by a parody image styled like the decorative wall murals commonly seen on schools and public buildings in Iran, where passages from religious figures and political leaders are often painted alongside floral designs.

In the satirical version circulating online, however, the wall bears only the mundane line about next week’s class being canceled – recasting an ordinary notice as the supposedly defining quotation of a newly appointed Supreme Leader.

Other jokes focused on Mojtaba’s lack of a public résumé. One post mocked the situation using corporate language:

“You don’t have a résumé, you want to work remotely, you got the job through connections – and you don’t even have a photo for your CV so they have to generate one with AI.”

Another user suggested that even performing a simple task could count as experience.

“At least bury your father so you can have one executive job on your résumé.”

‘Schrödinger’s Khamenei’

A darker strand of satire reflects the uncertainty and speculation that often accompany major political events in Iran.

Some jokes played with the idea that Mojtaba’s status remains ambiguous because he has not appeared publicly.

One widely shared post referenced the famous physics thought experiment known as Schrödinger’s cat:

“I think instead of Schrödinger’s cat we’re dealing with Schrödinger’s Khamenei. Until they show him, we don’t know whether he’s alive or dead.”

Some posts jokingly suggested that naming Mojtaba as leader could solve several political problems at once.

“Announcing Mojtaba as leader was actually smart. You can’t kill someone who’s already dead.”

Another post used similarly blunt humor:

“You know what’s better than one dead Khamenei? Two dead Khameneis.”

Other jokes focused on the strange overlap between the funeral of the late leader and the introduction of the new one. One user wrote sarcastically:

“Right now the Islamic Republic has two leaders on earth – one they won’t bury and another they won’t reveal.”

Even the burial itself became a subject of dark humor.

“The only reason they haven’t buried Khamenei yet is to save funeral costs – they’re waiting a few days to bury Mojtaba too.”

Inside Iran, political figures who disappeared from public view after the February 28 strike are gradually re-emerging through statements congratulating him on his elevation to leadership.

Among them are Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, the former leader’s chief of staff, and Asghar Mirhejazi, his powerful security chief, who issued a rare joint message despite earlier reports that Mirhejazi had been killed in the attack.

Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, also rumored to have died in a strike on his home, released a similar message.

These congratulatory notes appeared during one of the most solemn Shiite mourning periods, commemorating Imam Ali. At the same time, part of the country is mourning the former leader, while Mojtaba himself is grieving the loss of close family members.

State officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and security chief Ali Larijani, have recently appeared in simple, Zelensky-style military uniforms without insignia. All three have pledged allegiance to Mojtaba.

Social media has filled with dark humor about Ali Khamenei’s death and Mojtaba’s life expectancy.

More serious posts include the resurfacing of an old video circulated widely on X, reportedly with IRGC encouragement, in which reformist politician Faezeh Hashemi says she would prefer Mojtaba to the “fanatic elderly candidates” for leadership. Like others, she suggested he might introduce reforms.

Mojtaba’s record since 2005, however—particularly during elections and protest crackdowns—offers little evidence of reformist tendencies. Many analysts warn that Iran may become even more radicalized under his rule, noting his long-standing ties to vigilante groups involved in suppressing dissent.

Debate over hereditary succession has intensified. Critics argue that dynastic leadership contradicts the Islamic Republic’s founding principles. Others counter that hereditary succession mirrors the lineage of the Twelve Imams.

Members of the first group note that Khomeini’s son Ahmad was never allowed to inherit power—an argument echoed implicitly by some of Khomeini’s descendants, including his great-grandson Ali, on X.

Former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei and former state TV chief and tourism minister Ezzatollah Zarghami have both said they have been close friends of Mojtaba for years, describing him as “modest” and “simple.”

Rezaei, who appeared frequently on state television after Khamenei’s death, has promised to share more about Mojtaba in the coming days.

State TV’s IRINN channel has twice acknowledged that Mojtaba’s leadership faced serious resistance within the Assembly of Experts. In an unusual live broadcast comment, one analyst even suggested opposition to Mojtaba might emerge from within his own support base.

Some media outlets, including Khabar Online, cautiously suggested this week that Mojtaba’s rise could signal a more prolonged and unpredictable phase of conflict, reflecting broader uncertainty inside Iran’s political establishment over the direction his leadership may take.