Everyone is watching oil in Iran war, but real risk is water

That contrast, several Iran experts told Iran International, exposes a widening divide between Western progressive activism and the lived experience of many Iranians.

Analysts say the reaction among many Iranians is not about ideological loyalty but about seeing any weakening of the Islamic Republic as a rare opportunity to escape decades of repression.

“War is violent, it's terrible and it has started. The people of Iran didn't choose this war — the Islamic government, the Islamic Republic government, chose this war,” said Siavash Rokni, an Iran pop culture expert.

“Iranians will use any opportunity to bypass the Islamic Republic to assure the fall of the Islamic Republic and the institution of a democracy,” Rokni said.

Anti-war protests taking shape in Western capitals have often featured placards supporting the very regime responsible for killing scores of Iranians, with demonstrators holding images of the now-former Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei — the man ultimately responsible for the killings.

Rokni said one cannot claim to oppose war while supporting the regime responsible for such violence.

This week, clips of Iranians dancing to the Village People’s “Y.M.C.A.” in the exaggerated arm-pumping style popularized by Trump went viral following the confirmed death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The cultural irony is striking. “Y.M.C.A.” was released in late 1978 and was charting in early 1979 — the same period Iran’s Islamic Revolution culminated in the fall of the Shah and the rise of the Islamic Republic.

Now, decades later, the disco anthem has resurfaced as a soundtrack for some celebrating what they see as the potential unraveling of that same regime.

Celebrations were reported not only inside Iran but also in diaspora hubs including Los Angeles and London, underscoring that the reaction extended beyond Iran’s borders but largely among Iranians themselves.

Iran International has reviewed footage received directly from inside Iran in the hours following the strikes.

In one clip, explosions can be seen in the background with plumes of smoke rising over Tehran as an Iranian man says: “Thank you Mr. President, thank President Trump, we love you.”

In another video, a woman shouts “Trump!” followed by cheers, clapping and the sound of what appears to be a vuvuzela-style horn as a group of Iranians celebrate.

In a separate clip filmed inside Iran, a woman says in Farsi: “Bibi, we are happy, Netanyahu, Israel, Trump...death to Terrorist, thank you for helping us Hooray.”

Another video, recorded after the bombing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s headquarters, shows a group of young people flashing peace signs as they welcome the joint US-Israel military strikes.

Khorso Isfahani, an Iran analyst with NUFDI, framed the reaction not as celebration of war itself but as the culmination of decades of struggle.

“Iranians have been on the front line of fighting against Islamist fascist occupation of Iran for the past five decades. We have sacrificed so many lives, but it has always been an uphill battle. Finally the moment has arrived and we are celebrating it.”

David Patrikarakos, a British journalist of part-Iranian origin, said many Western activists fail to grasp that context.

“A lot of people, generally not Iranian — generally unable to find Iran on the map — feel fit to pronounce upon this,” he said, describing much of the protest movement as “signaling your virtue” while “paying no attention to the suffering and the thoughts of people inside Iran.”

He added that for many Iranians, support for Trump or Netanyahu is not ideological devotion but circumstantial.

For those celebrating, analysts say, the moment is not about endorsing war itself but about the possibility that it may mark an inflection point in a decades-long fight for political change.

The decision marks one of the most consequential moments in the history of the Islamic Republic, effectively transferring power within the same family for the first time since the 1979 revolution.

But who exactly is Mojtaba Khamenei?

A powerful figure behind the scenes

Mojtaba Khamenei, 55, has long been considered one of the most influential figures inside Iran’s ruling system despite rarely appearing in public or holding formal political office.

For years he operated from within the Office of the Supreme Leader, serving as a gatekeeper and power broker around his father. His position has often been compared to the role played by Ahmad Khomeini, the son of Islamic Republic’s founder Ruhollah Khomeini, who served as a key aide and confidant during the early years of the revolutionary state.

Analysts say Mojtaba gradually built influence across the regime’s political, security and clerical institutions.

Dr. Eric Mandel, director of the Middle East Political and Information Network (MEPIN), told Iran International that Mojtaba has long been a central but opaque figure in Tehran’s power structure.

“Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has long operated behind the scenes in Tehran, building deep ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and consolidating influence within the regime’s power structure. He is widely viewed as one of the architects of the regime’s repression," Mandel said.

Author and Iran analyst Arash Azizi told Iran International Mojtaba is viewed with deep suspicion. "This is why he has been a bete noire of democratic movements at least since 2009 when he was rumored to have helped orchestrate the repression. He is also known to be a favorite of some sections of the establishment such as those close to Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf who has ambitions of becoming Iran’s strongman."

Ties to Iran’s security establishment

A key source of Mojtaba’s influence lies in his close connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Mojtaba served in the Habib Battalion, a unit made up largely of volunteers connected to the Islamic Republic’s emerging revolutionary networks. The battalion operated under forces linked to the IRGC and took part in several major battles of the war.

Service in the Habib Battalion proved significant for Mojtaba. Many of the men who fought alongside him later rose to senior positions in Iran’s security and intelligence apparatus, including figures who would go on to lead parts of the IRGC’s intelligence organization and security commands responsible for protecting the regime.

Those wartime relationships are widely believed to have helped Mojtaba build lasting connections inside Iran’s powerful security establishment.

Over the years, opposition figures and political rivals have accused Mojtaba of playing a role in shaping election outcomes and coordinating crackdowns on dissent.

Questions over religious credentials

Iran’s constitution requires the Supreme Leader to possess deep knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and be recognized as a senior religious authority.

Mojtaba, however, is not widely considered to be among the highest-ranking clerics in Iran. He studied in the seminaries of Qom under several prominent conservative scholars but does not hold the rank of ayatollah.

Despite that, Iran’s political system has historically shown flexibility when elite consensus forms around a candidate.

A controversial succession

Mojtaba’s elevation is likely to intensify criticism that the Islamic Republic founded as a revolutionary Islamic system is evolving toward dynastic rule.

For years speculation about his succession drew comparisons to hereditary monarchies.

For a man who has spent decades operating largely in the shadows of Iran’s power structure, Mojtaba Khamenei now finds himself at the center of one of the most consequential periods in the country’s modern history.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed on Saturday morning in US and Israeli air strikes. On Tuesday, according to exclusive information obtained by Iran International, Iran’s Assembly of Experts, under pressure from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), chose his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the next Supreme Leader. The decision has not been made public and is expected to be announced after Ali Khamenei is buried.

This is not a routine succession. It is a wartime decision shaped by the security state, and it raises serious questions about constitutional procedure. The priority appears to be speed and control, as the Islamic Republic faces attacks from outside and a leadership vacuum at the top.

Why the IRGC pushed Mojtaba

The IRGC needed two things at the same time: control and legitimacy.

Control means keeping the chain of command intact, preventing splits at the top, keeping the security forces coordinated, and stopping a scramble for power. In this crisis, the IRGC’s first priority is internal stability.

Legitimacy matters too, but not in a broad national sense. It means legitimacy inside the regime’s core base: hard-line politicians, the security institutions, and the loyal networks that still see the Islamic Republic as “their” state. In that narrow world, Mojtaba has something others do not. He can claim direct continuity with Khamenei, and the core base can accept him without feeling the system has broken.

That combination is why the IRGC chose him.

Mojtaba also has long-standing ties to the IRGC, going back decades, and deep relationships across its command networks. For years, he has been a key channel between his father and the Guard’s leadership. That gives him a rare position. He is close to the security core, but also linked to the civilian and clerical leadership that depends on it.

He has also effectively run the Supreme Leader’s office, the Beit, for at least the past two decades, and is widely seen as Ali Khamenei’s closest confidant. The Beit is not just a state within the state. It is the core of the state itself. In practice, Iran’s elected government and president are often a façade, with little real power. Real authority has long sat in the Beit, which controls key security, political and financial levers. That is why this apparatus is now protecting itself, and why it does not want an outsider coming in and taking control.

The Islamic Republic at a fork in the road

The Islamic Republic now faces two broad directions.

One is to keep fighting, stay defiant, absorb more damage, and try to outlast the attacks. That would likely mean tighter internal control, the dispersal of forces and assets, and heavier reliance on asymmetric pressure, including missiles, drones, proxies, and covert operations, while signalling that the state will not negotiate under fire.

The other is to step back and accept major concessions to stop the war and reduce pressure. That would mean giving up key pillars of Iran’s regional and military posture in return for a halt to attacks and some easing of pressure.

Mojtaba is well placed to pursue either path.

If the system chooses a bitter deal, it needs someone who can own it and stop the hardcore from turning on the leadership. If it chooses to fight on, it needs someone who can keep the IRGC united and keep the security state functioning under sustained attack. That is the political function of this succession.

The main question now is whether Israel and the US will target him immediately or give him time to make that choice. If they strike him straight away, it will be hard to avoid one conclusion: the campaign is no longer about pressure or deterrence. It is about regime change. If they hold back, the focus shifts to Mojtaba’s next move, and whether he chooses escalation or a climbdown.

The problem of blood and revenge

Any agreement with Donald Trump was always difficult for Ali Khamenei. In Tehran’s narrative, Trump sought Iran’s “surrender” and had the blood of Qasem Soleimani on his hands. Khamenei repeatedly ruled out reconciliation and called for qisas, a concept in Islamic law meaning retribution, often understood as “life for life.”

For his successor, the burden is heavier. Trump now carries not only Soleimani’s blood, but also Ali Khamenei’s. That makes any compromise far harder to sell, and it also raises the domestic stakes for any decision to escalate.

Mojtaba has one advantage inside the system. He can present himself as the person entitled to decide what comes next. If the leadership chooses to fight on, he can frame it as continuity, duty, and retaliation. If it chooses to pause revenge and prioritise survival, he can frame it as a decision made by the heir and the family, not as a humiliation forced from the outside.

Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder and first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, set the guiding rule in a line that has the force of a fatwa in Shia political doctrine: “Preserving the system is the highest duty.” In plain terms, it means the survival of the Islamic Republic comes before almost everything else. As vali-e dam, the next of kin with the right to demand retribution, Mojtaba can argue that he also has the right to set it aside if the state’s survival requires it. That is how he can ask the regime’s core base to accept restraint, and present it not as retreat, but as obedience to a higher obligation.

What stepping back would mean in practice

If Mojtaba chooses regime survival over confrontation, the price will be high. A serious de-escalation would likely mean accepting Trump’s demands, including:

• Ending enrichment as a national project, not just pausing it
• Accepting long-term, enforceable limits on missile range
• Reducing or abandoning the proxy network, not just rebranding it
• Ending the policy of confrontation with Israel

For Mojtaba, accepting these would not just be a policy shift. It would mean dismantling his father’s 37-year legacy in a single afternoon.

Without real and verifiable change in these areas, the US and Israel would have little reason to stop.

Even then, a deal would not solve the regime’s deeper problem at home. Legitimacy inside Iranian society is badly damaged, especially after the January massacre, and the state is widely seen as corrupt, incompetent, and violent. A ceasefire might stop the bombs, but it would not stop the political decay.

Where this leaves the Islamic Republic

If Mojtaba keeps the hard line while the world’s most powerful military is striking alongside the region’s most capable one, the window for a new leader to consolidate may be measured in days, not months.

If he chooses a climbdown, the war may stop, but the inheritance remains bleak. He would be taking ownership of painful concessions that undo much of his father’s legacy, while inheriting a state that is badly broken. The Islamic Republic is facing something close to a failed-state reality: an economy in severe distress, hollowed-out institutions, and public hostility so high that normal governance becomes hard to sustain. A halt in attacks would not restore capacity, trust, or authority.

Either way, Mojtaba Khamenei begins in the ruins of his father’s world. The Islamic Republic’s options are all expensive, its survival is no longer guaranteed, and for the first time in forty years, time is the one thing Tehran cannot buy.

According to senior executives at Chinese state-owned gas firms briefed by government officials, Beijing had urged Iranian counterparts not to target oil and liquefied natural gas tankers transiting the narrow waterway and to refrain from striking key export hubs such as Qatar.

China buys the vast majority of Iran’s oil, providing Tehran with a crucial economic lifeline. But the world’s largest energy importer depends more broadly on Persian Gulf supplies, with both crude and LNG cargoes passing through Hormuz.

Qatar accounts for roughly a fifth of global LNG supply and provides about 30% of China’s LNG imports, the executives said. The country is the world’s second-largest LNG producer after the United States.

Asian buyers take more than 80% of Qatar’s LNG shipments, according to data from analytics firm Kpler.

Reuters reported on Tuesday that India began rationing natural gas as countries across Asia moved to secure alternative supplies after conflict in the Middle East disrupted shipping and halted Qatari output.

Officials and executives in Japan, Taiwan, Bangladesh and Pakistan said they did not expect an immediate impact because some cargoes due this month had already arrived, but would diversify imports and buy spot LNG if the war drags on.

The Turkish government also plans to implement a fuel scheme to reduce the impact of rising global oil prices on inflation, according to Reuters on Tuesday.

Tanker traffic through the strait has largely stalled since US and Israeli strikes over the weekend and Iran’s subsequent missile attacks across the region.

According to US Central Command, the Strait of Hormuz is not closed despite statements by Iranian officials.

On Monday, Qatar halted production at Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG export facility, after an Iranian drone attack, marking the first full shutdown in nearly three decades of operations.

Chinese energy importers have been told Beijing is seeking to ensure vessels continue moving through Hormuz, the executives told Bloomberg.

Publicly, China has made limited comment. Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi on Monday that while Beijing supports efforts to safeguard national security, Tehran should heed the “reasonable concerns” of its neighbors, according to a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement.

At a regular briefing, a ministry spokesperson said China was “deeply concerned” about the widening conflict.

Analysts say the immediate economic impact on China may be manageable, though higher oil prices could add to inflationary pressures.

“I think that is a big miscalculation on the part of Iran,” Petraeus told 24 with Fardad Farahzad Show, arguing that striking Arab countries that had sought to avoid direct involvement could push them to contribute more directly to regional defense efforts.

US and Israeli forces, Petraeus said, have already “dramatically degraded” Iran’s retaliatory capabilities, though he cautioned it was too early to determine whether the decline in attacks over the past 12 to 24 hours signaled a lasting shift.

“I think it's premature at this point to judge whether or not that will degrade further or if the volume can pick back up,” he said.

Coalition dynamics shift

Petraeus said Tehran’s decision to target regional states – including those that did not allow their bases to be used for operations – may alter the strategic calculus across the Persian Gulf.

Many countries in the region, he said, are already contributing to an integrated air and missile defense network that includes US-supplied Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, along with naval assets and aircraft capable of intercepting incoming projectiles.

While he stopped short of predicting expanded offensive participation, Petraeus said additional Western powers could also align more closely with the effort. “I’m confident they are all taking part in the defensive efforts that are ongoing,” he said.

Uncertain path to political change

Addressing whether military pressure could lead to political transformation inside Iran, Petraeus said any lasting shift would depend primarily on internal fractures within the security forces and leadership.

“The sad reality in such cases often is that the most guys with the most guns and the most willing to be brutal to the people prevail,” he said, cautioning against assumptions that external air campaigns alone can bring about regime collapse.

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  Iranians face war with fear, joy and hope

Petraeus described exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi as a symbolic presence who has outlined a transition toward an elected government rather than dismantling all existing institutions.

Ultimately, he said, momentum would hinge on whether influential insiders conclude that continued confrontation has become unsustainable, shaping not only Iran’s future but the broader balance of power across the Middle East.