Professor Emeritus of Government and Politics, George Mason University
Russia likely views Iran’s mass anti-regime protests with deep unease, but may ultimately adapt just as it did in Syria to preserve influence whether the Islamic Republic survives or a new political order emerges.
After the loss of longtime Russian allies Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, the Kremlin can hardly wish to suffer further loss of an ally in Tehran.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may yet remain in power—thanks partly to ongoing Russian-Iranian cooperation. But even if he does not, Vladimir Putin may still be able to salvage the situation.
Moscow, according to an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment, does not seem likely to intervene militarily in Iran to defend the Islamic Republic against its opponents. Russian forces, after all, are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine.
Yet, as detailed in an article in Foreign Policy, Moscow has long provided Tehran with electronic and other tools of repression. Since the Iranian demonstrators are not an armed opposition, Russian military intervention may not be needed to contain or suppress the unrest.
The situation might change, of course, if US president Donald Trump follows through on his threats to intervene in Iran. Both Tehran and Moscow want to avoid this. But how?
While Putin himself has been remarkably quiet about events in Iran, the one initiative Russia has engaged in so far is mediation between Iran and Israel. Both governments have reportedly conveyed to Moscow that neither will preemptively attack the other.
This Russian mediation effort may be highly important for protecting the Islamic Republic. Unlike just before and during the June 2025 twelve-day war—when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was urging the United States to join attacks on Iran—Netanyahu is now reportedly counseling restraint in Washington regarding military intervention.
While Israel has long opposed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Netanyahu may prefer that a weakened Islamic Republic remain in power rather than be overthrown and replaced by either a more hostile regime, or one more closely aligned with the West in ways Israel cannot shape.
Netanyahu has already found himself at cross-purposes with Trump over Syria, where the United States has sought to cooperate with the new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, while Israel views the government in Damascus as a threat.
Moscow’s coordination with Israel may therefore increase Putin’s ability to dissuade Trump from intervening in Iran.
For Moscow, the best outcome in the current crisis is that the Islamic Republic defeats its internal opponents and survives. But Russia may still retain significant influence and cooperation with Iran after a change in leadership—or even regime.
In Syria, Moscow has kept its naval and air bases despite the fall of Assad. In Venezuela, Russia has moved quickly to re-engage with the post-Maduro authorities, seeking to preserve economic and strategic ties despite a major political rupture.
If Khamenei falls but the Islamic Republic remains intact, Tehran is likely to continue cooperating with Russia despite any newfound willingness to work with the United States.
Even if the Islamic Republic collapses, its replacement will almost certainly continue to envision Iran as a regional great power.
A new Iranian government may pursue more cooperative relations with Washington while still seeking ties with Russia, China, and others—much as new leaderships elsewhere have attempted to diversify their external partnerships.
Moscow, for its part, will actively seek cooperation with any new authorities in Tehran to prevent Iran from becoming overly dependent on the West.
With regard to Ukraine, Putin has shown little flexibility, pressing ahead despite extraordinary human and financial costs. But when it comes to supporting anti-Western allies in the Global South, Moscow has been more pragmatic.
The demands of the war in Ukraine limit Russia’s ability to defend embattled partners elsewhere, while Putin’s long-standing efforts to cultivate relations with traditionally pro-Western governments have reduced the strategic necessity of rigid ideological allies.
It is undoubtedly embarrassing for Moscow to see longtime partners fall from power, but this is hardly unique to Russia—as the collapse of the Western-backed government in Afghanistan demonstrated.
Putin appears to understand that the downfall of any government in the Global South is typically followed by competition among outside powers for influence. This is not a moment to lament losses, but to adapt—to engage new leaders eager to keep their options open rather than rely on a single great-power patron.
Moscow’s preferred outcome in Iran remains the survival of the Islamic Republic and the continuation of close cooperation. But if leadership—or even regime—change occurs, Russia will move quickly to adjust.
If Putin’s success in retaining Russian bases in Syria despite backing the losing side is any guide, he may well succeed in doing so in Iran as well.
