Underlying the renewed debate is the concentration of power in the office of the Supreme Leader. After nearly four decades in power, 86-year-old Ali Khamenei exercises final authority over foreign policy, the economy and security matters, leaving elected institutions with little real leverage.
Calls to amend the constitution—long a staple of reformist discourse—have returned as moderates search for an institutional way out of what they describe as systemic dysfunction.
The proposals focus on strengthening presidential authority, restoring accountability and fixing an election system that critics say has been hollowed out over two decades.
“Based on the current version of the Iranian Constitutional Law, two-thirds of government institutions in Iran are not answerable to anyone and cannot be held accountable for wrongdoing,” Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a former head of parliament’s national security committee, told moderate outlet Khabar Online on Thursday.
The remarks echoed similar comments a day earlier by former lawmaker Mansoor Haghighatpoor, who argued that the constitution itself allows for revision and that treating it as immutable has become a political choice rather than a legal necessity.
Long overdue
Reformist and moderate figures have made such arguments for years, most notably former presidents Mohammad Khatami (1997–2004) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021), both of whom sought to expand executive authority and curb unelected power centers.
Their efforts went nowhere. Any constitutional amendment requires Khamenei's approval—an obstacle widely seen as insurmountable.
Much of the current critique centers on the 1989 constitutional revision, which transferred sweeping powers from the presidency to the Supreme Leader.
Since then, Khamenei has also entrenched the Guardian Council’s role in vetting election candidates, an extra-constitutional practice that has steadily narrowed voter choice. Politicians have protested biased disqualifications in every election since 2005, without effect.
Rouhani went further during his presidency, floating the idea of a referendum on limited issues such as legislation needed for Iran to join international financial conventions. Khamenei publicly—and angrily—rejected the proposal.
‘Not God’s word’
Haghighatpoor has focused on what he describes as the constitution’s internal contradictions, citing requirements such as the stipulation that the intelligence minister be a senior cleric.
“The Constitutional Law was not drawn by God,” he said. “It was written by the first Assembly of Experts in 1979, and they explicitly allowed for amendments. If laws no longer fit modern needs, they should be changed. That is a strength, not a weakness.”
Falahatpisheh added that Iran’s system lacks even basic mechanisms found elsewhere, such as the ability of a government or parliament to resign after failure. “This absence of accountability is itself a structural flaw,” he said.
Wishful thinking?
Parliament has no supervisory role over the armed forces, state television, the intelligence ministry or vast financial bodies operating under the Supreme Leader’s office.
Haghighatpoor also pointed to the Executive Headquarters of Imam Khomeini’s Decree (EHIKD), an opaque entity created in 1989—weeks before the death of Iran’s first supreme leader—to confiscate assets linked to the toppled monarchy.
That “temporary” body is now one of Iran’s largest financial conglomerates, second only to the Mostazafan Foundation. It operates directly under Khamenei’s authority and remains beyond parliamentary oversight.
The EHIKD is just one example, Haghighatpoor said, of structural problems that could only be addressed through constitutional reform.
Any such reform, however, requires Khamenei’s consent. For now, even proponents of constitutional revision concede that the debate remains largely theoretical.