Iran International
China’s recent backing of the United Arab Emirates’ claims over three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf has triggered unusually sharp public criticism of Beijing among Tehran’s hardline supporters.
Official reactions, however, were restrained. Iran’s Foreign Ministry called the claims “baseless,” directing its criticism at the UAE rather than China.
Even the state-run English-language broadcaster Press TV sought to soften Beijing’s position, saying China had merely supported a peaceful resolution “in accordance with the UN Charter and international law.”
No such diplomatic language was used by ultrahardliners.
“China must know that issuing a statement against Iran’s national sovereignty is a miscalculation in a strategic partnership,” conservative lawmaker Ahmad Naderi wrote on X.
He added that Tehran had so far contained its concerns over the treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang and “acted rationally,” but could reassess if its territorial red lines were crossed.
“Beijing cannot treat the One China principle and sovereignty over a rock in the South China Sea as a non-negotiable red line … and apply double standards when it comes to Iran’s territorial integrity,” he wrote.
‘No diplomatic slip’
Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor in chief of the hardline daily Kayhan, was even more direct. In a scathing editorial, he argued that by the same logic China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu—administered by Taipei—could also be questioned.
Shariatmadari warned that Iran could respond by reviving claims over the islands of Ariana and Zarkuh, and even Bahrain, which remained under Iranian sovereignty until August 1971.
The semi-official Mehr News Agency struck a similar tone. “This is no longer an uninformed diplomatic slip, but a serious error—one that cannot be hidden behind words or justifications,” an editorial said, asking: “Is China itself willing to negotiate with other countries over islands under its sovereignty?”
Criticism also came from outside the hardline camp. The establishment daily Jomhouri-ye Eslami, funded by the office of the supreme leader but often skeptical of Iran’s ties with China and Russia, noted that Beijing had now, for the third time in two years, sided with the UAE.
“Even if one accepts such a hypothesis regarding the Chinese president the first time this mistake was made,” the paper wrote, “it cannot explain the second mistake or the foreign minister’s current action.”
It accused China of ignoring Iran’s ownership of Abu Musa and the Tunbs to “extract greater concessions from the UAE,” and faulted Iran’s Foreign Ministry for passivity in the face of similar positions taken by both China and Russia.
Self criticism
The online magazine Emrooz-o Farda described the episode as a test of Iran’s diplomacy and of its partners’ commitment to basic principles.
“From Beijing’s perspective, this may be economic and political balancing,” it wrote, “but from Tehran’s point of view, getting involved in the issue of territorial integrity crosses a clear red line.”
Former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi, writing in Sazandegi in an article also published by the state news agency IRNA, called the trend deeply worrying. He linked China’s initial endorsement in December 2022 to similar statements by Russia in July 2023 and later European Union references to what they described as Iran’s “occupation” of the islands in October 2024 and October 2025.
“In the absence of negotiation and engagement with the West,” Ahmadi wrote, “Beijing and Moscow see no obligation to factor Iran’s sensitivities into their priorities.”
Journalist Ehsan Mansouri summed up the mood bluntly: “Unfortunately, we have become very weak—and Saudi Arabia and the UAE now matter more to China and Russia than we do.”
