Oil, gas and Iran economic analyst
Tehran’s frequently invoked threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz may be far easier to signal than to carry out, not least because it would harm allied China more than the hostile West.
For now, the threat is muted as Iran and the United States have returned to the negotiating table. But the shadow of war has not lifted.
Hardline and influential voices in both capitals continue to push a confrontational line, and the presence of the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln near Iranian waters is a reminder of how quickly tensions could escalate.
Earlier this week, units from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps approached and boarded a commercial vessel flying a US flag in the strait, while a US F-35 fighter jet shot down an Iranian drone that had approached the carrier strike group.
On the same day, amid a diplomatic scramble across the region to keep talks alive, hardline lawmakers in Tehran publicly revived calls to close the strait.
Yet the economic constraints on any serious disruption are severe.
The China factor
According to data from commodities intelligence provider Kpler seen by Iran International, nearly 95 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports in 2025 were loaded at Kharg Island and shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, primarily to China.
Estimates from the US Energy Information Administration show that roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products—about one-fifth of global consumption—pass through the strait each day.
Only about 6 percent of that volume is destined for Europe and the United States. Asian buyers dominate, absorbing 84 percent of oil and petroleum products transiting Hormuz, as well as more than 80 percent of liquefied natural gas shipments.
China alone imports around 5 million barrels of oil per day via the route. Any sustained disruption would therefore strike directly at Beijing’s energy security.
That vulnerability has grown in recent months as Venezuelan oil exports to China have effectively halted following stepped-up US enforcement. Venezuela exported about 850,000 barrels per day in January—volumes sufficient to replace most of the oil consumed in Europe and the United States that transits Hormuz.
Reuters reported that the United States last month reclaimed its position as the largest individual destination for Venezuelan crude, receiving about 284,000 barrels per day.
China, by contrast, has stepped back. PetroChina recently halted purchases of Venezuelan crude, signaling that Beijing no longer expects access to discounted supplies once available under sanctions-era arrangements.
A narrowing margin
With sanctions also complicating imports from Russia and Iran, China’s reliance on Persian Gulf oil—and on uninterrupted traffic through Hormuz—is set to deepen further.
From a Western perspective, these shifts have quietly altered the risk calculus. While any disruption in Hormuz would still push global oil prices higher, Europe and the United States are now better positioned than in the past to absorb short-term shocks. China is not.
For Iran, the costs would be higher still. Roughly 80 percent of its foreign trade, oil and non-oil alike, moves through ports along the Persian Gulf. Closing Hormuz would not only jeopardize China’s energy supplies but effectively paralyze Iran’s own external commerce.
There is also a broader cushion in the system. The International Energy Agency estimates that global spare production capacity will remain near 4 million barrels per day through 2026, helping to limit the impact of any temporary disruption.
All of this helps explain why Iran’s recurring threats to close the Strait of Hormuz—raised repeatedly over more than two decades—have never been carried out.
