Tehran confirms US arrest and deportation of 55 more Iranian nationals

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit was particularly notable. He met not only with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi but also with Iran’s president, the parliamentary speaker, and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Saudi deputy foreign minister Saud bin Mohammed Al Sati also held separate talks with Iran’s foreign minister and senior officials.

Expanded diplomatic engagement signals strategic intent

The scope of these engagements suggested that the trips were not ceremonial visits but part of a deeper, multilayered conversation on regional security and economic dynamics, reinforcing the perception that both Ankara and Riyadh sought structured dialogue with Tehran at a moment of heightened regional uncertainty.

Iranian media argue that overlapping crises—ranging from concerns of a new military confrontation between Iran and Israel to instability in Syria—has compelled major Middle Eastern actors to search behind closed doors for common ground and shared strategies.

Yet, not all experts believe these visits will produce breakthroughs. “The trips by Turkish and Saudi officials resemble goodwill gestures and attempts to assert regional roles more than representing practical solutions,” international affairs analyst Ali Bigdeli wrote in the reformist Sazandegi newspaper.

Syria’s central role

Ankara, Riyadh, and Tehran view Syria as a critical arena where their security interests and regional influence intersect, pushing them toward cautious coordination despite deep differences. Accordingly, Syria appears to have featured prominently in the Tehran talks on Sunday.

“Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia each have their own priorities regarding Syria and Syria’s strategic weight makes it impossible for any of them to overlook or bypass it,” a commentary in Donya-ye Eghtesad argued.

“Even so, all three have come to recognize the need for a workable common ground—one that allows cooperation to persist, preserves regional stability, and keeps diplomatic channels open,” the commentary added.

Jaafar Haghpanah, a university professor and Turkey specialist, told Khabar Online: “In Syria, a shared concern for both countries is preventing it from becoming an arena for Israeli influence. Both also fear Syria turning into a failed state and a haven for extremist movements.”

Rising anxiety over a renewed Israel–Iran clash

Concerns about a potential new round of hostilities between Iran and Israel have intensified and prospects of nuclear talks with Washington currently seem slim.

Meanwhile, Israel’s state radio reported last week that Tehran was accelerating preparations for a potential confrontation and Israeli fighter jets reportedly conducted threatening flights over Iraq close to Iran’s borders.

Such developments have contributed to anxiety in the region and further market instability in Iran. The rial has weakened more against the US dollar in recent days, a shift widely interpreted as reflecting fears of possible military escalation.

Ankara and Riyadh acting as intermediaries?

The combination of military activity and sensitive diplomatic exchanges has fueled debate that Turkey and Saudi Arabia may be exploring a mediatory role or delivered messages from the US government.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei categorically denied the claim on Monday, saying reports of message-passing from the American president were “not accurate.”

However, Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said it was “not impossible” that the visitors carried messages from Washington. He argued that Iran would not accept the reported US conditions for renewed talks.

According to lawmaker Mojtaba Zolnouri these conditions were “zero enrichment, ending cooperation with resistance groups in the region, and reducing Iran’s missile range.”

Sources in Washington told Iran International last week that Washington reaffirmed these three conditions in response to a letter allegedly sent by President Massoud Pezeshkian through Saudi channels requesting mediation for renewed dialogue.

Saudi and Turkish officials have not commented on the issue.

Chad dismantled two networks accused of being tied to Iran, the report said quoting Chadian security forces.

Officials described a strategy of infiltration, indoctrination and promises of support for coups aimed at expanding Tehran’s influence in Africa.

According to Infobae, the interrogations detailed how the Revolutionary Guard's Quds Force and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) allegedly recruit and train African citizens for operations targeting Western and Israeli interests.

In 2023, Israel asked visiting Chadian President Mahamat Deby to reduce the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Africa’s Sahel region, four years after the Muslim-majority country in central Africa restored its relations with the Jewish State.

Déby visited Israel to open Chad’s new embassy in the country, where he also made a rare stop at Mossad headquarters, a signal that the renewed ties carry national-security weight.

The alleged push for influence in Chad is not an isolated case, as Iran has been reportedly sending military equipment to Chad's eastern neighbor Sudan whose army is fighting against the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces.

Iran's alleged recruitments in Chad

The Infobae report says one of those detained by Chadian authorities admitted to investigators that he had been recruited by Iran's intelligence ministry. The detaine, identified as Ali Abdoulaye Mahamat, said the process began after studying at the Al-Mustafa International University in Iran's Qom.

Mahamat told authorities he met Iranian intelligence officers in hotels in 2022 and 2023. He said he was instructed to identify American, Israeli and French activity, recruit new members and map links between local rebel groups and Iranian handlers, according to the report.

He also described an intelligence officer named Karim, who he said escorted him to hotels, restaurants and secret locations and confiscated his phone. Mahamat told officials Karim demanded detailed information on foreign military movements and intelligence services operating in Chad.

Pressed by his handlers, Mahamat said he eventually provided names of Chadian intelligence officers and individuals allegedly in contact with Israelis.

Chad’s authorities say another detainee, Abdoulaye Ahmat Sheikh Alamine, confessed to being recruited by the Quds Force. During his interrogation, he said the cell he belonged to was directed by Department 400, which operates in Iraq, Africa and other regions.

He told investigators he received weapons training — including Kalashnikovs, RPGs and KFX systems — and traveled to Iraq under the guise of religious trips, where the group met Iranian contacts and trained alongside Shia militias, according to the report.

Mahamat also told investigators that MOIS officers posing as Iranian Foreign Ministry representatives instructed him to collect information on international presence in Chad, recruit assets for military training and assess the needs of rebel groups such as FACT.

According to Infobae, Chad’s security services say the revelations show a coordinated Iranian approach combining religious indoctrination, military training and promises of political power in exchange for attacks on Western and Israeli interests.

Chadian officials told the outlet their operations disrupted, at least temporarily, what they describe as Tehran’s efforts to expand influence and destabilize the region.

Last month, Iran International revealed an alleged Iranian plot targeting the Israeli embassy in Senegal and Israeli personnel in Uganda, which were thwarted by Mossad.

The operation was directed by the Quds Force, the IRGC’s overseas arm, which relied on a proxy network of Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals based in Iran, alongside locally recruited operatives in Africa — many of whom were said to have been enlisted through social media.

“Nobody in the GCC wants Iran to go down the drain,” Albudaiwi said at a panel titled Iran and the Changing Regional Security Environment during the Doha Forum 2025.

“We are here to talk about the present and the future – how to make our region as peaceful, as stable, as prosperous as possible along with our brothers and sisters in Iran.”

He said the GCC seeks a cooperative relationship with Iran based on dialogue, respect for the UN Charter, and non-interference in regional affairs. “We need to take the right steps towards trust-building measures,” he said.

“But there are really serious measures that we would like our brothers in Iran to take. The policies that Iran sometimes take really shake the stability of the region.”

Albudaiwi cited Iran’s support for Yemen’s Houthi group as an example of destabilizing activity and said Arab states astride the Persian Gulf had already taken steps toward de-escalation, including Saudi Arabia’s 2023 normalization agreement with Tehran and mediation efforts by Oman.

“We have put the right steps toward Iran,” he said. “What the GCC wants from Iran is simple and basic – like any normal neighborhood.”

He described Iran as part of the region’s shared culture and history but said progress required concrete change. “Iran is our neighbor, our history, our culture,” Albudaiwi said. “We have so much to share with Iran. It’s the present and the future that we should concentrate on.”

Meanwhile former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Iran remains resilient despite recent challenges, stressing that the country has endured hardship throughout its history.

“We’ve had our ups, and certainly today is not one of our ups,” Zarif said at the Doha Forum. “Iran has gone through storms for almost seven millennia – we’ve been invaded, we’ve been occupied, but we never went down the drain. We are still standing up and we will continue to stand up.”

Hossein Shariatmadari wrote that Bahrainis seek a “return to the main and mother homeland,” going beyond Iran’s usual rejection of GCC references to Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.

“This undeniable right of Iran and the people of its separated province cannot and should not be ignored,” he said.

His remarks followed a GCC communiqué issued Wednesday that reaffirmed support for Emirati claims over the islands and called for negotiations or referral to the International Court of Justice. Such statements often prompt formal Iranian protests or diplomatic summonses.

Kayhan links GCC stance to foreign alignment

Shariatmadari accused Persian Gulf states of acting under Western pressure and cited 19th-century British maps to argue Iran’s continuous sovereignty over the islands. He described Bahrain’s separation as a result of foreign intervention and said consultations with tribal leaders did not amount to a true referendum.

His remarks ventured beyond standard Iranian diplomatic messaging, which generally restricts itself to sovereignty claims dating to 1971 and rejects third-party arbitration. By reviving the Bahrain question – largely absent from formal diplomacy for decades – the column broadened the dispute at a moment when GCC statements increasingly pair the islands with Saudi-Kuwaiti positions on the offshore Arash/Durra gas field.

GCC communiqués regularly reprise both issues, while Iran emphasizes territorial “red lines” and warns neighbors against what Tehran describes as misreading its posture in the Persian Gulf.

Shamkhani, a former secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and now the Supreme Leader’s representative to Iran’s Defense Council, called the GCC stance unconstructive in a post on X.

He wrote: “The GCC claims about the Iranian islands and the Arash field in the middle of US and Israeli hostility are unconstructive.”

He added that Iran “showed restraint” during the recent 12-day conflict with Israel despite “some backing for the aggression,” and said: “Iran’s power in the Persian Gulf should not be misread; the role of neighbors is to create security, not to test the red lines of the Iranian nation.”

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GCC communiqués regularly reprise two Iran-related disputes: sovereignty over the three islands at the Strait of Hormuz (Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb), and more recently the offshore Arash/Durra gas field claimed by Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Iran administers the islands and rejects any third-party arbitration, citing sovereignty dating to 1971.

After most GCC ministerials, summits, or joint meetings with partners (EU, China, etc.), the closing statement typically “supports UAE efforts” on the islands and urges peaceful settlement or ICJ referral, alongside formulaic lines on Iran’s nuclear program and missiles.

• 

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  The islands fallout: is Iranian patriotism the West’s blind spot?

The pattern is cyclical: after each communiqué, Iran rejects the islands language as a sovereignty red line and often summons ambassadors or issues warnings.

Tehran did so following the October EU-GCC meeting, and has also bristled when partners like China echoed the “peaceful settlement” formula, summoning Beijing’s envoy in 2024.

Arash/Durra has become the newer staple in GCC texts, with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia asserting joint ownership and Iran maintaining overlapping claims.