Three-way regional chess: Tehran, Ankara, Riyadh seek stability amid crisis

Chad dismantled two networks accused of being tied to Iran, the report said quoting Chadian security forces.

Officials described a strategy of infiltration, indoctrination and promises of support for coups aimed at expanding Tehran’s influence in Africa.

According to Infobae, the interrogations detailed how the Revolutionary Guard's Quds Force and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) allegedly recruit and train African citizens for operations targeting Western and Israeli interests.

In 2023, Israel asked visiting Chadian President Mahamat Deby to reduce the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Africa’s Sahel region, four years after the Muslim-majority country in central Africa restored its relations with the Jewish State.

Déby visited Israel to open Chad’s new embassy in the country, where he also made a rare stop at Mossad headquarters, a signal that the renewed ties carry national-security weight.

The alleged push for influence in Chad is not an isolated case, as Iran has been reportedly sending military equipment to Chad's eastern neighbor Sudan whose army is fighting against the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces.

Iran's alleged recruitments in Chad

The Infobae report says one of those detained by Chadian authorities admitted to investigators that he had been recruited by Iran's intelligence ministry. The detaine, identified as Ali Abdoulaye Mahamat, said the process began after studying at the Al-Mustafa International University in Iran's Qom.

Mahamat told authorities he met Iranian intelligence officers in hotels in 2022 and 2023. He said he was instructed to identify American, Israeli and French activity, recruit new members and map links between local rebel groups and Iranian handlers, according to the report.

He also described an intelligence officer named Karim, who he said escorted him to hotels, restaurants and secret locations and confiscated his phone. Mahamat told officials Karim demanded detailed information on foreign military movements and intelligence services operating in Chad.

Pressed by his handlers, Mahamat said he eventually provided names of Chadian intelligence officers and individuals allegedly in contact with Israelis.

Chad’s authorities say another detainee, Abdoulaye Ahmat Sheikh Alamine, confessed to being recruited by the Quds Force. During his interrogation, he said the cell he belonged to was directed by Department 400, which operates in Iraq, Africa and other regions.

He told investigators he received weapons training — including Kalashnikovs, RPGs and KFX systems — and traveled to Iraq under the guise of religious trips, where the group met Iranian contacts and trained alongside Shia militias, according to the report.

Mahamat also told investigators that MOIS officers posing as Iranian Foreign Ministry representatives instructed him to collect information on international presence in Chad, recruit assets for military training and assess the needs of rebel groups such as FACT.

According to Infobae, Chad’s security services say the revelations show a coordinated Iranian approach combining religious indoctrination, military training and promises of political power in exchange for attacks on Western and Israeli interests.

Chadian officials told the outlet their operations disrupted, at least temporarily, what they describe as Tehran’s efforts to expand influence and destabilize the region.

Last month, Iran International revealed an alleged Iranian plot targeting the Israeli embassy in Senegal and Israeli personnel in Uganda, which were thwarted by Mossad.

The operation was directed by the Quds Force, the IRGC’s overseas arm, which relied on a proxy network of Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals based in Iran, alongside locally recruited operatives in Africa — many of whom were said to have been enlisted through social media.

“Nobody in the GCC wants Iran to go down the drain,” Albudaiwi said at a panel titled Iran and the Changing Regional Security Environment during the Doha Forum 2025.

“We are here to talk about the present and the future – how to make our region as peaceful, as stable, as prosperous as possible along with our brothers and sisters in Iran.”

He said the GCC seeks a cooperative relationship with Iran based on dialogue, respect for the UN Charter, and non-interference in regional affairs. “We need to take the right steps towards trust-building measures,” he said.

“But there are really serious measures that we would like our brothers in Iran to take. The policies that Iran sometimes take really shake the stability of the region.”

Albudaiwi cited Iran’s support for Yemen’s Houthi group as an example of destabilizing activity and said Arab states astride the Persian Gulf had already taken steps toward de-escalation, including Saudi Arabia’s 2023 normalization agreement with Tehran and mediation efforts by Oman.

“We have put the right steps toward Iran,” he said. “What the GCC wants from Iran is simple and basic – like any normal neighborhood.”

He described Iran as part of the region’s shared culture and history but said progress required concrete change. “Iran is our neighbor, our history, our culture,” Albudaiwi said. “We have so much to share with Iran. It’s the present and the future that we should concentrate on.”

Meanwhile former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Iran remains resilient despite recent challenges, stressing that the country has endured hardship throughout its history.

“We’ve had our ups, and certainly today is not one of our ups,” Zarif said at the Doha Forum. “Iran has gone through storms for almost seven millennia – we’ve been invaded, we’ve been occupied, but we never went down the drain. We are still standing up and we will continue to stand up.”

Hossein Shariatmadari wrote that Bahrainis seek a “return to the main and mother homeland,” going beyond Iran’s usual rejection of GCC references to Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.

“This undeniable right of Iran and the people of its separated province cannot and should not be ignored,” he said.

His remarks followed a GCC communiqué issued Wednesday that reaffirmed support for Emirati claims over the islands and called for negotiations or referral to the International Court of Justice. Such statements often prompt formal Iranian protests or diplomatic summonses.

Kayhan links GCC stance to foreign alignment

Shariatmadari accused Persian Gulf states of acting under Western pressure and cited 19th-century British maps to argue Iran’s continuous sovereignty over the islands. He described Bahrain’s separation as a result of foreign intervention and said consultations with tribal leaders did not amount to a true referendum.

His remarks ventured beyond standard Iranian diplomatic messaging, which generally restricts itself to sovereignty claims dating to 1971 and rejects third-party arbitration. By reviving the Bahrain question – largely absent from formal diplomacy for decades – the column broadened the dispute at a moment when GCC statements increasingly pair the islands with Saudi-Kuwaiti positions on the offshore Arash/Durra gas field.

GCC communiqués regularly reprise both issues, while Iran emphasizes territorial “red lines” and warns neighbors against what Tehran describes as misreading its posture in the Persian Gulf.

Shamkhani, a former secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and now the Supreme Leader’s representative to Iran’s Defense Council, called the GCC stance unconstructive in a post on X.

He wrote: “The GCC claims about the Iranian islands and the Arash field in the middle of US and Israeli hostility are unconstructive.”

He added that Iran “showed restraint” during the recent 12-day conflict with Israel despite “some backing for the aggression,” and said: “Iran’s power in the Persian Gulf should not be misread; the role of neighbors is to create security, not to test the red lines of the Iranian nation.”

• 

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  How Iran loses in joint oil and gas fields to neighbors?

GCC communiqués regularly reprise two Iran-related disputes: sovereignty over the three islands at the Strait of Hormuz (Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb), and more recently the offshore Arash/Durra gas field claimed by Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Iran administers the islands and rejects any third-party arbitration, citing sovereignty dating to 1971.

After most GCC ministerials, summits, or joint meetings with partners (EU, China, etc.), the closing statement typically “supports UAE efforts” on the islands and urges peaceful settlement or ICJ referral, alongside formulaic lines on Iran’s nuclear program and missiles.

• 

  Iran puts flag before faith after war with Israel

• 

  The islands fallout: is Iranian patriotism the West’s blind spot?

The pattern is cyclical: after each communiqué, Iran rejects the islands language as a sovereignty red line and often summons ambassadors or issues warnings.

Tehran did so following the October EU-GCC meeting, and has also bristled when partners like China echoed the “peaceful settlement” formula, summoning Beijing’s envoy in 2024.

Arash/Durra has become the newer staple in GCC texts, with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia asserting joint ownership and Iran maintaining overlapping claims.

Internal contestation is harsher than at any time in recent memory, with competing factions trying to preserve or redefine their place in a system that has lost the capacity for reform or institutional expansion.

Yet Iran's nearly 50-year-old theocracy persists, compensating for poor governance with stiff security control and the careful redistribution of shrinking resources.

Just as authorities have slackened enforcement of Islamic social rules, allowing unveiled women and open-air concerts in public, it has stepped up a crackdown on political dissent and alleged spies.

Opposing this order are three forces whose interaction with the securitized state produces neither fundamental change nor imminent collapse, but something closer to endurance through erosion.

Those are: people inside Iran fighting localized economic and professional battles without organized networks, an exiled opposition adept at narrative and symbolism but detached from lived realities inside Iran and foreign actors committed to curbing Tehran’s nuclear and regional strength but not to toppling it.

One system, many channels

The Islamic Republic is structured around the Supreme Leader, whose authority ultimately resolves all major decisions. Around this axis sits an intricate constellation of parallel institutions, security councils, loyalty networks and overlapping hierarchies.

Policymaking is multi-layered. But decision-making is ultimately his sole prerogative.

President Masoud Pezeshkian recently issued a telling statement that unmanageable infighting would ensure should Ali Khamenei somehow exit the scene. It underscores a basic fear: without the Leader’s centrality, the power networks would drift apart.

Nothing illustrates this better than the way “system” is used interchangeably for both the political order and the leader himself.

Khamenei functions less as the manager of a unified apparatus than as the referee of internal conflicts. The state bureaucracy is not the engine of governance but one node among political, security and economic bodies each pursuing their own interests.

The 12-day war intensified these fissures. The removal of influential IRGC figures disrupted long-standing balances and sharpened factional sensitivities.

The Babak Zanjani affair illuminates the power politics at play.

Sprung with little explanation from a death sentence for corruption, the disgraced tycoon now not only walks free but weighs in regularly on politics, even appearing to threaten former President Hassan Rouhani with death in a tweet this week.

Such a rapid rehabilitation could not occur without powerful establishment backing.

Unorganized discontent

The war’s economic toll—passed on to society through inflationary policies—has deepened hardship and widened discontent. Iran’s society today is in ferment but unorganized: protests erupt across workplaces and cities, but without intermediary institutions they remain local and short-lived.

A recent nurses’ strike in Mashhad, much like the truck drivers’ strike before it this spring, showed the pattern clearly: strong anger, weak connective tissue.

The labor market’s collapse into unstable, platform-based work illustrates a society living in permanent emergency. Eight million rideshare drivers do not prove total collapse, but they reveal a mass shift toward insecure livelihoods.

Economic stress drains the psychological capacity for sustained organization; survival overrides solidarity.

Provincial centers skew toward economic protests, while peripheral regions experience conflict mainly through security confrontation.

The recurring demolition of homes in Baluchistan in southeastern Iran is one example of a strategy that provokes local resistance but rarely ratchets up because no networks link periphery grievances to central demands.

Inside Iran, opposition forces function like isolated islands. Outside, the opposition produces abundant media output but struggles to translate daily grievances into a shared political language.

The gap between “voice” abroad and “life” inside has produced an opposition that amplifies frustrations but does not alter the balance of power.

Survival on the edge

The Islamic Republic continues not as an effective state but as a mechanism that defers crises day by day. Security has replaced policy; the cost of maintaining power rises constantly as the quality of governance decays.

The system persists because no countervailing power with organizational depth has yet emerged.

European-triggered international sanctions and intermittent threats from the United States and Israel show that containment—not internal transformation—may be the ultimate priority from outside powers.

External pressure accelerates economic and infrastructural decay but cannot substitute for domestic political change.

For the West, Iran remains a security file, not a political project.

Foreign actors may accelerate or intensify pressure, but the indispensable condition for change is alignment between internal and external forces around a shared language and objective.

Until such convergence forms, the Islamic Republic will remain in a state of endurance through erosion—able to enforce the status quo even as it becomes less capable of maintaining stability or basic services.