Iran International
Iran will be held responsible for the actions of armed groups it supports, including Hamas, and should be kept out of ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, a senior US senator told Iran International on Friday.
“The Islamic Republic will be held accountable for its proxy activity,” Senator Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) said. “Iran must stay away from Israel and stop sending money to Hamas.”
She said the ceasefire is vital for Israel’s stability and long-term security, but can only succeed if all hostages, living or dead, are returned and those responsible are brought to justice. “The hostages must come home without exception,” she said.
Her comments came as the first phase of a US-brokered ceasefire took effect under President Donald Trump’s plan to end the two-year war in Gaza. The deal, signed by the leaders of Egypt, Turkey and Qatar alongside Trump, began on October 10 and has so far led to the release of 20 living hostages by Hamas in exchange for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners. Hamas also handed over the bodies of 10 hostages, while Israel says the remains of 18 others are still in Gaza and must be returned without delay.
Analysts say Iran’s next steps could shape future talks
Analysts say the Gaza ceasefire could also have wider implications for Iran. A recent commentary from the Stimson Center said the truce may give Tehran another chance to re-engage in diplomacy with Washington if it chooses pragmatism over confrontation. It said that if the agreement endures, Iranian hard-liners could face pressure to support the peace deal or risk further isolation in the region.
A report from Chatham House said that while Trump’s success in securing the ceasefire was significant, the United States needs a clearer Iran strategy to make the peace sustainable. It said that without renewed diplomatic outreach, a cornered and economically strained Iran could act as a spoiler and undermine regional stability.
The three villages are Shafiabad in Kerman Province, Kandolus in Mazandaran Province and Soheili on Qeshm Island. Together, they represent Iran’s northern forests, central deserts and southern coasts.
Shafiabad, located on the edge of the Lut Desert, is known for its Qajar-era caravanserai and the surrounding sand dunes and “kaluts,” the wind-shaped desert formations that draw travelers and photographers from around the world.
Kandolus, in the green slopes of the Alborz Mountains, is famous for its traditional stone houses, handicrafts, and hiking trails through the Hyrcanian forests. With thousands of years of history, it is one of northern Iran’s oldest rural settlements and a model for cultural tourism.
Soheili, a coastal village on Qeshm Island, has become a leader in eco-tourism and community-based conservation, according to the Iranian Tourism Organization.
Villagers help protect the Hara Mangrove Forests, promote quiet and clean boating, and welcome visitors with local seafood, crafts, and star-filled night skies.
UN Tourism’s “Best Tourism Villages” program honors rural destinations that protect their natural environment, celebrate local traditions, and create opportunities for local communities.
“Our Best Tourism Villages 2025 highlight communities that are working to safeguard their cultural heritage, preserve their natural resources and create economic opportunities through tourism,” UN Tourism Secretary General Zurab Pololikashvili said in a statement.
In total, 52 villages from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East received the recognition, selected from over 270 applications from 65 UN Tourism Member States.
Lavrov has often claimed that Russia “always supported” and helped bring about the 2015 Iranian nuclear accord formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Zarif, however, has argued that Moscow actually tried to prevent it from being finalized.
Back in 2015, I also believed that Moscow was trying to derail the JCPOA.
Zarif recently told a conference in Tehran that Russia did not want Iran to have normal relations with the rest of the world, yet did not wish for Iran to enter direct confrontation with other states either.
In my view, Zarif’s accusation rings true.
Russia's way
Before Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine froze my ability to meet Russian colleagues, I regularly spoke with Russian scholars who were candid about their view of the Iranian-American relationship.
Several indicated that, from their perspective, the worst-case scenario for Russia was not an Iranian nuclear weapon, but an Iranian-American rapprochement. They feared that if such a rapprochement occurred, Tehran would have far less need for Moscow and might even work with Washington against Russian interests.
From their point of view, it was clearly in Russia’s interests for Iranian-American relations to remain hostile.
As for Zarif’s charge that Moscow prefers Iran not to have normal relations but also avoids direct confrontations: this reflects Russia’s standard diplomatic approach. Moscow benefits when countries are at odds, since it can then provide security assistance to one side—or even both.
When adversaries make peace, they tend to focus on economic development and cooperation with the US, Europe or China—but rarely with Russia.
While Moscow profits from tension, it usually does not want outright conflict, as that can expose its unwillingness or inability to support its “allies”—as seen during the recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran.
Despite Iran having sold armed drones and reportedly even ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine, Moscow did virtually nothing to help Tehran during that conflict.
This could have led to a rupture in relations, but ongoing hostility between Iran and the US has kept Tehran tied to its one-sided cooperation with Moscow.
Tehran’s choice
Still, Russia cannot be blamed entirely.
One striking feature of today’s “multipolar” order is how many states in the “Global South” manage to cooperate simultaneously with both the West and with Russia and China. In the Middle East, countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and even Israel maintain such balanced relations.
Washington may be uneasy with this but has largely had to accept it. Moscow, for its part, takes satisfaction in America’s discomfort, though it harbors no illusion that these states would abandon the West in favor of Russia or China. They benefit from good relations with all major powers.
Not so Iran.
Continued hostility with the US prevents Tehran from reaping the benefits of cooperation with Washington, while ensuring that Russia can exploit the relationship without fear of losing Iran to the West.
And this, as Zarif observed, is precisely where Moscow wants Tehran to remain.
Doomed—or not?
It need not be this way.
Syria’s new, formerly jihadist leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has shown that it is possible to build productive ties with America, Europe, Turkey Arab states—and even with Russia, whose forces bombed his rebel movement just last year.
Instead of dwelling on justified grievances against Moscow, Sharaa has focused on how Syria can benefit from engagement with all sides.
It is highly doubtful that Iran’s aging Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would ever countenance rapprochement with the United States. His worldview is too deeply rooted in the revolutionary notion of America as a permanent enemy.
But 86-year-old Khamenei cannot last indefinitely, and leadership change is coming.
However unlikely it seems now, his successor may yet recognize the advantages of setting aside old grievances to improve ties with Washington—and, in turn, to gain leverage over a Russia now wary of losing Iran to Western influence.
Whether the US would reciprocate is another matter. Donald Trump’s willingness—even eagerness—to make deals with long-time adversaries such as Russia and North Korea suggests he might be open to one with Iran as well.
There is, of course, no guarantee this will happen.
It is more likely that Khamenei’s successor will resemble him—someone who refuses “on principle” to allow rapprochement with the US, Europe, or Iran’s Arab neighbors, regardless of the economic benefits such a shift might bring to Iranians.
Meanwhile, Moscow will continue to profit from Iran’s isolation.
