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Iran has long been preparing to defend its nuclear facilities against a possible military strike, defense and security analyst Farzin Nadimi said in an interview with Iran International.
"Israel’s past attacks on Iran were exploratory," Nadimi said, adding that “if an assault is launched with the goal of destroying all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would require precise planning and consideration of Iran’s defense capabilities—something the Islamic Republic has been preparing for over many years.”
Nadimi said Tehran has built an integrated air defense network under Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters — Iran’s central command for air defense — uniting the capabilities of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the army.
Since the late 2010s, the Islamic Republic has worked to unify its air defense systems under a project known as the “Great Prophet System,” according to Nadimi.
Iran is unlikely to agree to a comprehensive nuclear deal under the current level of US pressure, international relations researcher Hossein Aghaei told Iran International.
“The Islamic Republic sees the right to enrichment, preservation of centrifuges, and nuclear infrastructure as deterrence tools, and does not want to lose them,” Aghaei said.
“If what we read in the news is correct—that the United States has backed down from its original conditions and seeks a middle-ground deal acceptable to Tehran—even under those circumstances, there are red lines for the Islamic Republic that could become problematic,” he added.
“If the current level of pressure continues, the Islamic Republic will not agree to a comprehensive deal,” he said, warning that Tehran faces a binary choice: “Either it accepts the US-proposed deal or moves toward greater tension.”
The Islamic Republic has entered a new phase of security governance—one where control is no longer maintained solely through arrests and bullets, but through data analysis, surveillance, and information engineering.
This shift from overt violence to algorithmic discipline is framed in official discourse as “smartification” and “psychological security”—buzzwords that mask a deeper objective: building a more efficient, anticipatory system of social control.
As Iran negotiates with the United States abroad, it is preparing for a future at home without a deal. Figures once tainted by high-level corruption—such as Babak Zanjani—are now rhetorically rehabilitated as symbols of national resilience, reflecting a broader effort to rebrand dysfunction as discipline.
Authorities are deploying everything from internet monitoring and mobile signal tracking to facial recognition, shop surveillance, and even mandatory in-home cameras to build a digital control society. The goal: neutralize dissent before it begins.
This new architecture of repression aims to present a softer, even “benevolent” face of policing—one nearly invisible thanks to smart technologies. The result is a seamless, predictive regime designed not only to watch citizens, but to sort, anticipate, and contain them.
Policing internet, profiling people
In recent years, the Islamic Republic has adopted a more systematized and technical approach to digital control.
A clear marker of this trend was the resolution passed by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace in January 2025. While billed as a plan to “lift filtering,” the directive in practice expands regulation of online activity.
It authorizes the government, along with the Ministry of Culture and the Judiciary, to police “criminal content,” restrict VPNs, and penalize the spread of so-called “fake news.”
This legislative tightening is matched by tactical enforcement. During protests in Izeh in March 2024, authorities imposed localized internet shutdowns that left hundreds of thousands offline. These quiet, surgical disruptions have become a recurring method of quelling unrest.
In parallel, authorities deactivated SIM cards of journalists, activists, and political users—targeting not speech, but connection itself.
The same tools are now used to enforce dress codes. In Isfahan, authorities reportedly use contactless payment readers and surveillance cameras to identify women who defy compulsory hijab.
Threatening messages are sent not only to the women, but to their families—a form of psychological policing that leverages fear and shame.
Urban surveillance, algorithmic control
These measures show no sign of slowing. In May 2025, traffic police announced plans to use facial recognition for pedestrian violations—a tool once limited to license plates now trained on people.
In October 2024, the national police (FARAJA) began equipping 50,000 officers with body cameras that livestream to command centers, turning patrols into mobile surveillance nodes.
Surveillance is also extending into the private sector. Under the “Septam” system launched in late 2024, businesses must install cameras linked to law enforcement to receive operating licenses.
In April 2025, building codes were updated to require surveillance cameras in any residential or commercial complex with four or more units. The state now watches not just public streets but the thresholds of private homes.
These initiatives fall under the “Police Smartification” plan outlined in the FARAJA Architecture Document. Though couched in the language of public service, its purpose is unmistakable: to restructure digital and urban life for maximum predictability and control.
Pre-empting dissent
The driver behind this system is not technological ambition—it is fear. Officials anticipate the return of mass protests, spurred by economic hardship, power outages, and the possible failure of negotiations.
In response, they are building a pre-emptive framework of repression, where law and policing blur, and surveillance becomes the default mode of governance.
This strategy does not merely suppress resistance—it aims to erase the very possibility of it. By severing communication, dissolving public and digital spaces, and inducing despair, the state hopes to prevent disobedience not just in action, but in thought.
If realized, Iran will not merely be a surveillance state—it will be an anticipatory one. A state where individuals are profiled, categorized, and neutralized before they act.Where repression no longer wears a uniform, but operates silently—to predict and pre-empt dissent.
While suffering from severe gas shortages, Iran wastes a staggering volume of natural gas during production and transmission—equal to Spain’s annual consumption or about half of what Turkey or Italy use each year.
In regional markets, the wasted gas would be worth over $10 billion per year. It amounts to 40% of the gas used annually by Iranian households.
This massive loss stems from underinvestment in gas recovery infrastructure at oil fields and an aging transmission network.
Most recent data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) shows methane leaks from Iran’s oil and gas facilities exceeded 8 billion cubic meters in 2023.
Iran also flares over 20 billion cubic meters annually due to the lack of gas-capturing systems at oil production sites, according to the World Bank estimates.
Leaks and flaring
Iran ranks fourth globally in methane emissions from fossil fuel operations. Despite this, Iran has made little progress in cutting emissions.
IEA data shows most methane leaks originate from production facilities, with the rest linked to transmission infrastructure.
When it comes to gas flaring, Iran ranks second worldwide. For two decades, the government has done virtually nothing to capture associated gas—the byproduct of oil extraction—opting instead to burn it off at the wellhead.
This alone releases 38 million tons of greenhouse gases annually, nearly matching the total yearly emissions of Sweden or Norway.
Iran’s Oil Ministry estimates it would cost $5 billion to capture the flared gas. Yet investment in oil and gas fields has fallen sixfold in two decades and now stands at just $3 billion, according to the parliament’s Research Center.
As a result, flaring continues unabated, and gas production growth has slowed to a third of its pace a decade ago. Iran now faces gas shortages in all seasons.
Authorities often blame consumers for excessive use, overlooking the fact that losses during production and transmission account for 40% of the gas consumed by households.
Turning to imports
With domestic solutions stalled, Iran has increasingly looked abroad to cover its shortfall. But solving the crisis will take more than money—it also requires advanced technology and cooperation with international energy firms.
Recent efforts have focused on non-binding memoranda of understanding with Russian companies, none of which have led to concrete outcomes. Ironically, Russia itself suffers from even greater gas losses and lacks the technological capability to fix the problem at home or in Iran.
Iran has also tried to import gas from Turkmenistan and Russia. Turkmenistan, however, halted exports years ago over debt dispute. Russia recently agreed to supply small volumes via Azerbaijan, but pipeline capacity on that route is a fraction of peak deficit in winter.
Despite these shortages, Iran continues to export gas to Turkey and Iraq, often at the expense of domestic industries and power plants.
The reason? Price disparities. Exporting just 7% of its gas earns more revenue than selling the remaining 93% at heavily subsidized domestic rates, offering critical budgetary relief.
In its current budget, Iran projects gas exports of 16 billion cubic meters worth $5 billion—a 14% increase over last year.
But the future is uncertain. The 25-year gas deal with Turkey expires in 2026, and Iraq has announced plans to phase out Iranian gas imports within three years.
Without urgent investment, technological cooperation, and sweeping infrastructure reforms, Iran’s energy sector risks permanent decline—trapped in a cycle of waste, environmental damage, and economic self-sabotage.
The fate of negotiations between Iran and the US hinges on one unresolved issue: uranium enrichment. As a former Iranian diplomat told Rouydad24, despite early momentum in the talks, a single unresolved point may now unravel months of diplomacy—proving that “the devil is in the details.”
Former diplomat Qassem Mohebbali said enrichment has become more than a technical issue—it’s now a political and symbolic one.
“The core of the talks is uranium enrichment,” Mohebbali said. “Iran doesn’t even have a nuclear power plant needing large-scale enrichment, yet the issue has taken on enormous significance. It’s a matter of national pride.”
He outlined two possible compromise models: a deal similar to India’s with direct US oversight, or a heavily monitored approach like Japan’s. Without such a solution, he said, Iran must weigh whether enrichment is worth risking war.
“If Iran exits the talks, the snapback mechanism could be triggered, reviving UN sanctions and increasing the risk of military confrontation,” he said, arguing that even without war, escalating sanctions could push Iran’s economy beyond its limits.
“This is no longer a game of ‘no war, no peace,’” he said. “The choice now is between war and peace.”
