Iran withdraws violence against women law after hardliner revisions

The display, first posted by a user on the social media platform X last week, showed a row of pads visible in see-through folders—an abrupt break from the longstanding norm of black plastic bags and whispered requests at the counter.

The post quickly surpassed one million views and gathered thousands of likes and shares. “From black plastic to product albums to help us choose better. What a path we’ve come, woman!” wrote one user, who reposted the image with commentary that resonated widely.

Others joined the conversation with similar stories of resisting the imposed shame around buying menstrual products in public.

The marketing choice—practical on its face—has gained symbolic weight in a country where women’s bodies are policed not just through law but through entrenched taboos.

“Seven years ago, when My Lady launched its maxi pads, we had to secretly open samples for customers,” wrote a user identifying as a company marketer. “The store manager scolded us, said it was shameless. So we made a discreet booklet with three samples stuck inside—like contraband.”

The move to make pads visibly accessible in stores echoes moments from the 2022 protests, when women were photographed covering surveillance cameras in Tehran’s subway with sanitary pads—turning a product once treated as unmentionable into a symbol of defiance.

That imagery reinforced a broader shift: menstruation was no longer something to be hidden, but something women could use—literally and figuratively—to resist.

In a post viewed more than 800 times, another X user described how, in smaller towns, buying pads still carries a strong social stigma. “I’d say put it in a regular bag, and I’d relish the look on the seller’s face,” she wrote. “You could see them thinking, ‘How shameless the new generation has become.’ It was deeply satisfying.”

That stigma, rooted in religious and patriarchal frameworks, frames menstruation as impure. Across various cultures with strong religious influences, menstruating women are often deemed unclean and barred from certain spaces. The expectation is silence—both about the blood and the discomfort.

In Iran, where the Islamic Republic’s laws tightly govern gender expression and public morality, that silence is rigorously enforced.

Still, the shift is underway. A handful of men have joined the conversation online, recalling how they were dispatched to buy pads to shield female relatives from embarrassment.

“I’d run home with the black bag, praying no one saw me,” one wrote. But others mocked the change, reflecting a lingering cultural divide. Of 84 replies under one widely shared post, 11 came from male accounts opposing the visibility initiative.

The company behind the display, My Lady, has previously drawn official backlash. In March, following the release of a video marking International Women’s Day—one that referenced women’s exclusion from stadiums and legal rights—their Instagram page was taken down. Still, the public rallied, citing the brand’s decade-long focus on education and taboo-breaking.

The rise of transparent packaging may not end the stigma, but its presence in plain sight signals a societal reckoning.

The journey from hushed exchanges to open acknowledgment continues, carried forward by a generation of women unwilling to be hidden.

The program has persisted, with various reforms, for 15 years despite being blamed for distorting the economy and stoking inflation.

Now, Pezeshkian’s government is poised to introduce its own changes to ease the strain on a budget hollowed out by years of sanctions and economic mismanagement.

The proposed exclusion of wealthier households signals a shift towards a more needs-based support system as Iran grapples with persistent economic challenges.

About 30 percent of Iranians live below the poverty line. By removing roughly 18 million recipients from the program, the government aims to reduce fiscal pressure and redirect funds toward low- and middle-income families hardest hit by years of 30-40 percent annual inflation.

In the current fiscal year Pezeshkian’s government has allocated 3,240 trillion rials or about $4 billion at the current open market exchange rate, for cash subsidies.

The figure is separate from the extensive indirect subsidies provided to keep prices of fuel, electricity, water, essential foods, and medicine low.

Since the introduction of the latest subsidy reforms by former president Ebrahim Raisi's administration in May 2022, the rial has devalued by around 185 percent, from 280,000 to approximately 800,000 rials per US dollar as of April 27, 2025.

Consequently, the real value of monthly cash payments has fallen dramatically, now worth just about $3.74 to $5 per person for target groups.

Origins of Iran's cash subsidy program

The cash subsidy system began in 2010 under the populist government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, building on a controversial proposal made by his reformist opponent Mehdi Karroubi during the disputed 2009 presidential election.

Karroubi had promised a universal cash payment of 500,000 rials (around $50 at the open market exchange rates at the time) per person without a clear funding plan, drawing sharp criticism over its potential inflationary effects.

Ahmadinejad’s administration launched the Targeted Subsidy Reform Plan in late 2010, paying 450,500 rials (about $40) monthly to each citizen.

Funded by cuts to energy and utility subsidies, the program initially boosted Ahmadinejad’s popularity but quickly lost value as inflation and currency devaluation took hold. By August 2013, the real value of the handout had dropped to about $15 per person.

Rouhani’s response: the livelihood subsidy

Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration (2013–2021) attempted several times to remove higher-income households from the universal program, but efforts faltered due to the absence of a transparent tax database.

As economic pressures mounted, the government introduced an additional "livelihood subsidy" in late 2019 after a sharp increase in fuel prices triggered widespread unrest.

This new subsidy targeted lower-income groups, offering payments based on household size to about 60 million Iranians.

Single-member households received 550,000 rials per month (just over $4 at the time), with smaller amounts paid per person to members of larger families.

Raisi’s changes: new tiers and e-vouchers

Facing deepening economic challenges, Ebrahim Raisi’s hardline government restructured the cash subsidy system in May 2022.

Monthly payments to the highest-income 10 percent of the population were eliminated, while remaining recipients were divided into two groups: the poorest 30 percent received 4 million rials (around $14) monthly, and the middle 60 percent received 3 million rials (about $11).

To further curb inflationary pressures, in February 2023 Raisi’s administration introduced a voluntary scheme allowing families to receive their subsidies as store credit instead of cash.

Participants could use their credits to purchase a list of 11 subsidized essential food items such as rice, cooking oil and dairy products from designated stores.

According to the photos take on April 30, the large crater has been formed in front of the administrative building of Sina Marine and Port Services Development Company, which was the epicenter of the explosion.

In the images, the complete destruction of the building—located in the northwest section of the compound—can be also clearly seen, along with the adjacent warehouses and at least three other buildings. The trees in the area also appear to be completely burned.

The images also show a large number of shipping containers crushed on both sides of the explosion site, highlighting the extent of the destruction.

Iran International had previously reported that the 15-hectare Sina yard, which could accommodate between 12,000 to 20,000 twenty-foot containers, was entirely destroyed. The latest satellite photos confirm the previous report.

The new images also reveal the total destruction of a large administrative building in the nearby Onik yard, located to the north of the Sina area. Damage to this building has not been previously reported.

Khazar Qeshm Company: 10 hectares

To the west of the Sina yard lies the yard of Khazar Qeshm Company, with an area of 10 hectares, which has been almost completely destroyed. The images show that the roof of the company’s warehouse, which is located approximately 500 meters from the explosion's epicenter, has been completely torn apart.

While the Culture Ministry, the Supreme Council of National Security and the Press Supervisory Board issue ad hoc directives to newspaper editors about what to publish, three newspapers consistently defy those and often escape with a gentle caution.

They are Kayhan, Javan and Vatan-e Emrooz, linked respectively to the Supreme Leader’s office, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the ultraconservative Paydari Party, all of which continue to criticize the negotiations with the United States – in apparent disregard of the highest office of the realm.

Earlier this week, Kayhan, known for its staunch anti-Americanism, attacked those who back talks with Washington, accusing them of turning a blind eye on the harm done to Iran by US sanctions. 

"Why should we trust Trump, a man even his allies do not trust," the paper asked, using some unusually provocative language to describe Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Ultraconservative daily Vatan-e Emrooz also cautioned in its editorial against advancing the talks in a way that would make withdrawal or retreat from any agreement impossible.

The negotiating team should be wary of leaving Iran vulnerable to exploitation, the editorial warned.

The admonitions and the critiques may not be as harsh as they were a couple of weeks ago – prior to Khamenei’s cryptic backing of negotiations. But the very fact that they keep flowing after the leader’s blessing of diplomacy is significant.

"Speaking without restraint at times ... our unnecessary objections, our lack of patience, and our flawed analyses of situations can have historical consequences,” Khamenei cautioned last week with no direct reference to the ongoing negotiations. 

“Therefore, we must be very careful," he said. But the trio appear to have not received the memo. Or maybe they have.

The three dailies not only represent powerful factions within the Islamic Republic’s polity, but they also enjoy direct access–with varying degrees–to Khamenei’s office.

It may be easier, therefore, to explain their editorials as necessary objections, contingencies for a potential policy shift should the interests of the leadership require one.

No surprise, perhaps, that IRGC-linked Javan, the daily closest to and representing actual power, has shown the most balanced approach to the negotiations in recent weeks. 

"Iran may wish to maintain its image as an anti-imperialist warrior. But who says an agreement limited to eliminating sanctions against reducing enrichment levels will tarnish that image,” Javan asked in an editorial this week.

"We have done this before. Why shouldn't we do it again...? No country in the world will characterize this as Iran relinquishing its ideals."

Unlike other outlets in Iran, which face severe consequences for minor errors, these three dailies roam carefree on the theocracy’s political plane. Whether or not their tone is part of a grand strategy by the topmost officialdom remains unknown.

"Some say that Trump is unpredictable,” Javan concluded its editorial. “Well, we are not that predictable either!"

Azim Farrokhond, a local resident, was demonstrating against the execution of one of his relatives when he was fatally shot, the sources said.

Special forces stormed the gathering, they added, injuring several protesters and arresting others.

The protest coincided with the executions of two prisoners, Karim Farrokhond and Mahmoud Ostadmamzayi, who had been sentenced to death for armed robbery.

Although the prisoners' sentences had been suspended several times, sources said the executions were carried out.