Iran International
Iran has subjected its Baha’i community to 45 years of physical violence, imprisonment and denial of education and employment, a new report by a top Iranian human rights organization said.
The report, titled Outsiders: Multifaceted Violence Against Baha’is in the Islamic Republic of Iran, was launched in New York on Monday and was prepared by the US-based Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran and Monash University Eleos Justice program.
"The Baha'i Faith's followers were seen as apostate infidels, and they have faced continuous and intense persecution, marked by episodes of extreme violence and systematic denial of life," Dr. Roya Boroumand, executive director of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, said in statement shared on X by the international non-governmental organization Baha’i International Community.
The report categorizes this persecution into three types of violence: direct, structural, and cultural violence.
Direct violence includes extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detention. The report highlights that structural violence stems from the Islamic Republic's laws and policies that systematically exclude Baha’is from equal rights, while cultural violence is reinforced through state propaganda, with Baha’is portrayed as “impure” and as “agents of foreign powers” to justify ongoing discrimination.
“This is a community stripped of its freedoms simply for exercising their rights to practice their faith,” Germany’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Thomas Peter Zahneisen, added at the report’s launch in New York.
“Despite torture, forced confessions, and other forms of abuse, the story of the Baha'is in Iran is not only one of suppression, but one of humanity, perseverance, and courage,” he added.
Mai Sato, UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, highlighted that Baha’is are excluded from Iran’s constitution, which justifies official marginalization. “The structural violence inflicted by the state is resisted and not embraced by the Iranian community,” she said in a statement coinciding with the report's launch.
“That is a hopeful and uplifting end to the report.”
The report connects the ideological basis of this persecution to Iran's central ruling doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih or clerical rule, which leaves little room for religious pluralism.
Baha’is, it added, are viewed as a theological and political threat and accused of allegiance to Israel and Western powers, deepening their marginalization.
The report’s findings align with recent independent findings from rights organizations. In July 2024, Human Rights Watch classified Iran’s treatment of the Baha’i community as “a crime against humanity of persecution.”
A joint statement by 18 UN Special Rapporteurs condemned “a sharp rise in attacks” on Baha’i women. Former UN Special Rapporteur on Iran Javaid Rehman said, “The Baha’is were targeted with genocidal intent and persecution.”
Researchers in the Boroumand Center report highlighted a shift in public attitudes toward the Baha’is.
“Our findings suggest that, despite repeated attempts to indoctrinate the public with anti-Baha’i sentiment, the Iranian population has increasingly resisted the policy of discrimination,” Christopher Alexander, a researcher on the report, said. “Direct and structural violence are perpetuated by the state, but there appears to be an increasing lack of internalization of this violent culture by the masses.”
The Islamic Republic’s treatment of Baha’is could constitute crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the report said.
Researchers urged the international community to use universal jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute these crimes, while Baha’i representatives continue to call for urgent protections.
Bani Dugal, Principal Representative of the Baha’i International Community to the United Nations, said the report’s international attention “gives hope to those suffering persecution within the country and calls on the Iranian government to end its violent policies against all victims of human rights abuses in Iran.”
The cabinet's directive, dated November 10, ratified the implementation of an article in the current Iranian year's budget (started March 20), which addresses subsidy reforms.
According to this regulation, licensed private companies are now authorized by the Ministry of Oil to import and distribute premium (super) gasoline at non-subsidized prices, outside the government's network of gas stations.
The Iranian government offers one of the cheapest gasolines in the world, at less than 10 US cents per gallon, according to a policy of subsidizing essential commodities for the population. However, these subsidies including food, natural gas and electricity costs the government more than $50 billion annually.
Although the decree does not explicitly mention subsidized gasoline, domestic media have interpreted it as a sign of impending fuel price increases.
The estimated price for this imported gasoline is around 800,000 rials per liter (around $1.20). President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration continues to deny having any plans to reduce subsidies for gasoline, while seemingly advancing it in practice. Thus far, the government has approved an 11-fold increase in aviation fuel prices and anticipates substantial revenue growth from fuel sales.
There is no clear information on the quality of the premium gasoline Iran plans to allow for import. However, Iran has a longstanding practice of importing high-quality gasoline and diluting it for profit. In April 2023, Hossein Aghayan, a former director in the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), said, "Previously, we imported super or premium gasoline and mixed it with light naphtha, and there was no issue. But if we aim to supply high-quality gasoline, we must import it." As a result, the gasoline sold by the government has low Octane and is considered sub-standard.
A few hours after the document was shared with the media, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani faced a wave of questions from journalists about a possible gasoline price increase.
She emphasized, “There is no increase in the price of gasoline in next year’s budget.”
However, Mohajerani acknowledged that the government must import gasoline to address shortages.
Earlier this month, a spokesperson for the Planning and Budget Organization noted, “Setting the prices of petroleum products requires decision-making at the highest levels of national management, and any adjustment or pricing must be thoroughly discussed across various levels.”
For most Iranians, who earn about $200 per month, a large increase could push an already struggling population to the brink. Violent protests shook Iran in November 2019, when the government suddenly tripled gasoline prices. But the government is also cash-strapped because of US sanctions that have led to limited export of crude oil.
Historically, fuel price increases in Iran have happened outside of budget legislation, as in November 2019 when gasoline prices rose with the Supreme Leader’s backing of a decision by the Coordination Council of the Three Branches, bypassing parliamentary oversight.
This new decree, allowing private companies to import premium gasoline and supply it outside the usual distribution network, acts as an implementation regulation of the budget law. However, neither the import of premium gasoline nor its distribution outside the standard network was specified in this year’s budget. Instead, the government is advancing this policy through a special directive.
Under the administration of Hassan Rouhani, Iran issued its first license to supply fuel outside the traditional distribution network. Following this, the private sector entered the market with fuel tankers, referred to as "mobile stations," which delivered fuel directly to consumers upon request. Some of the mobile stations were also stationed in designated urban areas, where they sold gasoline on-site.
A government directive mandates daily electricity cuts of at least two to three hours in numerous regions and provinces. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration has attributed the shutdown of three power plants—in Isfahan, Arak, and Karaj—to an acute natural gas shortage and pollution concerns from burning mazut (fuel oil) as a substitute. However, Ministry of Energy data reveals that the primary cause is a shortage of all fuel types, including mazut, diesel, and natural gas.
Thermal power plants in Iran account for 95% of the country’s electricity generation and require a daily supply of 280 million cubic meters of gas or an equivalent of 225 million liters of mazut and diesel.
Until two years ago, Iran experienced gas shortages primarily in winter, but now it faces an increasing gas deficit in all seasons. In spring and summer of this year, gas accounted for 86% of the fuel used in power plants, a decrease from 94% during the same period last year.
Ministry of Energy data shows that despite earlier increases this year of 50% in mazut supply and 26% in diesel supply to power plants, liquid fuel reserves dropped to 42% by early autumn. This decline is due to a 100% surge in mazut consumption and an 80% rise in diesel use at power plants since the start of the Iranian calendar year on March 21.
Iranian mazut contains 3.5% sulfur, seven times the international standard for marine fuel. The quality and sulfur content of diesel in Iran also exceed Euro 4 standards.
The Iranian Parliament Research Center reports that Iran faced a daily gas shortage of 150 million cubic meters during the spring and summer, a figure that could rise to 300 million cubic meters per day this winter.
Iran holds the world’s second-largest gas reserves after Russia and ranks as the fourth-largest producer. However, the lack of renewable energy development, extensive energy waste, particularly in gas, and the low efficiency of power plants have led the country into a gas deficit.
Meanwhile, data from BP shows that while Iran’s annual gas production growth exceeded 5% over the past decade, it has slowed to 2% in the past three years. Last year, Iran produced about 260 billion cubic meters of gas, with 12 billion cubic meters exported to Turkey and Iraq.
Iran’s mazut situation
Reports from tanker tracking companies also indicate a sharp decline in Iran's mazut exports, highlighting the surge in domestic consumption of this highly polluting fuel.
Until a few years ago, Iran was exporting an average of 400,000 barrels of mazut daily. However, this figure dropped to 220,000 barrels last year.
The main customers for Iranian mazut are China and the UAE. Calculations by Iran International, citing data from Vortexa, Kpler, and the United Against Nuclear Iran(UANI), an advocacy group, indicate that during the first 10 months of this year, Iran exported an average of 70,000 barrels of mazut daily to China and 60,000 barrels to the UAE.
In other words, Iran's mazut exports have halved compared to last year and dropped to a third of their level in 2021. Data from the Ministry of Energy shows that Iran consumed 8 billion liters of mazut in power plants last year, in addition to double this amount of diesel in power generation sector.
Iran's gas exports
Data from BP reveals that Iran exported 12 billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey and Iraq last year, consistent with official data from both Turkey and Iran. While no report on Iran’s total gas exports for the current year is yet available, official data from Turkey indicates that it imported 4.2 billion cubic meters of gas from Iran in the first eight months of this year—an increase of 10.5% compared to the same period last year.
In its budget draft for the coming year, the Iranian government has forecasted gas exports of 16 billion cubic meters, valued at $5.2 billion. If Iran were to consume this amount of gas domestically in power plants instead of exporting it, it would reduce the need for 16 billion liters of mazut and diesel—equivalent to approximately $8 billion in international market value.
In simple terms, redirecting exportable gas to domestic power plants could reduce pollution and save Iran an additional $3 billion. However, Iran continues to prioritize gas exports, likely to sustain Iraq and Turkey's dependency or to secure its export markets. Recently, Iran also filed a lawsuit against Pakistan in the International Court of Justice over delayed gas imports.
According to an existing contract, Pakistan was to begin purchasing 7 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas annually starting in 2015. However, it claims that concerns over U.S. sanctions have prevented it from moving forward with the imports.