Ex-President Khatami Abstains From Voting In Iran Elections
Iran’s former president Mohammad Khatami, a leading Reformist figure, has abstained from voting in the elections, a sign that he joined the popular boycott of the election.
Iran’s former president Mohammad Khatami, a leading Reformist figure, has abstained from voting in the elections, a sign that he joined the popular boycott of the election.
Mohammad-Ali Abtahi, a senior aide to the former president, confirmed the report on Saturday.
Iran's hardliners, using the interior ministry and the election watchdog, the Guardian Council, barred hundreds of former officials and politicans from running in the elections.
Khatami used to be so popular in the past that his call for participation in the elections would guarantee millions of votes.
In February, he highlighted widespread dissatisfaction among educated youth, elites, and over 50 percent of the population who abstained from voting in the 2020 and 2021 elections.
The former president emphasized the need for competitive, free, and fair elections, advocating for representation of reformists, conservatives, and all Iranians.
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, only individuals loyal to the clerical regime have been permitted to run in elections. Those with dissenting views not only faced bans on political activities but also risked arrest and lengthy prison terms.
Though a large number of Reformists chose not to run in Iran’s recent parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections, the few who had registered were mostly disqualified by the Guardian Council. The most prominent example was former president Hassan Rouhani who was barred from re-election at the Assembly of Experts.
Though Iranian regime media claim a voter turnout of more than 40% in the elections, social media posts offer a contrasting narrative through videos and images, indicating a lackluster participation.
A telephone poll conducted from abroad by Washington-based Stasis Consulting had projected that the turnout would be set to hit a new record low of just 34 percent.
Iran and Russia have recently signed 19 contracts to strengthen their bilateral cooperation across various industries, as reported by the Shana News Agency, affiliated with the Iranian Oil Ministry. These agreements, reached during the 17th meeting of the joint economic cooperation committee in Tehran, encompass energy, health, trade, and education sectors. Talks are also underway to develop new gas and oil reserves, indicating the potential for further agreements soon.
Furthermore, the electrical companies of both nations have entered into a cooperative agreement aimed at advancing research and technology in power generation. This initiative seeks to enhance collaboration through digitalizing electrical networks, improving energy efficiency, and localizing equipment manufacturing. Additionally, a protocol has been adopted to modify the roadmap for scientific and technological collaboration in the oil and gas industry, emphasizing practical cooperation enhancement in 21 key areas.
Challenges and Opportunities
For the Iranian energy industry as well as the larger geopolitical environment, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on technological collaboration between Russia's Transneft and Iran's Ministry of Oil brings both chances and problems.
By possibly introducing Russian technology into Iran's oil industry, the MOU establishes a precedent for technical collaboration. This might improve the production and efficiency of Iran's oil and gas projects. The strengthening alliance between Russia and Iran has the potential to change local energy supply environments, which might affect global energy pricing and distribution networks.
The deal is a component of larger conversations on energy cooperation, which also include the development of gas reserves and the establishment of a gas hub in Iran. Iran's standing in the international energy market may be enhanced by this.
However, Iran and Russia have a history of broken agreements,which highlights how difficult it is to meet the promises of these MOUs. The contradiction between Russia's reluctance to convert memoranda into contracts and Iran's statements suggests that execution may be difficult. Both nations have lofty goals, but they also have economic difficulties. For example, Gazprom of Russia has experienced a sharp decline in earnings and a rise in debt, casting doubt on the viability of spending $40 billion in Iran's energy industry.
Russia and Iran are also potential competitors in the energy markets, while Western sanctions on both nations might make cooperation more difficult by impeding the execution of ambitious objectives. Although the MOU gives Iran a chance to alleviate its natural gas shortage, Iran's energy independence may be compromised if it becomes dependent on Russian gas through swaps or direct transfers.
Iran and Russia have recently solidified their bilateral cooperation by signing 19 contracts, marking an advancement across various sectors. This development follows the successful negotiations of agreements covering commerce, energy, health, and education at the 17th meeting of the Joint Economic Cooperation Committee in Tehran, Iran.
The MOU between Transneft and Iran's Ministry of Oil, which holds promise for enhancing collaboration within the oil industry, but intricacies of geopolitics and conflicting economic interests, uncertainties persist regarding its specific objectives and potential consequences.
Even with all the possible drawbacks—like dependency worries, financial restraints, and legal obstacles—one can't help but wonder what real intentions are driving these partnerships. It begs the question of whether Iran and Russia have other hidden goals at work, or if they are just looking to take advantage of these openings to increase their energy capabilities and influence globally. While building strong relationships, promoting innovation, and deftly managing global dynamics may seem appealing, it also raises the issue of what hidden agendas may be at play.
