Iran hardliners warn against compromise after US election shakeup

Tehran sent Washington a nuclear proposal through Qatar, Reuters reported, citing a senior Iranian official who said any discussion of its contents would depend on the United States first meeting Iran's seven demands.

The official said Washington was reviewing the proposal.

Trump has acknowledged that the war contributed to Republican losses in Tuesday's elections, while Democratic leaders have vowed to use their new congressional majorities to push for an end to military operations against Iran.

For Tehran, the election results have raised the prospect of negotiating with a politically weakened president, although Iranian officials continue to insist on concrete concessions before relaxing their grip on the Strait of Hormuz.

Putin offers support for ending war

Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei travelled to Moscow, where he delivered a message from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Rezaei told Iranian state television that Khamenei had wanted the message conveyed to Putin as soon as possible. He did not disclose its contents.

According to Rezaei, Putin condemned US and Israeli attacks on Iran, including strikes on its nuclear facilities, and offered Russian assistance in ending the war.

"He believed this was an unjust war and that it should end as soon as possible," Rezaei said. "He said, 'We are ready to cooperate in any way we can to help end the war.'"

Rezaei said Putin welcomed recent consultations among four regional countries in Tehran and supported a security framework that would exclude outside powers.

"Like our Chinese friends, we believe there should be regional arrangements and that foreign countries should not interfere in the region's security," Rezaei quoted Putin as saying.

Rezaei's involvement may also indicate a willingness among influential figures in Iran's security establishment to explore a negotiated settlement.

The New York Times reported, citing two Iranian officials and an American official, that Rezaei had privately expressed openness to discussing Iran's nuclear programme.

According to the report, he has been involved in negotiations with Qatari mediators alongside Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Regional diplomatic outreach

Araghchi also held separate telephone conversations Thursday with his counterparts from nine countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, according to Iranian state media.

The calls, which also included Pakistan, Jordan, Kuwait and Cyprus, focused on regional developments and efforts to end the war.

The breadth of the diplomatic activity suggests that discussions extend beyond Iran's foreign ministry to senior figures in its security and political establishment, although Tehran's willingness to compromise remains unclear.

The central obstacle is the sequence of concessions. Iran wants Washington to meet its demands before substantive nuclear discussions can proceed, while the United States has yet to indicate whether it will accept those conditions.

On Iranian state television and in state-aligned media, commentators are debating how to make Tehran's threats of retaliation more credible, with proposals ranging from devastating attacks on military and energy infrastructure to changes in Iran's nuclear posture.

Speaking on the state television programme Be Vaght-e Iran (Iran Time) on Tuesday, international relations analyst Mostafa Najafi argued that Iran's previous military responses had failed to convince Israel that another conflict would carry sufficiently high costs.

Najafi said Israelis had experienced the impact of Iranian missile attacks during the second week of the 12-day war, but that the damage had been less significant during the subsequent 40-day war.

He cited Israeli polling that he said showed 60% of Israelis continued to support military action against Iran, potentially encouraging Israel to launch another operation.

"Any new deterrence equation must credibly convey to the Israeli enemy that if another confrontation occurs, the consequences will go beyond those of the 12-day war, the 40-day war, and the subsequent True Promise 1 and True Promise 2 operations," he said.

Najafi claimed that Iranian decision-makers had resolved to inflict considerably greater damage on Israel in any future confrontation. He argued that Tehran should demonstrate its ability to retaliate within minutes of an attack, sending credible signals before hostilities begin rather than waiting for another war.

Another panellist, Vahid Khazab, argued that Tehran should warn Washington that any new conflict would involve attacks on energy infrastructure.

He cited the attack on Qatar's Ras Laffan energy complex as an example of the damage Iran could inflict, claiming that it had not yet returned to production, unlike Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, which Riyadh had restored after an attack.

Khazab said Israel should also be warned that Iranian retaliation would target its infrastructure.

The discussion has continued even as the war's political consequences become increasingly apparent in Washington. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress in Tuesday's midterm elections, with Trump acknowledging that the Iran war contributed to Republican losses. Vice President JD Vance went further, identifying the conflict as the principal reason for the defeat.

European targets enter the discussion

The debate comes amid increasingly expansive threats in Iranian state-aligned media about the geographical scope of any future conflict.

Referring to a recently reported meeting between Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and senior military commanders, Najafi said Tehran had previously warned that another war would become a regional conflict.

He argued that Khamenei's reported instruction to respond to attacks "without any geographical limitations" should now be treated as a credible threat by Iran's adversaries.

On Tuesday, Tehran Municipality-affiliated Hamshahri newspaper published a map of Europe and reported that Iran's armed forces were updating their list of potential targets "without geographical limitations."

The newspaper suggested that US air and naval bases, logistical facilities and other military infrastructure in Europe could be targeted if Washington and Israel attacked Iran's strategic infrastructure.

It also raised the possibility of extending the range of Iranian ballistic missiles, potentially bringing US bases in Europe within reach.

Nuclear doctrine and the NPT

The discussion has also extended to whether Iran should reconsider its nuclear doctrine and its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Najafi criticised Tehran for repeatedly threatening to change its nuclear doctrine before the 12-day and 40-day wars without following through, arguing that this had weakened its deterrence.

He said Iran needed to make a clear decision before another confrontation and communicate it through official channels, backed by a broader national consensus.

"Before the war, the message must be conveyed in every possible way to the other side and to all other parties, including hostile parties and allies who, in one way or another, play a role in our nuclear file," he said.

Najafi argued that changing Iran's nuclear doctrine would not necessarily require withdrawal from the NPT. He suggested Tehran could instead reduce its commitments under the treaty, while warning that withdrawal without a corresponding change in deterrence capabilities could expose Iran to additional threats.

"If you are going to make a change, and that change necessarily involves withdrawing from the NPT, without translating it into nuclear deterrence, I don't think it will create deterrence. It could even create additional threats against the country," he said.

Khazab offered a different approach, claiming he had received reliable information that Iranian decision-makers were considering using the threat of NPT withdrawal as a bargaining chip.

He suggested Tehran could seek concessions, including sanctions relief, in exchange for remaining in the treaty.

Khazab added that any such move would depend on Washington first meeting Iran's seven conditions for ending the war.

The Democratic takeover gives opponents of the war greater influence over military spending, congressional investigations and legislation restricting presidential authority. Yet it also creates a nearly two-month period in which Trump can pursue military objectives before lawmakers assume their new positions on January 3.

The possibility that electoral defeat could encourage further military action emerged in assessments by foreign policy specialists and analysts interviewed by Iran International on Tuesday.

"We can expect Trump to carry out a major military operation, perhaps even more intense than what he would have undertaken had he retained control of Congress," international relations analyst Fereshteh Pezeshk told Iran International.

Pezeshk argued that Trump could seek to demonstrate his authority and influence the media narrative following Republican losses. She said the incoming Congress might delay military funding or create other obstacles, but would have limited power to restrain the president, who would remain commander-in-chief after January 3.

Trump acknowledged the economic impact of the Iran war after the Republican defeat but rejected the suggestion that voters opposed the military campaign itself.

"I don't think it's the war. I think it's a gasoline price. People agree with what I'm doing on Iran, but they really probably weren't willing to do the short-term consequence of paying more for gasoline," Trump told Fox News.

The president nevertheless defended his Iran policy.

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  Trump says Iran war decision serves long-term US interests despite election setbacks

"I am totally convinced that my decision on Iran for the long term good of our country and even the world was absolutely the correct one and it continues to be," Trump told Politico.

Could defeat encourage a bigger offensive?

The administration was preparing a major new offensive against Iran before the midterms, and the election result could strengthen Trump's incentive to proceed during the transition period, Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, wrote on November 2.

Slavin identified reopening the Strait of Hormuz and securing Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium as possible objectives.

But she said that renewed attacks could expose American allies in the Persian Gulf to further Iranian retaliation, increase energy costs and cause extensive destruction without achieving Washington's goals.

A military escalation could also offer Trump a way to seek a decisive outcome before Democrats acquire greater oversight powers.

Trump's calculations differ from those of conventional presidents because he places considerable weight on his personal political achievements, journalist and political analyst Omid Memarian told Iran International.

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"Trump is an unconventional president whose calculations of costs and benefits are very different from those of other politicians and former presidents," Memarian said.

He argued that the president could use the period before January to launch a concentrated military operation, weaken Iran's military or nuclear capabilities, declare victory and then seek negotiations or reduce American involvement.

"I think it may even have increased the likelihood of an attack," Memarian said.

A Democratic Congress would make managing the war more difficult through investigations, committee hearings and scrutiny of military decisions, Memarian said. That could increase Trump's incentive to seek a faster conclusion rather than simply abandon military options.

The possibility has a historical parallel. After Republicans lost the 2006 midterm elections, President George W. Bush increased US troop deployments to Iraq the following year despite mounting public opposition to the conflict.

That precedent does not establish what Trump will do, but it illustrates why an electoral defeat need not produce an immediate reduction in military operations.

How much power will Democrats have?

Control of Congress gives Democrats substantial legislative and budgetary authority, but the president remains commander-in-chief.

Congress can investigate the administration, restrict appropriations and pass legislation addressing military operations. Trump, however, can veto restrictive legislation, requiring two-thirds majorities in both chambers to override him.

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  Trump's Iran escalation fuels Senate clash over war powers

"Even if Democrats hold a majority in both houses, their influence will be limited to the legislative and political tools of Congress," former national security adviser John Bolton told Deutsche Welle.

Democrats have already sought to use Congress's financial authority against the war.

Senator Tim Kaine, who has repeatedly challenged Trump's military operations without congressional authorization, pledged in August to continue efforts to cut off funding.

"I'm going to keep doing all that I can to cut off funding for what will go down in history as one of America's most foolish foreign policy catastrophes of all time," Kaine said in an official statement.

Other Democrats, including Senator Chris Coons, have distinguished between replenishing American military stockpiles and financing operations that would effectively extend the conflict.

Yet restricting funding may become politically harder if Trump orders a major offensive before January.

Democrats could inherit responsibility for decisions about supplying American troops already engaged in combat, political analyst Morad Veisi said. Opposing the war would not necessarily make lawmakers willing to withhold resources from deployed forces.

Could Trump pursue the Islamic Republic's downfall?

The possible objectives of further military action remain a major point of disagreement among analysts interviewed by Iran International.

Trump could regard the remainder of his presidency as an opportunity to secure a historic legacy, potentially including military action contributing to the Islamic Republic's downfall, Veisi said.

"I think Trump could leave behind a political legacy by helping bring about the downfall of the Islamic Republic. I'm not saying he will definitely do it, but it would be consistent with his character, and he has 60 days," Veisi said.

Veisi linked that possibility to what he described as Israel's increasingly explicit pursuit of the Islamic Republic's removal. He argued that Trump might support a broader campaign if he believed it could deliver a defining political achievement.

The analyst also suggested that an expanded conflict launched before January could leave incoming Democrats confronting military commitments they would find difficult to reverse.

Pezeshk offered a different assessment, distinguishing between forcing the Islamic Republic to submit to American demands and deliberately seeking its overthrow.

"We still do not see evidence that Trump is taking steps that would lead us to conclude he intends to overthrow the Islamic Republic rather than force it to submit," Pezeshk told Iran International.

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  Democrats seize on Iran war costs to hit Trump ahead of midterms

She argued that Trump appeared more attracted to a Venezuela-style approach than an Iraq-style intervention involving prolonged American responsibility for political reconstruction.

She also questioned whether Washington had a clear plan for replacing Iran's governing institutions.

Could Tehran misread the election?

Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf portrayed the election result as a rejection of the war and warned Washington against disregarding what he described as the will of American voters.

"Conscience or the cost of living, Americans said NO TO WAR, and we endorse this message," Ghalibaf wrote on X.

"If the US govt betrays their public will to serve international paymasters and blackmailers, it will learn our NO comes with a Nightmare," he added.

Ghalibaf's message combined his interpretation of the election with a warning of consequences if Washington continued its military campaign.

But the shift in congressional control does not necessarily signal a corresponding change in Washington's strategic objectives.

Iranian leaders should not mistake political divisions in Washington for a weakening of American power, Washington-based national security specialist Amir Hamidi told Iran International.

"President Trump may lose his congressional majority, but he has not lost his presidential authority. An electoral defeat for one party is not a defeat of America's national power," Hamidi said.

• 

  Iran wrong to expect midterms to restrain Trump, former US official says

Hamidi added that the Islamic Republic could pay a heavy price for misreading the election result, arguing that the US president remains commander-in-chief and retains significant authority over diplomacy and crisis management.

Congressional oversight of military operations and war spending could increase under Democratic control, but that would not necessarily diminish US deterrence or its longstanding security commitments, Hamidi said.

A narrowing window before January

The Democratic victory may have changed the political timetable for the Iran war without changing who controls its immediate course.

Until the new Congress takes office on January 3, Trump retains the authority to make military decisions that could shape the conflict well beyond the transition period. A major offensive during those weeks could leave incoming lawmakers confronting decisions already made and military commitments difficult to reverse.

The election result also presents a question for the Islamic Republic: whether Washington's domestic political divisions will translate into restraint or whether an approaching deadline could encourage further military action.

The coming weeks may therefore matter more than the new balance of power in Congress. A vote intended to change the direction of American politics could precede a decisive turn in a war that the incoming lawmakers have yet to gain the power to influence.

Al Hadath reported on October 30 that mediators were considering a plan to match each Iranian nuclear concession with a US step to ease sanctions. The draft raised the possibility of China serving as a guarantor. Beijing’s account of its talks with an Iranian envoy on Monday gave no indication it had accepted that role.

The question has practical consequences for Tehran. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear agreement and reimposed sanctions. Matching concessions step by step could limit how much Iran gives up before it sees an economic return. What China would do if Washington later restored sanctions remains unclear.

Beijing also has a stake in reopening Hormuz

Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on Monday that Tehran wanted China to play a greater role in regional diplomacy. According to China’s foreign ministry, Wang backed Iran’s sovereignty and urged all sides to make concessions to avoid renewed fighting.

Wang’s separate meeting that day with Saudi national security adviser Musaed al-Aiban helps explain the limits of that backing. Wang stressed the need to protect energy supplies and shipping routes. China relies on oil shipped through Hormuz, giving it an interest in reopening the waterway even if Tehran would prefer to keep it closed until Washington meets its demands.

Beijing also announced plans to send its Middle East envoy, Zhai Jun, to Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq welcomed a larger Chinese role during his own visit to Beijing. Qatar, meanwhile, continues to mediate between Tehran and Washington.

Where Moscow and Tehran agree

Mohsen Rezaei, who heads Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday. The council said they discussed regional developments. Its public account gave no details of any agreement on the US naval blockade.

Putin said in October that he wanted shipping through Hormuz to resume and sanctions on Iran eventually lifted. Russia has also offered to take custody of Iran’s enriched uranium, giving Moscow a potential role if Tehran and Washington can agree on what happens to the stockpile.

For Tehran, the order of concessions matters. Rezaei said Tuesday that Washington must act on Iran’s seven conditions before the strait reopens. A senior Iranian official told Reuters the demands include oil sanctions waivers, an end to the naval blockade and the release of frozen funds. Moscow supports sanctions relief, but Putin has stopped short of endorsing Tehran’s demand that Washington move first.

Vahid Khazab, a regular commentator on the state television program Be Vaght-e Iran (Iran Time), argued Monday night that the circumstances that allowed the 12-day war to end no longer applied.

He recalled that Trump declared that conflict over after the United States struck Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility and Tehran retaliated against the Al Udeid air base in Qatar. This time, he said, a strike would leave the question of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz unresolved.

“Suppose he attacks Kuh-e Kolang (Pickaxe Mountain) and then says, ‘That’s it, it’s over.’ Well, what happens to the Strait of Hormuz?” Khazab asked.

“This means the war has not ended. That is why a symbolic move like the one during the 12-day war is not possible,” he added.

Khazab argued that Trump needed to end the conflict either through military action or an agreement, while portraying Iran as unwilling to make concessions in negotiations.

He urged Tehran to convey a warning that renewed attacks would provoke retaliation carrying lasting economic and political costs for Washington.

“Trump must understand this. It is very important that this message be conveyed to him — publicly, officially, secretly, in any way — that if you attack again, Iran will respond in a way that will seriously jeopardize the next two years of your future and America’s future, particularly by causing economic problems, including a recession,” he said.

“This would make him refrain from taking risks, including launching even a short war, regardless of the electoral outcome, in order to protect his legacy.”

Nima Akbarkhani, another regular panelist introduced on the program as a military expert, discussed the possibility of Trump staging a “major, spectacular Hollywood-style operation” to declare victory and end the war.

He argued that even such an operation would leave Trump in a difficult political position if Democrats won the midterm congressional elections.

Mehdi Abbasi, a guest introduced as a US affairs expert, speculated that a Democratic victory could prompt Trump to attack Iran during the roughly two months before the new Congress takes office in January.

Limited strikes and plans for further attacks

The discussion came amid limited US military action and reports of preparations for a potentially broader confrontation.

The United States struck Iran’s Qeshm Island on Monday as part of a series of limited attacks in recent weeks, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing US officials.

Trump said Tuesday that US forces had destroyed an Iranian anti-aircraft installation that he said had taken about two months to build.

The New York Times separately reported Tuesday, citing US officials, that US Central Command had a plan to begin strikes against Iran as early as Wednesday, after the midterm elections. The reported plan did not establish that Trump had ordered an attack.

Responding to the Qeshm strike, Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said Tuesday that Iran remained in a state of war and retained the right to defend itself until military aggression against it had ended completely and permanently.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Monday that reports of plans for further military action against Iran were deeply concerning and urged renewed diplomatic efforts.

Tehran holds to its demands

Tehran and Washington continue to exchange messages through intermediaries, including Qatar. Trump and Vice President JD Vance have expressed optimism about diplomacy, while Iranian officials insist Washington must meet Tehran’s conditions.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Tuesday that Washington’s response to Tehran’s demands was unconvincing. He said the Strait of Hormuz would reopen only after the United States explicitly addressed and implemented Iran’s seven conditions.

Vance sent Rezaei a letter through Qatar several days earlier. Rezaei did not specify whether his Tuesday remarks referred to that letter or another message conveyed through intermediaries.

Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf also warned Tuesday that Tehran’s response to a possible US attack would be unpredictable.

President Masoud Pezeshkian, meanwhile, reiterated that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had granted his government additional powers to pursue negotiations.

Pezeshkian said his administration would seek to resolve the conflict through diplomacy but did not specify the scope of that authority.

His emphasis on negotiations drew criticism from hardline commentator and university professor Foad Izadi, who argued that such statements could help Washington choose the timing of another attack.

In a post responding to Pezeshkian, Izadi cited Trump’s remarks that oil prices were falling because people believed there would be no war with Iran and that Tehran wanted an agreement quickly.

Izadi accused Pezeshkian of helping Trump lower public expectations of war and manage oil prices by repeatedly emphasizing negotiations. He warned that Washington could attack again in the middle of diplomatic exchanges, at a time of its own choosing.

Speculation over nuclear weapons

Some Iranian commentary has also raised the possibility of nuclear weapons being used in a renewed confrontation, although Gharibabadi said Tuesday that Washington had not announced an official position on using such weapons against Iran.

Hossein Ajorlou, an international relations academic, told Fararu that a broad but short operation using powerful conventional weapons remained the most likely scenario.

He nevertheless speculated that Washington could consider tactical nuclear weapons if it failed to secure a quick result and reached a military stalemate.

Ajorlou emphasized that he considered conventional weapons, including bunker-busting bombs and precision-guided munitions, the likelier option.

Limits of a change in Congress

Several Iranian commentators have cautioned that a shift toward Democrats in Congress would not necessarily prevent another military confrontation.

Ali Hassan Heydari, an international affairs analyst writing for the hardline Siraj24 website, argued that victory for either party should not be interpreted as a fundamental change in Washington’s strategic approach.

A Democratic victory could nevertheless raise the political and financial costs of continuing the war and restrict Trump’s freedom of action, he wrote.

“This matters for Iran’s calculations, but it should not lead to a strategic miscalculation, because the outcome of the war and the question of the Strait of Hormuz will not be determined solely by the composition of Congress,” Heydari wrote.

“The elections may change the rules of Trump’s game, but resolving the confrontation with Iran requires decisions and agreements that go beyond the US ballot box.”

Amirali Abolfath, a US affairs expert, similarly cautioned against expecting a change in congressional control to end the conflict.

“We should not place too much hope in the idea that a change in the composition of Congress alone will bring the war to a halt, although these changes are not without effect and should not be viewed in absolute, black-and-white terms,” he told ISNA.