US denies Turkey-Lebanon proposal, says Iran-backed Hezbollah must disarm

For the first time, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan will meet Britain, France and Germany for security-focused talks. The meeting comes as attacks on ships and regional energy infrastructure continue and oil prices have reached their highest level in five months.

The Istanbul meeting could mark a shift from regional consultations toward broader security coordination. It follows months of efforts by regional states to build cooperation against threats from the Islamic Republic, particularly attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — the three members of the Mecca defense pact — will all attend and have committed to using their military capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia. Egypt is also considering military support for Riyadh.

The three European powers are now joining the talks with concerns of their own, particularly over energy.

The platform could lead to a form of division of labor in the Iran war, operating in parallel with US and Israeli military pressure on the Islamic Republic and focused primarily on containing the Iran-backed Houthis.

From regional consultations to defense cooperation

Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have held regular consultations since March following Houthi threats in Bab al-Mandab. The grouping has become known as the R4.

The four countries have emphasized direct regional involvement in resolving crises and in recent months have adopted common positions on the Iran war, Palestine and Saudi security.

Alongside these diplomatic efforts, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded defense cooperation through the Mecca pact. Under the agreement, an external armed attack on one member is considered an attack on all three.

Officials from the three countries agreed on August 31 to establish a joint secretariat and expand defense cooperation. Their defense committee decided on October 5 to make agreed forces and military capabilities available for rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia.

The four R4 countries also condemned Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in an October 11 statement and backed Riyadh’s measures to counter the threats.

Turkey is meanwhile pursuing parliamentary approval of the Mecca pact, while Egypt’s parliament is due to decide on Monday, October 26, whether to deploy forces in military support of Saudi Arabia. Egypt is not a member of the pact, but the prospect of it joining is being seriously considered.

Despite these developments, the countries continue to emphasize a diplomatic solution to the Iran-US war, and some remain in contact with Tehran.

While seeking to prevent the war from spreading, they are also moving closer to joint defensive action against Iran-backed Houthi attacks. These parallel efforts could help contain the crisis and pave the way for a new regional security arrangement, but could also draw the countries deeper into the war and create domestic political tensions.

Containing the Iran-backed Houthis on a parallel track

Protecting critical infrastructure is a central priority for Saudi Arabia in its cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan.

Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi economic and military facilities and insecurity in Bab al-Mandab have caused direct damage while putting pressure on the kingdom’s energy exports and investment plans.

Strengthening Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities could reduce some of that vulnerability. But the impact of the new cooperation may extend beyond protecting Saudi facilities.

Saudi defenses against such attacks currently depend on direct US support. A greater role for Turkey and Pakistan, combined with coordination among the four regional countries, could reduce that dependence and allow Washington to devote more resources and attention to the Iran war.

From this perspective, two parallel tracks are taking shape. The United States and Israel are pursuing direct military pressure on Iran, while the countries represented in Istanbul are cooperating to contain the regional consequences of the war.

The two tracks, however, do not constitute a single coalition. Despite their political and security ties with the United States, the regional countries have avoided joint arrangements with Israel, preventing the two approaches from becoming fully integrated.

Cooperation with Washington does not necessarily mean participation in Israel’s strategy. These countries can oppose an expansion of the war against Iran while acting to contain threats arising from it, particularly Houthi attacks.

The practical result could be a form of division of labor even without a formal agreement between the US-Israel camp and the R4.

Iran’s leverage and the risk of diminished influence

The emerging arrangement has particular significance for Iran. If the cooperation succeeds and takes on a military dimension, it would amount to action against an ally of Tehran.

For now, Iran is seeking to raise the cost of continuing the war for the United States and regional countries by leveraging its geographic position in the Strait of Hormuz and its support for the Houthis. Tehran has also promised to respond to actions against its interests.

Alongside maintaining these forms of leverage, Tehran is using diplomacy in an effort to turn them into political gains.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said a seven-day proposal for restoring normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was conveyed through Qatar, with implementation conditional on Tehran’s demands being met.

On Yemen, he has said Iran is prepared to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Ansarullah while rejecting the assertion that the Houthis take direct orders from Tehran.

The two positions indicate that Tehran wants to preserve its ability to turn regional pressure into political leverage. Continued pressure, however, could produce a different outcome.

Governments facing attacks on infrastructure and disruption to maritime routes are moving toward closer defense cooperation to reduce their vulnerability, potentially increasing their capacity to confront Iran.

Crucially, reducing the impact of regional pressure does not necessarily require the military defeat of Iran-aligned forces.

If Saudi Arabia can better protect its infrastructure with help from new partners and the threat to shipping in Bab al-Mandab diminishes, part of Tehran’s bargaining power would be reduced.

Its leverage in the Strait of Hormuz would not be directly affected by these arrangements and would remain in Tehran’s hands, though it could become more fragile than before. Much will depend on Tehran’s response to actions taken by the countries participating in the platform.

Ansarullah, however, is an actor with demands of its own, and ending the Yemen war would require a separate agreement.

Continued contacts between Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt and Tehran also indicate that these governments still see a role for the Islamic Republic in reducing tensions. Anadolu Agency has reported that Pakistan’s army chief asked Tehran to use its influence to halt Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure.

Europe and the future of regional security

The involvement of Britain, France and Germany could broaden the scope of this emerging cooperation.

Their involvement reflects concerns about the wider consequences of the war, disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and, above all, energy supplies.

The European countries are joining the R4 states in an effort to address those concerns, but their involvement would also increase NATO’s presence in the region and could potentially lead to an expanded military role.

For Turkey, hosting the meeting provides an opportunity to strengthen its position in regional diplomacy. Saudi Arabia can combine the defensive support of regional partners with broader European consultations.

The European countries, meanwhile, are engaging governments that cooperate with the United States while maintaining political access to Tehran, allowing them both to maintain channels with Iran and signal their opposition to its actions.

Continued European engagement with the R4 could produce a multilayered structure linking political cooperation among the four regional countries, the defense commitments of three of them and diplomatic coordination with Europe.

Such a structure would not immediately replace the US presence and would not necessarily align with Israel’s strategy, but it could give regional countries a larger role in managing crises — a role Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strongly pursued.

From this perspective, the Istanbul meeting may signal an emerging division of labor between two parallel tracks: US and Israeli military pressure on Iran on one side, and efforts by regional countries, with European participation, to contain Tehran’s regional proxies on the other.

While such cooperation could help reduce tensions, it also carries the risk of widening the war — a shared concern that has made all sides cautious about taking major military action.

The freezing of some $350 million in Iranian cryptocurrency and a US maritime blockade that Washington says has prevented at least $25 billion in Iranian oil exports highlight the pressure on Tehran’s finances.

“Cryptocurrency is not really a method for a central bank or for a country’s trade,” said Maleki, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former executive at the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Maleki said cryptocurrency was better suited to relatively small transactions and transfers, while blockchain transactions could be traced.

“You can see on the blockchain where it came from and where it went,” he said.

Iran has turned to cryptocurrency as economic pressure has narrowed its options, Maleki said, adding that such transactions can be traced and the funds blocked.

Oil revenue dries up

The larger problem for Iran is the loss of oil revenue.

US Central Command commander Admiral Brad Cooper said Thursday that the maritime blockade had prevented Iran from exporting at least $25 billion worth of crude oil over 100 days.

Iran initially continued selling oil that had left the Strait of Hormuz before the blockade and remained aboard tankers in international waters.

Those floating reserves were depleted by mid-October, the Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday, citing analysts at commodity-data firm Kpler.

“There’s no more oil to discharge to China anymore,” Kpler’s head of crude oil analysis Homayoun Falakshahi told the Journal.

“The economic clock of the Islamic Republic has basically stopped,” Maleki said, arguing that Tehran no longer has access to the oil income it previously used to finance imports.

Imports pose the next test

Some goods now entering Iran were paid for earlier, while other imports are continuing through land routes, Maleki said.

The greater pressure will come when Tehran has to finance new purchases and transportation costs without the oil revenue it previously relied on.

“When they can no longer pay the cost of buying and transporting the goods they are now importing over land, that is when the problems will become much more difficult for the Islamic Republic,” Maleki said.

He cautioned that it was difficult to determine how quickly that point would be reached.

“I can’t give you a number of days or weeks,” he said.

Maleki said cryptocurrency was suitable for limited transfers, while the loss of oil revenue would make it harder for Iran to pay for imports.

Maleki said it was difficult to estimate in days or weeks when the loss of revenue would translate into more severe economic pressure.

Although Washington has not declared a land blockade of Iran, the closure of crossings with Pakistan and Iraq and continued disruption to freight traffic at the Turkish border have raised alarm in Tehran.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, acknowledged in an interview with Drop Site published Thursday that Iran would suffer from a prolonged blockade.

“Anyone who says otherwise is not being realistic. Families will pay the price, investment will suffer, and maintaining some sectors of the economy will become more difficult,” he said.

But Rezaei argued that economic pain did not amount to strategic defeat and that Washington was wrong to believe worsening conditions would force Tehran to accept US demands.

Agence France-Presse reported Wednesday that the United States was pressing Iran’s neighbors to close border crossings, following a maritime blockade in southern Iran and air restrictions that have grounded most Iranian flights.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has said the maritime blockade has halted trade through southern sea routes, which previously accounted for 75% to 80% of Iran’s trade.

Pakistan: transit disputes

Iran has responded cautiously to Pakistan, which has been mediating between Tehran and Washington.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei attributed the suspension of operations at border crossings to “technical problems” on the Pakistani side and said the two countries were discussing reopening them.

After the US maritime blockade took effect, Iranian traders increasingly used Pakistani ports as alternative routes.

But tighter requirements for electronic bills of lading and difficulties transferring money have complicated trade, according to Peyman Sanandaji, a senior official at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.

Pakistan closed the Rimdan–Gabd and Taftan crossings on Tuesday during a visit to Tehran by Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir, citing security concerns and efforts to prevent smuggling.

Iranian officials said Munir ordered the crossings reopened during his visit, but the latest reports indicated Pakistan was allowing only Iranian gas tankers and perishable fruit and vegetable shipments to pass.

Fada-Hossein Maleki, head of the Iran-Pakistan parliamentary friendship group, warned Thursday that Iran could close its border if Islamabad continued preventing trucks from crossing.

Such a move could also hurt Pakistan, which uses Iranian territory to move some exports toward Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus and receives millions of liters of Iranian gasoline and diesel through official trade and smuggling.

Iraq: conflicting signals

Iraq has not announced a general closure of its border with Iran. But Al Jazeera reported that the Chazabeh–Al-Shaib crossing was closed Wednesday on the direct orders of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and that further crossings were expected to shut.

Abdul Amir Taiban, an adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, said Thursday that Chazabeh had been closed to prevent the entry of drugs and counterfeit dollars and dinars.

He accused Iran of undermining Iraq’s economy, smuggling drugs and violating Iraqi sovereignty.

Iran and Iraq have 13 official border crossings, several of them major routes for exports and commercial traffic, particularly with central and southern Iraq.

Iraq temporarily closed its crossings with Iran a month earlier after a drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline from Iraqi territory was attributed to Iran-aligned groups. The crossings reopened several days later.

Iran has reacted more openly to Iraq’s latest move than to Pakistan’s restrictions.

Deputy Interior Minister Ahmad Zeynivand said Thursday Tehran had sent Baghdad an official note seeking clarification, while claiming trade in essential goods through maritime routes and northern borders continued without disruption.

Turkey: long delays

Turkey is Iran’s third-largest trading partner, with formal and informal bilateral trade estimated at between $23 billion and $30 billion.

The Bazargan crossing in West Azerbaijan province is Iran’s most important land gateway for trade with Turkey and access to European markets.

Iranian media have reported delays of as long as 20 days at Bazargan in recent months. Although Turkey has capacity to receive 1,000 Iranian trucks daily, it has reportedly allowed only 200 to 300 through, while around 600 Turkish trucks enter Iran each day.

The bottleneck threatens a crucial alternative to Iran’s restricted maritime routes even without a formal closure of the Turkish border.

Alternatives remain limited

Iran shares land borders with seven countries, but the remaining routes offer only limited alternatives to its major trade corridors.

Crossings with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia remain open, providing routes toward Central Asia, Russia and the Caucasus. Afghanistan also remains open, but inadequate infrastructure and chronic congestion limit its usefulness as an alternative transit corridor.

Iran had increasingly looked to road and rail links through Central Asia after restrictions on maritime and air transport. Further border closures would therefore leave Tehran with progressively fewer ways of moving goods.

The disruptions have prompted some hard-line government supporters to call for retaliation against neighboring countries, including restrictions on Iranian electricity exports and internet transit to Iraq.

But several land routes remain open, and there is no declared land blockade. Limited capacity and existing bottlenecks mean those routes cannot readily replace maritime trade, leaving further closures capable of intensifying pressure on an economy already struggling with the effects of the US blockade.

Speaking to Iran International, Zhao said Beijing shares Iran’s “common displeasure” with the United States and Western systems and values Iran’s geographic position for the Belt and Road Initiative.

Yet he described the partnership as driven by energy security, economic interests and longer-term geopolitical calculations rather than ideological solidarity.

“There is some long-term interest in there for sure,” Zhao said. “But it is a transactional relationship.”

China has become Iran's main economic lifeline under US sanctions, buying nearly all of its exported oil, while Tehran has increasingly looked to Beijing alongside Moscow for diplomatic support in the face of Western pressure.

Energy interests come first

Energy security has provided one of the clearest illustrations of the limits of that partnership.

In a recent meeting between Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, both sides publicly underscored that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open without any toll system.

“China is protecting its own economic and energy interest first and foremost,” Zhao said. “We do see China’s position evolving when its own domestic calculations about energy and overall supply chain security change over time.”

The 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership signed by China and Iran in 2021 has also under-delivered. Reports at the time suggested Chinese investment of roughly $400 billion, or about $20 billion annually.

Actual flows have been “at least one order of magnitude smaller,” Zhao said, as Chinese banks and companies have sought to avoid US secondary sanctions.

Nuclear weapons, regime change

Zhao said Beijing has come to value nuclear non-proliferation more as its global influence has grown, in part because of its experience with North Korea.

“China doesn’t want Iran to have nuclear weapons, but China eventually is sympathetic to Iran’s cause,” he said. “It thinks that Iran’s need for deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, is ultimately driven by American hostile policy.”

Beijing does not see its role as changing Iran’s calculations and has been reluctant to threaten economic or military cutoffs, Zhao said. Instead, it has emphasized that the US and Israel should alter their policies to reduce Tehran’s incentives for nuclear deterrence.

Opposition to externally imposed regime change is a higher priority for Beijing than the nuclear file itself, he said.

“China’s primary security concern is its own regime security, so it doesn’t want to see the norm of allowing foreign countries interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and toppling governments that they don’t like.”

Beijing’s initial criticism of the US-Israeli war against Iran focused heavily on the killing of the supreme leader, which China viewed as a violation of international norms.

But Zhao suggested Beijing's opposition had limits and would depend in part on whether efforts to remove Iran's government violated what China regarded as established international norms.

Influence at the lowest cost

Beijing has cultivated ties with Saudi Arabia, including joint military exercises and involvement in its missile and nuclear programs, partly as a hedge against uncertainty elsewhere in the region.

China and Russia have meanwhile provided Tehran with diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council, disputing the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran and most recently opposing efforts to restore international monitoring of their implementation.

Yet China has shown little appetite for becoming a security guarantor for Iran or other regional partners, Zhao said, including through proposals that Iran transfer enriched uranium to Chinese custody.

“China is keenly aware of the potential risks and burdens to play a greater security role,” he said. “Its approach is to develop relations, increasing Chinese influence at the lowest cost.”

That calculation could change as the conflict develops. Zhao said China and Russia could influence its trajectory by supplying air-defense systems or missile-related materials that would help Iran deter or survive future strikes.

But he declined to predict how the confrontation over Iran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz would ultimately end.

“I generally don’t have good answers about how this war will end in the long run,” Zhao said.

Mostafa Sepahvand told Woolwich Crown Court that he had been asked to attack Iran International journalists Kambiz Hosseini and Mojtaba Pourmohsen, as well as two other people, Alon Farago and Jonathan Turner.

Asked by prosecutor Emlyn Jones what those behind the alleged operation wanted him to do, Sepahvand replied: “To hit them.”

“They asked me to hit Jonathan and scare him off; they asked me to break Kambiz's arms and legs; they asked me to hit Pourmohsen to stop him writing about the regime,” he said.

Sepahvand, 41, is on trial alongside Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57. All three deny charges under Britain's National Security Act.

Prosecutors say the men gathered information for Iranian intelligence in preparation for serious violence against people critical of Tehran.

Sepahvand acknowledges conducting surveillance but says he only appeared to cooperate because of threats against him and his family and never intended to hurt anyone. Instead, he says, he deliberately tried to frustrate the operation.

“I played them,” he has repeatedly told the court.

Prosecutors challenge his account

Cross-examining Sepahvand on Thursday, Jones directly challenged that defense, suggesting his claims that he had been deceiving the Revolutionary Guards were explanations invented after his arrest.

“What I am suggesting is that every time you said ‘I was playing the IRGC,’ you were lying,” Jones said.

“No, that was not the case,” Sepahvand replied.

The prosecution questioned Sepahvand about visits he made to addresses he had been given and photographs and videos taken during the alleged surveillance.

Sepahvand acknowledged going to an address associated with Pourmohsen and taking a photograph, but denied that he was preparing an attack.

“I go there, I get a picture, I go back home,” he said. “They ask me to hit them, I play them.”

Jones argued that Sepahvand's repeated visits, searches and complaints about inadequate information showed that he was carrying out groundwork for the alleged attacks rather than trying to sabotage them.

Sepahvand insisted that he deliberately told his contacts that addresses were wrong, exaggerated the difficulty and expense of finding the targets and repeatedly delayed carrying out their instructions.

He said that had he encountered the journalists, he would have warned them. “If I saw them I'd tell them that IRGC was after them and you have to escape,” he told the court.

£150,000 demand questioned

Jones also challenged Sepahvand over his repeated demands for money, including messages in which he said he would complete the job for £150,000.

Sepahvand said the demands were another delaying tactic because money was a “weak spot” for the people directing him.

“If I wanted to accept the money, I would have accepted £30,000,” he told the court, referring to a smaller payment discussed earlier in the alleged operation.

Jones questioned why Sepahvand would have been in a position to demand payment if, as he maintains, he had agreed to cooperate only because Iranian operatives were threatening him and his family.

Sepahvand said he had told them he would need a team and money to carry out the attacks but maintained that he never intended to do so.

“They wanted to force me and I didn't do it,” he said.

Sepahvand became increasingly agitated during the cross-examination, repeatedly raising the case of Navid Imami, a man he says was connected to the Iranian embassy in London and had supplied information about the targets.

The judge called a break after Sepahvand repeatedly interrupted Jones and later warned him that if he continued shouting or repeating his defense rather than answering questions, the jury could conclude that he did not have answers to the prosecution's case.

Sepahvand testified Wednesday that he had met Imami at the Iranian embassy in February 2025 while the alleged operation was under way.

He maintains that pressure on members of his family in Iran forced him to maintain contact with the people directing the operation and that his apparent cooperation was intended to protect others without carrying out the attacks.

The prosecution's cross-examination of Sepahvand is due to continue when the trial resumes Monday.