A man accused of plotting attacks on Iran International journalists told a London court on Thursday that his Iranian handlers had instructed him to break one journalist’s arms and legs and assault another to stop him from criticizing the Islamic Republic.
Mostafa Sepahvand told Woolwich Crown Court that he had been asked to attack Iran International journalists Kambiz Hosseini and Mojtaba Pourmohsen, as well as two other people, Alon Farago and Jonathan Turner.
Asked by prosecutor Emlyn Jones what those behind the alleged operation wanted him to do, Sepahvand replied: “To hit them.”
“They asked me to hit Jonathan and scare him off; they asked me to break Kambiz's arms and legs; they asked me to hit Pourmohsen to stop him writing about the regime,” he said.
Sepahvand, 41, is on trial alongside Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57. All three deny charges under Britain's National Security Act.
Prosecutors say the men gathered information for Iranian intelligence in preparation for serious violence against people critical of Tehran.
Sepahvand acknowledges conducting surveillance but says he only appeared to cooperate because of threats against him and his family and never intended to hurt anyone. Instead, he says, he deliberately tried to frustrate the operation.
“I played them,” he has repeatedly told the court.
Prosecutors challenge his account
Cross-examining Sepahvand on Thursday, Jones directly challenged that defense, suggesting his claims that he had been deceiving the Revolutionary Guards were explanations invented after his arrest.
“What I am suggesting is that every time you said ‘I was playing the IRGC,’ you were lying,” Jones said.
“No, that was not the case,” Sepahvand replied.
The prosecution questioned Sepahvand about visits he made to addresses he had been given and photographs and videos taken during the alleged surveillance.
Sepahvand acknowledged going to an address associated with Pourmohsen and taking a photograph, but denied that he was preparing an attack.
“I go there, I get a picture, I go back home,” he said. “They ask me to hit them, I play them.”
Jones argued that Sepahvand's repeated visits, searches and complaints about inadequate information showed that he was carrying out groundwork for the alleged attacks rather than trying to sabotage them.
Sepahvand insisted that he deliberately told his contacts that addresses were wrong, exaggerated the difficulty and expense of finding the targets and repeatedly delayed carrying out their instructions.
He said that had he encountered the journalists, he would have warned them. “If I saw them I'd tell them that IRGC was after them and you have to escape,” he told the court.
£150,000 demand questioned
Jones also challenged Sepahvand over his repeated demands for money, including messages in which he said he would complete the job for £150,000.
Sepahvand said the demands were another delaying tactic because money was a “weak spot” for the people directing him.
“If I wanted to accept the money, I would have accepted £30,000,” he told the court, referring to a smaller payment discussed earlier in the alleged operation.
Jones questioned why Sepahvand would have been in a position to demand payment if, as he maintains, he had agreed to cooperate only because Iranian operatives were threatening him and his family.
Sepahvand said he had told them he would need a team and money to carry out the attacks but maintained that he never intended to do so.
“They wanted to force me and I didn't do it,” he said.
Sepahvand became increasingly agitated during the cross-examination, repeatedly raising the case of Navid Imami, a man he says was connected to the Iranian embassy in London and had supplied information about the targets.
The judge called a break after Sepahvand repeatedly interrupted Jones and later warned him that if he continued shouting or repeating his defense rather than answering questions, the jury could conclude that he did not have answers to the prosecution's case.
Sepahvand testified Wednesday that he had met Imami at the Iranian embassy in February 2025 while the alleged operation was under way.
He maintains that pressure on members of his family in Iran forced him to maintain contact with the people directing the operation and that his apparent cooperation was intended to protect others without carrying out the attacks.
The prosecution's cross-examination of Sepahvand is due to continue when the trial resumes Monday.
A man accused of plotting an attack on Iran International journalists told a London court Wednesday that he met an alleged Revolutionary Guards contact at the Iranian embassy while he was gathering information on the journalists.
Mostafa Sepahvand told Woolwich Crown Court that he visited the embassy on February 15, 2025, where he met a man he identified as Navid Emami.
Sepahvand said he told Emami that addresses provided for the journalists were incorrect but that he was still pursuing the matter. According to Sepahvand, Emami asked whether his co-defendant Farhad Javadi Manesh was working with him.
Later in his testimony, Sepahvand said Emami had supplied addresses to people he described as connected to the Revolutionary Guards. He also alleged that Emami had threatened him.
Sepahvand, 41, is on trial alongside Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57. All three deny charges under Britain's National Security Act.
Prosecutors say the men gathered information for Iranian intelligence in preparation for serious violence against Iran International journalists Mojtaba Pourmohsen and Kambiz Hosseini.
Sepahvand accepts that he conducted surveillance but says he acted under duress and deliberately tried to undermine the operation.
The court was shown phone and vehicle location data placing Sepahvand near addresses linked to the alleged targets, as well as messages in which he passed Manesh information about Hosseini, including references to his dog and a blue Volkswagen Golf.
Sepahvand said he asked Manesh to make a video of the car. On one occasion, he said, he travelled to an address specifically so his phone's GPS would show his Iranian contacts that he had been there.
He said he was trying to convince the Revolutionary Guards that he was cooperating while actually frustrating the alleged operation.
“I played them,” Sepahvand told the court.
Sepahvand also testified that £30,000 had been sent to a money exchange in Finchley after an address linked to Pourmohsen was raised, but said he did not collect it because he did not want to carry out the task.
Asked who had sent the money and what it was for, Sepahvand named a man called Ruhollah and said it was to “go after the journalists.” Asked which journalists, he said that had not been specified.
Sepahvand said he had initially asked for £150,000. When he denied telling his Iranian contacts that he would attack a journalist if they paid him, his barrister, Tyrone Smith, pointed him to an earlier message in which he appeared to say he would carry out the attack if paid.
Sepahvand said he had no choice but to make such claims because he believed the Revolutionary Guards were monitoring his communications and waiting for him to say he would not carry out the attack.
He said he had been under duress from the beginning, citing the arrest of an associate and his younger brother, a raid on his mother's home and pressure over a criminal case against him in Iran.
“I didn't want anyone to be hurt,” Sepahvand said toward the end of his testimony. “I wanted to protect everyone.”
The trial continues.
Israel has barred a United Airlines pilot of Iranian descent from serving on flights to the country over unverified social media allegations that he supported Iran's government, the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah, Ynet reported Wednesday.
Israel's Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism Ministry alerted security and transportation officials on October 19 to allegations circulating on X about the pilot, Sina Amjadian, according to a ministry letter obtained by Ynet.
The letter included two posts from X. One alleged that Amjadian, who was said to have previously worked for flydubai, had shared content supporting Iran's government, including a video in which he purportedly kissed and saluted its emblem.
The other alleged that he had expressed support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah and called on United Airlines to investigate his conduct.
Ynet said it could not independently verify the allegations and that the material submitted to Israeli authorities did not include original statements or social media posts by Amjadian.
The allegations nevertheless prompted a security review and a decision to prohibit Amjadian from serving as a crew member on flights to Israel, senior Transportation Ministry officials told Ynet.
The Diaspora Affairs Ministry said the warning followed an attempted attack aboard a flydubai flight bound for Israel in late September, during which a co-pilot attacked the captain and attempted to seize control of the aircraft.
The incident prompted Israel's National Command and Control Center for Combating Antisemitism to expand its monitoring to people who might pose a threat to aviation security, according to the ministry.
It said the allegations concerning Amjadian warranted security scrutiny because of the responsibilities of an international airline pilot and the potential risks to passengers and crew.
Transportation Ministry officials told Ynet that the ministry did not independently monitor social media or gather intelligence but coordinated with security agencies when information raised aviation safety concerns.
They said preventing a pilot from operating flights to Israel was separate from denying the individual entry to the country, which falls under the authority of border control officials.
Ynet said it remained unclear whether Amjadian had previously flown to Israel, had been scheduled to operate a flight to Ben Gurion Airport or was qualified to fly aircraft used by United Airlines on its Israel routes.
There was no indication that any flight had been canceled or prevented from reaching Israel because of the restriction.
Conflicting accounts emerged Wednesday over Iraq's plans for its border with Iran, as Baghdad attributed the closure of one major crossing to technical shortcomings while reports said more could be shut amid US pressure to restrict trade routes with Tehran.
Iraqi government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi said the Sheeb crossing, known as Chazabeh in Iran, was closed because it lacked sufficient technical, technological and developmental readiness, according to the official Iraqi News Agency.
He said trade was proceeding normally through several other crossings with Iran.
But Al Jazeera cited an Iraqi government official on Tuesday as saying Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had ordered Sheeb closed indefinitely and several other crossings gradually shut in the coming days. No reason was given for the planned closures.
Separately, AFP reported Wednesday, citing two Iraqi political sources, that Washington was pressing Baghdad to close crossings with Iran as part of efforts to increase economic pressure on Tehran.
One source said the US Treasury Department raised the issue with Zaidi during his visit to New York for the UN General Assembly last month and that the proposed restrictions would leave only two crossings open, one in federal Iraq and another in the Kurdistan region.
The second source said Washington had asked other countries bordering Iran to take similar measures.
Reuters reported that Sheeb had been closed to passengers, vehicles and commercial trucks. An Iraqi border official told the agency the closure would allow security arrangements to be reviewed and detection equipment installed to prevent the smuggling of prohibited materials.
Tehran seeks reopening
Iranian officials said they had received no advance warning of the closure.
Valiollah Hayati, a security official in Iran's southwestern Khuzestan province, said consultations were under way with Iraqi authorities to reopen Sheeb and advised passengers and commercial trucks to use the nearby Shalamcheh crossing.
Iranian Interior Ministry spokesperson Ali Zeinivand said Iraq was required to notify Tehran of extended border closures but had not done so.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also criticized disruptions at Iran's borders on Wednesday, saying they had become places where traffic was held up rather than allowed to pass. He said the Foreign Ministry would seek to resolve obstacles originating in neighboring countries.
The uncertainty comes days after Pakistan suspended commercial activity at two major crossings with Iran, Taftan-Mirjaveh and Gabd-Rimdan, on October 17.
Iranian authorities said the border reopened on Tuesday, although the resumption of normal commercial traffic at both crossings has not been independently confirmed.
Iran and Iraq share a border of more than 1,400 kilometers (870 miles) and have extensive political, religious and economic ties.
Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board has ordered the deportation of an Iranian man living in Toronto over his role in a criminal network that helped Iran evade international sanctions, Global News reported Wednesday, citing a 36-page ruling.
Amin Yousefijam, a former Tehran police lieutenant who has lived in Canada since 2016, helped coordinate shipments of restricted equipment from the United States to Iran through the United Arab Emirates, the board found, according to the report.
The shipments included electronics, motors and other dual-use goods with both civilian and military applications. Global News reported that some of the materials could potentially be used in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.
The deportation order was issued in July but only released to Global News this week. The board found that Yousefijam played an essential role in an operation that violated Canadian and US sanctions, although his involvement was more limited than that of his brother, Arash Yousefijam, who led the scheme.
Yousefijam was arrested in Toronto in 2021 and extradited to the United States, where he pleaded guilty to sanctions violations, the report said. After returning to Canada, he legally changed his name to Ameen Cohen.
The immigration board found that he intentionally failed to disclose his US conviction when applying for the name change, rejecting his explanation that he had been advised not to report convictions outside Canada.
The Canada Border Services Agency argued that Yousefijam posed a threat to national security. The board found insufficient evidence that he remained a security threat, however, and instead ordered his deportation on the grounds of membership in a criminal organization.
Global News quoted Yousefijam as saying he remained in Canada and was considering his legal options. He declined to say whether he had appealed the deportation order.
The case comes amid a broader Canadian effort to remove people with ties to the Islamic Republic, although Yousefijam's deportation is separate from proceedings targeting senior Iranian government officials.
According to Canada Border Services Agency figures, authorities had identified 40 senior Iranian officials living in Canada as of October 1. Two had been deported, eight had left voluntarily and two more were awaiting removal.
The Revolutionary Guards' threat to target undersea internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz raises questions about its feasibility, as the waterway carries a fraction of global bandwidth and damaging its cables would not shut down the world's internet.
Yadollah Javani, the Revolutionary Guards' political deputy, warned on Wednesday, October 21, that vital internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz could be targeted if Iranian infrastructure came under attack.
The strait's importance to global oil and gas shipments may suggest that it holds similar significance for international internet traffic. Telecommunications data, however, paints a different picture.
According to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), five active submarine cable segments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for less than one percent of the world's international bandwidth.
Telecommunications research firm TeleGeography identifies three major cable systems serving the route: Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1), FALCON and Gulf Bridge International (GBI).
The principal data routes linking Europe and East Asia pass through the Red Sea, meaning the strategic importance of Hormuz to global energy markets does not translate into equivalent influence over the internet.
Cables serving Iran's neighbors
Submarine cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz, according to TeleGeography, have been routed through Omani waters because of longstanding political considerations and difficulties in relations with Iran.
These cables primarily serve countries in the Persian Gulf, meaning an attack would pose a more immediate threat to regional connectivity than to the wider global internet.
Damage to submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz could disrupt international connectivity in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, although all four countries have alternative terrestrial connections. Saudi Arabia is less dependent on Persian Gulf cable routes, with most of its international bandwidth carried through systems landing on its Red Sea coast.
Why cutting cables does not mean cutting internet access
The global internet does not depend on a single network or point of failure. Telecommunications operators use multiple submarine and terrestrial routes to carry data and can redirect some traffic when a connection becomes unavailable.
Such rerouting may reduce speeds, increase latency or disrupt certain services, but it does not necessarily disconnect users entirely.
Damaging a cable is also fundamentally different from depriving a country of internet access. The outcome depends on the number of affected routes, operators' dependence on them and the capacity remaining elsewhere in the network.
Mehdi Saremifar, a Canada-based technology expert, described earlier Revolutionary Guards threats against submarine cables as largely rhetorical in an interview with Iran International.
Referring to similar threats made by Iranian authorities during the summer, Saremifar said their calculations had used the total volume of global submarine cable traffic rather than the much smaller amount passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
"These cables carry much of the traffic for countries along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait, parts of Iraq, Jordan and Syria. That means traffic in these areas would be affected, but not all of it," Saremifar said.
Alternative terrestrial connections, including routes through Saudi Arabia and Egypt, could carry some of the displaced traffic, Saremifar said, adding that Iran's earlier threats had already encouraged consideration of backup routes.
"So it is neither a particularly far-reaching threat nor a particularly serious one," Saremifar said.
He also questioned the operational significance of the earlier warning, noting the institutional background of the Revolutionary Guards official who issued it. Evidence of actual naval movements toward the cables would warrant a different assessment, he said.
Damage could disrupt communications and economic activity in Persian Gulf commercial centres, but would not necessarily produce a prolonged internet outage, Saremifar added.
What the Red Sea disruptions reveal
Previous submarine cable failures have disrupted communications without shutting down internet access across entire regions.
In February 2024, three cables were damaged in the Red Sea, most likely by the dragging anchor of the Rubymar, a cargo ship struck by Houthi missiles. Repairs took six months, according to TeleGeography.
Four submarine cables were damaged in the Red Sea in September 2025, disrupting connectivity across parts of the Middle East and Asia, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
In March 2024, damage to four cables off West Africa disrupted internet services in 13 countries. Operators rerouted some traffic through unaffected submarine and terrestrial networks, according to the Internet Society.
These cases illustrate an important distinction: the time required to repair a cable is not necessarily the length of the resulting internet disruption. Operators may restore some services through alternative networks before physical repairs are completed.
Security risks in the Persian Gulf could delay cable repairs by restricting access for specialized vessels. However, the availability of alternative submarine and terrestrial routes means delayed repairs would not necessarily cause a prolonged internet shutdown across the region.
Legal constraints on targeting submarine cables
Submarine communications cables are also subject to international legal protections.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea protects the laying and maintenance of submarine cables under Article 79, while Article 113 requires states to criminalize certain intentional or negligently caused damage to cables beneath the high seas.
Legal responsibility would depend on factors including the location of an attack, applicable jurisdiction and the international obligations of the countries involved.
During armed conflict, international humanitarian law also applies.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, civilian communications infrastructure is generally protected against direct attack unless it meets the specific criteria for becoming a military objective.
Military use of part of a communications network does not automatically make the entire network a lawful target. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must still be observed.
These requirements are particularly relevant to cables carrying civilian communications for several countries simultaneously.
The gap between the threat and the internet's reality
Javani's warning follows earlier threats by Iranian officials against submarine internet infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.
Yet the Strait of Hormuz's limited share of international bandwidth, together with the availability of alternative routes, means that even substantial damage to cables in the area would not amount to a global internet shutdown.
The more immediate consequences could fall on Persian Gulf Arab states and businesses dependent on regional connectivity.
The threat therefore highlights a gap between the Revolutionary Guards' warnings and the technical and geographical limits of carrying them out: cables in the Strait of Hormuz can be damaged, but the global internet does not depend on them to remain operational.
