Iran Air chief says 30 to 40 operational aircraft destroyed in war
Between 30 and 40 of Iran’s operational aircraft were destroyed during the war, while another 70 to 80 were hit, Iran Air chief executive Taher Abdolhai said on Monday.
Between 30 and 40 of Iran’s operational aircraft were destroyed during the war, while another 70 to 80 were hit, Iran Air chief executive Taher Abdolhai said on Monday.
Abdolhai said Iran had a little over 300 aircraft in total, but only around 130 to 140 were operational before the latest losses, according to Nournews, a media outlet close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
He said the scale of damage varied. Some aircraft were hit by missiles and suffered holes in their fuselages, while one Iran Air aircraft was “completely pulverized.”
Wartime losses cut into an already limited fleet
The figures suggest the war significantly reduced an aviation fleet that was already constrained by sanctions, aging aircraft and difficulties obtaining spare parts.
Abdolhai’s estimate is higher than some earlier figures given by Iranian officials. The secretary of Iran’s Association of Airlines had previously estimated that about 20 aircraft suffered serious damage.
Mohammadreza Rezaei Kouchi, head of parliament’s Civil Commission, had separately said around 50 aircraft were damaged and 10 destroyed.
It remains unclear how many of the damaged aircraft can be repaired and returned to service.
Sanctions have long constrained Iran’s aviation sector
Iran’s commercial aviation industry has for years faced restrictions on buying aircraft, sourcing parts, carrying out maintenance and receiving services at some foreign airports.
Abdolhai said those restrictions had made it harder for Iran Air to maintain its fleet and had also cut the airline off from some profitable markets.
The wartime losses have added another layer of pressure by shrinking the pool of aircraft available for commercial flights and reducing the industry’s ability to preserve routes and revenue.
Final scale of damage remains unclear
Abdolhai did not give a final estimate for the financial cost of the losses or say how many damaged aircraft were beyond repair.
The differing figures offered by Iranian officials also make the full scale of the damage difficult to establish independently.
People in Iran have described deteriorating hospital services, rising treatment costs, shortages of medical staff and equipment, and long waits for care, as healthcare workers struggle with low wages and growing workloads, according to accounts shared with Iran International.
The complaints come as health officials report a growing shift from private to public hospitals because of financial hardship, with the country's nursing workforce at roughly half the national standard.
Rising costs and pressure on public hospitals
Four hospitals refused to admit a patient because they lacked specialist doctors, forcing the patient to seek private treatment at a cost of 200 million rials (about $76) in a single night, according to an account sent to Iran International.
The US dollar is trading at around 2.62 million rials in Iran, reflecting the sharp decline in the national currency's purchasing power.
Iran's minimum monthly base wage stands at around 166 million rials ($63), meaning the patient's single-night medical bill exceeded a full month's minimum wage, even before other living expenses.
Another patient said an emergency department at a public hospital charged around 100 million rials (about $38), provided no invoice and said emergency expenses were not covered by insurance.
A resident of Shiraz described worsening conditions at hospitals, where shortages of doctors and nurses have disrupted patient care.
Economic hardship and higher medical tariffs have shifted 30 to 40 percent of patient visits from private facilities to public hospitals this year, Yaser Foroughi, deputy for treatment at Iran University of Medical Sciences, said.
Other patients described overwhelmed medical staff struggling to meet growing demand despite efforts to provide adequate care.
Patients face steep bills and demands for unofficial payments
Several citizens described doctors requesting cash or gold coins outside formal hospital payment procedures before performing surgery.
One patient said a doctor at Tehran's Atieh Hospital quoted 4 billion rials for leg surgery alone, with at least two weeks of hospitalization due to an infection and accommodation for a companion expected to cost another 15 billion rials.
Others complained about rising out-of-pocket expenses and insurance coverage that failed to meet their medical needs.
Equipment shortages and long treatment delays
Patients said hospitals were running short of basic supplies, forcing them to purchase items including bedsheets, syringes and gloves themselves.
Healthcare workers and patients had previously told Iran International in September that syringes, sterile gauze, intravenous cannulas and latex gloves were either scarce or subject to rationing.
Another patient said MRI machines at public hospitals were frequently broken or required waits of up to three months for appointments.
Some private hospitals were also refusing supplementary health insurance, according to accounts submitted to Iran International.
One person said emergency services refused to dispatch an ambulance for their 73-year-old mother, who has cancer, after she fell, because two hours had passed since the fall.
Several patients also complained about declining patience among hospital staff when dealing with patients and their families.
Nurses say they are doing the work of two people
Iran's nursing workforce stands at roughly half the national standard, forcing individual nurses to carry the workload of two people, Ahmad Nejatian, head of Iran's Nursing Organization, said on October 17.
Nurses work an average of 80 hours of overtime each month, Nejatian said.
Healthcare workers linked deteriorating services to severe staffing shortages, exhaustion and inadequate pay.
One nurse said better salaries and living conditions, comparable to those in Persian Gulf countries, Europe and the United States, would improve healthcare workers' ability to care for patients.
A patient hospitalized for 12 days, however, described nurses continuing to treat patients respectfully and work diligently despite severe staff shortages and demanding conditions.
Low wages deepen pressure on healthcare workers
One healthcare worker said medical staff were expected to provide specialized care, particularly in intensive care units, on monthly salaries of just 250 million to 300 million rials ($95–$115), with a housing allowance of 10 million rials (about $4).
Another citizen blamed the government's economic policies for making it increasingly difficult for healthcare workers to concentrate on their duties.
Some nurses have gone months without receiving their salaries, leaving them with little motivation to train new staff, a medical trainee told Iran International in September.
The accounts point to mounting pressure on Iran's healthcare system, with rising treatment costs pushing more patients toward overstretched public hospitals as staff shortages, low wages and equipment shortages constrain the care available to them.
Retirees staged protests in several Iranian cities on Sunday over soaring living costs, inadequate pensions and healthcare problems, with some demonstrators also chanting against government corruption, repression and executions.
Social Security and steel industry retirees gathered in Tehran, Rasht, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Shush and Ahvaz, demanding higher pensions, payment of overdue benefits and improved access to healthcare.
Videos obtained by Iran International showed protesters chanting slogans including "Our enemy is right here, they lie when they say it's America" and "Cut back on one case of embezzlement and solve our problems."
In Tehran, retirees gathered outside the headquarters of the Social Security Organization, Iran's state pension and social insurance body, chanting "High prices, embezzlement — this is your economy," according to Pezhvak-e Kar Iran, a labor news outlet affiliated with the Iran Labor Confederation Abroad.
In the northern city of Rasht, demonstrators also condemned executions, chanting "We swear by the blood of our comrades, we will stand until the death sentences are overturned."
More than 70 political prisoners have been executed since December 2025, while at least 20 others face execution on politically motivated charges.
The US-based Human Rights Activists in Iran group said in an October 9 report that at least 2,003 people had been executed over the preceding year, a 29% increase from the previous 12-month period.
In the western city of Kermanshah, retirees protested the declining purchasing power of their pensions, chanting "Where are the oil dollars? We bear the inflation" and "War and sanctions are excuses; our lives are the evidence."
Protesters also demanded the release of imprisoned workers, teachers and protesters, including labor activist Nahid Khodajoo, who was arrested at her home by security forces about two weeks ago. Her whereabouts remain unknown.
In the central city of Isfahan, retired steelworkers marched to the provincial governor's office, demanding free and continuous healthcare, payment of overdue benefits and pensions equivalent to 90% of the salaries of comparable active workers.
Iran's semi-official ILNA news agency reported that repeated promises by officials to address the steelworkers' grievances had not been fulfilled.
In the southwestern city of Shush, retired workers from the Haft Tappeh sugarcane complex protested low pensions, inflation, unemployment, housing shortages and the suppression of independent labor organizations, according to the Haft Tappeh Sugarcane Workers' Syndicate.
"We will fight, we will die, we will win our rights," protesters chanted.
In nearby Ahvaz, retirees gathered outside the provincial Social Security headquarters, demanding overdue pension increases and protesting rising prices.
"Our expenses are in dollars, but our salaries are in rials," demonstrators chanted, according to the Iranian Retirees Council. Other slogans included "No to executions" and "Unity against poverty and corruption."
Retirees told ILNA that pensions below the poverty line had made it increasingly difficult to afford basic necessities, including food, medicine and medical care.
Iran's base monthly minimum wage stands at approximately 166.3 million rials ($63 at the October 18 free-market exchange rate), excluding additional allowances.
Years of inflation and the declining value of the rial have eroded purchasing power, fueling recurring demonstrations by retirees and workers demanding higher wages, improved healthcare and payment of outstanding benefits.
Mehrdad Akhlaghi Ketabchi, a sanctioned veteran of Iran's missile industry with ties to the Revolutionary Guards, became defense minister on Sunday, following his predecessor's killing in the war with the United States and Israel.
Akhlaghi secured 237 votes in favor and 15 against in a virtual parliamentary session attended by 277 lawmakers.
He replaces Aziz Nasirzadeh, who was killed on February 28 during the opening day of joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran. The ministry had since been overseen by acting minister Majid Ebn al-Reza.
Unlike several previous defense ministers who rose through military command positions, Akhlaghi built his career inside Iran's weapons manufacturing establishment, overseeing industrial organizations involved in missile production, aerospace technologies and military procurement.
His name has appeared on international sanctions lists since 2007, reflecting his longstanding involvement in institutions central to Iran's ballistic missile program.
From engineering to missile production
Born on September 10, 1958, in Rasht, northern Iran, Akhlaghi studied chemical engineering at Amirkabir University of Technology before earning a master's degree in strategic management from Malek Ashtar University of Technology, an institution affiliated with the Defense Ministry.
He entered Iran's defense industries in the early 1980s and spent more than four decades in technical, industrial and managerial positions, according to Iranian state-linked media.
Much of his career has involved solid-fuel missile propulsion systems and the management of industrial facilities associated with ballistic missile development.
Solid-fuel propulsion allows missiles to remain stored for extended periods and reduces preparation time before launch, making it a significant component of Iran's missile capabilities.
Akhlaghi previously headed the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, a subsidiary of the Aerospace Industries Organization involved in Iran's ballistic missile program.
In November 2014, then-Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan appointed him managing director of the Aerospace Industries Organization, replacing Mehdi Farahi.
He later became head of the Defense Industries Organization, which produces conventional weapons and supplies military equipment to Iran's armed forces.
Akhlaghi's role in the Fateh-110 missile project
Akhlaghi's close relationship with Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, a founder of the Revolutionary Guards' missile program, was central to his involvement in developing Iran's missile industry.
Akhlaghi worked closely with Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, widely known as the father of Iran's ballistic missile program. Tehrani Moghaddam oversaw the development of the Revolutionary Guards' missile arsenal before he was killed in a November 2011 explosion at a military facility near Tehran.
Iran's IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency, citing The Eternal Man, a biography by Masoumeh Sepehri, reported that Akhlaghi approved $10 million in equipment purchases and production facilities for the Fateh-110 missile despite uncertainty over whether the project would succeed.
The account, based on an interview with a senior missile designer, describes Akhlaghi's direct involvement in financing infrastructure used to produce missiles for the Revolutionary Guards.
Pezeshkian also referred to Akhlaghi's association with Tehrani Moghaddam during Sunday's parliamentary session, crediting figures such as the two men with developing Iran's military capabilities.
Nearly two decades under international sanctions
Akhlaghi's involvement in Iran's missile industry brought him under international sanctions long before his appointment to the cabinet.
The United Nations Security Council included him in Resolution 1747, adopted on March 24, 2007, identifying him as head of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group.
The group had previously been sanctioned over its involvement in Iran's ballistic missile program.
The US Treasury Department also placed Akhlaghi under sanctions in 2008.
US State Department information about his activities identified him as a senior figure in missile-related industrial operations and described his participation in negotiations to purchase equipment for the missile industry.
In 2020, the first Trump administration sanctioned him in connection with his position as director of the Defense Industries Organization.
The European Union has also included Akhlaghi on its sanctions lists, identifying his senior roles within both the Defense Industries Organization and the Aerospace Industries Organization.
Britain imposed sanctions on him in 2023, citing his involvement in activities connected to the development of systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
His name was also included in UN sanctions lists following the reimposition of international sanctions in September 2025.
The measures have made Akhlaghi one of the more extensively sanctioned figures to enter Pezeshkian's cabinet, with restrictions linked to his work in institutions involved in missile development and weapons production.
Missile production and air defenses top priorities
Akhlaghi outlined plans to expand weapons production, strengthen air defenses and rebuild military industrial facilities during his parliamentary confirmation session.
His proposed program includes developing new military technologies, improving production efficiency and increasing cooperation with universities and technology companies.
Akhlaghi also proposed shortening the development cycle for certain new defense technologies to a maximum of six months.
The program envisages increasing the share of production outsourced to companies outside the Defense Ministry to 75 percent in the Iranian year beginning in March 2026 and more than 85 percent the following year.
Highly classified weapons production would remain within facilities controlled by the ministry.
Akhlaghi has also identified continued support for armed groups aligned with the Islamic Republic across the region as a ministry priority.
His agenda builds on programs developed under Nasirzadeh, with adjustments intended to address the damage and military requirements arising from the recent wars.
Akhlaghi portrayed Iran's military capabilities as having frustrated US and Israeli objectives during the latest conflict.
"These capabilities have brought the American-Zionist enemy to the point of desperation in the recent war and placed it in a strategic deadlock," Akhlaghi told lawmakers.
His remarks came as the Defense Ministry faces the task of replacing damaged infrastructure and restoring weapons production capacity following months of military confrontation.
Warning to Washington over possible strikes
Akhlaghi also delivered a warning to the United States on the sidelines of Sunday's parliamentary session.
Asked about the possibility of Washington using the GBU-43 bomb, commonly known as the Mother of All Bombs, against Iran, he said the Defense Ministry had prepared measures to respond.
"The US president should be thinking about how to get his forces out of our region alive. If he drops one bomb, he will have to see how many of his troops he will have to take out of the region horizontally (dead)," Akhlaghi told reporters.
The remarks followed warnings by US officials about the possibility of further military action against Iranian facilities.
President Donald Trump has raised the possibility of striking the underground Pickaxe Mountain complex near Natanz, while US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has warned of severe military consequences if negotiations with Iran fail.
A sanctioned missile official takes charge after the war
Akhlaghi's appointment follows the war with the United States and Israel, which killed senior Iranian military officials and exposed vulnerabilities in the Islamic Republic's military infrastructure and air defenses.
Pezeshkian told lawmakers that the new minister had the backing of the army, the Revolutionary Guards and other military and security institutions.
The president also referred to Akhlaghi's presence on US sanctions lists and expressed hope that he would remain alive to continue his work.
The decision to appoint an official sanctioned for nearly two decades over his involvement in Iran's ballistic missile program points to the leadership's continued reliance on the same military-industrial establishment that oversaw the development of its missile arsenal.
Akhlaghi now faces the task of rebuilding military production capacity and expanding weapons manufacturing at a time when Iran's missile program remains a major source of confrontation with Washington and European governments.
Investment in trade routes linking Asia and Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus is putting pressure on Iran’s ambitions to become a major transit hub, with neighboring countries developing transport and digital networks that bypass Iranian territory.
Among them is the Middle Corridor, a network of rail, road and sea links connecting China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus while bypassing Iran.
The corridor is intended not only to connect Chinese and European markets. Countries along the route are also expanding trade among themselves, and the broader connectivity push extends beyond cargo to energy, information technology and data.
On October 15, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan inaugurated a 380-kilometer fiber-optic link across the Caspian seabed with a capacity of more than 400 terabits per second. Part of the Digital Silk Way initiative, the cable complements the Middle Corridor.
Beyond carrying data along the East-West axis, its backers say it will help attract investment in AI data centers, cloud services and high-tech industries.
In its latest report, the World Bank projects that, if the planned investments materialize, freight volumes across the Caspian could rise from 8.8 million tons in 2023 to 32.1 million tons in 2040.
The report also finds that developing the corridor could, in the long term, increase the combined GDP of host countries by about 3.3 percent, equivalent to approximately $58 billion at current levels of economic activity, and raise employment by 2.9 percent.
These gains depend on policy and operational reforms alongside construction. The World Bank identifies at least $25 billion in infrastructure investment needs through 2040, plus an estimated $30 billion for connecting infrastructure, logistics facilities and equipment.
One of the most contentious proposed links is the route through southern Armenia that would connect mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, known in Azerbaijan as the Zangezur corridor.
Under agreements reached since August 2025, the US-backed project is being developed as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, with Armenia retaining sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territory.
Azerbaijan projects that the route could carry 15 million tons of freight annually. The section through Armenia is roughly 42 to 43 kilometers long.
After several years of fierce opposition to the proposed Zangezur corridor, Iran appears to be taking a more pragmatic approach to Armenia’s inclusion in East-West transport networks, although concerns over American involvement remain.
Iran’s ambassador in Yerevan expressed concern in September about an American presence near the border and proposed a mechanism to address Tehran’s concerns. On October 16, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said Iran had asked about the possible deployment of US military forces on Armenian territory and that Yerevan had assured Tehran this would not happen. He said he believed the Iranian side was satisfied with Armenia’s answers.
The World Bank estimates that developing the Middle Corridor could increase Armenia’s GDP by 3.4 percent, equivalent to $873 million, and raise employment by 3.9 percent in the long term. Armenia, however, is not yet a transit country on the route; the report assumes a direct rail link through the country becomes operational in the early 2030s.
Iran’s transit ambitions face growing competition
Azerbaijan and Iran have also pursued an alternative connection between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Iranian territory, known as the Aras corridor.
That route could preserve a role for Iran in regional transit, but participation in one connecting segment would fall short of Tehran’s broader ambition to become a central hub for trade between Asia and Europe. Western sanctions also complicate efforts to attract European businesses to routes through Iran.
A comparison with Turkey, a key link between the Middle Corridor and European markets, is telling. The World Bank estimates that corridor development could increase Turkey’s GDP by more than $47 billion and employment by about 4.4 percent in the long term.
Iran also faces competition from other regional transport plans. Iraq, with participation from Qatar, the UAE and Turkey, is advancing the Development Road, intended to link the Grand Faw port to the Turkish border at an estimated cost of about $17 billion. Iraqi officials have projected annual revenues of roughly $4 billion, although the project’s returns depend on financing, completion and demand.
The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and Syria’s Four Seas initiative, linking the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Black Sea and Caspian region, likewise reflect efforts to develop alternative networks. These projects remain at different stages of development, and their commercial success is not assured.
More than two decades after Iran, India and Russia agreed to establish the International North-South Transport Corridor, Tehran’s ambition to become a transit hub linking India with Russia and European markets remains only partly realized. Shipments have moved through Iran, but the existence of traffic alone does not demonstrate that the route has fulfilled its wider commercial promise.
Iran’s weak logistics performance adds to the challenge. In the World Bank’s 2023 Logistics Performance Index, it ranked 123rd with a score of 2.3 out of five. Geography gives Iran potential advantages, but converting them into sustained transit business requires reliable infrastructure, efficient border procedures and commercially viable international connections.
A growing number of former Iranian officials and political figures are calling for an agreement with the United States, while hardliners and military commanders continue to push for confrontation, exposing a deeper struggle over the direction of Tehran’s foreign policy.
Among the latest voices calling for a change of course are former President Hassan Rouhani, former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi and Hossein Marashi, secretary-general of the centrist Executives of Construction party.
Along with several other political figures, they have argued that Iran needs to reduce tensions with the United States and break its prolonged diplomatic impasse if it is to ease economic pressure and resume development.
Their interventions have come against a sharply different message from hardliners and military officials, who continue to frame resistance to Washington and Israel as essential to Iran’s security and warn against concessions under pressure.
The competing messages reflect a broader uncertainty at the heart of Iranian foreign policy: whether Tehran should use diplomacy to secure an exit from its confrontation with the United States or continue to raise the costs for its adversaries in the hope of extracting better terms.
The question has become more urgent after months of direct conflict with the United States, repeated warnings from Washington and Israel and several major waves of domestic unrest since 2018.
Those pressures have left the leadership increasingly sensitive to questions of public legitimacy while also making major diplomatic concessions politically dangerous. Any compromise with Washington risks being portrayed by rival factions as capitulation, giving decision-makers an incentive to postpone choices rather than assume responsibility for them.
Diplomacy without a clear destination
Hamid Aboutalebi, a former diplomat close to Rouhani, described that dilemma in an interview with Khabar Online this week, arguing that Iranian diplomacy has become caught between the urgency of immediate conflicts and the absence of a clearly defined long-term strategy.
The result, in his assessment, is a state of drift in which public expectations increasingly collide with geopolitical realities.
Aboutalebi’s criticism goes beyond whether Iran should or should not negotiate with Washington. He argues that Tehran has failed to clearly define the purpose, scope and desired outcome of diplomacy itself.
Without that clarity, he said, Iran cannot transform developments on the battlefield into political gains and is left “reacting to events rather than shaping them,” particularly in its confrontation with Israel and the United States.
That uncertainty is also visible in the government’s public messaging.
Many Iranians look to diplomacy primarily as a possible route toward economic relief and greater stability. Iranian officials, however, continue to alternate between warnings of further resistance and indications that negotiations remain possible.
The result is an expanding gap between what diplomacy is expected to deliver and what the government is prepared to commit to.
Aboutalebi argues that Iran must move beyond managing one crisis after another and instead define what it wants its foreign policy to achieve over the longer term.
That would require, in his view, deeper regional integration, a structured approach to the nuclear dispute and the development of economic partnerships capable of reducing Iran’s isolation.
The cost of suspended diplomacy
The argument is not new.
Tejarat-e Farda, one of Iran’s leading economic weeklies, has previously described the country’s approach as one of “suspended diplomacy” — a condition in which Tehran neither moves decisively toward confrontation nor commits itself to meaningful negotiations.
The magazine portrayed the consequences in unusually bleak terms, arguing that Iranians had come to recognize what it called the “tragic depth” of the country’s foreign-policy failures, producing not confidence or enthusiasm but “lethargy and despair.”
Writing in 2022, the publication argued that Iranian foreign policy had entered a prolonged state of strategic hesitation driven by domestic political caution, regional pressures and fear of diplomatic steps that might prove difficult to reverse.
The nuclear issue offered perhaps the clearest example.
Political analyst Fatemeh Mosayebi argued at the time that Tehran repeatedly signaled its willingness to engage in dialogue while avoiding concrete commitments, contributing to a cycle of hesitation in which neither Iran nor Western governments wanted to make the first major move.
Four years later, the circumstances are radically different, but the diagnosis retains much of its relevance.
Iran has moved from indirect regional confrontation to war with the United States, while the costs of economic pressure and military escalation have risen substantially. Yet the fundamental question identified in the earlier debate remains unresolved: what outcome is Iranian diplomacy actually intended to achieve?
Domestic rivalry further complicates the answer. Major foreign-policy decisions in Iran carry consequences not only for relations with Washington but also for the balance of power among competing political camps.
A failed compromise can be weaponized by hardliners, while escalation that imposes additional economic or military costs can become ammunition for their opponents.
That dynamic encourages delay. Tejarat-e Farda called it a “suspension of decision,” arguing that postponing difficult choices can ultimately “cost more than confrontation” by prolonging economic pressure without producing corresponding strategic gains.
The increasingly public calls for negotiations suggest that the price of that indecision is becoming harder to ignore.
Figures such as Aboutalebi and Marashi are not simply arguing for another round of talks. Their criticism raises a more fundamental question about whether Iran can continue simultaneously threatening escalation, signaling openness to diplomacy and postponing decisions about the compromises any agreement would ultimately require.
For now, Tehran continues to preserve both possibilities.
But the longer Iran remains caught between confrontation and compromise, the harder it becomes to present uncertainty itself as a strategy.
