Iran deputy foreign minister says NPT is ‘on life support’
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh said the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had been severely weakened by what he described as double standards over attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
“The NPT is currently on life support. It has been severely weakened and eroded,” Khatibzadeh said during a visit to Vienna.
He criticized the International Atomic Energy Agency for not condemning US and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, saying the response had intensified debate inside Iran over the benefits of remaining within the treaty.
Nearly five decades after the 1979 Revolution brought an end to Iran's legal wine industry, the country retains vast vineyards and a centuries-old winemaking heritage but remains absent from a global wine export market worth $37.8 billion in 2025.
Iran has approximately 128,000 hectares of vineyards, just 31,000 fewer than Australia, whose wine exports were worth around €1.3 billion ($1.45 billion) in 2025.
The disparity reflects the disappearance of an industry from Iran's economy following the revolution, when the newly established Islamic Republic banned the production and sale of alcoholic beverages.
Grapes continue to be cultivated across Iran, including in Fars, Qazvin, Hamedan and Urmia, while Iranian raisins remain present in international markets. But an industry that could have generated exports, employment and tourism has remained absent for nearly five decades.
Freshly harvested grapes are displayed alongside traditional food preparation and drying trays in Ruyan, Semnan province, northern Iran, August 31, 2026.
Historic wines of Shiraz
The name "Shiraz" is now one of the most recognizable in the global wine industry, although the grape variety has no proven genetic connection to the grapes historically cultivated in Shiraz, southern Iran.
The shared name has long fueled a theory that the Syrah grape originated in Shiraz, Persia, before reaching France. In 1832, Scottish viticulturist James Busby brought Syrah vines from France to Australia, where the variety eventually became known as Shiraz.
Genetic research later established the grape's French origins, although the precise evolution of the Australian name remains disputed. The historical association with Persia has nevertheless endured.
Wine is deeply embedded in Persian culture and literature. Words such as mey and badeh, both meaning wine, and saqi, meaning cupbearer, established an enduring presence in Persian poetry.
Wine produced in Shiraz enjoyed commercial recognition during the Safavid period, when English and Dutch merchants transported some of it through the Persian Gulf to India and other parts of Asia, primarily for their own consumption.
In 1665, Shah Abbas II granted the French East India Company permission to produce wine in Shiraz for its employees.
The tradition continued into the Pahlavi era. Before the 1979 revolution, wine production and sales were legal in Iran, with commercial wineries operating in the country.
Freshly harvested grapes in crates at a vineyard in Ruyan, Semnan province, northern Iran, August 31, 2026.
The industry that might have been
Wine is more than the product of a vineyard. The industry extends from agriculture to factories, laboratories, glass bottle manufacturing, packaging, transportation, marketing, exports and tourism.
During the same decades that Iran's wine industry ceased operating, countries including Australia, Chile and New Zealand expanded their presence in the international market through investment in technology, education and branding.
According to the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV), Australia had approximately 159,000 hectares of vineyards in 2025 and exported wine worth about €1.3 billion ($1.45 billion).
The comparison does not mean Iran and Australia have identical winemaking potential. Commercial winemaking requires suitable grape varieties, specialized equipment, established production standards and access to international export networks.
A hypothetical model based on OIV statistics and Australian industry data suggests that if 20 percent of Iran's existing vineyards were dedicated to growing grapes suitable for winemaking, annual wine production could reach approximately 125 million liters.
The estimate assumes an average harvest of seven metric tons of grapes per hectare and a conversion rate of 0.7 liters of wine per kilogram of grapes.
Under a hypothetical scenario in which Iran exported half of that production, divided equally between bottled wine at about $5 per liter and bulk wine at about $0.80, annual exports would be worth around $186 million at 2025 prices.
The figure is illustrative rather than a forecast. The calculation does not account for the cost of converting vineyards and building a wine industry, or the value of grape and raisin production displaced in the process.
Even with those limitations, it illustrates how part of Iran's existing agricultural capacity could have developed into an export-oriented industry.
Such an industry could also have generated employment across grape-growing regions, supporting agricultural workers, food-processing businesses, packaging plants, transportation companies and exporters.
A wine tourism destination?
In many parts of the world, winemaking has become an important contributor to tourism, attracting visitors and generating income beyond the vineyards themselves.
Bordeaux in France, Tuscany in Italy and Napa Valley in the United States are among the best-known examples of regions where vineyards have become tourist attractions alongside their role in wine production.
Shiraz, the capital of Fars province in southern Iran, would have had many of the ingredients for developing a comparable form of tourism, although revenues generated by established international wine regions cannot simply be applied to Iran.
The city and surrounding region already boast internationally recognized attractions, including Persepolis, the ancient ceremonial capital of the Achaemenid Empire, Pasargadae, the tombs of the Persian poets Hafez and Saadi, historic Persian gardens and distinctive local cuisine.
Vineyards, winery tours and opportunities to experience local food and wine could have complemented these attractions.
The name "Shiraz" itself could also have represented a valuable commercial advantage, although its international recognition in wine today is largely the result of Australia's successful industry.
The Gate of All Nations (also known as the Xerxes Gate) at the ancient ceremonial capital of Persepolis in Fars Province, Iran.
Combining the international familiarity of the Shiraz name with the legacies of Hafez and Saadi, Persepolis, Persian gardens and the region's long history of winemaking could have helped establish a distinctive identity for local tourism.
Other grape-growing regions of Iran such as Qazvin province and the city of Takestan, as well as Hamedan and Urmia, could have established wine-producing regions based on their climates and traditions of grape cultivation.
Iran's lost opportunity extends beyond the wine that might have been produced. It encompasses nearly five decades in which investment, jobs, exports and tourism around such an industry were unable to develop.
Perhaps a glimpse of what such an industry might have become can be found in one of the most celebrated verses of Hafez, the 14th-century Persian poet whose name remains inseparable from Shiraz:
Come, let us scatter flowers and pour wine into the cup.
Let us break through the roof of heaven and devise a new design.
A former Iranian labor minister has drawn ridicule after saying the country has no economic problems other than high prices and inflation, remarks that came as official data showed year-on-year inflation approaching 90%.
Hojjat Abdolmaleki, who served under former president Ebrahim Raisi and is an economics professor, made the remarks in a recent interview with state television that has circulated widely online over the past two days.
“In the economy, the issue is only and only high prices and inflation,” Abdolmaleki said. “Set high prices aside and you have no other economic problems… We have no problems, praised be God.”
The former minister has previously made controversial remarks about the causes of inflation. In August, he claimed that rising prices were not even one percent attributable to the war and regional conditions.
Reformist and moderate newspapers, including Sazandegi, criticized the assertion as an oversimplification that ignored the economic costs and currency shocks resulting from political and military developments.
Abdolmaleki has also dismissed the economic consequences of international internet disruptions, saying nobody had lost their job because of internet shutdowns and that online sellers could move their businesses to domestic platforms.
Critics argued that changing platforms could not guarantee businesses would retain their customers, income or jobs.
Ridicule crosses political lines
Abdolmaleki's latest remarks have drawn criticism from conservatives as well as moderate and reformist voices.
The moderate conservative news website Khabar Online published the video under the headline: “Abdolmaleki’s Great Discovery About Iran’s Economy: Erase the Problem from the Equation to Solve It!”
Bamdadeno, an online media outlet active primarily on Instagram and Telegram, compared the argument to saying that “if you disregard poverty, there are no poor people; ignore unemployment, and everyone is employed.”
“The issue is not simply how bizarre a sentence is,” it added. “The issue is that decisions about employment, livelihoods and the welfare of millions of Iranians were once made on the basis of this kind of outlook and oversimplification.”
Rouhollah Jome’i, a conservative political activist, took a sarcastic swipe at Abdolmaleki, who is associated with hardline groups known as “super-revolutionaries.”
“What an interesting way of putting it! For example, if we set aside delusional super-revolutionaries, we would have no political or security problems either…” he wrote on X.
Journalist Mohammad Parsi applied the same logic to other problems facing Iranians.
“Yes, if there is no internet, there is no problem with filtering; if we do not get sick, there is no problem with medicine; and if we do not drive cars, there is no problem with petrol,” he wrote.
“This satire becomes bitter when we remember that this man was once a minister in this country and made decisions on our behalf!”
One Instagram user applied the same logic to several other problems: “Yes! The problem with drought is only a lack of water! The problem with power cuts is a lack of electricity! The problem with cars is a shortage of parts and funding! Otherwise, we have no problems!”
Another user questioned whether the country could hope for improvement with people like Abdolmaleki in positions of influence over major decisions.
Inflation approaches 90%
The remarks come as official figures indicate that inflationary pressures in Iran remain severe.
According to the latest figures from the Statistical Centre of Iran, year-on-year inflation rose by 0.8 percentage points last month to 89.8%. Annual inflation increased from 69.9% in August to 73.6% in September.
Inflation in food and beverages was considerably higher than the overall rate, with prices of some food items, including cooking oil, rising by more than 250% compared with a year earlier.
Even housing rents, which recorded the lowest rate of increase among the 12 main categories of goods and services in the household consumption basket, rose by more than 30% year on year.
The figures point to mounting pressure on Iranian households and declining purchasing power, providing a stark backdrop to Abdolmaleki's assertion that, high prices aside, the economy has no other problems.
Security forces in Iran during the 2022 nationwide protests
Iran has built impunity for the killing of protesters into its laws and judicial system, Amnesty International said in an investigation detailing how security forces accused of deadly violence can help determine whether their own actions were lawful.
Four years after the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini sparked the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, Amnesty said official denial, firearms legislation, compromised judicial proceedings and government-appointed investigations had combined to shield those responsible for the 2022 crackdown from meaningful accountability.
The findings form part of Amnesty International's report Architects of Atrocities: State Machinery Orchestrating Crimes Against Humanity in Iran's 2022 Woman Life Freedom Uprising.
State denial and glorification
Amnesty identified six recurring narratives used by Iranian authorities and state-affiliated media to deny responsibility for the killing of protesters.
Authorities blamed unidentified individuals or protesters themselves, portrayed deaths as staged or attributed them to private disputes, illness, suicide, road accidents and other causes.
They also alleged that some victims had been killed during clashes involving armed opposition groups or while confronting security forces, without providing evidence.
According to the report, state institutions pressured families of those killed to publicly endorse the government's versions of events.
Amnesty found that authorities responded particularly rapidly to reports of women and girls being killed, circulating alternative explanations in an effort to prevent them from becoming symbols of the protest movement.
Senior judicial officials meanwhile publicly praised security forces involved in suppressing the demonstrations, which Amnesty said reinforced impunity and demonstrated a lack of judicial impartiality.
Laws protecting lethal force
Amnesty said Iranian law provides security forces with broad authority to use firearms against protesters, including at peaceful gatherings classified as unlawful.
Under the Law on the Use of Firearms, officers can open fire to disperse demonstrations deemed illegal when other measures have failed and a warning has been issued. Fewer restrictions apply to gatherings authorities classify as armed.
Amnesty said the legislation falls short of international standards restricting firearms to situations involving an imminent threat of death or serious injury.
The law also protects security personnel from criminal liability. Officers whose use of firearms is deemed lawful are exempt from civil and criminal responsibility, while compensation for an innocent person killed or injured can be paid by the relevant security institution rather than the officer.
Amnesty also highlighted legislation imposing severe penalties on armed forces personnel who refuse to use weapons or engage forces designated as enemies in certain circumstances.
The organization said the provisions could punish personnel for refusing to carry out military duties while shielding those who use lethal force in accordance with domestic law.
Security forces investigating themselves
Cases involving protesters killed by security personnel are handled within a military judicial system closely connected to the armed forces, Amnesty said.
A decree issued by Iran's supreme leader requires at least half of judges, prosecutors and administrative staff within the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces to be members of the armed forces, including the Revolutionary Guards, police and army.
When shootings occur, an internal committee within the relevant security force assesses whether officers complied with firearms legislation. Military prosecutors and courts can then rely on those findings.
Amnesty examined 10 judicial cases across eight provinces involving protesters and bystanders killed during the 2022 uprising.
Four investigations were terminated because prosecutors said there was insufficient evidence to establish security-force responsibility. In two others, authorities acknowledged that security personnel had fired the fatal shots but still terminated criminal investigations.
Other cases resulted in convictions, but Amnesty said they demonstrated how convictions could subsequently be overturned, charges reduced or imprisonment replaced with financial compensation.
Supreme court intervention
Mohammad Jameh Bozorg was killed inside his home in Malard, west of Tehran, in September 2022 after members of the Basij paramilitary force raided the property.
Basij member Shahram Bazrbouy was initially sentenced to death under qesas, or retributive punishment, for shooting him in the face at close range.
After then-Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Salami requested a judicial review, judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei determined that the killing did not constitute intentional murder.
The Supreme Court subsequently overturned the murder conviction, sentenced Bazrbouy to three years in prison and ordered the Revolutionary Guards to pay blood money to the victim's family.
In another case, a death sentence against the police officer who killed Sepehr Biranvand in Khorramabad was twice overturned by the Supreme Court. The officer was ultimately acquitted of murder and sentenced to 10 months in prison for unlawful shooting.
Amnesty said an earlier court had cited CCTV footage showing the officer deliberately aiming at Biranvand as he fled, but the later ruling accepted his account that the shooting had been accidental.
Government investigations
Two days before the United Nations Human Rights Council voted to establish an independent fact-finding mission into the crackdown, then-Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi announced the formation of a domestic investigative committee in November 2022.
Then-President Ebrahim Raisi established a separate special committee in May 2023, whose mandate was later extended by President Masoud Pezeshkian. Iranian authorities repeatedly cited the committee as justification for refusing to cooperate with the UN investigation.
Amnesty concluded that the committee's investigations lacked independence, impartiality and transparency.
More than two-thirds of its main 110-page report focused on accusations against foreign governments, media outlets and online platforms. Only 15 pages addressed allegations of human rights violations, with just half a page devoted to examining the deaths.
Amnesty also found that parts of the report repeated material published by Iranian intelligence and security institutions, including passages copied word for word from a joint statement by the Intelligence Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards' Intelligence Organization.
The organization said the committee had recycled official narratives rather than independently investigated allegations of unlawful killings, torture and other abuses.
Amnesty concluded that meaningful accountability would remain unattainable without fundamental changes to the laws and institutions responsible for investigating and prosecuting such crimes.
Court sketch from Woolwich Crown Court. Credit: SWNS/Julia Quenzler
A man accused of plotting an attack on Iran International journalists in Britain told police he had received £2,000 for filming, according to interview transcripts read at Woolwich Crown Court on Wednesday.
Mostafa Sepahvand, 41, made the statement during questioning on May 15, 2025, as investigators examined his communications with contacts in Iran and his alleged role in gathering information about potential targets.
Prosecutors allege Sepahvand was receiving payments from individuals directing the operation from Iran.
Sepahvand is on trial alongside Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57. All three deny charges under Britain's National Security Act.
Prosecutors allege the men gathered information for Iranian intelligence in preparation for serious violence against at least one target in Britain, with Sepahvand expected to carry out an attack and the other two helping with preparations.
The alleged targets included Iran International journalists Mojtaba Pourmohsen and Kambiz Hosseini.
In an earlier hearing, jurors heard a March 20, 2025, voice recording in which Sepahvand said he had been promised £150,000 and help resolving a criminal case in Iran if he completed the task.
"They have sent me £3,500, and they keep sending me fifty addresses," he said in the recording, complaining about the costs of visiting locations.
During the police interviews that were read out by prosecutors on Wednesday, Sepahvand acknowledged having access to addresses but insisted he had not carried out violence.
"We could hit them. We had the address. But I swear to the God who is up there we did not do anything," he told investigators.
The addresses discussed in the case were not limited to locations associated with Iran International journalists.
Sepahvand repeatedly maintained that he had been threatened and pressured by people he linked to the Iranian government, while denying carrying out the actions demanded of him.
"They put pressure on me to do something. They threatened me but I did not do it. I didn't do it," he said.
Asked about photographs relating to Iran International journalists, Sepahvand told investigators: "There are only those pictures and I haven't done anything."
"They came to say do it, do it with your friends. I swear to God we didn't."
The questioning also examined Sepahvand's communications with Mostafa Ghorbani, including messages about addresses, payments and assurances concerning his legal difficulties in Iran.
In one exchange dated February 24, 2025, Ghorbani relayed a message from a contact named Amin saying certain addresses should not have been sent.
Sepahvand declined to comment when questioned about that exchange.
The court also examined transcripts of police interviews with Manesh, who denied gathering intelligence on Iran International or receiving instructions to target its journalists.
During an interview on May 3, 2025, Manesh acknowledged that he might have walked or driven past the broadcaster's offices and taken photographs, but said he could not remember the details.
He described the building as beautiful and said he had been curious about it. He also told investigators he had visited a nearby car wash to obtain medication for a sore throat.
"Not at all," Manesh replied when asked whether he had targeted Iran International journalists.
Investigators subsequently questioned him about a photograph of Iran International presenter Kambiz Hosseini sent to him by Sepahvand on December 24, 2024.
Manesh denied knowing Hosseini's name, despite police pointing out that the photograph displayed both the journalist's name and Iran International's branding.
He said he had been curious about whether the person pictured was a journalist who had been beaten up.
Police also asked about an Instagram link concerning Hosseini's program and Manesh's English response of "good good" to a link sent by Sepahvand.
Manesh said the expression was a catchphrase he had picked up from a YouTuber known as AB and that it meant "I don't care."
He maintained that the phrase carried no particular meaning.
Asked about Sepahvand's subsequent message, "This is it bro," Manesh said he was unsure what it meant but suggested it might refer to the reporter he believed had been beaten up.
Manesh described his relationship with Sepahvand as a casual friendship, saying the two spoke approximately every other day, often discussing cars and health matters.
He said Sepahvand had lent him money in amounts not exceeding £300 and denied that Sepahvand knew people who could threaten him or his family.
According to the prosecution's account of their defenses, Sepahvand accepts conducting surveillance for Iran but says he feared the consequences of refusing and deliberately did a poor job. Prosecutors reject that explanation.
Manesh and Noori acknowledge visiting locations and taking photographs and videos but maintain they did not know they were assisting Iranian intelligence.
The trial is scheduled to resume Thursday at 10:30 a.m.
Iranian missile are displayed on the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution in Tehran, Iran, February 12, 2026
A senior Revolutionary Guards official has compared Iran’s conflict with the United States to a world war that could reshape the global order, reflecting a mindset in Tehran that appears increasingly resistant to backing down despite the risk of renewed US attacks.
IRGC political deputy Yadollah Javani said Wednesday that the conflict could have consequences comparable to the two world wars and alter the global balance of power.
His remarks capture a broader calculation among Iranian hardliners: if the confrontation is genuinely existential and its consequences historic, preserving Iran’s leverage may matter more than reducing the immediate risk of escalation.
That calculation is increasingly visible around the Strait of Hormuz, where the IRGC has intensified threats against US and commercial vessels even as officials warn that Washington may be preparing another attack.
President Donald Trump recently told an election campaign gathering in Alaska that he would call on Israel to prepare for a possible attack on Iran, while saying a decision on Iran would be announced “very soon.”
IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebi said Washington could launch new attacks before the November midterm elections, arguing that Trump might seek a military achievement before voters go to the polls.
Pressure around Hormuz
A Singapore-flagged container ship sank near the strait after being hit by a projectile, Reuters reported Wednesday, citing maritime security sources.
IRGC Navy Rear Admiral Ali Azmaei said Iranian coastal defense and fast-attack units were “waiting for American warships to approach the Strait of Hormuz so they can be sunk.”
He also warned that commercial vessels operating under coalition naval escort should not assume they would be protected from Iranian action.
Iranian media also reported Wednesday that a small fishing boat had been attacked by an unidentified drone near the strait, killing those on board. The circumstances of the reported attack remained unclear.
Javani said Wednesday that Iran had moved beyond the danger of a surprise attack and that its armed forces were prepared to respond to further enemy action.
He said Iran's adversaries had expected the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to produce victory within 48 to 72 hours.
Tehran has meanwhile continued to distance itself from Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. Whatever their origin, attacks threatening Saudi energy infrastructure add to pressure on oil markets, increasing the economic cost of the wider confrontation.
The appeal of the grey zone
Despite the growing economic cost to Iran itself, hardline outlets including Kayhan, Javan and state television continue to champion the “neither war nor negotiation” strategy associated with former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
A comprehensive agreement with Washington could require Tehran to surrender some of its nuclear and regional leverage, while another full-scale war could impose far greater costs on the country and threaten the political system itself.
Remaining between the two, hardliners argue, allows Iran to preserve its nuclear capabilities and regional influence without making irreversible concessions.
They also frequently cite the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as evidence that American commitments cannot be trusted and that any agreement reached today could be abandoned by a future administration.
But the escalating confrontation around Hormuz illustrates the danger inherent in that strategy. Maintaining such a grey zone requires Tehran to create enough risk to generate leverage without pushing the United States or Israel into another major attack.
Where the factions agree
Moderate, pragmatist and reformist-aligned media outlets close to President Masoud Pezeshkian and his foreign policy team have generally argued that Tehran should take advantage of diplomatic opportunities before conditions change.
Their disagreement with hardliners is substantial but does not necessarily extend to Iran's fundamental objectives.
Both sides seek to preserve the Islamic Republic and as much of its nuclear and regional leverage as possible. They differ over whether diplomacy or continued pressure offers the safer route.
For now, Tehran appears to be testing the hardline proposition that it can raise the cost of confrontation enough to make Washington compromise without pushing Trump toward war instead.
Seen from that perspective, Javani's invocation of a world war is more than bellicose rhetoric. It reflects a view of the confrontation as consequential enough that backing down carries risks of its own.
The increasingly dangerous contest around the Strait of Hormuz may determine how much room remains between compromise and another war.
