Nearly three-quarters of respondents to an Iran International Instagram poll backed continued US pressure on the Islamic Republic, while thousands of comments revealed deep divisions over its economic cost and whether it could bring political change.
More than 35,000 people took part in the online poll, with 71% supporting continued US pressure and 29% opposing it.
A separate analysis of nearly 5,000 unique usable comments examined recurring themes around the purpose of US pressure, its economic consequences and prospects for political change. The poll votes and comments were separate datasets.
Some respondents drew a distinction between broad economic pressure and measures aimed directly at Islamic Republic officials, their families and assets.
One respondent called for the expulsion of officials' children from Western countries and the confiscation of their assets, while urging Washington not to destroy infrastructure needed by Iranians now and in the future.
“Then the people will see that you are against the Islamic Republic, not against the people,” the respondent wrote.
The comments also revealed disagreement over Washington's objectives, with some viewing American pressure as useful leverage and others questioning whether Washington sought political change or primarily an agreement with Tehran.
For some, the debate centered on whether easing pressure through negotiations would produce meaningful change or give the Islamic Republic an opportunity to preserve the existing political system.
Others argued that economic pressure was insufficient and favored more direct action.
Military action versus continued pressure appeared in 6.2% of the analyzed comments, underscoring that support for action against the state did not necessarily amount to support for sanctions.
The Trump administration has intensified economic pressure on Iran, targeting its oil revenues and access to international financial networks.
On October 8, the US Treasury announced sanctions on 17 vessels and associated companies it identified as part of Iran's remaining shadow fleet. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Washington would continue targeting those facilitating Iranian oil sales.
Economic cost weighs heavily
Economic and household costs were the most prevalent theme in the comments, appearing in 33% of those analyzed. Opponents pointed to rising prices, declining purchasing power and difficulties meeting basic household needs.
Many argued that ordinary Iranians were bearing the burden while government officials remained relatively insulated.
“The pressure is on the people alone; it makes no difference to the government,” one respondent wrote. “American pressure has only emptied ordinary people's fridges.”
Others warned that intensified sanctions or conflict could further damage businesses, access to medicine and the country's infrastructure.
The concerns echo an earlier Iran International Instagram poll in which 68% of more than 56,000 respondents said US pressure was hurting ordinary Iranians more than the authorities.
Comments on that poll showed that some nevertheless considered economic hardship an acceptable cost if pressure contributed to political change.
Hopes for political change
Some comments portrayed continued US pressure not as an end in itself but as a means of weakening the Islamic Republic and bringing about political change.
Some said they were prepared to endure greater economic hardship if the pressure contributed to the government's eventual fall.
“It's true that we are under pressure in every respect too, but it weakens the government, so we will endure it,” one respondent wrote. “Pressure on the Islamic Republic must increase.”
References to regime change appeared in 12% of the analyzed comments. But calls for the Islamic Republic's removal did not necessarily establish whether a respondent supported the specific form of US pressure described in the poll.
While the poll produced a clear majority for continued US pressure, the comments revealed divisions over whom that pressure should target, how much economic hardship was acceptable and whether it should ultimately lead to political change.
As a self-selected Instagram survey, the poll and comment analysis are not representative of Iranian public opinion.
Men accounted for just over 75% of participants and women just under 25%. The largest age group was 25 to 34, at 37%, followed by those aged 35 to 44 at 28%.
The International Monetary Fund forecast Tuesday that Iran’s economy would shrink 7.6% in 2026, a worse outlook than for its main Middle Eastern rivals amid the war, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE facing smaller contractions and Israel and Turkey expected to grow.
The IMF's latest World Economic Outlook revised Iran's forecast downward from a 5.4% contraction projected in July. The economy is now expected to shrink for a second consecutive year, following an estimated 0.9% decline in 2025.
The IMF expects the economies of the Middle East and Central Asia to contract by 0.3% this year, a sharp reversal from the 1.9% growth it forecast in April.
Several countries in the region face deeper contractions than Iran, with the IMF forecasting declines of 16.7% in Kuwait, 16% in Iraq, 15.6% in Qatar and 11.3% in Bahrain.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are expected to see smaller contractions of 3.3% and 3.9%, respectively. Others are projected to grow, including Egypt by 5.1%, Israel by 4.5%, Oman by 4.1%, and Jordan and Turkey by 2.7% each.
The deterioration in most regional countries reflects renewed military exchanges and prolonged disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran faces the additional pressure of the US naval blockade.
Iran's projected contraction nevertheless stands out, reflecting restrictions on its oil exports and an economy already weakened by years of sanctions and structural problems.
‘Deep recession’
Iranian government data presents a similarly bleak picture.
The Statistical Center of Iran reported last month that GDP contracted 10% in spring 2026 compared with the same period a year earlier, the sharpest quarterly decline in 15 years.
Even excluding oil, the economy shrank 4.6%, showing that the downturn extended well beyond the energy sector.
Oil and gas production fell 26.4% from a year earlier, while industry and mining contracted 14.7% and services 4.8%. Agriculture was the only major sector to expand, growing 2.3%.
Exports of goods and services fell nearly 36% and imports declined almost 15%. Household consumption dropped 4%, indicating a further weakening of domestic demand and purchasing power.
The figures contrast sharply with the global outlook, with the IMF expecting growth of just over 3% worldwide in 2026.
Officials offer rosier picture
Senior Iranian officials have continued to offer far more optimistic assessments.
Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati told state television last week that inflationary pressures had eased during the summer and that the government had prevented the economic collapse predicted by Washington.
Former Labor Minister Hojjat Abdolmaleki went further in recent remarks that drew mockery on Iranian social media, saying inflation was effectively Iran's only economic problem.
“If you put high prices aside, you have no other economic problems,” he said.
Pressure on oil exports
Iran loaded no crude oil or condensate onto tankers throughout September, according to data from commodities intelligence firm Kpler, the first full month without loadings since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Washington has described its economic campaign as an effort to deprive Tehran of its remaining sources of revenue.
On October 8, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on 17 vessels and associated companies it identified as part of Iran's remaining shadow fleet.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the administration would continue targeting those facilitating Iranian oil sales.
The combination of the IMF forecast and Iran's own economic data points to a recession extending well beyond the country's energy sector.
How much deeper it becomes will depend in large part on the duration of the war, the blockade and Tehran's ability to restore oil exports.
The Islamic Republic’s threats to target undersea internet cables in the Persian Gulf drew mockery and criticism from readers who told Iran International that such attacks could deepen Iran’s isolation and damage its own connectivity.
The responses followed a warning by Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, that communications cables, data centers and artificial intelligence facilities in the region could become targets if war resumes.
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the hardline Kayhan newspaper and the supreme leader’s representative at the publication, backed the warning and advocated cutting international fiber-optic cables to confront the United States and its allies.
“The threat to cut internet cables will end up like the Strait of Hormuz story: the whole region will have internet except Iran. Perhaps that is their aim,” one reader wrote.
Others mocked the proposal as an incentive to turn to satellite internet, with one calling it “the best advertisement for Starlink.”
‘Give him the wire cutters’
Much of the criticism focused on Shariatmadari, who wrote on Monday that nearly seven major international internet cable systems pass through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. He claimed even minor damage could disable more than 80 percent of commercial, banking, military and AI-related communications and disrupt the global internet.
Some readers questioned his technical understanding of the infrastructure he was proposing to attack.
“Give him the wire cutters. The strongman wants to cut the wires,” one wrote.
“Do you even know what fiber optics are?” another asked.
Other responses suggested the threats would encourage greater interest in Starlink, which provides internet access through low-Earth-orbit satellites and a dedicated terminal, without relying on local fixed or mobile networks.
“Starlink will surely support this too,” one reader quipped.
A reader from Firuzkuh wrote: “By the time you pick up the pliers to cut off the internet, Elon Musk will have activated Starlink. This remark alone gives him a good incentive to bring high-speed internet into Iran.”
‘Do you know anything about building?’
Other readers contrasted Shariatmadari’s proposal with what they described as his lack of interest in developing the country.
“Have you ever, even once in your life, thought about building and developing the country, now that you are threatening fiber-optic cables on the seabed?” one asked.
Another put it more briefly: “Do you know anything about building and development?”
One reader questioned the influence wielded by the newspaper editor: “The country has become so lawless that when Kayhan’s editor gives his opinion, you would think he was the supreme leader.”
Several messages drew comparisons with Shariatmadari’s earlier support for closing the Strait of Hormuz, warning that another attempt to disrupt regional infrastructure could backfire on Iran.
Shariatmadari has repeatedly advocated using communications infrastructure against Washington. On September 3, he urged Iran’s army and Revolutionary Guards to turn fiber-optic cables in the Persian Gulf into a means of confronting the United States.
Other hardline outlets have also promoted pressure on technology companies. In May, Tasnim News Agency called for charging foreign companies fees for cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz and requiring technology giants, including Meta, Amazon and Microsoft, to operate under Iranian laws.
Britain said on Monday that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had “almost certainly” directed a suspected plot targeting RAF Fairford, as it vowed to crack down on Iranian criminal networks, sanctioned two Iranian nationals and summoned Iran’s ambassador.
RAF Fairford in southwest England, which had been used by US bombers to carry out strikes on Iran, became the focus of a major security operation after five British men were arrested nearby in the early hours of Sept. 27 on suspicion of terrorism and explosives offences.
US officials have said the suspected plot involved a drone attack. President Donald Trump said last week that an Iran-linked threat had prompted the United States to withdraw its bombers from the base.
“I can confirm our assessment that it is highly likely to have been coordinated in Iran, almost certainly directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard,” Prime Minister Andy Burnham told parliament.
Iran has denied involvement. Iran’s ambassador to Britain, Seyed Ali Mousavi, on Monday rejected any Iranian role in the suspected plot and said Tehran was willing to cooperate with British authorities investigating the incident, state news agency IRNA reported.
Details of the suspected plot remain limited. The five British men were later released on police bail under what authorities described as stringent conditions. Two other arrested men, including a British-Iranian national, were also released.
Police said petrol was found in vans seized during the investigation but no viable explosive was discovered.
“We will not tolerate these threats on our soil,” Burnham said. “We will crack down on Iran's use of criminal networks, using our full range of powers to target them and their funding streams, and we will bring further sanctions to restrict the capacity of Iran and the IRGC to do us harm.”
Sanctions and diplomatic summons
Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said he had instructed his department to summon Iran’s ambassador.
“Iran’s continued attempts to undermine the security of the United Kingdom and international partners through its criminal networks, proxy groups and state-backed malign activity is unacceptable,” Miliband said.
Britain also sanctioned Ruhollah Bazghandi and Shahram Ali Reza Tamarzadeh Jakki under its Iran sanctions regime.
The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office said Bazghandi, whom it identified as the IRGC’s head of counterespionage operations, was suspected of planning or conducting espionage for Iran and of involvement in threatening, planning or conducting attacks against people and assets in Britain or other countries.
Jakki was sanctioned for allegedly supporting or assisting activity involving threats, plans or attacks against people outside Iran. Britain described him as a facilitator for the already sanctioned Zindashti criminal network, which it says has been involved in plots targeting Iranian dissidents.
Joint condemnation
Foreign ministries from nearly 30 countries, including the United States, Canada, France and Germany, issued a joint statement condemning “Iran’s use of violent attacks, including the acts of lethal plotting, arson, sabotage, cyber-attacks, and other hybrid activities against us and our partners.”
“The UK has also concluded this event demonstrates the IRGC’s continued willingness to project hostile activity beyond its borders through covert networks and proxy actors,” the statement said.
British authorities have for years accused Iran of involvement in plots and attempted assassinations in Britain using criminal networks and proxies, allegations Tehran has repeatedly denied. Britain said last year that it had identified 20 credible Iran-backed threats to kill or kidnap people based in the UK.
In July, Britain used new state-threat powers to ban support for the IRGC and Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya, or HAYI, a linked group that had claimed responsibility for seven attacks earlier this year targeting sites connected to Jewish and Israeli communities and Persian-language media.
Washington’s new sanctions are unlikely to stop a China–Iran freight train at the border, but may make the route Tehran has turned to under pressure from the US naval blockade costlier and less reliable.
The blockade has sharply restricted maritime trade, while years of sanctions have squeezed Iran’s access to international finance. But not every trade channel had already closed.
Trains carrying goods from China were still reaching Iran before the latest US measures. The question now is whether sanctions on Iran’s railway companies will narrow that remaining route and complicate the flow of goods, including auto parts, carried on it.
Last week, the US Treasury designated three Iranian rail companies: the state-owned Islamic Republic of Iran Railway Company, known as RAI; Raja Passenger Trains Company; and private freight operator Railway Transportation Company.
The department said Iran had turned to rail to sustain trade and transport oil as the maritime blockade took hold.
The sanctions block the US-based property of the designated companies and prohibit US persons from dealing with them, while separate sectoral determinations give Washington wider scope to impose future designations. They do not automatically block every foreign railway, freight company or shipment connected to Iran.
The more immediate effect may be caution among companies involved in the trade. Banks may reject payments. Insurers and equipment suppliers may refuse to handle business involving designated companies. Others may charge higher fees or take longer to process shipments.
None of this would close the railway, but together it could make the route less dependable.
A useful route, with clear limits
The China–Iran rail connection is no longer just a proposal. In September, a block train bound for Iran was reported traveling through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan before entering at Sarakhs.
A train from Xi’an to Iran’s Aprin dry port in 2025 was reported to have taken about 15 days, compared with an estimated 30 to 40 days by sea. Iranian railway officials also reported that 43 freight trains arrived from China in the first nine months of 2025.
Those figures show a route in use, although they do not indicate how much of Iran’s overall trade moves by rail.
Rail can move selected goods, industrial inputs, equipment and containerized cargo faster than shipping by sea. But it cannot replace the volume carried by tankers or bulk freighters.
Treasury says Iran is using rail to help transport oil, but its announcement provides no figures for oil moved this way. There is therefore little evidence that rail is a meaningful substitute for seaborne oil exports.
The new designations could nevertheless complicate the China route. Freight must be coordinated among operators, border agencies and terminals in several countries, making the response of Chinese and Central Asian companies important to how disruptive the sanctions ultimately prove.
Auto parts show where the sanctions overlap
The automotive sanctions create a second pressure point because auto parts from China have traveled to Iran by rail.
In 2025, Iran Khodro reportedly received an all-rail shipment through Sarakhs. The head of the local special economic zone said the route reduced transit and stockpiling time from about 50 days to 15.
Sanctions on automakers and rail operators could therefore put pressure on the same supply chain from two directions.
Procurement and payment may become harder, while freight companies and intermediaries may avoid shipments linked to designated firms.
The impact on car production, however, will depend on what parts are affected, how much stock manufacturers have and whether other suppliers or routes are available.
The trains may run, but at a price
The blockade has squeezed Iran’s maritime options; the rail sanctions raise the risks attached to an overland alternative.
They may not stop the China–Iran connection, but could make it costlier and less predictable by deterring the banks, insurers and logistics firms that keep shipments moving.
How much traffic falls will depend largely on the response of Chinese and Central Asian operators.
For now, the railway remains open. But as Iran leans more heavily on the trade routes still available to it, Washington is trying to make those routes harder to use.
The US blockade and tighter sanctions enforcement are cutting into Iran’s oil income and targeting financial networks that sustain the Islamic Republic, but may still fall short of forcing Tehran into concessions, experts said at an Iran International town hall in Washington.
The discussion, hosted by Fardad Farahzad, brought together Kerri Bitsoff, a former senior official at the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); Patrick Clawson, the Morningstar senior fellow at the Washington Institute; and Mohammad Machine-Chian, a senior economist and analyst at Iran International.
“The thing about sanctions, if they’re on the books but not enforced, they only hurt the people,” Bitsoff said, arguing that the current US campaign differed from previous rounds by focusing more heavily on enforcement and the financial intermediaries sustaining Iran’s economy.
Blockade bites
Iran faces declining oil revenues alongside damage to its energy infrastructure following the war, raising the prospect of severe economic difficulties during the coming winter, Clawson said.
President Masoud Pezeshkian had acknowledged that Iran could not export oil during the initial blockade, according to Clawson, who said the country subsequently sought alternative routes for limited shipments.
Iran had also relied on oil previously stored aboard vessels and in China, but those reserves were approaching exhaustion, he said.
Damage to natural gas infrastructure could compound the difficulties, potentially forcing greater reliance on mazut, a heavily polluting fuel used for electricity generation.
Iran depends on natural gas for approximately 69 percent of its energy requirements, making disruptions particularly consequential for households and industry, Clawson said.
Machine-Chian estimated that between $21 and $23 billion in export proceeds had not returned to Iran and that the blockade could cost the country another $35 billion in oil revenue.
Hitting financial networks sustaining Iran's leadership
The current campaign differs from previous sanctions because Washington is concentrating on enforcement and the intermediaries sustaining Iran's economy rather than simply announcing additional restrictions, Bitsoff said.
She pointed to restrictions imposed by the United Arab Emirates, measures against Iranian airlines and Turkish action against banks connected to Iranian transactions.
Such measures could influence officials and business figures whose continued support for the Islamic Republic depends on financial privileges and access to international markets.
Earlier sanctions had often pushed legitimate commerce underground while allowing networks connected to the Revolutionary Guards to profit, Bitsoff said.
Machine-Chian described the emergence of wealthy intermediaries, sometimes called sanctions merchants, who benefited from moving Iranian oil and money through opaque arrangements.
Those networks subsequently became obstacles to negotiations and economic normalization because their commercial interests depended on maintaining the existing system, he said.
Machine-Chian distinguished between sanctions that impose prolonged hardship without producing results and measures designed to achieve specific objectives within a foreseeable period.
The loss of the UAE, Machine-Chian added, as a major commercial and financial intermediary has further complicated Iran's position.
Dubai previously provided an important channel for Iranian transactions, but restrictions have forced businesses to seek alternatives through Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Machine-Chian said.
Those routes, he said, have limited capacity and cannot quickly replace the financial infrastructure previously available through the Emirates.
China and regional allies face financial constraints
China remains Iran's principal oil customer, but its commercial relationship offers fewer advantages to the Islamic Republic than commonly assumed, Bitsoff said.
Independent Chinese refineries purchase Iranian crude at substantial discounts, while payments in yuan often remain in China and are largely available for purchasing Chinese goods.
Major Chinese banks generally avoid Iranian transactions, leaving smaller intermediaries to facilitate much of the remaining trade, she said.
The blockade also allows Washington to restrict Iranian oil exports without directly confronting major Chinese financial institutions, Clawson said.
Targeting those institutions could provoke Chinese retaliation affecting broader US economic interests.
The financial pressure is also affecting Iran's regional allies.
Hezbollah has struggled to maintain basic financial obligations and social support programs since the blockade began, Bitsoff said.
Machine-Chian argued that Iran's relationships with allied armed groups had become increasingly transactional, making continued financial assistance essential to sustaining their loyalty.
Political survival and prospects for negotiations
Despite the mounting pressure, the panelists differed over whether the Islamic Republic would ultimately accept Washington's demands.
Economic hardship alone was unlikely to persuade Iran's leadership to abandon its objectives, Bitsoff said.
Instead sustained pressure could influence members of the security apparatus whose loyalty depends on salaries, privileges and expectations of continued stability.
Clawson considered negotiated concessions possible, pointing to previous occasions when Iran reversed positions it had presented as nonnegotiable.
He suggested Iran could accept a three-year suspension of uranium enrichment, particularly because its facilities had been damaged and were not operational.
Machine-Chian was more skeptical, arguing that abandoning regional ambitions and nuclear objectives would challenge central elements of the Islamic Republic's political identity.
The blockade's sustainability also remains a concern because maintaining naval operations places substantial demands on American ships, crews and maintenance resources, Bitsoff said, although she expected the operation to continue.
The discussion highlighted a central uncertainty: whether sustained economic pressure will produce concessions, weaken the leadership's support structures or prolong Iran's economic difficulties without fundamentally changing its political direction.
