Strait of Hormuz to stay closed until Iran's demands met, IRGC adviser says
A senior adviser to the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said on Wednesday that the Strait of Hormuz remained closed and would stay that way until Tehran’s demands were met.
“The Strait of Hormuz is closed, and the armed forces have full control over it,” Mohammad Reza Naghdi said. “This situation will continue until Iran’s legitimate demands are met.”
Naghdi also said Iranian forces would block what he described as unauthorized routes through the strategic waterway.
His remarks came hours after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the strait was open and that oil flows had returned to nearly their prewar level, arguing that Iran had “lost complete control” of the waterway.
“Write your will.”
Those were the words Iranian protester Erfan Nabian says he heard in solitary confinement before he was handed a sheet of paper and asked what he wanted for his final meal before his execution.
Nabian, whose legal name is Erfan Hajbonian Dehaghani, is a 26-year-old protester from Isfahan who was sentenced to death after being detained following Iran’s nationwide protests in January.
Speaking to Iran International from an undisclosed location, Nabian described torture, a coerced confession, a mock execution and imprisonment alongside protesters who were later executed.
Minutes after being told to write his will, blindfolded, he was led into another room and ordered to stand on a stool.
Then a noose was placed around his neck.
“All the memories of my life were coming before my eyes,” Nabian recalled. “I thought I would never see my family again.”
Even with the rope around his neck, Nabian said interrogators continued questioning him about the protests, his phone password and allegations linked to the Alikhani Square case, a mass prosecution stemming from deadly clashes during the January 8 protests in Isfahan, which he denied.
The noose remained around his neck for between five and 10 minutes, he said.
A confession under duress
Nabian said he was then placed in front of a camera and ordered to say he had not been beaten or physically harmed.
If he looked away or failed to give the answers his interrogators wanted, he said, they stopped the recording, beat him and started again.
After the filming, Nabian said a man told him: “You’re going to be executed. The sentence has been issued.”
Nabian asked to call his family. Permission was refused.
Minutes later, shackled to a bench, he asked again.
“Please, can you tell them to let me speak to my family? I want to hear my family’s voices for the last time.”
Only then, he said, was he told he would not be executed at that moment and would instead be transferred to prison.
From Alikhani Square to detention
Nabian said he had also joined Iran’s 2019 and 2022 protests.
On January 8, 2026, he joined demonstrations in Isfahan. At Alikhani Square, he said security forces were firing live ammunition at protesters. Four or five pellets struck his right leg.
Fearing arrest if he sought treatment at a hospital, Nabian made his way home. With no knowledge of how to remove the pellets, he cleaned and bandaged the wound himself as his leg began bleeding heavily.
Erfan Nabian removes pellets from his body after being shot during protests in Isfahan on January 8, 2026.
He said he later went back outside to look for a young girl who had become separated from her mother and found the child dead.
Despite what he had seen, Nabian returned to the streets the following day.
“We couldn’t turn a blind eye,” he said, referring to the violence he had seen on January 8 as protesters were shot at.
The events at Alikhani Square later became the basis for one of the most consequential capital cases to emerge from the January protests. Fifty-nine people were initially arrested and 12 were sentenced to death, according to a lawyer who spoke to Iran International.
UN experts led by Mai Sato, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, said the defendants were tried in a single closed hearing that violated fair-trial standards and raised concerns over the use of televised confessions.
Amnesty International separately described the proceedings as a “grossly unfair mass trial” and documented torture, forced confessions and denial of access to lawyers among defendants.
‘The Alef-Ta slaughterhouse’
Nabian said he was arrested on March 6 and taken to Ghaemieh police station.
There, he said, officers demanded the password to his phone and gave him an unidentified substance intravenously.
He was then transferred to a detention facility he identified as Alef-Ta in Isfahan.
Nabian described it as a roughly 10-story building used for solitary confinement and torture.
“I call it the Alef-Ta slaughterhouse,” he said.
He described being stripped, soaked with water and beaten with hoses and batons. At one point, he said, his arms were secured above him while he was beaten for around an hour.
Star of David tattoos and accusations of spying for Israel
Nabian said his tattoos became a particular focus for his interrogators.
They included Hebrew writing, a Star of David on the right side of his neck and ancient Iranian symbols, including the Derafsh Kaviani, on his arm.
He said interrogators repeatedly struck areas bearing the tattoos, including the Hebrew writing on his back.
Erfan Nabian is pictured with a Star of David tattoo on his neck in a photo posted on social media in November 2022.
“One of them kept saying, ‘I’ll beat you so much you’ll start speaking Hebrew,’” Nabian recalled.
He said interrogators accused him of being an Israeli spy, receiving money from Israel and undergoing training.
Nabian denied the allegations.
Dastgerd and the sentence
On March 20, Nabian was transferred to Dastgerd prison in Isfahan.
He said intake staff initially refused to admit him because of his injuries, including a broken finger and damaged knees.
His death sentence was later commuted to 11 years in prison, according to a court verdict reviewed by Iran International.
Nabian said the sentence included one year for propaganda and 10 years over alleged psilocybin possession. He denied the drug allegation and said authorities gave differing accounts of the amount.
Iranian authorities have previously faced allegations of bringing fabricated drug charges against political detainees.
Norway-based rights group Iran Human Rights has described the case of Iranian-Dutch protester Zahra Bahrami, arrested after the 2009 demonstrations and executed in 2011, as a fabricated drug case in which she was tortured into confessing.
The US-based Center for Human Rights in Iran, then known as the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, said at the time that Iranian security agencies had in several cases planted drugs and added drug-related charges to the cases of political prisoners.
The cellmates later executed in connection with the Alikhani case
Inside Dastgerd, Nabian lived alongside other defendants tied to the Alikhani case.
Among them were Sasan Azadvar and Erfan Esfandiari, both later executed.
Nabian also spent around two days with Abolfazl Sepahi, another Alikhani defendant.
He said Sepahi told him he had been shot from behind with live ammunition in the pelvis during the January 8 protests and described torture he endured in detention, including having a butane torch held near his eye.
Sepahi was later publicly executed alongside Amirhossein Safari in Ali-Khani Square.
He also remembered Shervin Bagherian, another Ali-Khani defendant whom he befriended in Dastgerd, as intelligent and good-natured. Bagherian often came to his room, where he played chess and spent time with fellow prisoners.
It was only after his release that Nabian saw Bagherian’s forced confession, broadcast on state television. “My heart broke,” he said. “I kept thinking about what this kid must have gone through.”
Amnesty International said Bagherian had been forcibly disappeared for 21 days, subjected to torture and denied access to a lawyer before his forced confession was broadcast on state television on January 25.
For Nabian, the names appearing in reports of executions were not strangers. They were men he had lived beside, spoken with and come to know in prison — before watching, from outside, as one after another was taken to the gallows.
Air strike and crackdown inside Dastgerd
Nabian was still inside Dastgerd when an air strike on March 31 hit military facilities immediately behind the prison.
Iran International later reported that a military base and ammunition depot behind Dastgerd were hit by three missiles and parts of the prison were damaged. A judicial document said some prisoners were killed and others died in the ensuing fire.
Nabian said the blasts cut electricity, water and telephone access and were strong enough to throw prisoners from upper bunks.
“Everyone was shouting, ‘Come save us. Open the doors so we can get out.’”
He said some staff left while inmates remained behind locked ward doors. Some doors were later damaged or opened as prisoners tried to reach safety.
Nabian said security forces and IRGC personnel subsequently entered the prison and opened fire.
His ward remained locked. He said other prisoners later told him they had seen bodies and black body bags in corridors.
The following day, Nabian said, he could hear prisoners being beaten and tortured. He also described a “tunnel of terror,” in which prisoners accused of involvement in the unrest were forced between lines of guards who struck them with gun stocks, batons and hoses.
A judicial document later obtained by Iran International listed 75 prisoners as defendants over the unrest and fire. At least 26 were ordered to stand trial, while 18 faced charges that could carry the death penalty.
Nabian was released on bail on April 7. He said he left Iran because he feared rearrest, further torture, a lengthy prison term or another death sentence.
“I really love my country,” he said. “I always believed Iran would be free.”
A senior hardline Iranian lawmaker has been named in an allegation involving unauthorized excavation for antiquities and treasure, while parliament is also examining a reported excavation case involving an unnamed member of the legislature.
Investigative journalist Yashar Soltani said he had obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, a lawmaker from Qom and a figure associated with the hardline Paydari Front, was involved in unauthorized digging for historical artifacts and treasure.
“After oil, the Paydari camp is now after treasure,” Soltani wrote on X on Tuesday.
“I have obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, the lawmaker representing Qom, was involved in unauthorized excavation in search of historical artifacts and treasure,” he added.
Soltani did not publish the documents or say where or when the excavation allegedly took place. The allegation has not been independently verified, and Zolnouri has not publicly responded.
Parliament examining excavation case
Journalist Zahra Abdollahi separately said the issue of a lawmaker involved in excavation for buried treasure had been raised at a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee and referred to the body that oversees lawmakers’ conduct.
“At a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee, the issue of a lawmaker’s misconduct in connection with digging for treasure and buried antiquities was raised, and it was decided that the matter should be reviewed by the board overseeing lawmakers’ conduct,” she wrote on X.
Abdollahi did not identify the lawmaker, meaning there is no public evidence establishing that the parliamentary case concerns Zolnouri.
She said she had obtained an official document addressed to a prosecutor concerning excavation at a residential property in a historically sensitive area. According to her account, the letter called for the work to be halted.
Abdollahi said she planned to release further details of the document.
Paydari link comes amid oil-sales scrutiny
Soltani tied his latest allegation to a separate controversy surrounding Iran’s sanctions-era oil sales.
“I previously said that one of the four recipients of 85 million barrels of oil was the son-in-law of the Paydari Front spokesperson,” he wrote.
The reference was to Ruhollah Razavi, whose name has appeared in reporting on the network of trusted intermediaries, known in Iran as “trustees,” used to sell sanctioned oil and move the proceeds back to the country.
The wider system has come under growing scrutiny over billions of dollars in oil revenues that were not returned to Iran. An Iran International investigation found that members of one network collectively failed to repatriate $11 billion, while confidential documents showed 86 million barrels of oil had been assigned to four intermediaries who already owed money from previous sales.
Iran International also reported this week that senior IRGC commander Hossein-Reza Sadeghi and his son Saeed played central roles in efforts to preserve an IRGC Intelligence oil-sales network and shift its financial operations from the United Arab Emirates to Russia.
Two surveys emerging from within or around Iran's political establishment paint a bleak picture of public confidence: deep skepticism toward state institutions, single-digit trust in political officials and overwhelming demand for change.
What they reveal much less clearly is what kind of change Iranians actually want, partly because answering such questions openly can carry serious consequences.
One, presented by Ebrahim Hajiani, a former director of the state-affiliated Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), says the proportion of Iranians seeking "fundamental political change" has risen from 8 to 67 percent in two decades.
The other, supervised by Ali Rabiei, social adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian, found that about 53 percent supported fundamental reforms, 19 percent wanted regime change and 13 percent favored minor structural adjustments. Only 9 percent supported preserving the status quo.
Despite their different methodologies and categories, the findings converge on one broad conclusion: dissatisfaction with Iran's political and social institutions is deep, and relatively few respondents appear content with the status quo. Hajiani's "fundamental political change," however, cannot automatically be equated with regime change.
The trust figures are similarly stark.
According to Hajiani, only 7 to 8 percent of respondents trust political officials, while trust in the three branches of government ranges between 25 and 30 percent.
Rabiei's survey found trust in the judiciary at just over 30 percent, against more than 54 percent who expressed distrust. The executive branch was trusted by just over 25 percent, while more than 59 percent expressed distrust. Parliament was trusted by 23 percent, with more than 59 percent saying they distrusted it.
The security institutions fare better. Hajiani found that 53 percent trust the regular Army, while both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police are trusted by 46 percent.
Both researchers describe the findings in terms of an institutional crisis. Hajiani speaks of a "crisis of authority" or "crisis of reference," while Rabiei identifies a "crisis of efficiency, trust and political representation."
Hajiani also identifies 2022, the year the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising erupted, as a social watershed, dividing Iranian society into a "before" and "after" in attitudes towards dress codes, family dynamics, religion and the role of women.
Rabiei, meanwhile, argues that a "broad social middle" still exists: a large segment of society that is dissatisfied but seeks reform, stability and gradual improvement rather than upheaval. He says this constituency is poorly represented in the media, political parties and state institutions.
His figures provide some support for that interpretation, but the conclusion should be treated cautiously. The surveys themselves illustrate why.
Hajiani says around 70 percent of those approached by pollsters do not respond. That raises an obvious question over whether those willing to participate are representative of those who refuse, particularly when questions concern the legitimacy of the political system.
Sharq newspaper has previously noted that refusals and evasive answers are particularly common on questions touching on the legitimacy of the government and political system.
In an environment where opposition activity can bring serious consequences, respondents may have reason to be cautious about openly expressing support for replacing the Islamic Republic.
That does not necessarily mean the polling itself is dishonest. Even a methodologically rigorous survey can produce guarded responses when the questions are politically sensitive.
There are other limitations. Neither of the reports as publicly presented provides sufficient detail about sample size, methodology or response rates to allow a full assessment of representativeness.
Their institutional connections also warrant caution: Rabiei is a presidential adviser, while Hajiani is a former head of a state-affiliated polling organization.
A potentially more consequential problem is harder to measure: who agrees to answer sensitive questions, how those questions are framed, and which findings ultimately become public.
That makes precise conclusions about how many Iranians want reform, fundamental change or the replacement of the Islamic Republic difficult to draw from these surveys alone.
Still, even research emerging from institutions connected to Iran's establishment describes a society in which confidence in political leaders is extremely low, demand for substantial change is widespread and only a small minority appears satisfied with the status quo.
Iran’s central bank chief has rejected what he portrays as a US prediction of economic collapse, even as the rial trades near record lows and Iranian oil exports have fallen to zero.
Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati said Tuesday that a US prediction of economic collapse was failing to materialize, pointing to what he described as the continued functioning of Iran’s economy despite months of war, sanctions and restrictions on its oil trade.
“There are only five days left of that two-week promise they made that the country’s economy was supposedly going to collapse,” Hemmati told state television. “We are sitting here now talking about the country’s economic achievements, and I tell them that this will not happen.”
Hemmati appeared to be referring to recent remarks by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who said on Sept. 27 that Iran had about 15 million barrels of oil left in transit and would make its final deliveries to China within roughly two weeks, after which it would have “nothing left to trade for anything.”
The remarks come as Washington intensifies economic pressure on Iran, targeting its oil revenues and access to the international financial system.
Hemmati played down the impact of reduced access to foreign currency, saying Iran had supplied about $24.9 billion since the beginning of the Iranian calendar year in March, compared with $28 billion during the same period a year earlier.
The central bank has also moved to provide up to $2 billion to the foreign exchange market in an effort to support the rial.
“The reason we provided $2 billion in foreign currency for the market was to make Trump and his Treasury secretary understand that we have no problem providing foreign currency,” Hemmati said.
The rial nevertheless continued to lose value, falling to about 2.688 million against the US dollar on the unofficial market on Saturday, a record low. The currency has lost more than half its value over the past year, while inflation has risen above 70%.
Pressure on Iran’s principal source of foreign revenue has also intensified. Iranian oil exports fell to zero in September amid the US naval blockade, even as Persian Gulf oil flows excluding Iran recovered to more than 81% of their pre-war levels.
Bessent said Tuesday that Iran had not loaded a single barrel of crude onto a vessel since Aug. 25.
Despite playing down the impact of the pressure on Iran’s economy, Hemmati acknowledged the difficulties facing ordinary Iranians.
“We truly understand the difficulties and pressures people are facing,” he said. “We are doing our best, and we are concerned as well. We are trying to minimize these problems.”
IRGC Commander-in-Chief Ahmad Vahidi attends a ceremony to pay his respects to late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, July 5, 2026. In 2022, Vahidi was Iran's Interior Minister and led the State Security Council
Iran’s repression of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising was coordinated from the top through a functioning chain of command linking senior authorities to security forces on the streets, Amnesty International says.
Amnesty cites leaked orders, official statements, appointment records and documents showing internal reporting and coordination.
Among the evidence is an order issued by Iran’s General Staff of the Armed Forces on September 21, 2022, which moved through the police’s national command system to county-level forces and was entered into local police records.
It examines how security councils developed policy, ministers transmitted binding instructions, commanders deployed forces and government bodies funded prolonged operations.
Security councils set policy
At the national level, the Supreme National Security Council sets Iran’s defence and security strategies, including its response to protests. The president chairs the council, whose membership includes senior political, military and intelligence officials.
The State Security Council, headed by the interior minister, coordinates domestic security policy. Provincial and county security councils, chaired by governors, monitor local conditions, report upward and coordinate the responsibilities of security bodies.
During the 2022 uprising, these structures connected national decisions to operations in individual provinces and counties, Amnesty found.
The interior minister at the time, Ahmad Vahidi, held overlapping positions that gave him authority across the system. Alongside leading the ministry and State Security Council, he served as the supreme leader’s deputy commander-in-chief for police affairs, placing him above the police’s general commander in its command structure.
State Security Council resolutions became binding orders when communicated for implementation by the interior minister.
Amnesty examined leaked resolutions dated September 18 and 26, 2022, accompanied by cover letters signed by then deputy interior minister Majid Mir Ahmadi. Those letters transmitted instructions to senior officials and required implementation and reporting.
Police and IRGC units carried out operations
The police, known by the Persian acronym FARAJA, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were the principal security bodies involved in lethal protest dispersals.
Within FARAJA, the Prevention Police oversaw police stations and provided the initial response to protests. Its Assistance Cohorts supplied additional personnel when stations needed support.
The Special Cohorts, commanded nationally in 2022 by Hassan Karami, were deployed when protests exceeded the capacity of those forces to disperse them.
The IRGC operated through provincial corps overseen by regional headquarters. Their subordinate forces included operational divisions, Security Cohorts and county-level Basij structures.
Amnesty found that Basij’s recruitment, training, mobilization and remuneration were governed through the IRGC, placing them within its institutional structure.
Specific order
Amnesty obtained and verified a September 21 instruction from the General Staff that called for a “firm and severe” response. Two days later, the police commander in Mazandaran province instructed forces to “respond mercilessly and go as far as causing death.”
Other orders went into operational detail, specifying the forces to deploy, their locations and the weapons and ammunition to use.
A leaked letter from Vahidi to then president Ebrahim Raisi, dated January 8, 2023, recorded a State Security Council decision the previous October to allocate nine trillion rials to the Interior Ministry for security costs.
Amnesty put that sum at approximately $22 million at the market exchange rate at the time. The letter also described costs associated with transporting, feeding and accommodating thousands of deployed personnel.
Responsibility beyond those who fired
Amnesty assessed commanders under the principle of superior responsibility, examining their control over subordinates, knowledge of crimes and failure to prevent or punish them.
For Interior Ministry officials, it focused on aiding and abetting, reflecting their alleged role in coordinating and facilitating operations.
The organization said commanders continued to praise security forces and order further repression despite mounting evidence of crimes.
It listed 10 national officials and 77 regional, provincial and county officials associated with its detailed investigations in western Iran, pointing out that the list was not exhaustive and that individual criminal responsibility must be established through independent investigations and fair prosecutions.
The organization said no responses had been received to letters seeking comments from Iran’s leadership and senior officials before publication.
