Iran says US talks ‘meaningless’ as third tanker hit near Hormuz

The decision followed an emergency meeting of the Mecca defense pact’s committee, which reaffirmed the three countries’ solidarity in confronting attacks against Saudi Arabia and Islamic holy sites, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister said.

The committee agreed to activate “collective deterrence measures” in response to the attacks and those responsible for them, he said.

Pakistan’s foreign ministry said in a joint statement that the three countries had also agreed on the rapid deployment of military forces and capabilities in Saudi Arabia. The statements did not detail the forces involved or specify what role they would play.

The move came as Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces reported major gains along the Red Sea coast, saying Monday they had retaken Mokha and advanced around the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one day after launching a major offensive to recover territory seized by the Houthis last month.

The armed forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government said they had recaptured the port of Mokha, Reuters reported. Military spokesman Majed al-Nuzaili also reported the capture of Dhubab airport and the cutting of the road linking Dhubab to Mokha.

Saudi-led coalition spokesperson Maj. Gen. Turki al-Malki said 100 fighter jets were participating in Operation Yemen Dawn, providing round-the-clock support for ground forces and air cover over Bab al-Mandeb. He said the campaign had destroyed 324 “high-value” Houthi targets.

The Houthis earlier denied reports of government advances around the strait.

Yemen’s Information Minister Moammar al-Eryani told Reuters government forces had secured effective control of Bab al-Mandeb, although another government source said fighting continued at a nearby military base.

The offensive follows Houthi advances along Yemen’s western coast and around Taiz. Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced the campaign Sunday, setting out ambitions to recover Houthi-held territory and restore state institutions.

Saudi campaign expands toward Sanaa

The government’s stated objectives extend beyond recovering recently lost coastal territory to retaking Sanaa, which has been under Houthi control since 2014.

“Our armed forces have begun implementing a strategic offensive operation on Sanaa,” al-Nuzaili said Monday. Houthi-run Al Masirah television reported attacks on the capital, although the announcement did not establish that government ground forces had reached the city.

The government’s reported coastal gains came alongside further Houthi advances inland. The Associated Press reported that the group captured Turbah on Sunday, a town on the main road between Taiz and Aden that had served as an important position for government forces defending Taiz.

The Houthis have also continued missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, the attacks that prompted Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad to put their new collective-defense framework into operation.

On Monday, the group’s HOCC agency warned airlines that Saudi airspace was unsafe for civilian flights and would become a “theater of operations” for its forces, according to a statement carried by the Houthi-run Saba news agency.

US backs Saudi right to respond

The activation of the Mecca pact adds another layer to Saudi Arabia’s military response as Washington provides support without directly joining the war in Yemen.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio backed Saudi Arabia’s right to respond to Houthi attacks in remarks to reporters Monday.

“Obviously the Saudis have come under Houthi attack … and they have a right to defend themselves,” Rubio said. He also said Washington intended to honor what he described as its binding security agreement with Riyadh.

Rubio said neither Saudi Arabia nor Yemen’s internationally recognized government supported continued Houthi control of territory taken from government forces.

About 200 US advisers are working in Saudi planning and operations centers, including on targeting, while Washington is also providing intelligence sharing, planning assistance and aerial refueling, Al Jazeera reported Monday, citing a US official.

The official said, however, that US forces were not participating in the Yemen war and had no specific military objectives there.

At the center of the campaign is Bab al-Mandeb, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Fighting there threatens commercial shipping at a time when the Iran war has also disrupted passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian officials had previously presented Houthi control of the waterway as a strategic gain against Washington. In remarks reported September 27, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, described Houthi control of Bab al-Mandeb as another step toward a broader US defeat in the region.

Even if government forces consolidate their coastal gains, the Houthis could still threaten shipping with drones and missiles launched from positions farther inland or elsewhere along Yemen’s coast.

The warnings came during a day that also saw Iran execute two protesters detained during the January uprising, the Revolutionary Guards threaten a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, and Yemeni government forces launch a major offensive against the Iran-backed Houthis.

Netanyahu says Iran is fighting for survival

Iran’s leadership is weaker than at any point since its establishment and is fighting for survival, Netanyahu said at a ceremony marking the third anniversary of the October 7 attack.

“The tyranny is weaker than it has ever been since its establishment. It is fighting for its life, and its end is to disappear — or rather, to pass from the world,” Netanyahu said.

Netanyahu portrayed the October 7 attack as the opening stage of an Iranian-led effort to destroy Israel. He described what he called a three-pronged Iranian strategy involving armed groups surrounding Israel, thousands of missiles aimed at the country and nuclear weapons intended to destroy it.

“That was Iran’s three-pronged plan. But through our combined efforts, we crushed it, stage by stage,” Netanyahu said.

Israel struck Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles and severely damaged its nuclear program, including scientists, facilities and infrastructure, Netanyahu added.

Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff chief Ali Abdollahi issued his own warning later Monday, saying any renewed conflict would spread beyond Iran and Israel.

“If a new war begins, its fire will engulf everyone,” Abdollahi said.

Iran would respond immediately and without limits if the United States launched another strike, regardless of whether Washington acted before or after congressional elections or at Israel’s urging, Abdollahi added.

IRGC threatens tanker in Strait of Hormuz

The military warnings coincided with a confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz, where a tanker turned back after the Revolutionary Guards hailed the vessel and threatened to target it if it continued its inbound transit, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said.

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  Security meeting, military buildup: US weighs next move on Iran?

The encounter took place 11 nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman. The tanker’s master complied with the instruction and reversed course, UKMTO said.

The episode came as energy shipments through Hormuz showed signs of recovery. At least three liquefied natural gas shipments had exited the strait since late last week, extending a rebound in traffic, Bloomberg reported, citing ship-tracking data. Outbound LNG flows nevertheless remained more than 75% below prewar levels.

Iranian lawmaker Hassan Ghashghavi separately warned neighboring countries that their infrastructure could be targeted if Iranian infrastructure came under attack.

“We have told our neighbors that our security is your security, and our insecurity is your insecurity,” Ghashghavi, spokesman for parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, said.

Yemen offensive puts Houthis under pressure

Yemen’s government forces opened another regional front on Monday, launching an operation against the Iran-backed Houthis and announcing advances around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Government forces took control of the strait and Dhubab airport and cut the road between Dhubab and Mokha, military spokesperson Colonel Majed al-Nuzaili said. Hundreds of Houthi fighters were surrounded in Dhubab, he added.

The Saudi-led coalition said it struck 324 targets during the operation and provided air protection over Bab el-Mandeb and air cover for Yemeni government forces.

Yemen’s presidential council earlier announced the launch of “Operation Dawn of Yemen,” which it said was intended to retake Sanaa and restore state institutions.

The developments placed the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, two strategic waterways at opposite ends of the Arabian Peninsula, at the center of Monday’s regional developments.

Executions and economic strain at home

Inside Iran, the judiciary confirmed the executions of Alireza Sepahi and Alireza Raisi, two protesters detained during the January 2026 protests.

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  Two more January protesters executed in Iran

The two men were defendants in the Alikhani Square case in Isfahan, in which five others had previously been executed. Iran’s Supreme Court upheld death sentences for 12 defendants in the case in July.

UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran Mai Sato condemned Sepahi’s execution and raised concerns about his treatment and judicial process. Sepahi’s lawyer was still seeking a review when the execution was carried out, Sato said.

Prince Reza Pahlavi’s communications office later vowed to pursue accountability for those involved in the executions through fair trials.

Economic difficulties also remained prominent. Workers across several sectors told Iran International that employers were delaying or splitting wage payments and cutting benefits, with some employees taking second jobs to meet everyday expenses.

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  Iranian currency hits another record low under US economic pressure

The combination of military warnings abroad and political, economic and security developments at home kept the possibility of renewed conflict and its consequences at the center of Iran’s news on Monday.

President Masoud Pezeshkian accepted Paknejad’s resignation on October 4 and appointed Bovard, chief executive of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), to lead the ministry temporarily.

The presidential office said Paknejad had sought to resign some time earlier for personal reasons and that Pezeshkian initially wanted him to remain, eventually accepting the resignation at Paknejad’s insistence.

That leaves little verified basis for attributing his departure to the blockade or any particular dispute inside the oil industry. The more answerable question is what Bovard inherits — and which of the pressures facing Iran’s most important source of revenue are actually within the Oil Ministry’s control.

A blockade no minister can lift

The immediate problem is physical: Iran is struggling to get new oil to its customers.

Iran International reported, citing Kpler and TankerTrackers, that no Iranian crude cargo has crossed the US blockade line toward China since mid-July and that no new crude has been loaded at Iranian terminals since mid-August.

Iran initially kept deliveries going from crude already stored aboard tankers. By mid-August, around 67 million barrels had accumulated on vessels in Iran’s southern waters. But access to empty tankers became increasingly limited, bringing new loadings to a halt.

Iran’s crude production has consequently fallen to about 1.8 million barrels per day, roughly the amount required for domestic consumption and around half its pre-war output, according to Kpler.

The decline follows an already sharp fall in exports. Crude and condensate loadings were estimated at around 220,000 to 255,000 barrels per day in August, down from about 740,000 in July and roughly two million in March.

Paknejad, shortly before his resignation was announced, said revenue from oil already sold was continuing to reach Iran.

That is not necessarily at odds with the collapse in new loadings. Payments can continue for cargoes sold and delivered earlier even after the physical flow of fresh crude slows. The larger problem for the government is how long those revenues can be sustained without new oil entering the export system.

Here, Bovard’s room for maneuver is limited. A new minister cannot by himself remove a US naval blockade, provide empty tankers or reopen a route to China. Any meaningful recovery in export volumes would depend largely on a change in the conditions surrounding the blockade.

An oil-sales system Bovard can influence

The ministry has more direct control over another problem: how sanctioned oil is sold and how the proceeds are returned.

Iran has long relied on intermediaries, commonly known as trustees, to sell crude and move the proceeds because sanctions restrict its access to conventional banking channels. The system has become increasingly controversial as cases involving unpaid revenues and heavily indebted intermediaries have emerged.

Iran International reported on September 8, based on two confidential documents from the Oil Ministry and Supreme National Security Council, that large oil cargoes had been handed on credit and at steep discounts to four trustees who already carried substantial debts from earlier transactions.

One confidential letter said the four had been granted an unusually high discount of $8.50 per barrel despite outstanding debts and failures to return proceeds from previous oil sales.

The investigation also identified Mohammad Javad Bavand, appointed by Paknejad as special assistant for supervision of oil trading, as a central figure in managing a new network of intermediaries. Subsequent documents obtained by Iran International showed an 86-million-barrel oil consignment being assigned to four indebted trustees.

The cases form part of a broader dispute over oil revenues that have failed to return to the state. Iran International previously reported that the head of the State Inspection Organization had acknowledged at least $1.6 billion misappropriated by intermediaries, while 59 criminal cases had been opened.

The Oil Ministry has defended the trustee system as a necessity created by sanctions and rejected allegations that it failed to supervise the firms involved. But the controversy poses a problem that is more directly within a minister’s reach than the blockade: who receives oil to sell, on what terms, what guarantees are required and what happens when proceeds are not returned.

Bovard’s appointment is relevant here because he comes directly from NIOC, putting an official familiar with the operational side of the industry at the head of the ministry.

He also inherits a ministry that has faced disputes over appointments and authority. Iranian media have reported friction surrounding Mohammad Shariatmadari’s continued leadership of Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company, including disagreement over attempts to replace him.

There is no established evidence that either the Shariatmadari dispute or the trustee controversy prompted Paknejad’s resignation, particularly given the presidential office’s account that he left for personal reasons. Their significance is instead in what they show about the management system Bovard is taking over.

What can actually change?

The two main challenges confronting Bovard therefore require very different responses.

The blockade is largely beyond the ministry’s control. Even an experienced NIOC executive cannot restore export routes or tanker access through an administrative reshuffle.

The internal oil-sales system is different. Bovard could have greater influence over how intermediaries are chosen, whether indebted trustees continue receiving cargoes, what payment guarantees they must provide, how overdue proceeds are pursued and how closely oil transactions are supervised.

No such changes were announced with his appointment.

That makes the significance of the reshuffle relatively straightforward to assess. If Iranian terminals resume loading crude and exports to China restart, the decisive factor will probably be a change in the blockade or the wider conflict.

If the ministry changes the way trustees are selected, tightens guarantees, recovers overdue revenues or alters the officials managing sanctioned oil sales, those would be changes Bovard can more directly influence.

Paknejad’s resignation therefore does not by itself explain what is happening to Iran’s oil exports or signal a new policy. Bovard inherits an external constraint he has little power to remove and an internal sales system over which he may have considerably more room to act.

Whether the change at the top matters will depend on which of those problems, if either, begins to change.

The system produced another striking result this weekend, when Iran’s five-member team won five gold medals at the International Olympiad on Astronomy and Astrophysics in Hanoi, securing the world championship for a third consecutive year.

The achievement is part of a much longer record. Iran has spent decades identifying exceptional schoolchildren, training them intensively and directing them toward mathematics, physics, engineering, computer science and other technical disciplines.

International victories bring prestige, but the students themselves are arguably more valuable. They form part of the human capital on which Iran’s universities, technology sector and some of its most strategically important industries depend.

That is also where the system encounters its central contradiction. Iran has proved remarkably effective at finding and developing scientific talent. It has had considerably more difficulty keeping it.

A pipeline for elite science

Iran’s Olympiad program is not simply a collection of international competitions. It is the upper end of an extensive system for identifying gifted students while they are still in school.

The Young Scholars Club organizes national Olympiads across mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, informatics, astronomy and other disciplines, with many successful competitors coming through Iran’s selective schools for gifted students, commonly known as Tizhooshan.

Students who advance through successive rounds receive specialized instruction well beyond the standard school curriculum. A small number are eventually selected for international teams and spend months preparing to compete against the strongest students from other countries.

Participation has grown sharply. Some 121,000 students entered Iran’s scientific Olympiads in the Iranian year ending in March 2026, up from 87,000 the previous year, an increase of about 40% and the highest participation in a decade.

There are substantial incentives for those who reach the top. International gold medalists in established scientific Olympiads can receive exemptions from Iran’s fiercely competitive national university entrance examination, or Konkoor, giving them a privileged route into the country’s leading universities and technical programs.

The results extend well beyond astronomy. Iran has repeatedly won medals in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and informatics, including some of the highest placements in international competition.

For the state, those performances provide visible evidence that sanctions and international isolation have not prevented Iran from cultivating world-class scientific ability.

There is substance to that claim. Repeated success shows that Iran has developed an effective mechanism for discovering exceptional students and preparing them to compete at the highest level.

But Olympiad results demonstrate concentrated excellence rather than the overall strength of Iran’s education system. A small group of highly selected students can receive intensive training and state support while ordinary schools face shortages, unequal resources and deteriorating economic conditions.

More revealing is what happens to the medalists after they leave school.

From Olympiad medals to strategic universities

Research into the careers of International Mathematical Olympiad medalists illustrates how concentrated Iran’s elite science pipeline has become.

Among 75 Iranian mathematics medalists whose undergraduate education could be established in one study covering medalists from 1986 to 2005, 71 attended Sharif University of Technology and the other four went to the University of Tehran.

The concentration provides a direct link between Iran’s Olympiad system and two of the institutions at the center of its scientific establishment.

Sharif is widely regarded as Iran’s leading engineering and technical university. It has also had longstanding connections with research areas tied to Iran’s nuclear, missile and defense sectors.

Several research bodies located at the university have been sanctioned by the United States under authorities targeting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

European sanctions have gone further, citing Sharif’s cooperation with organizations involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program and its connections with entities associated with nuclear research and uranium enrichment.

The University of Tehran has its own history of research touching sensitive fields. Its academics have worked in areas relevant to missiles, drones, aerospace technology and nuclear science, as well as projects connected to Iran’s space program.

The university also played an early role in the development of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Its Atomic Center, established in the 1960s around a US-supplied research reactor, was transferred to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1974 and became the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.

None of this means Olympiad winners are systematically recruited into nuclear or missile programs. There is no evidence of such a direct mechanism, and the overwhelming majority of teaching and research at Iran’s major universities is civilian.

The connection is one of human capital.

The mathematics, physics, computing and problem-solving skills cultivated through Olympiad training are also essential to artificial intelligence, aerospace engineering, advanced computing, cybersecurity, nuclear science and missile development.

The universities that attract Iran’s strongest students supply engineers and researchers to a broad range of institutions, from civilian technology firms and research centers to parts of the defense and nuclear establishment.

For a heavily sanctioned state, such expertise has particular value.

Restrictions on imports, technology transfers, investment and international research collaboration make indigenous scientific capacity more important. Iran may struggle to obtain certain foreign technologies or advanced equipment, but scientific expertise developed domestically is considerably harder to restrict.

The Olympiad system therefore serves a purpose beyond medals. It identifies unusually capable students early, concentrates resources on their development and helps direct them toward disciplines important both to Iran’s economy and to sectors the state considers strategically vital.

But producing that talent does not mean Iran gets to keep it.

The talent drain

Studies of Iranian Olympiad medalists suggest that a substantial proportion eventually build their lives elsewhere.

Among 82 Iranian International Mathematical Olympiad medalists whose current location could be established in one study, 49 — around 60% — were living abroad.

The same research found a strong relationship between studying abroad and permanent migration. More than 70% of Olympiad medalists who pursued either undergraduate or doctoral education overseas eventually remained abroad, while those educated entirely in their home countries were considerably more likely to stay.

Other figures circulated in Iran have been even more dramatic.

In 2022, the secretary-general of the Iranian Talent Association said that 82 or 83 members of a group of 86 Olympiad medalists tracked by the organization had emigrated, arguing that inadequate support for talented young people inside Iran was a major factor.

Iranian officials disputed that figure and cited research suggesting that a majority of a much larger group of international Olympiad winners still lived in Iran or had returned after studying abroad.

The samples and methodologies differ, making the figures difficult to compare directly. But the broader problem of migration among Iran’s most highly educated young people is widely acknowledged.

For students who spend years preparing to compete at international level, the contrast between opportunities inside and outside Iran can be stark.

At home they face inflation, currency depreciation, weakened salaries, limited research funding, shortages of modern laboratory equipment, bureaucratic restrictions and obstacles to international scientific cooperation.

Sanctions deepen many of those pressures by limiting access to equipment, software, financing and research partnerships.

The qualities that make these students valuable to Iran also make them unusually mobile.

An international Olympiad medal is a credential recognized by universities around the world. A student emerging from Sharif with an Olympiad background can compete for places at elite graduate schools, research laboratories and technology companies abroad.

The investment that makes the student valuable inside Iran therefore also increases their ability to leave it.

Maryam Mirzakhani remains the best-known example.

She won mathematics Olympiad gold medals for Iran as a teenager, studied at Sharif and later moved to the United States, where she became a professor at Stanford University and the first woman to win the Fields Medal.

Her career demonstrated both sides of Iran’s Olympiad system: its ability to identify exceptional talent and its difficulty retaining the long-term scientific benefits of that talent.

That does not mean every medalist leaves. Many remain in Iran and contribute to universities, research centers, technology companies and industry. Some who study overseas also maintain scientific ties with Iran or eventually return.

But the loss carries disproportionate weight when those leaving represent some of the most intensively selected and trained scientific talent the country produces.

The Olympiad paradox

Iran’s investment in scientific Olympiads therefore remains rational even when some of its most successful products emigrate.

The system discovers talent that might otherwise go unnoticed, raises scientific standards, gives exceptional students opportunities and produces genuine international achievements.

It also develops scientists and engineers in disciplines Iran considers essential to its economic and technological future.

Under sanctions, that logic becomes even stronger. When technology, equipment and capital are difficult to import, investing in people becomes one of the few capabilities a country can develop largely from within.

Yet that strategy depends on more than discovering talented teenagers.

Iran can identify an exceptional student at 15, provide intensive training, waive the university entrance examination, send them to Sharif and celebrate when they defeat competitors from dozens of countries.

What the Olympiad system cannot provide is the research environment, professional freedom, economic security and long-term career prospects that determine where that student chooses to live at 25 or 35.

That gap can turn Iran’s investment into an unintended subsidy for institutions abroad.

Iranian families, schools and public institutions bear much of the cost of discovering and developing globally competitive students. Foreign universities, laboratories and companies can later recruit scientists and engineers whose foundational training has already been completed.

For Iran, the implications extend beyond academia. The same talent that can strengthen a university laboratory or technology company can also contribute to aerospace, artificial intelligence, nuclear research and other strategically important sectors.

This weekend’s five astronomy gold medals show that the first part of Iran’s system continues to work exceptionally well. For a third consecutive year, Iranian students have demonstrated that they can compete with the best young scientific talent in the world.

The harder measure of success comes years later: whether Iran can offer those students a future compelling enough to keep the talent it worked so hard to discover.

None of this establishes that Trump has decided to resume attacks. But together, the developments would give him substantially greater military capacity at a time when diplomatic efforts to end the war have made little progress.

Vice President JD Vance chaired Friday’s meeting at Camp David, according to Axios, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, special envoy Steve Witkoff, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine among those attending.

Three US officials told Axios that Iran and the conflict involving the Houthis in Yemen were discussed during the several-hour meeting. The White House has not disclosed what, if anything, was decided.

Trump convened senior foreign-policy officials at Camp David in June 2025, just days before Israel began its war with Iran, with several of the same officials attending. The parallel does not mean events will follow the same course, but it gives Friday’s meeting added significance.

More ships, aircraft and troops

The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group and USS Makin Island amphibious readiness group are heading to the Middle East, carrying more than 7,000 sailors and 2,000 Marines, according to US officials.

The USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington are already in the region, along with the USS Boxer amphibious readiness group. If the deployments overlap, the United States could have three carrier strike groups and two amphibious groups in the region by the end of October.

Some of the deployments may involve replacing forces that have spent months in the region rather than preparations for an offensive. But they would leave commanders with substantially more options if Trump orders operations to intensify.

Trump keeps military option open

The deployments come as negotiations between Washington and Tehran have stalled, with Qatar attempting to bridge differences between the two sides.

Trump told TIME this week that renewed US military action after the November midterm elections was “possible” if an acceptable agreement was not reached.

“I believe right after the election we’ll win, but maybe before the election,” Trump said Thursday, while describing Iran as “ready to fold up.”

Asked Friday what he intended to do next on Iran, Trump declined to elaborate, saying reporters would have “a big story” if he gave them the answer and adding: “You’ll see.”

Preparing for retaliation

Washington is also strengthening defenses against the kind of Iranian response that could follow renewed US attacks.

Additional Patriot air-defense systems have been deployed to protect critical energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, while the growing naval presence provides further defensive as well as offensive capacity.

Iran retains missiles and drones and has demonstrated its ability to threaten shipping and regional infrastructure. The Strait of Hormuz remains a major vulnerability, as recent incidents involving commercial vessels have underlined.

A US maritime blockade has severely constrained Iranian oil exports, while the Treasury Department this week widened its Operation Economic Outcast sanctions campaign into Iran’s automotive and rail industries.

Military and economic pressure are therefore increasing even as Washington continues to pursue a diplomatic route.

The question is whether that force is intended to strengthen Washington’s hand at the negotiating table or to give Trump a military option if he concludes the negotiations have failed.