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Iran’s truck repair hub feels the squeeze as work dries up

Oct 2, 2026, 11:27 GMT+1Updated: 12:29 GMT+1
Staff at a repair workshop in Isfahan’s Amir Kabir industrial district, where businesses serving trucks and heavy machinery have reported a sharp drop in activity. (ILNA)
Staff at a repair workshop in Isfahan’s Amir Kabir industrial district, where businesses serving trucks and heavy machinery have reported a sharp drop in activity. (ILNA)

Business at one of central Iran’s main heavy-vehicle service hubs has fallen by about 30% from a year earlier, offering a ground-level view of an economy where soaring food prices, a battered currency and weaker freight activity are squeezing workers and small businesses.

The Amir Kabir industrial area in Isfahan is home to mechanics, machinists, body shops, battery specialists and parts dealers serving trucks, construction equipment and mining machinery. Labor news agency ILNA said activity across the district had fallen sharply as transport demand weakened and the cost of keeping vehicles on the road climbed.

“When freight activity slows and less cargo is being moved, drivers face serious problems,” a person working in the district told ILNA. “Most drivers bought their vehicles on installment, so besides making loan payments, they also have to cover the high cost of supporting their families.”

Inflation eats into household budgets

The slowdown comes as Iranian households face some of the steepest price increases in years. Official data for September showed consumer prices were 89.8% higher than a year earlier, while average inflation over the preceding 12 months reached 73.6%. Food and drink prices had already risen 127.5% year on year in August.

Reuters reported in September that food prices had more than doubled while the wider economy was being squeezed by sanctions, restrictions on oil exports and the costs of the seven-month conflict with the United States.

Iran’s currency has added another layer of pressure. The rial fell beyond 2.5 million to the US dollar on the free market earlier this week, a record low, compared with roughly 1.1 million a year earlier.

For businesses dependent on imported equipment, that fall feeds quickly into prices.

“Parts dealers buy according to the day’s dollar rate,” an Amir Kabir business operator said, adding that prices often fail to come back down even when the rial temporarily strengthens.

“The consumer and the worker end up carrying the greatest burden,” he said.

Fewer loads hit an entire chain of jobs

The industrial district illustrates how weakness in one part of Iran’s economy spreads quickly into others.

A single truck can generate work for engine mechanics, gearbox specialists, machinists, painters, welders, upholsterers and parts sellers before it gets back on the road. When freight volumes fall, drivers delay repairs and workshops lose business.

“There’s a deep slowdown across the industrial area,” the tradesperson said. “It’s not that the vehicles don’t need work. Purchasing power and liquidity have fallen sharply.”

Some vehicles are repaired but then sit idle because there is no cargo to move, he said. Even when transport work is available, delayed payments from cargo owners leave drivers and workshops short of cash.

That weakness is also reflected in accounts shared with Iran International, with Iranians describing cuts to spending on food, housing and medicine as savings run down and private-sector job losses spread.

Cheap parts bring expensive problems

Workshop owners are also grappling with replacement parts that they say are either prohibitively expensive or of poorer quality.

A local tradesperson told ILNA that original components for older European and American heavy vehicles had become difficult to obtain, leaving operators increasingly dependent on Chinese-made replacements.

“In the past, if you rebuilt a Volvo or Mack with original parts, it could run for years without another major repair,” he said. “Now poor-quality parts mean repeated breakdowns.”

Original parts can still sometimes be found, he added, but at prices that often make them uneconomical for truck owners already dealing with loans, insurance and weaker freight income.

The result is a cycle in which operators choose cheaper parts, suffer more frequent failures and return to workshops while having less money available to pay for the repairs.

Skilled jobs come under pressure

The downturn is beginning to affect hiring and job security.

A machining workshop may employ 10 to 12 people repairing engine blocks, crankshafts and other heavy components. With business down and insurance, municipal charges and other expenses still rising, workshop owners may stop taking on workers or begin cutting staff, according to ILNA.

“A workshop with 10 or 12 workers may no longer want to expand its workforce and may even reduce the number of employees because its income cannot cover its costs,” a local business owner said.

The impact could outlast the immediate downturn. Training an experienced technician can take about a decade, he said, but workshops have less incentive to bring in apprentices when they are unsure whether they can retain existing staff.

Pressure reaches beyond Isfahan

The problems in Amir Kabir mirror a broader contraction in everyday economic activity as the government struggles with reduced oil revenues, sanctions and restrictions on trade.

US pressure has sharply reduced Iran’s access to foreign currency from oil exports, while sanctions evasion has become more costly. That has made imported equipment and raw materials harder to finance just as the rial’s fall raises their local-currency price.

For the workers and drivers in Isfahan, however, the crisis comes down to a simpler calculation: there is less work, while virtually everything needed to do that work costs more.

“If prices are going to remain high, then at the very least the volume of work has to increase,” a local tradesperson told ILNA. “Businesses need enough cash flow to keep operating.”

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Can the Caspian give Iran a way around Hormuz?

Oct 2, 2026, 09:21 GMT+1
•
Umud Shokri
100%
File photo: Ships dock at Anzali Port on Iran’s Caspian Sea coast

With war disrupting Iran’s southern trade routes, Tehran is looking north to the Caspian for alternatives. But the available evidence suggests they cannot replace its crucial oil exports.

More cargo moving across the Caspian could help Iran keep supplies coming in. But rising freight totals do not show whether Tehran has found a practical alternative for exporting oil.

To establish that, we need to know what is being shipped, where it is going and what trade it replaces.

Grain and industrial goods can ease shortages; crude needs its own export infrastructure and buyers. Iran’s oil swaps at Neka show both what the northern route can offer and what it cannot.

What the freight numbers measure

Russia’s Ministry of Transport reported 1.8 million tonnes of freight on the trans-Caspian route in 2025 and 1.3 million tonnes in the first half of 2026. It separately reported maritime freight of 2.8 million tonnes in 2025 and about 4.5 million tonnes in the first seven months of 2026.

The figures point to increased activity, but the ministry does not break the cargo down by Iranian origin, Iranian destination or commodity.

The North–South Transport Corridor spans several countries, routes and modes. Cargo can transit Iran without being Iranian trade or move between other participating countries.

A corridor-wide increase could reflect transit shipments, trade between third countries or Iranian goods rerouted from elsewhere. The aggregate numbers do not distinguish among them.

Nor should the route and maritime figures be added together as if they measure the same flow. The ministry presents them separately and does not provide enough detail to establish how their coverage overlaps.

Evidence of genuine substitution requires knowing what cargo moved, where and which route it replaced. Grain rerouted from a southern port to northern Iran would demonstrate substitution for that cargo.

A shipment merely transiting Iran would demonstrate corridor use, not replacement of lost Iranian trade.

Imports and exports are different problems

Northern routes can still be valuable for Iran. Food, feed and industrial inputs can support domestic supply during a disruption. But that resilience should not be confused with replacing oil revenue.

Around 90% of Iran’s crude exports normally pass through Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, according to Reuters. Bringing goods into northern Iran does not automatically provide the terminals, pipelines and shipping arrangements needed to move Iranian crude to international buyers.

Iran’s ports have nominal annual capacity of about 300 million tonnes, but only around 30 million tonnes is in the north, according to figures cited by Al Jazeera. One large vessel in the south can potentially carry as much cargo as 20 Caspian ships.

The question is not simply whether trade can move north, but whether those routes can serve the same economic purpose at comparable scale.

Neka was not an oil-export system

Iran’s Neka terminal was connected by pipeline to refineries in Tehran and Tabriz. Under previous oil-swap arrangements, crude from Caspian producers was delivered to Neka and processed in northern Iran. Iran then made an equivalent volume of its own crude available for export through Kharg.

The arrangement helped supply northern refineries while freeing Iranian crude elsewhere for export. It did not eliminate reliance on southern export infrastructure.

Swap volumes peaked at about 110,000 barrels per day in June 2006, fell to almost zero by 2011 and did not subsequently resume at scale, according to Lee and Kalyuzhnova. Changes in relative pricing were among the factors that made the route less attractive.

Infrastructure alone therefore does not create a durable oil route. The economics of each barrel, the terms of any swap and the availability of buyers matter too.

Any claim that Neka now provides a meaningful export alternative requires current evidence: how much crude is arriving, whether it is being refined, swapped or exported, and where any exported Iranian barrels actually leave the country.

Who controls the alternative?

Moscow’s transport ministry links freight growth to Russian-Iranian cooperation and identifies the unfinished Rasht–Astara railway as a key project.

The more important question is whether Iranian access depends on a limited number of suppliers, carriers, financiers or cross-border arrangements. Iran could gain another route while still having little control over the terms on which it operates.

That is not inevitable. A corridor involving several suppliers and transport partners could give Tehran more options.

The test is whether cargo can move regularly at competitive cost, with workable payment and customs arrangements, without a single partner becoming a bottleneck.

What would an alternative look like?

The available figures establish that activity on parts of the northern corridor has increased. They do not establish how much Iranian trade has been rerouted, whether those routes are commercially sustainable or whether they can substitute for oil-export capacity.

The Caspian may give Iran useful alternatives for specific shipments. Whether that amounts to strategic diversification depends on what Iran can move, at what scale, where it can send it and who sets the terms.

For now, rising freight totals are a starting point for that analysis, not proof that Iran has built a northern substitute for its oil-export system.

Leaked Kremlin plan undercuts Moscow's claims on ruble-rial trade with Iran

Oct 2, 2026, 01:38 GMT+1
•
Kerri Bitsoff
100%
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attend a meeting in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan December 12, 2025.

A leaked Russian government roadmap obtained by Fox News put the share of Russia-Iran trade settled in national currencies at 68%, far below Moscow’s public claims that nearly all bilateral trade had shifted to rubles and rials.

The push to settle bilateral trade outside the dollar has drawn renewed US scrutiny. Last month, the US Treasury imposed new sanctions on Russia’s VTB Bank, in part for its role in creating a ruble-rial settlement system.

On Thursday, Treasury also targeted the Russia-linked A7 Network, describing it as a “shadow banking network” used by Iran to evade sanctions. It said A7’s sub-agents formed a money-laundering and sanctions-evasion mechanism connected to Russian illicit finance that Iran used to move funds, including for oil sales and weapons procurement.

Both governments have spent years insisting they don’t need the dollar, but the amount of trade settled in each other’s currencies isn’t a number you need to announce unless you’re trying to convince people that sanctions aren’t working.

Sanctions leverage only works if people believe it is there. To convince people otherwise, Russia has since 2019 announced a rising share of its Iran trade settled in rubles and rials: from 40 percent to 50, 60, 80, until Putin himself claimed 95 percent in January 2025.

The Islamic Republic communicates in broad proclamations rather than Soviet-style quarterly statistical reports: its central bank governor said in November 2024 that Iran had “completely excluded the dollar” and traded only in rubles and rials.

But the internal plan, approved in September 2024, put it at 68 percent, with a goal of 71 by 2026.

The reality doesn’t fit the claim

The Kremlin’s claim of a working ruble-rial payment system is harder to sustain when the two sides have an imbalance in trade, because that can leave one side without enough of the other’s currency to meet demand. Russian figures put 2023 bilateral trade at about $4 billion, comprising $2.7 billion in Russian exports and $1.3 billion in Iranian exports.

The two countries also simply do not like holding each other’s currencies. Russia’s central bank described its problem with currencies like the rial in 2023: they are “often non-convertible or only partially convertible,” carry “higher volatility,” and trade in markets too thin to hedge.

Iranian exporters, according to Iran’s Resistance Economy Think Tank, refuse rubles when they can, and if they accept them sell them for dirhams as quickly as possible.

The usual fix for a shortage like this is a central bank swap line, which Iran and Russia signed in July 2024. Two years on, however, the only money either side has publicly put behind it was a 1 billion-ruble deposit, worth about $10 million at the time, at VTB to cover “possible ruble shortages,” and any further draw would leave Russia holding rials as collateral — a currency it cannot sell at home and that has lost 29 percent against the ruble since January.

An Iranian MP says Russia has offered a $20 billion ruble loan that Iran has not taken.

The trade goes around it

If the ruble-rial system worked as advertised, Iranian merchants wouldn’t be paying exchange houses in Dubai and Turkey to reach Russian suppliers.

Iranian MP Meysam Zohourian told Fars News in June that before the war even essential goods bought from Russia were routed through the UAE and settled in dirhams.

Fars asked in August why merchants still settle Russia trade through exchange houses and trustees in Turkey.

Iran’s central bank governor, Abdolnaser Hemmati, called his June trip to Moscow “an operational mission to untie the knots” in foreign trade, starting with letters of credit for Iranian merchants.

What the number counts

Whatever number is claimed, it doesn’t measure money moving between Russia and Iran — it’s a bookkeeping instrument, recording which currency left a Russian company’s account, not what currency reached the other side.

If a Russian importer’s bank takes rubles out of its account, converts them to dollars, and pays the seller in dollars, Russia’s Central Bank counts that as a ruble settlement, despite a contract priced in dollars and a seller that receives dollars.

The number also leaves out trade arranged without conventional cross-border payments. When countries are cut off from the international financial system, it’s easier to move goods than money, and Russia and Iran have increasingly turned to barter and swap arrangements.

Moscow has made barter official policy. The economy ministry issued a government manual for barter contracts in 2023, and a Russian economist says Iran is the one trading partner where barter accounts for a real share of the trade.

Russia and Iran have also pursued energy swaps. Swap deliveries of petroleum products had begun by late 2022, while the two sides were discussing a broader arrangement covering up to 5 million tons of oil and 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Trade conducted through such arrangements would not necessarily appear in the national-currency settlement percentage.

What the mismatch tells you

Russia and Iran’s coordination is real, but both countries overstate the impact. The public number, announced for propaganda value, doesn’t even match the government’s internal goal.

And the mechanism is in reality a cobbled-together assortment of poorly working, mismatched payment arrangements that don’t serve either side well except in their fight against the international financial system.

Iran links under scrutiny in separate Flydubai, UK airbase investigations

Oct 1, 2026, 22:51 GMT+1
100%
Travelers board a FlyDubai aircraft at Ben Gurion International Airport after a separate FlyDubai flight from the United Arab Emirates to Israel was diverted to Saudi Arabia following an emergency signal, in Lod, near Tel Aviv, Israel, September 30, 2026. REUTERS

Iran on Thursday was linked by US and Israeli officials to the Flydubai incident, the second such case after British police opened a probe into possible Tehran involvement in a suspected RAF Fairford plot and arrested a dual UK-Iranian national.

US President Donald Trump raised the prospect of an Iranian connection, saying investigators were examining whether Tehran had a role in the incident and that, based on what he was hearing, he believed there could be one.

“We're working on it right now,” Trump said. “I would say the answer based on what I'm hearing, is yes. But we're working on it right now.”

Asked whether the co-pilot could have been placed on the flight by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards or radicalized separately, Trump said: “It could have been. Yeah.”

Trump also warned Iran of retaliation if investigators established its involvement.

“Oh they’ll be hit, very hard, don’t worry,” he told reporters Thursday. “You just ask them. They know what happened. They’ll be hit very hard.”

Israeli agencies investigate

Israel’s Mossad and Shin Bet intelligence and security agencies are also investigating the incident and whether the Omani co-pilot acted alone or was directed by others, according to i24News. Israeli officials said no Iranian involvement had been identified so far, and an initial assessment was that the co-pilot likely acted alone.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday that the co-pilot had undergone Islamist radicalization but that it was too early to determine whether he had connections to Iran.

“I think it's too early to say whether he had any connections with Iran or with anyone else,” Netanyahu said, adding that he expected more clarity within days.

The flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv was diverted to Saudi Arabia after the co-pilot allegedly stabbed the captain and tried to bring down the aircraft. Passengers subdued him, and a reserve crew aboard the plane landed it safely in Saudi Arabia.

The United Arab Emirates has launched its own investigation into the circumstances and motives behind the incident, including whether it involved terrorist intent, prior planning or outside direction.

Iran role in UK airbase plot

The Flydubai developments came days after a separate investigation in Britain raised questions about possible Iranian involvement in a suspected plot involving RAF Fairford, an airbase used by US bombers in operations against Iran.

British counter-terrorism police on Thursday arrested a dual UK-Iranian national in London on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts as part of the investigation. Police said they were examining “all possible angles — including possible foreign state involvement.”

The arrest followed the detention Sunday of five British men in their 20s near RAF Fairford. They were arrested on suspicion of terrorism and explosives offenses but were later released on bail.

Police said petrol was found in the vans used by the men but no improvised explosive devices were discovered.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham said Wednesday there were “strong indications that Iran played a part in what happened over the weekend at RAF Fairford,” while stressing that the case remained an ongoing police investigation.

Iran denies involvement

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi rejected Burnham’s assertion, pointing to the release of the initial five suspects on bail.

“I can confirm Iran's belief that releasing supposed terrorists working for foreign states really says it all,” Araghchi wrote on X. “You're barking up the wrong tree.”

Iran summoned Britain’s ambassador in Tehran on Thursday to protest the accusations, with the Foreign Ministry describing them as baseless.

The Flydubai and RAF Fairford investigations are separate, and authorities have not established Iranian responsibility in either case.

US targets Iran auto, rail and metals sectors in new sanctions blitz

Oct 1, 2026, 19:40 GMT+1
100%
File photo: Workers on the production line for SAIPA’s Tiba car in Iran.

The US Treasury sanctioned Iran’s automotive and rail sectors Thursday, expanding its campaign to some of the country’s largest industrial companies as Washington seeks to choke off Tehran’s sources of revenue with Operation Economic Outcast.

The Treasury said the sectors provide important sources of revenue and logistical capacity and are intertwined with IRGC patronage, trade-based money laundering and sanctions evasion.

“The Iranian regime's ability to fund its war machine and inflict terror on the world has been severely diminished thanks to Operation Economic Outcast,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

“Today’s action directly targets Iran’s enablers and lays the groundwork for the United States and our partners to drain the regime’s revenue once and for all.”

The automotive designations include Iran Khodro Company, SAIPA, Iran Khodro Diesel, Pars Khodro, Zamyad and Niroo Motor Shiraz.

Iran produced nearly 1.1 million vehicles in 2024, according to the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers. Iran Khodro and SAIPA together account for more than 90% of the country’s domestic auto market.

The Treasury described the sector as a major remaining source of revenue for Iran and said Niroo Motor Shiraz had supplied more than 6,000 motorcycles for plainclothes intelligence agents working with the IRGC and Basij militia.

Foreign companies were also sanctioned for supporting Iran’s auto industry, including firms based in Indonesia, the UAE, Turkey and Hong Kong.

The Treasury said they supplied components to Iranian automakers or helped move parts into Iran, including shipments linked to Bahman Diesel, which it said produces vehicles for the Iranian armed forces and IRGC missile and drone units.

In the rail sector, the US government sanctioned the Islamic Republic of Iran Railway Company and Raja Passenger Trains Company, saying Tehran has increasingly relied on rail to move oil and sustain trade amid the US maritime blockade.

It also sanctioned Heavy Equipment Production Company (HEPCO) and its China-based subsidiary, saying HEPCO machinery has been used by the IRGC and Quds Force to build underground facilities and military training sites.

The metals sanctions targeted companies in the UAE and Germany over dealings with Iranian steel producers.

The Treasury also designated Ramin Keshvardoust and Mehnoosh Poursaraf Hamedani and companies tied to their steel and financial network in Iran, China and elsewhere.

The US government accused the network of facilitating tens of millions of dollars in Iranian steel and oil shipments and laundering transactions through Iran’s shadow banking system.

In a separate action Thursday, the Treasury targeted the Russia-linked A7 Network, describing it as a “shadow banking network” used by Iran to evade sanctions.

It said A7’s sub-agents formed a money-laundering and sanctions-evasion mechanism linked to Russian illicit finance that Iran used to move funds, including for oil sales and weapons procurement.

Operation Economic Outcast was launched in August to cut off Iran’s remaining sources of revenue and expand sanctions pressure beyond oil into industrial sectors that Tehran still relies on for trade, logistics and foreign currency.

The Treasury says the campaign is designed to isolate companies and financial channels that help Iran move funds, sustain industrial production and circumvent US restrictions.

Iran oil exports vanish as regional flows surpass prewar levels

Oct 1, 2026, 18:55 GMT+1
•
Dalga Khatinoglu
100%
FILE PHOTO: A satellite image shows an oil terminal at Kharg Island, Iran, February 25, 2026.

New tanker-tracking data shows that Iran’s new oil exports have effectively ground to a halt, while crude exports from Arab countries in the region surpassed pre-war levels in the final week of September.

Data from commodities intelligence firm Kpler shows that regional crude exports reached their highest level since the war began in late February.

Average crude exports stood at around 16.5 million barrels per day in September, but the seven-day average rose to around 19.5 million barrels per day in the final week of the month, surpassing the pre-war level of approximately 17 million barrels per day.

By contrast, Iran has not loaded any new oil at its terminals since mid-August, while no Iranian oil cargo has crossed the US blockade line since mid-July. Data from tanker-tracking firm TankerTrackers also points to a halt in new Iranian crude shipments.

Homayoun Falakshahi, a senior analyst at Kpler, told Iran International that the halt in loadings has forced Iran to cut oil production to roughly the level required for domestic consumption, around 1.8 million barrels per day—roughly half its pre-war output.

Iran’s oil exports

Kpler data, seen by Iran International, shows that since mid-July, no Iranian oil cargo has crossed the blockade line and travelled through Asian waters toward China.

Iran continued loading oil for several weeks and, by mid-August, had stored around 67 million barrels aboard tankers anchored in its southern waters. But as access to empty tankers became increasingly limited, new loadings also came to a halt.

TankerTrackers data indicates that Iran’s oil terminals were effectively inactive in terms of crude loadings throughout September.

As of last week, around 15 million barrels of Iranian oil remained on the water in Asian waters. Falakshahi said most of those cargoes had already been sold, meaning Iran effectively has no new oil available for delivery to Chinese buyers.

China is the only major buyer of Iranian crude and purchased an average of around 1.5 million barrels per day from the Islamic Republic over the past year.

Iran also exported around 500,000 barrels per day of oil products and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) last year to buyers including the UAE, China and other Asian countries. Those flows have also stopped since the start of the naval blockade.

Arab oil exports recover

By contrast, Arab countries in the region have restored much of their oil exports and established alternative routes for transporting crude.

Kpler says their crude exports averaged at least 16.5 million barrels per day in September, roughly matching their pre-war average. In the final week of the month, however, exports rose substantially further.

Before the war, nearly 17 million barrels per day of crude and 6.3 million barrels per day of oil products from Iran and Arab countries in the region, including Oman, were shipped to global markets through the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea—a combined 23.3 million barrels per day.

In the final week of September, crude exports from these countries reached nearly 19.5 million barrels per day, above the pre-war level. Oil-product exports, however, stood at around 3 million barrels per day, less than half their pre-war level.

Overall, crude and oil-product exports from the region reached more than 22.4 million barrels per day in the final week of September, just 900,000 barrels per day below the pre-war level.

The comparison is particularly striking because Iran accounted for around 2 million barrels per day of crude and oil-product exports before the war. Excluding Iran, exports from Arab countries in the region have therefore risen above their pre-war level, largely offsetting the disappearance of Iranian supplies from the market.

OPEC data shows that the UAE, which left the group in May, increased oil production to more than 3.8 million barrels per day in August—around 700,000 barrels per day above its pre-war level.

No new data has yet been released on UAE oil production in September. The country has production capacity of close to 5 million barrels per day.