Canada vows action against transnational repression after Iran threats

Rapidly rising prices are forcing families to think less about what they can afford next year or next month and more about what they should buy today before their money loses more value tomorrow.

“If you are an average Iranian, you know what you can buy today. You might not buy tomorrow — and by tomorrow, I mean 24 hours later,” economist Ali Dadpay told Iran International’s Eye for Iran podcast. .

“This is an economy that right now saving in eggs makes more sense … than saving in tomans,” he said.

An egg now costs roughly 25,000 tomans. But the story is not its dollar value. It is how quickly the purchasing power of the toman is eroding. Money put aside today may buy noticeably less within days.

“You have to tell people the frustration, the anger, the feeling of inability to provide for one’s family or afford healthcare services, pay for prescription drugs,” Dadpay said.

Average monthly income is below $200, by his estimate, while housing consumes an increasingly large share of household earnings.

Meat and other proteins are disappearing from some families’ diets. Even damaged fruit, once bought by the poorest or given to the homeless, is increasingly becoming an option for ordinary households trying to stretch their money.

“We are not approaching an economic disaster,” Dadpay said. “We are in the middle of an economic disaster.”

Economic pain, political anger

The erosion of Iran’s middle class has been underway for years, but the pressure is accelerating. Saving itself has become less about building wealth than preserving purchasing power, with gold and foreign currency used to make sure today’s earnings can still pay for necessities weeks or months from now.

“This is an economy that has stopped to invest in its future,” Dadpay said.

The political question is what happens when years of impoverishment collide with shortages, unemployment and declining public services.

Iranian authorities appear increasingly concerned about that possibility. Officials have identified gasoline, unemployment and livelihoods as potential triggers for unrest.

Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has threatened a tougher response to renewed protests, while leaked Basij audio has exposed concerns about further unrest.

Strategic forecaster Kamran Bokhari cautioned against treating economic deterioration as evidence that political rupture is imminent. Economic misery alone does not bring down governments, particularly those with an extensive coercive apparatus.

“It’s a meltdown and we’re watching it in real time,” Bokhari said.

For now, people can still adapt. Stores open, supply chains continue to function and families cut spending, change what they eat and plan around what they can afford over the next few weeks rather than the next few years.

But adaptation has limits.

You cannot eat paper

Tehran can continue paying its forces, at least in nominal terms.

Iran is a large economy of roughly 90 million people, with extensive borders and black-market networks capable of keeping some goods moving. The government can prioritize spending and print more money.

What it cannot print is the food, medicine, fuel and other goods that money is supposed to buy.

“When there are not enough products in the society, when there is not enough bread and butter for people, then the money is not going to solve the problem,” Dadpay said. “It’s just paper. You cannot eat paper.”

That creates a problem for a government relying heavily on material benefits to maintain loyalty. A higher salary offers diminishing protection against discontent if inflation rapidly destroys its purchasing power or shortages mean there is less available to buy.

Gasoline captures the contradiction particularly well.

Iran possesses enormous oil and natural gas reserves, yet Iranians have faced fuel shortages and long lines at filling stations. Dadpay traces the problem partly to decades of cheap subsidized gasoline, inefficient domestic cars, fuel smuggling and limited competition.

For years, there was still enough wealth to keep that system functioning.

Dadpay compared it to dividing a cake. Different groups could continue receiving a piece even as the cake became smaller. Now, he said, “there is no cake.”

Few easy ways out

Even an easing of external pressure would not necessarily resolve the deeper problems.

Powerful economic networks tied to the IRGC have benefited from monopolies and restricted competition, while greater foreign investment and competition could threaten those interests.

For Bokhari, that helps explain why Iran’s crisis is about more than sanctions, war or access to money.

“The kind of reforms needed means that this regime will not be what it is today,” he said.

Neither economist nor forecaster is putting a date on political rupture. Economic deterioration can persist for years, and the Islamic Republic has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use force to contain unrest.

But the immediate crisis is less abstract. Families are getting poorer, shortages are adding to the strain and money itself is becoming increasingly unreliable as a store of value.

Dadpay’s measure of that decline is strikingly simple. “This is an economy that right now saving in eggs makes more sense … than saving in tomans.”

Within six weeks, two of Iran’s neighbors have opened their markets to the satellite internet service. Iraq authorized Starlink on July 17. The United Arab Emirates granted it a 10-year general license on Aug. 28, and public sales began on Sept. 3.

SpaceX reportedly waived subscription fees for terminals operating inside Iran during the January 2026 internet shutdown, leaving access to the illegal hardware itself as one of the main obstacles.

Until now, Starlink terminals reaching Iran have largely had to pass through black-market supply chains involving multiple intermediaries. Legal sales in two nearby countries could shorten those chains, increase the supply of terminals and ultimately drive down prices inside Iran.

A standard Starlink kit now sells for around $400 in the UAE. At the end of August, the same model was selling for around $2,100 on Iran’s black market, while the smaller Starlink Mini was selling for around $1,850, according to data collected by Starlink4Iran.

During the January shutdown, the price of a standard kit surged to around $3,000, while the Mini reached around $2,300.

100%

The premium reflects more than profit. Equipment entering Iran passes through intermediaries facing the risks of confiscation and punishment, along with the costs of moving devices covertly across the border.

Legal markets next door will not eliminate those risks. But they could reduce the number of intermediaries involved and make terminals cheaper and more plentiful.

A new route from Iraq

The potential impact is particularly significant in Iraq, which shares a long land border with Iran and has extensive trade and passenger traffic with its neighbor.

Ahmad Ahmadian, an internet freedom activist and director of the nonprofit Holistic Resilience, which works to expand Iranian access to Starlink, said Erbil has already been an important source of communications equipment reaching Iran through informal channels.

Legalization could broaden that network to include traders and people who regularly travel between the two countries, he said.

During periods such as Arbaeen, the annual Shiite pilgrimage when millions of travelers move between Iran and Iraq, thoroughly inspecting everything they carry becomes more difficult, Ahmadian said.

Ahmadian expects some travelers to bring Starlink equipment into Iran for their own use or resale. The devices, he said, could even become a kind of “souvenir” brought back from Iraq.

The smaller Starlink Mini could prove particularly attractive. Roughly the size of a laptop, it is easier to transport than a standard dish, although its official availability in Iraq has yet to be confirmed.

There are still significant obstacles to an Iraqi Starlink market.

The license was issued by Iraq’s Communications and Media Commission, but the Communications Ministry says it has not signed a separate agreement with SpaceX and has raised objections over pricing and routing traffic through Qatar.

The Kurdistan Region has separate regulations, and as of early September no final agreement with SpaceX had been announced.

According to Iraqi officials, around 40,000 unauthorized terminals were already operating in the country before the license was issued, reportedly serving around 200,000 people, including government and security users.

Regulatory disputes may therefore slow the development of the legal market, but they are unlikely to eliminate an existing network of sellers, installers and users.

The UAE offers another potential source.

Starlink equipment was already available in Dubai’s free-trade zones before the general license was issued, and some terminals in Iran have previously been sourced there through intermediaries. Legal public sales could make the equipment easier to obtain.

One dish, many users

More terminals inside Iran would not necessarily benefit only those wealthy enough to buy one.

Some Starlink owners already share their connections with other users, including through VPN and other circumvention services.

Tools such as NasNet Connect can use Iran’s own National Information Network, or NIN, to connect users to a local gateway whose route to the international internet is provided by Starlink. That matters because Iranian authorities have repeatedly cut access to the global internet during periods of unrest and crisis while leaving the NIN and approved domestic services functioning.

A user’s connection to the local gateway can therefore still travel over Iranian telecommunications infrastructure, while the gateway’s route to the outside world exits through Starlink, beyond conventional international connections controlled by the state.

For relatively light uses such as messaging and web browsing, a single terminal can potentially support around 20 to 30 users, according to Ahmadian. Video calls, streaming and large downloads substantially reduce that number.

There is also a financial incentive.

Dish owners can sell VPN or other internet access to recover their costs or even generate income. If cheaper hardware reduces the initial investment, more terminals could potentially become gateways for groups of users rather than individual connections.

None of this makes such networks invisible. Iranian authorities can attempt to identify servers and dishes, disrupt communications and interfere with satellite signals.

But a growing number of privately operated connections would make the task of sealing Iran off from the international internet more complicated.

Free, for now

There is another important limitation: a Starlink terminal bought legally in Iraq or the UAE is not guaranteed to work once brought into Iran.

SpaceX retains control over which terminals are activated and whether they remain connected. It reportedly waived subscription fees for terminals operating in Iran during the January 2026 blackout but did not say how long the arrangement would last.

Ahmadian said active terminals in Iran have continued to operate without subscription charges in recent months. Some accounts previously disconnected for non-payment have also been restored, he said.

It remains unclear whether that policy will continue indefinitely or whether newly arrived terminals bought in Iraq or the UAE will automatically receive free service.

Using Starlink also carries significant personal risk inside Iran. The Islamic Republic considers the equipment illegal and has sought to disrupt satellite connections, locate terminals and punish users.

Nor can satellite internet come close to replacing Iran’s conventional internet infrastructure. Even if black-market prices fall substantially, the hardware will remain beyond the reach of many households.

But for journalists, activists, businesses and families who have lived through repeated internet shutdowns, Starlink increasingly serves as something different: a backup route to the outside world when Tehran cuts conventional connections.

The arrival of legal Starlink markets in Iraq and the UAE does not take Iran’s internet kill switch out of the government’s hands. But it could mean fewer doors close when the switch is thrown.

“There’s probably only about 30 million barrels of Iranian crude oil left that China hasn’t bought,” Bessent said. “So that will run out soon, and there will be no problem with China buying because they have no product.”

Bessent described the pressure campaign, dubbed “Operation Economic Outcast,” as the largest effort to isolate a country economically and said Washington intended to “asphyxiate” Iran’s ruling establishment.

“The blockade is working like nothing we’ve ever seen, and the combination - everyone says sanctions don’t work - but I can tell you, blockade and sanctions are one of the most powerful one-two punches in the history of economic isolation,” he said.

Asked about his prediction that the Strait of Hormuz would become irrelevant to the oil industry within two years, Bessent said oil-producing countries around the Persian Gulf were developing “alternative pipeline routes that will no longer entail oil going through the Strait of Hormuz.”

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  US tanker attacks near Iran's shores widen from Jask to its oil heartland

Bessent also rejected the suggestion that Iran controlled the waterway.

“The Iranian chokehold, to the extent they have one - and I can tell you, they do not have one - we are in control of the strait,” he said. “To the extent that they can threaten their neighbors, once we leave, that will not exist anymore.”

Iran’s Economy Ministry has established an “economic war” command center to coordinate and accelerate responses to economic problems caused by the conflict, deputy economy Minister Morteza Zamanian said on Sunday.

He acknowledged that higher energy prices caused by the conflict were affecting Americans but predicted that the shock would end and wage growth would continue.

“This war will end, and those will turn into real wage gains,” Bessent said.

He added that the administration expected the conflict to leave Iran unable to develop a nuclear weapon.

“I think we are going to get to the other side of this Iran conflict with a safer world, with an Iran that cannot have a nuclear weapon,” he said.

The United States imposed a naval blockade in July alongside expanded sanctions aimed at restricting Iran’s oil exports and cutting a key source of government revenue.

Iran’s Economy Ministry has, meanwhile, established an “economic war” command center to coordinate and accelerate responses to economic problems caused by the conflict, Deputy Economy Minister Morteza Zamanian said on Sunday.

The center will initially focus on problems affecting businesses, trade and financing within the ministry’s authority, while using government economic bodies to coordinate responses across agencies, he added.

The apartments are at 3a Palace Green, an exclusive development overlooking Kensington Palace and close to the official London residence of the Prince and Princess of Wales. Both properties include staff accommodation and private roof terraces, according to the report.

One is a five-bedroom duplex covering 3,944 square feet across the sixth and seventh floors. It was purchased for £19 million in 2016 but is now being offered for just under £12 million.

Knight Frank and Sotheby’s International Realty are jointly marketing the apartment. The listing describes it as “an exceptional duplex penthouse with staff accommodation and commanding unrivalled views across Kensington Gardens from one of London’s most prestigious addresses.”

The brochure does not identify its politically sensitive connections but notes: “Due to the property being in receivership, we do not have all of the material information for the property; therefore you should ensure you make all relevant inquiries,” the report said.

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  Khamenei's son built secret overseas property empire - Bloomberg

The second penthouse occupies the seventh and eighth floors of the same building. It was bought for £16.75 million in 2014 and has also entered receivership.

Land Registry documents show that financial advisory firm Teneo was appointed as its receiver, the report said, adding that the apartment does not appear to have been publicly listed, leaving its asking price unknown.

Several prospective buyers are believed to have viewed the properties amid significant interest, according to The Sunday Times.

The registered owner of both apartments is Iranian banker Ali Ansari, whom the US Treasury sanctioned in July as a “key financier” for Khamenei. Washington said Ansari “oversees a sprawling global network of assets benefiting Iran’s leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and other regime elites.”

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  US probes Iran’s Supreme Leader's money flows through Wall Street banks

Ansari was previously sanctioned by Britain over allegations that he financed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His British assets were frozen, and he was barred from entering the country. He is understood to deny wrongdoing.

The British government is believed to have authorized the sale of the two apartments after Ansari defaulted on their mortgages, according to The Sunday Times. The private lenders that financed the purchases appointed receivers to recover their money, although the amount originally borrowed is not known.

Any proceeds remaining after the lenders are repaid are expected to be frozen while Ansari remains under sanctions.

Neither Khamenei nor Ansari has been seen by employees at the Palace Green development since the apartments were purchased, the newspaper reported.

Since his father was killed in US-Israeli airstrikes in February, Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen or heard publicly, leaving his condition and circumstances unclear.

“The mere threat out there, just the threat of these, is enough to deter traffic, certainly commercial traffic,” Votel told Eye for Iran podcast. .

“It has a huge deterrent effect and it puts the burden on us to keep really, really close watch on this area.”

That creates a paradox in the latest battle over Hormuz: Iran may be turning to rocket-launched mines because more powerful options have been degraded, yet Washington must still behave as though the threat could get through.

The latest US-Iran flare-up began after the US military said it detected Iranian forces on Larak Island preparing to launch rockets carrying sea mines into the Strait. US forces struck the launchers before they could fire.

Iran has traditionally been able to deploy naval mines using small boats, submarines or aircraft. Firing them from rockets would allow Iranian forces to place mines at a distance without exposing boats and crews to US forces watching the waterway.

Why Iran may be turning to rockets

Iranian state television reported on the Fajr-5 multiple-launch rocket system as a weapon for mining Hormuz as early as January 2025, and military analysts have said Iran had been testing the concept.

What has changed is the battlefield around it.

Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and an expert on Iran’s military and asymmetric warfare, told Eye for Iran that Iran’s conventional military capabilities were significantly degraded during the war, followed by attacks on important IRGC Navy infrastructure.

Nadimi said Iran has lost much of its ability to deploy the larger and more dangerous sea mines it could once put into the water through more traditional means.

“They have little choice but using these smaller, less capable rocket-launched mines,” he said, adding that Iran has also repeatedly tried to strike shipping with anti-ship cruise missiles and one-way attack drones, many of which have been intercepted or jammed.

Iran’s apparent new weapon can therefore be read not simply as evidence of innovation, but as adaptation after military losses.

Less destructive does not mean less disruptive

Rocket-launched mines come with significant compromises. Naval mines capable of badly damaging large ships are heavy. Fitting one into a rocket requires a smaller weapon, limiting its destructive power.

Nadimi said Iran’s rocket-delivered versions are significantly smaller than some older naval mines in its arsenal and consequently less capable of inflicting major damage on large tankers.

But a mine’s effectiveness is psychological as much as it is physical: once mines are believed to be in the water, uncertainty over their location can deter ships from entering.

Votel pointed to the history of mine warfare in the Persian Gulf, including US Navy encounters with Iranian mines during the Tanker War of the 1980s.

Commercial vessels and their insurers therefore do not necessarily need evidence that a mine will hit a ship before taking the threat seriously.

Washington’s burden

That uncertainty shifts part of the burden from Iran to the United States.

The US does not simply have to destroy mines once they enter the water. It has to watch the Strait, Iranian coastal positions and potential launch sites closely enough to prevent Tehran from putting them there in the first place.

“It puts a lot of pressure on us to make sure that we have constant surveillance, not only of the waterways themselves and the main transit routes, but really of the locations where these mines or these weapons can come from,” Votel said.

The latest US strike suggests Washington currently has the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to do that. American forces identified the Iranian launchers and struck them before the mines could be fired.

But Iran does not necessarily have to defeat that surveillance system to impose a cost. Simply retaining the capability forces the US to keep watching and commercial operators to trust that nothing has slipped through.

For Tehran, that creates an asymmetric advantage even after significant military losses: the US must repeatedly demonstrate that Hormuz is safe, while Iran only has to preserve doubt that it might not be.

Degradation or restraint?

There is an important caveat. The smaller scale of Iran’s recent attacks does not necessarily mean Tehran is incapable of doing more.

Nadimi said there are signs Iran is deliberately exercising restraint with some weapons, particularly ballistic missiles, to avoid triggering a larger escalation involving both the United States and Israel.

The rocket-launched mine claim itself also remains contested. Some maritime specialists have questioned whether Iran has operationalized the system as the US describes, while others consider it technically plausible.

Even if the system is operational, however, Iran would not need to mine the Strait extensively for it to have an effect. All Tehran needs is for military planners, ship operators and insurers to believe there is a credible possibility that it could get some mines into the water.

Votel sees that as part of a broader Iranian strategy: “Their intention is to make this painful for us and for those that are supporting the United States.”

Iran may now have fewer options for mining Hormuz than it once did. But if the threat of a mine is enough to make a ship hesitate—and enough to make the US military watch Iran’s coastline around the clock—Tehran can still impose a cost without a mine ever hitting a vessel.