Iran MP says no frozen funds released, calls out Central Bank governor

More than 80% of liquid cargo transits through the strait over the past two weeks either used the Omani route or traveled with transponders switched off and likely followed that path, CNN reported, citing Kpler, which tracks ships using transponder and satellite data.

The US military is meanwhile quietly operating a shipping corridor along the Omani side of the strait that is helping move about 10 million barrels of oil a day, Axios reported, citing two US officials.

“It increasingly looks like Iran has at least partially lost control of the strait,” Homayoun Falakshahi, Kpler’s head of crude oil analysis, told CNN.

US organizes traffic along Oman

The US operation has been underway for several weeks, with 15 to 20 tankers entering and leaving the strait each night through a southern channel along Oman’s coast, the two US officials told Axios.

The effort goes beyond moving outbound oil shipments. The US military is helping empty tankers enter the Persian Gulf from the Arabian Sea, travel to ports in the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait to load oil and then exit through the strait, according to Axios.

A task force run from the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division headquarters at Fort Bragg coordinates daily inbound and outbound traffic with regional Gulf partners, Axios reported. US fighter jets patrol above the route to intercept Iranian cruise missiles and drones.

“We have been controlling the southern lane of the Strait of Hormuz for two months now. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can be a nuisance, but they don't control the strait. We do,” a US official with direct knowledge of the operation told Axios.

The growing use of the Omani route has also reduced Iran’s ability to collect tolls from vessels passing through the strait as it did earlier in the war, according to Kpler.

Ali Gholhaki, a political activist close to Iranian parliament speaker and top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, said in a post on X that the United States had used specialized vessels to clear sharp rocks along the southern, Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz to facilitate traffic through the corridor.

“The quiet transfer of oil by the United States through the southern Strait of Hormuz will reduce the strait’s leverage,” he wrote, adding that if the arrangement continued, Washington would have little incentive to lift its blockade, ease sanctions or release frozen funds.

Trump says blockade is working

Trump said Wednesday the strait remained open and described the US naval blockade of Iran as “100% successful.”

“Right now, the Strait is open. A lot of boats are coming through,” Trump told reporters at the White House.

“The blockade has been 100% successful. No boats have gotten into Iran, but they are getting in for other places,” he said.

US Central Command said Wednesday that US forces had redirected 65 commercial vessels, disabled three and boarded two as part of enforcement of the blockade against Iran.

Iran has nevertheless continued attacking vessels using the waterway, according to CNN. The continued attacks leave control of the strait contested even as recent shipping patterns indicate Tehran has less ability to dictate traffic than it did earlier in the war.

Washington weighs further pressure

The erosion of Iran’s leverage in the Strait of Hormuz comes as Washington considers tightening economic pressure on Tehran further.

Trump said Wednesday the United States was weighing additional sanctions on Iran.

“We have things that we could sanction. We have very draconian sanctions, and we’ll see what happens,” he told reporters.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also signaled tougher measures last week, telling Newsmax that Washington would apply measures against Iran that had “never been seen” in the economic isolation of a country.

Trump also argued that Hormuz could become less important to global energy markets as countries turn to alternative oil supplies and new pipelines.

“People have found other alternatives, which they never thought about: Texas, Alaska, Louisiana, and other places,” he said.

“So I think the Hormuz Strait is not going to be quite as important as it was in the past,” Trump added.

Trump also said Wednesday that Iran could not be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon.

“Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. You know why? Because they would use it. We are not gonna let them use it,” he said.

For now, the growing use of the Oman-side route and the US-organized corridor point to a significant erosion of Iran’s leverage over Hormuz, while continued Iranian attacks show that control of the strategic waterway remains contested.

The campaign says it is being carried out with the participation of Heyat-e Gharar, a religious group active on the Iranian messaging platform Eitaa. Donations are being collected through accounts belonging to the Qom-based Hazrat Khadijeh Institute, a religious charity that organizes collective animal sacrifices and meat distribution.

The campaign website describes the initiative as a nazr, a religious vow or offering made for a particular purpose. In this case, it takes the form of qorbani, the ritual slaughter of an animal as an act of religious devotion dedicated to Khamenei’s health.

Donors can cover the full 250 million-rial cost of a sheep, about $132, or contribute smaller amounts collectively. At the advertised price, 10,000 sheep would cost 2.5 trillion rials, or about $1.32 million.

Abdolkarim Abedini, a former representative of the Supreme Leader in Qazvin province and former Friday Prayer leader of Qazvin, has also urged people to participate. In a video, he called for 10,000 sheep to be sacrificed for Khamenei’s health and to ward off what he called the “Zionist-American enemy,” urging people to “hurry” to take part.

Locals question campaign amid economic hardship

The campaign has drawn criticism from Iranians who told Iran International they questioned why the public should fund it amid severe economic pressure and high food prices.

“Why would I sacrifice a sheep for Mojtaba when I haven’t been able to afford lamb myself for years?” one person wrote to Iran International.

A Tehran resident said they had received a text message about the campaign several days earlier.

“A few days ago, we received a text saying they were collecting an offering for the Leader’s health and that we should send money for 10,000 sheep,” the resident told Iran International. “Why should the money come from the people?”

The campaign comes amid continued uncertainty over Khamenei’s health and whereabouts. He was reportedly seriously injured in the Feb. 28 US-Israeli strike that killed his father and predecessor, Ali Khamenei, and has not appeared in public since becoming Supreme Leader.

Khamenei has not delivered a public speech or interview since taking office, and no new authenticated photograph, video or audio recording of him has been released. His public communications have instead consisted of written statements attributed to him.

Oman has traditionally provided the most discreet and trusted channel, while Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey have used their relations with both sides to facilitate contacts or transmit messages.

Yet the continuing deadlock in negotiations has now encouraged Washington to widen the diplomatic circle.

In recent days, Austria and Greece have separately opened contacts with Tehran after consultations with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, according to media reports.

The unexpected involvement of Austria and Greece suggests that European diplomacy, long marginalized in the Iran-US relationship, may be making a cautious return in the context of a regional military escalation.

The sequence of recent contacts is striking. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Austrian Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger in Washington on August 11 and spoke by telephone with Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis the following day. On August 13, both European ministers held separate conversations with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Although the US State Department denied asking them to transmit messages, the timing was probably not coincidental. The State Department subsequently confirmed that Iran had been discussed, while Austria formally offered Vienna as a venue for potential future talks. Greece emphasized freedom of navigation and maritime security in its exchanges with Tehran.

This is not yet formal mediation. Neither Austria nor Greece has the experience, access or accumulated trust that Oman possesses. Their involvement should instead be understood as an exploratory attempt to identify additional channels at a moment when traditional diplomacy is struggling. The proliferation of intermediaries itself is revealing: it demonstrates not the vitality of the diplomatic process, but its fragmentation.

Austria’s possible role is rooted in diplomatic history. Vienna hosted negotiations that culminated in the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It is also home to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would likely play a central role in verifying any future settlement concerning Iranian nuclear activities. Austria can therefore offer more than a neutral meeting room. It provides an institutional environment closely associated with nuclear diplomacy, technical verification and the memory of an agreement that once appeared capable of containing the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Vienna nevertheless carries contradictory symbolism. For Iranian officials, it recalls the JCPOA’s acceptance of limited Iranian enrichment for civilian purposes and the partial lifting of sanctions. But it also evokes the subsequent collapse of the agreement after the first Trump administration withdrew from it in 2018. Austria cannot repair that breach of confidence on its own. Its principal advantage is therefore procedural rather than political: it can provide a discreet and credible setting in which the United States, Iran and the IAEA might clarify their positions.

Greece brings a different form of leverage. As one of the world’s leading maritime nations, it has direct interests in the security of the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. The disruption of navigation through Hormuz is not an abstract geopolitical problem for Athens. It affects Greek-owned shipping, insurance costs, energy prices and the stability of international trade. Greece can consequently address Iran not only as a European Union member and US ally, but also as the representative of an industry directly exposed to the consequences of escalation.

This maritime dimension may make Athens useful in discussions focused on practical arrangements rather than an immediate comprehensive agreement. Measures guaranteeing freedom of navigation, reducing threats against commercial vessels or creating communication mechanisms to prevent incidents at sea could be easier to negotiate than the most divisive nuclear and security questions. Greece could contribute technical knowledge and political advocacy to such discussions, although it lacks the capacity to provide Iran with the sanctions relief or security guarantees Tehran ultimately seeks.

The emergence of Austria and Greece also exposes the decline of the traditional European powers in the Iranian diplomatic arena. France, Germany and the United Kingdom were central to the nuclear negotiations that began in the early 2000s. Since then, however, the credibility of the European trio has deteriorated in Tehran and the three countries are facing bilateral diplomatic crises in their relations with Tehran. Iranian leaders accuse them of failing to protect the economic benefits of the nuclear agreement after the American withdrawal and of increasingly aligning themselves with Washington’s coercive approach. The mutual distrust generated by sanctions, mutual accusations of security “infiltration” and spying, regional conflict and disputes over Iran’s nuclear activities has left little space for the earlier model of European mediation.

This marginalization is being reinforced by the widening security confrontation. The Financial Times reported Wednesday that Iran had considered attacking US military targets in Europe, including in Bulgaria and Cyprus, if Washington further escalated the war.

Reuters reported Wednesday that a NATO official said the alliance was prepared to address any threat and take necessary action to defend its members. The official cited four occasions earlier this year when NATO air defenses intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles heading toward Turkey, saying they demonstrated the strength and effectiveness of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.

Smaller European countries may therefore benefit from carrying less political baggage. Austria is associated more closely with dialogue than with strategic pressure and maintained substantial economic and energy ties with the Islamic Republic throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Greece, for its part, has generally remained outside the most confrontational debates over Iran. Yet their relative neutrality should not be overstated. Both countries are members of the European Union and close partners of the United States. Tehran will ultimately judge their usefulness by their ability to secure concrete concessions from Washington, not by the cordiality of their diplomatic rhetoric.

Their involvement also reflects the widening international cost of the conflict. The restriction of traffic through Hormuz, a corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption normally passes, has transformed the crisis from a bilateral confrontation into a global economic emergency. Washington wants the strait reopened, while Tehran sees control over navigation as one of its most powerful remaining sources of leverage. Austria and Greece are entering the process because the consequences of failure now extend far beyond the Middle East.

The immediate objective should therefore be modest. Vienna and Athens are unlikely to replace Muscat, Doha or Islamabad, and multiplying intermediaries can produce contradictory messages and allow both Iran and the United States to avoid making difficult decisions. Their most useful contribution would be to support a coordinated diplomatic framework: Austria concentrating on nuclear verification and the venue for talks, Greece on maritime security, and traditional regional mediators on political communication and guarantees. Ultimately, no mediator can compensate for a lack of political will to pursue a diplomatic solution rather than military escalation. Austria and Greece cannot make that choice on behalf of Washington and Tehran, but they may help create the conditions in which diplomacy becomes possible.

Their return is therefore neither a diplomatic breakthrough nor an irrelevant gesture. It reflects an increasingly marginalized Europe urgently seeking new ways around a dangerous impasse. If carefully coordinated, these unlikely European channels could help prepare the ground for renewed negotiations. Otherwise, they risk becoming yet another improvised attempt to contain a conflict that its principal actors have so far proved unable to resolve. Europe nevertheless has a strong interest in assuming a more active diplomatic role: European states are already bearing many of the conflict’s economic and security consequences, yet they possess neither the political leverage to shape a settlement nor the military capacity – and, in most cases, the willingness – to impose one.

“I went to three gas stations to fill up and all three were closed,” one Tehran resident told Iran International on Wednesday. “One of them had put up a banner saying, ‘We have no gasoline.’”

Another resident said: “Today I spent about an hour in line for gasoline. Many gas stations had no fuel.”

Another Tehran resident said the Interior Ministry had ordered traffic police to crack down on older cars and motorcycles and impound them.

“They have said these vehicles should remain in impound lots for a month so that fuel consumption can be reduced this way,” the resident said.

The accounts come as Iran faces mounting pressure on fuel supplies, with domestic production struggling to keep pace with demand as a US naval blockade on Iranian maritime traffic disrupts fuel imports that previously helped cover the country’s domestic shortfall.

Esmail Saqab Esfahani, head of Iran’s Energy Efficiency Organization, said Saturday that the country faced a daily gasoline shortfall of around 14 million to 15 million liters.

Hossein Samsami, a member of parliament’s Economic Committee, warned Monday that raising gasoline prices amid current economic pressures could trigger widespread unrest, likening it to “a spark in a powder keg.”

Iranian officials have grown increasingly concerned about the prospect of renewed protests, while seeking to cast public discontent as being fueled by foreign adversaries.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf said Tuesday that the enemy was seeking “riots, assassinations and separatist activities” and intended to “exploit” any potential dissatisfaction over gasoline.

Concerns over methanol-blended gasoline

Plans to blend methanol into gasoline have also raised concern among Iranians, with locals telling Iran International they were uneasy about the fuel’s safety and its potential impact on vehicles and public health.

The concerns come against a backdrop of longstanding questions over fuel quality in Iran and previous reports that authorities used non-standard chemical compounds to help offset gasoline shortages.

Vahid Ghanei-Fard, CEO of the Persian Gulf Star Refinery, Iran’s largest gasoline producer, said Tuesday that a pilot project to produce methanol-based gasoline had been successful, with methanol accounting for 3% of the blend.

He said the fuel met “national and international standards” and that the use of methanol had helped raise the refinery’s daily gasoline output to around 49 million liters.

Saadatollah Molavi, an Iran-based refinery expert and frequent energy commentator, told IMNA, an Isfahan municipality-affiliated news agency, that methanol could play a role in easing Iran’s fuel shortage.

But Molavi warned against treating it as a long-term solution without assessing costs, efficiency, gas consumption and infrastructure needs, suggesting the blend may offer only a temporary fix rather than a sustainable answer to Iran’s fuel deficit.

Last May, the London-based independent research group Iran Open Data reported in May 2025, citing a confidential Oil Ministry document, that authorities had used hazardous and contaminated chemical compounds outside the conventional refining process to increase gasoline supplies.

The report described the practice as widespread and systematic and said it was aimed at compensating for the country’s gasoline shortfall.

Concerns over the quality of Iran’s gasoline are longstanding. In January 2023, Dariush Golalizadeh, an official with the Department of Environment, said only 38% of gasoline produced in the country met Euro 4 and Euro 5 standards.

Iranian lawmakers on Sunday, August 16, approved the general principles of the "Plan to Counter the Infiltration of Intelligence Services and Foreign Governments or Institutions" by 183 votes in favor, four against and five abstentions.

The vote means parliament approved the proposal in principle but has not yet approved its individual articles or penalties. The publicly available version contains 19 articles, though lawmakers have said the details have not been finalized.

Majid Ansari, President Masoud Pezeshkian's vice president for legal affairs, said on Wednesday that the cabinet had reviewed the proposal in October last year, and sent its formal opposition to parliament because of what he described as fundamental problems in its provisions.

"The government's official position is opposition to this proposal," Ansari told the state-run IRNA news agency.

Government cites rights concerns

Ansari said the proposal conflicted with several constitutional principles covering citizens' rights, fundamental rights and individual freedoms, and in some cases was also inconsistent with Sharia law.

He said the measure would sharply restrict academic contacts between Iranian universities, researchers and specialists and institutions abroad.

"To achieve the country's important scientific goals, we must work to facilitate communication and the exchange of scientific information, but the provisions of this proposal will create serious restrictions on the country's scientific growth and development," he said.

Ansari said researchers, doctors and academics need ties with international institutions to prevent their work from becoming stagnant and warned that broad restrictions on contacts could push more specialists to leave Iran.

"If every type of contact and communication faces restrictions and is criminalized by law, naturally they will prefer to migrate and carry out their scientific and research activities in a free environment," Ansari said.

• 

  Iran’s new infiltration bill could make ordinary contact a crime

Government says existing laws are enough

The Pezeshkian government said Iran already has laws and security agencies with powers to deal with foreign intelligence activity and does not need new legislation in its current form.

Ansari said any new legislation should instead be prepared with the participation of the government and judiciary and submitted as a government bill after legal, judicial, social and political review.

He called on parliament to remove the proposal from its agenda or subject it to a more detailed two-stage review, saying its broad criminal provisions required input from the judiciary.

Draft restricts foreign contacts

The publicly available draft extends beyond acts normally associated with espionage and covers a wide range of contacts between Iranians and foreign individuals and institutions.

One provision would require individuals, private companies and state bodies to notify authorities and receive written permission from the Foreign Ministry, or an Iranian embassy or consulate abroad, before contacts with foreign embassies, offices or non-Iranian organizations inside or outside Iran.

The draft provides limited exemptions for matters including civil registration and personal-status issues. Violations could result in fines and restrictions on social rights.

Another article would ban providing information, reports or statistics to foreign intelligence services, non-Iranian groups or institutions, or foreign nationals without permission from the Intelligence Ministry. It provides for prison terms and, in some cases, a permanent ban from the job through which the information was obtained or supplied.

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  Iran’s intelligence mocked by allies and foes over 'secret' Israel files

The draft would also make sending photographs, video, audio or other data to non-Iranian media or people engaged in media work outside Iran punishable by prison.

Interviews or other communication with some US- or Israeli-funded media would also be punishable by prison, while interviews with other foreign media would have to be reported to an Intelligence Ministry system.

Foreign visitors and academic ties

The proposal also contains restrictions affecting foreign nationals in Iran.

Foreigners who enter or remain in Iran without completing required legal procedures could be deported and fined the equivalent of 10,000 euros.

Foreign nationals who entered legally but carried out cultural activities deemed contrary to national security or the state's general policies could face the same penalties. Other offenses committed by foreign nationals in Iran could carry penalties one degree more severe than otherwise prescribed.

The Intelligence Ministry would also be required to publish each year a list of foreign governments, universities and institutions approved for scholarships, grants, academic agreements, conferences and other scientific cooperation.

Scientific cooperation with universities or institutions not on that list, as well as sending medical, research or archaeological samples to them, could result in a prison sentence.

Supporters say measure is needed after wars

Mohammad Saleh Jokar, a lawmaker from Yazd and head of parliament's Internal Affairs and Councils Committee, defended the need for stronger measures against infiltration but said the details of the proposal had not yet been finalized.

Jokar said Iran had suffered major damage from infiltration before and during what he called the 12-day war with Israel and the US last year and the 40-day war with the US this year, adding that foreign adversaries had used different channels to collect information.

He said the assassinations of a number of Iranian commanders and officials were linked to infiltration and said hostile networks inside Iran had used messages, money, weapons and other resources to pursue their objectives.

Jokar said parliament needed to identify and close routes used for infiltration, whether they involved a physical or virtual presence inside the country.

But he also said the proposal's individual provisions required detailed consideration by lawmakers and rejected suggestions that the currently circulating text had been finalized.

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  Iran’s ‘infiltration’ bill sparks backlash over sweeping reach

Legal scholar warns of vague offenses

Mohsen Borhani, a prominent legal scholar and faculty member at the University of Tehran's law school, also sharply criticized the proposal.

Borhani said its wording was vague and could put the freedom of citizens, academics, political and social activists and artists at risk.

He pointed to language in the draft covering acts such as "showing a dark image of the country," promoting what authorities consider "anti-Islamic culture," taking part in courses deemed incompatible with Iranian culture and making policy proposals considered contrary to the state's fundamental interests.

The draft provides penalties for some cultural activity carried out under foreign direction, including permanent restrictions on some artistic work, and provides prison sentences for some educational courses and workshops involving specified foreign institutions.

Article 1 also provides lengthy prison terms for some policy or legislative proposals made under foreign direction if authorities determine they damaged national security, fundamental state interests, public trust or electoral participation.

Borhani said such broad wording could allow selective enforcement and urged the government, the Science Ministry, the Culture Ministry and other institutions to oppose the measure.

Criticism spreads on social media

Some Iranian social media users also reacted with alarm after parliament's Sunday vote, focusing on the proposal's restrictions on education, media contacts and links with the outside world.

"The biggest point in the proposal is that it lays the groundwork for closing off scholarships for Iranian students," one user on X wrote.

Another user described the measure as "cutting ties with the world on the path to turning Iran into North Korea," saying the proposal could bring media, scientific and civil contacts with foreign institutions under tighter security control.

"Welcome to the world's largest prison," another user wrote, pointing to proposed prison terms for interviews with some US media and restrictions on contact with foreign embassies without government permission.

The posts reflected concern among some social media users that the proposal could sharply restrict academic, media and civil contacts with organizations outside Iran. They do not represent a scientific measure of Iranian public opinion.

The draft remains subject to change. Parliament's vote on Sunday approved only its general principles, and lawmakers have not yet approved the individual articles or penalties contained in the publicly available text.