A London court on Friday sentenced Romanian nationals George Stana and Nandito Badea to a combined 20 years in prison for stabbing Iran International journalist Pouria Zeraati outside his Wimbledon home in March 2024.
Stana and Badea, who received 12 years and eight years in prison, respectively, were found guilty last month of wounding Zeraati with intent in the 2024 attack.
The Judge agreed with the prosecution’s case and assessment that this was a state-sponsored attack, concluding that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the attack was carried out in the interests of and on behalf of the Iranian state, according to a police statement.
"The judge ruled that the ‘foreign power condition’ under section 31 of the National Security Act was met in the case of Stana due to the extensive planning and his lengthy involvement in the plot, indicating that he knew, or at very least ought to have known of the connection to the Iranian state," the statement said.
"The condition was not deemed to have been met in the case of Badea, who was not aware of the connection to Iran as the motivation behind the attack."
UK Security Minister Angela Eagle said the "abhorrent" attack on Zeraati was “carried out on behalf of Iran before both men cowardly fled the country.”
“These sentences send a clear message: anyone acting on behalf of a foreign state to commit crimes in the UK will be identified, pursued and punished,” she said.
Eagle added that Britain takes the threat from Iran “extremely seriously” and vowed that the UK would “continue to hold the regime to account.”
Chief Superintendent Kris Wright, head of Protective Security Operations for Counter Terrorism Policing London, told Iran International after the sentencing that police and prosecutors had always treated the attack as one “coordinated and orchestrated on behalf of, or by, the Iranian regime.”
He said the judge’s sentencing remarks showed she was satisfied the evidence presented in court was strong enough to use powers under the National Security Act to increase the offenders’ sentences.
The case has drawn renewed attention to threats facing Persian-language journalists and dissidents in Britain, particularly after UK authorities previously said they had disrupted around 20 Iran-related plots or hostile activities since 2022.
Wright said Counter Terrorism Policing had worked extensively with Persian-language media organizations in London and across the UK for several years, adding that police recognized the position they were in and would continue helping them “enjoy the freedoms available in the UK” and continue their work.
Asked whether the attack reflected a broader pattern, Wright said police were seeing “an increasing number of hostile activities, criminal activities, and planning activities” directed or coordinated by foreign states.
He said authorities were also seeing a growing use of “criminals-for-hire,” or proxies, including UK-based criminals and individuals who enter the country on behalf of foreign regimes to carry out attacks.
Wright said one suspect in the Zeraati case remains outside UK custody and is still subject to legal proceedings in Romania. He said the Metropolitan Police were working closely with international partners and remained “fully committed” to bringing everyone involved to justice.
“This is a hugely important verdict today, and it sends a message to regimes around the world that Britain values and thrives on democracy,” Wright said.
“Those who seek to undermine the values we hold dear will not be allowed to thrive here in the UK,” he added, saying police would use every available means within the justice system to hold those responsible to account and expose the overseas agencies, bodies and regimes behind such activity.
Lawyer Hojjat Kermani said Kashani's sister, Sima Kashani, was also arrested. He said it was not immediately clear which security agency had detained the three, according to the Emtedad news website.
Kermani said the arrests, ahead of a long public holiday and the closure of judicial offices, had increased concern among their families.
Jokar and Kashani were among a group of environmental activists arrested in 2018 by the Revolutionary Guards' intelligence organization. They were later convicted on espionage charges after a case that drew criticism from human rights groups and UN experts over the arrests, interrogations and trial.
Jokar was sentenced to eight years in prison and Kashani to six years. The other defendants were released from Tehran's Evin prison at different times, with the last of them freed in April 2024.
One of the defendants, Iranian-Canadian conservationist Kavous Seyed-Emami, died in custody about a month after his arrest in 2018. Iranian judicial officials said he had killed himself, a conclusion rejected by his family.
The latest arrests come amid reports by rights groups of a new wave of detentions of civil, political and labor activists across Iran following recent unrest and the war with Israel and the United States.
Internet access in Iran was cut off for months, first amid the January protests and then during the March war, before being partially restored after an 88-day nationwide blackout.
International connectivity has returned for many fixed-line and home broadband users, but the network remains degraded, unstable and heavily censored.
More than 100 days after the broader shutdown began, the pattern of restoration has been limited, selective and tightly controlled.
From conditional access tied to identity verification and the migration of businesses to domestic platforms to the creation of internet-access whitelists, the Islamic Republic appears intent on preserving its multi-layered system of censorship, surveillance and communications control.
The National Information Network, centralized gateways to the global internet, controlled mobile-network settings, identity-verification systems and device-registration mechanisms are all tools that allow the state to restrict or cut off public access to the global internet while keeping stable communication channels open for selected groups.
That is why direct-to-cell, or D2C, has attracted growing attention among Iranians. Many see the promise of direct phone-to-satellite connectivity — without a dish, terminal, domestic operator or government gateway — as a possible way out of the Islamic Republic’s digital prison.
The idea has gained enough attention that the Pentagon held talks with SpaceX about activating direct-to-cell service for Iranian citizens. According to Reuters, SpaceX requested up to $500 million to launch the service and $100 million per month to operate it.
The central question, however, is whether current versions of direct-to-cell technology can meet such expectations on the scale of Iran. For now, the answer is no: today’s systems remain limited in capacity, vulnerable to radio interference and risky for users who could be identified through Iran’s device-registration and mobile-network systems.
The central questions, however, remain: Can current versions of Direct-to-Cell technology truly meet such expectations on the scale of Iran? Is the technology still only an emergency and limited communication channel, or can it become a scalable escape route for millions of Iranian users? And if future generations of the technology operate without relying on domestic towers and operators, will Iran’s digital wall be broken?
Dependency on mobile operators and the foreign eSIM scenario
In ordinary Starlink service, the satellite connects to a dedicated ground terminal — the same dish that users must obtain, install, maintain and hide from the Islamic Republic. The phone connects to the Starlink modem through Wi-Fi.
But Direct-to-Cell is based on a different idea: an ordinary phone itself becomes the receiver and transmitter for satellite communication.
Current versions of Direct-to-Cell are mostly not independent satellite internet systems. Rather, they complement the existing coverage of mobile operators in each area, effectively turning the satellite into a space-based cell tower whose real function is to cover mobile-network dead zones.
The use of independent S-Band frequencies and the deployment of satellites in very low Earth orbit, or VLEO, closer to the Earth’s surface, are among the paths that could make D2C more relevant to Iran’s problem.
Under this scenario, foreign Starlink partner operators such as T-Mobile, Kyivstar or One NZ in New Zealand would declare Iranian territory a zone without terrestrial coverage and include it under their own service.
Politically and technically, this model comes closer to what Iranian citizens expect from the technology. In that case, a phone using a SIM card or eSIM from one of these operators could establish a D2C connection from inside Iran to SpaceX’s new-generation satellites. Reports say about 700 satellites of this type are already in orbit.
But making this scenario a reality is not limited to SpaceX’s will or decision. It requires an entire chain: frequency spectrum, regulatory licenses, compatible phones, modems, antennas, transmission power and chipsets that support new satellite bands.
Companies such as Qualcomm, MediaTek, Apple, Samsung and Google play a decisive role in this process. If phone hardware is not ready, even an advanced satellite constellation will not become a practical connection for users inside Iran.
Even under this optimistic scenario for Iran, three major obstacles remain: limited capacity, the possibility of radio interference, and the risk of users being identified through device registration and the Hamta system.
1. Capacity limits in densely populated areas
The first serious obstacle to widespread D2C deployment in Iran is capacity. This connection is not designed to replace urban internet. It is designed to deliver minimal connectivity to areas with no terrestrial coverage or weak coverage. But in Iran, the issue is not simply connecting a few users on a road or in a mountain area.
The issue is a communications blackout in cities where hundreds of thousands of people may simultaneously need messaging apps, voice and video calls, news, maps, email, financial services, and the ability to send photos and videos.
In some early tests, recorded bandwidth for a single connection reached about 14 Mbps. But this number should not be confused with the experience of urban internet speeds. In the real world, that limited bandwidth must be shared among all users across the wide area covered by each satellite.
To better understand the scale, in a city such as Tehran, if only 1% of residents simultaneously wanted a very basic 1 Mbps connection, the network would need capacity equivalent to 99 Gbps. Compared with the current capacity of each active D2C beam, which ranges from 4 to 17 Mbps, and even compared with an optimistic 150 Mbps outlook for future generations, this reveals a gap hundreds of times larger than current capabilities.
2. Radio interference from ground signals
Even if D2C can reduce the problems of capacity and dependence on domestic operators, it still faces an obstacle rooted in the physics of radio waves. To connect, a phone must receive a very weak signal from a satellite moving hundreds of kilometers above the Earth, while operating in an environment filled with nearby mobile towers, ground transmitters and local signals that are far stronger.
In this context, the ratio between the desired signal and surrounding interference determines whether the receiver can detect the satellite signal at all amid noise and terrestrial interference.
A nearby ground tower operated by MCI or Irancell could emit a signal so much stronger than the satellite signal that the phone’s receiver effectively fails to see the weaker signal or cannot build a stable connection on it.
In such a situation, the government does not need to target the satellite. It only needs to use towers, transmitters and control over mobile-network power levels to make the radio environment around the user unfavorable for satellite connectivity.
For the Islamic Republic, this type of interference could be fast, local and low-cost. So even if the satellite is beyond the government’s reach, the user’s phone remains on the ground, inside a radio environment that can be manipulated. Future versions with dedicated spectrum, better modems and more resilient protocols may reduce part of this vulnerability, but they will not eliminate it entirely.
3. Device registration and user identification
The more serious security question is how identifiable a user inside Iran would be when using D2C. In Iran, a phone is not merely a communication device. The SIM card, subscriber identity, device identity and the user’s real identity are linked together across several layers.
Every phone has a unique hardware identifier, or IMEI, which serves as the device’s identity on mobile networks. The Hamta system can link this identifier to the SIM card, activation history, ownership and, in many cases, the user’s real identity.
In such an environment, using a foreign SIM card or eSIM for satellite connectivity does not necessarily make the user anonymous. If a phone with a known IMEI suddenly tries to connect through an unauthorized satellite route using a foreign operator identifier, that behavior could become an unusual and flaggable pattern.
The combination of device registration, operator data, SIM-card databases and local monitoring tools could turn such a connection into a security risk. The key question, therefore, is how this can be done without exposing the user’s identity, location and behavioral pattern.
A strategic opportunity, not an immediate solution
Direct-to-Cell should be taken seriously, but it should not be exaggerated. For Iran, the appeal of this technology is clear: if one day an ordinary phone can connect to a satellite without a dish, separate terminal, domestic operator or Islamic Republic gateway, one of the foundations of Iran’s internet-control architecture will be challenged. But that day has not yet arrived. Current versions under development are mainly designed to cover dead zones, not to replace urban internet for tens of millions of users.
Limited capacity, the possibility of interference, and the risk of exposing and identifying users mean this technology is not currently a public and scalable escape route from Iran’s internet shutdown. Its present value is mostly as an emergency tool: sending messages, sharing locations, issuing alerts or maintaining brief communication during a crisis.
The future could be different if the next generation of satellites brings together higher capacity, independent spectrum, compatible phones, user security and global protective rules. Until then, Direct-to-Cell remains an important opening for the future — not today’s solution to the digital prison.
